Leaders in the Northern Marianas have warned that a deepening economic crisis in the US territory could begin to undermine civilian systems that support America’s long-term strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.

In joint letters sent to US President Donald Trump and Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Delegate Kimberlyn King-Hinds, Governor David M. Apatang, Senate President Karl King Nabors, and House Speaker Edmund Villagomez urged swift federal action to stabilise the territory’s economy.

They said the CNMI’s small and fragile economic base left it highly vulnerable to further shocks, with potential knock-on effects for infrastructure, workforce stability, and essential services that support US operations in the region.

• READ MORE: Other US Pacific policy reports

King-Hinds said the issue went beyond local governance.

“When core civilian systems begin to fail, the consequences extend well beyond the Commonwealth,” she said, adding that stable communities and reliable infrastructure were essential to sustaining a US presence in the Pacific.

Apatang said the territory was approaching a critical point, citing business closures and population decline.

“We are running out of time,” he said, adding that existing federal tools could still help steady the situation if deployed quickly.

Strategically located
Nabors said economic erosion in a strategically located US jurisdiction risked weakening the civilian foundation that supports military readiness and access in the Indo-Pacific.

Villagomez said early intervention would help preserve long-term options for both the Commonwealth and the United States.

The leaders said the measures outlined in their letters fall within existing federal authorities and do not require new congressional appropriations. They warned that delays could lead to cascading failures across key services and infrastructure, increasing long-term costs and risks.

The appeal was framed as part of a broader effort to ensure the CNMI’s economic challenges are factored into US strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Setting aside any thoughts I may have about theocratic rulers (whether they be in Tel Aviv or Tehran), I am personally glad that Iran was able to hold out against the US-Israeli attacks this month.

The ceasefire, however, will only be a pause in the long-running campaign to destabilise, weaken and isolate Iran. Regime change or pariah status are both acceptable outcomes for the US-Israeli dyad.

The good news for my region is that Iran’s resilience pushes back what could be a looming calamity: the US pivot to Asia and a heightened risk of a war on China.

• READ MORE: Ramzy Baroud: The fallout — winners and losers from the Israeli war on Iran
• Caitlin Johnstone: The fictional mental illness that only affects enemies of the Western empire
• Other Israeli war on Gaza reports

There are three major pillars to the Eurasian order that is going through a slow, painful and violent birth.  Iran is the weakest.  If Iran falls, war in our region — intended or unintended – becomes vastly more likely.

Mainstream New Zealanders and Australians suffer from an understandable complacency: war is what happens to other, mainly darker people or Slavs.

“Tomorrow”, people in this part of the world naively think, “will always be like yesterday”.

That could change, particularly for the Australians, in the kind of unfamiliar flash-boom Israelis experienced this month following their attack on Iran. And here’s why.

US chooses war to re-shape Middle East
Back in 2001, as many will recall, retired General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, was visiting buddies in the Pentagon. He learnt something he wasn’t supposed to: the Bush administration had made plans in the febrile post 9/11 environment to attack seven Muslim countries.

In the firing line were: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon, Gaddafi’s Libya, Somalia, Sudan and the biggest prize of all — the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One would have to say that the project, pursued by successive presidents, both Democrat and Republican, has been a great success — if you discount the fact that a couple of million human beings, most of them civilians, many of them women and children, nearly all of them innocents, were slaughtered, starved to death or otherwise disposed of.

With the exception of Iran, those countries have endured chaos and civil strife for long painful years.  A triumph of American bomb-based statecraft.

Now — with Muammar Gaddafi raped and murdered (“We came, we saw, he died”, Hillary Clinton chuckled on camera the same day), Saddam Hussein hanged, Hezbollah decapitated, Assad in Moscow, the genocide in full swing in Palestine — the US and Israel were finally able to turn their guns — or, rather, bombs — on the great prize: Iran.

Iran’s missiles have checked US-Israel for time being
Things did not go to plan. Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman pointed out this week that for the first time Israel got a taste of the medicine it likes to dispense to its neighbours.

Iran’s missiles successfully turned the much-vaunted Iron Dome into an Iron Sieve and, perhaps momentarily, has achieved deterrence. If Iran falls, the US will be able to do what Barack Obama and Joe Biden only salivated over — a serious pivot to Asia.

Could great power rivalry turn Asia-Pacific into powderkeg?
For us in Asia-Pacific a major US pivot to Asia will mean soaring defence budgets to support militarisation, aggressive containment of China, provocative naval deployments, more sanctions, muscling smaller states, increased numbers of bases, new missile systems, info wars, threats and the ratcheting up rhetoric — all of which will bring us ever-closer to the powderkeg.

Sounds utterly mad? Sounds devoid of rationality? Lacking commonsense? Welcome to our world — bellum Americanum — as we gormlessly march flame in hand towards the tinderbox. War is not written in the stars, we can change tack and rediscover diplomacy, restraint, and peaceful coexistence. Or is that too much to ask?

The recent series of high-level agreements between Papua New Guinea and France marks a significant development in PNG’s geopolitical relationships, driven by what appears to be a convergence of national interests.

The “deepening relationship” is less about a single personality and more about a calculated alignment of economic, security, and diplomatic priorities with PNG, taking full advantage of its position as the biggest, most strategically placed island player in the Pacific.

An examination of the key outcomes reveals a partnership of mutual benefit, reflecting both PNG’s strategic diversification and France’s own long-term ambitions as a Pacific power.

• READ MORE: Other France in the Pacific reports

A primary driver is the shared economic rationale. From Port Moresby’s perspective, the partnership offers a clear path to economic diversification and resilience.

But many in PNG have been watching with keen interest and asking: how badly does PNG want this?

While Prime Minister James Marape offered France a Special Economic Zone in Port Moresby (SEZ) for French businesses, he also named the lookout at Port Moresby’s Variarata National Park after President Emmanuel Macron drawing the ire of many in the country.

The proposal to establish a SEZ specifically for French industries is a notable attempt to attract capital from beyond PNG’s traditional partners.

Strategically coupled
This is strategically coupled with securing the future of the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project.

Macron’s personal undertaking to work with TotalEnergies to keep the project on schedule provides crucial stability for one of PNG’s most significant economic ventures.

For France, these arrangements secure a major energy investment for its national corporate champion and establish a stronger economic foothold in a strategically vital region between Asia and the Pacific.

In the area of security, the relationship addresses tangible needs for both nations.

PNG is faced with the immense challenge of monitoring a 2.4 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, making it vulnerable to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The finalisation of a Shiprider Agreement with France provides a practical force-multiplier, leveraging French naval assets to enhance PNG’s maritime surveillance capabilities. This move, along with planned defence talks on air and maritime cooperation, allows PNG to diversify its security architecture.

For France, a resident power with Pacific territories like New Caledonia and French Polynesia, participating in regional security operations reinforces its role and commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Elevating diplomatic influence
The partnership is also a vehicle for elevating diplomatic influence.

Port Moresby has noted the significance of engaging with a partner that holds permanent membership on the UN Security Council and seats at the G7 and G20.

This alignment provides PNG with a powerful channel to global decision-making forums. The reciprocal move to establish a PNG embassy in Paris further cements the relationship on a mature footing.

The diplomatic synergy is perhaps best illustrated by France’s full endorsement of PNG’s bid to host a future UN Ocean Conference. This support provides PNG with a major opportunity to lead on the world stage, while allowing France to demonstrate its credentials as a key partner to the Pacific Islands.

This deepening PNG-France partnership does not exist in a vacuum.

It is unfolding within a broader context of heightened geopolitical competition across the Pacific.

The West’s view of China’s rapid emergence as a dominant economic and military force in the region has reshaped the strategic landscape, prompting traditional powers to re-engage with renewed urgency.

increased diplomatic footprint
The United States has responded by significantly increasing its diplomatic and security footprint, a move marked by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Port Moresby to sign the Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Similarly, Australia, PNG’s traditional security partner, is working to reinforce its long-standing influence through initiatives like the multi-million-dollar deal to establish a PNG team in its National Rugby League (NRL), a soft-power exercise reportedly linked to security outcomes.

This competitive environment has, in turn, created greater agency for Pacific nations, allowing them to diversify their partnerships beyond old allies and providing a fertile ground for European powers like France to assert their own strategic interests.

A strong foundation for the relationship is a shared public stance on environmental stewardship. The agreement on the need for rigorous scientific studies before any deep-sea mining occurs aligns PNG’s national policy with a position of environmental caution.

This common ground extends to broader climate action, where France’s commitment to conservation in the Pacific resonates with PNG’s status as a frontline nation vulnerable to climate change.

This alignment on values provides a durable and politically important basis for cooperation, allowing both nations to jointly advocate for climate justice and ocean protection.

For the Papua New Guinea economy, this deepening partnership with France is critically important as it provides high-level stability for the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project and creates a direct pathway for new investment through a proposed SEZ for French businesses.

Vital economic resource
Furthermore, by moving to finalise a Shiprider Agreement to combat illegal fishing, the government is actively protecting a vital economic resource.

For Marape’s credibility in local politics, these outcomes are tangible successes he can present to the nation as he battles a massive credibility dip in recent years.

Securing a personal undertaking from the leader of a G7 nation, gaining support for PNG to host a future UN Ocean Conference, and enhancing national security demonstrates effective leadership on the world stage.

This allows him to build a narrative of a competent statesman who, through “warm, personal relationships”, can deliver on promises of economic opportunity and national security while strengthening his political standing at home.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

New Zealand’s Pacific connection with the United States is “more important than ever”, says Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters after rounding up the Hawai’i leg of his Pacific trip.

Peters said common strategic interests of the US and New Zealand were underlined while in the state.

“Our Pacific links with the United States are more important than ever,” Peters said.

• READ MORE: Other Indo-Pacific reports

“New Zealand’s partnership with the United States remains one of our most long standing and important, particularly when seen in the light of our joint interests in the Pacific and the evolving security environment.”

The Deputy Prime Minister has led a delegation made up of cross-party MPs, who are heading to Fiji for a brief overnight stop, before heading to Vanuatu.

Peters said the stop in Honolulu allowed for an exchange of ideas and the role New Zealand can play in working with regional partners in the region.

“We have long advocated for the importance of an active and engaged United States in the Indo-Pacific, and this time in Honolulu allowed us to continue to make that case.”

Approaching Trump ‘right way’
The delegation met with Hawai’i’s Governor Josh Green, who confirmed with him that New Zealand was approaching US President Donald Trump in the “right way”.

“The fact is, this is a massively Democrat state. But nevertheless, they deal with Washington very, very well, and privately, we have got an inside confirmation that our approach is right.

“Be very careful, these things are very important, words matter and be ultra-cautious. All those things were confirmed by the governor.”

Governor Green told reporters he had spent time with Trump and talked to the US administration all the time.

“I can’t guarantee that they will bend their policies, but I try to be very rational for the good of our state, in our region, and it seems to be so far working,” he said.

He said the US and New Zealand were close allies.

“So having these additional connections with the political leadership and people from the community and business leaders, it helps us, because as we move forward in somewhat uncertain times, having more friends helps.”

At the East-West Center in Honolulu, Peters said New Zealand and the United States had not always seen eye-to-eye and “US Presidents have not always been popular back home”.

“My view of the strategic partnership between New Zealand and the United States is this: we each have the right, indeed the imperative, to pursue our own foreign policies, driven by our own sense of national interest.”

The delegation also met the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo, the interim president of the East-West Center Dr James Scott, and Hawai’i-based representatives for Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Australia is caught in a jam, between an assertive American ally and a bold Chinese trading partner. America is accelerating its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, building up its fighting forces and expanding its military bases.

As Australia tries to navigate a pathway between America’s and Australia’s national interests, sometimes Australia’s national interest seems to submerge out of view.

Admiral David Johnston, the Chief of the Australia’s Defence Force, is steering this ship as China flexes its muscle sending a small warship flotilla south to circumnavigate the continent.

• READ MORE: Other Declassified Australia investigative reports
• Other AUKUS reports

He has admitted that the first the Defence Force heard of a live-fire exercise by the three Chinese Navy ships sailing in the South Pacific east of Australia on February 21, was a phone call from the civilian Airservices Australia.

“The absence of any advance notice to Australian authorities was a concern, notably, that the limited notice provided by the PLA could have unnecessarily increased the risk to aircraft and vessels in the area,” Johnston told Senate Estimates .

Johnston was pressed to clarify how Defence first came to know of the live-fire drill: “Is it the case that Defence was only notified, via Virgin and Airservices Australia, 28 minutes [sic] after the firing window commenced?”

To this, Admiral Johnston replied: “Yes.”

If it happened as stated by the Admiral — that a live-fire exercise by the Chinese ships was undertaken and a warning notice was transmitted from the Chinese ships, all without being detected by Australian defence and surveillance assets — this is a defence failure of considerable significance.

Sources with knowledge of Defence spoken to by Declassified Australia say that this is either a failure of surveillance, or a failure of communication, or even more far-reaching, a failure of US alliance cooperation.

And from the very start the official facts became slippery.

Our latest investigation –

AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE: NAVIGATING US-CHINA TENSIONS

We investigate a significant intelligence failure to detect live-firing by Chinese warships near Australia, has exposed Defence weaknesses, and the fact that when it counts, we are all alone.

… pic.twitter.com/GxbSxrtXyc

— Declassified Australia (@DeclassifiedAus) March 7, 2025

What did they know and when did they know it
The first information passed on to Defence by Airservices Australia came from the pilot of a Virgin passenger jet passing overhead the flotilla in the Tasman Sea that had picked up the Chinese Navy VHF radio notification of an impending live-fire exercise.

The radio transmission had advised the window for the live-fire drill commenced at 9.30am and would conclude at 3pm.

We know this from testimony given to Senate Estimates by the head of Airservices Australia. He said Airservices was notified at 9.58am by an aviation control tower informed by the Virgin pilot. Two minutes later Airservices issued a “hazard alert” to commercial airlines in the area.

The Headquarters of the Defence Force’s Joint Operations Command (HJOC), at Bungendore 30km east of Canberra, was then notified about the drill by Airservices at 10.08am, 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

When questioned a few days later, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese appeared to try to cover for Defence’s apparent failure to detect the live-fire drill or the advisory transmission.

“At around the same time, there were two areas of notification. One was from the New Zealand vessels that were tailing . ..  the [Chinese] vessels in the area by both sea and air,” Albanese stated. “So that occurred and at the same time through the channels that occur when something like this is occurring, Airservices got notified as well.”

But the New Zealand Defence Force had not notified Defence “at the same time”. In fact it was not until 11.01am that an alert was received by Defence from the New Zealand Defence Force — 53 minutes after Defence HQ was told by Airservices and an hour and a half after the drill window had begun.

Defence Minister Richard Marles later in a round-about way admitted on ABC Radio that it wasn’t the New Zealanders who informed Australia first: “Well, to be clear, we weren’t notified by China. I mean, we became aware of this during the course of the day.

“What China did was put out a notification that it was intending to engage in live firing. By that I mean a broadcast that was picked up by airlines or literally planes that were commercial planes that were flying across the Tasman.”

Later the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, told ABC that two live-fire training drills were carried out at sea on February 21 and 22, in accordance with international law and “after repeatedly issuing safety notices in advance”.

Eyes and ears on ‘every move’
It was expected the Chinese-navy flotilla would end its three week voyage around Australia on March 7, after a circumnavigation of the continent. That is not before finally passing at some distance the newly acquired US-UK nuclear submarine base at HMAS Stirling near Perth and the powerful US communications and surveillance base at North West Cape.

Just as Australia spies on China to develop intelligence and targeting for a potential US war, China responds in kind, collecting data on US military and intelligence bases and facilities in Australia, as future targets should hostilities commence.

The presence of the Chinese Navy ships that headed into the northern and eastern seas around Australia attracted the attention of the Defence Department ever since they first set off south through the Mindoro Strait in the Philippines and through the Indonesian archipelago from the South China Sea on February 3.

“We are keeping a close watch on them and we will be making sure that we watch every move,” Marles stated in the week before the live-fire incident.

“Just as they have a right to be in international waters . . .  we have a right to be prudent and to make sure that we are surveilling them, which is what we are doing.”

Around 3500 km to the north, a week into the Chinese ships’ voyage, a spy flight by an RAAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane on February 11, in a disputed area of the South China Sea south of China’s Hainan Island, was warned off by a Chinese J-16 fighter jet.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to Australian protests claiming the Australian aircraft “deliberately intruded” into China’s claimed territorial airspace around the Paracel Islands without China’s permission, thereby “infringing on China’s sovereignty and endangering China’s national security”.

Australia criticised the Chinese manoeuvre, defending the Australian flight saying it was “exercising the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in international waters and airspace”.

Two days after the incident, the three Chinese ships on their way to Australian waters were taking different routes in beginning their own “right to freedom of navigation” in international waters off the Australian coast. The three ships formed up their mini flotilla in the Coral Sea as they turned south paralleling the Australian eastern coastline outside of territorial waters, and sometimes within Australia’s 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Exclusive Economic Zone.

“Defence always monitors foreign military activity in proximity to Australia. This includes the Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Task Group.” Admiral Johnston told Senate Estimates.

“We have been monitoring the movement of the Task Group through its transit through Southeast Asia and we have observed the Task Group as it has come south through that region.”

The Task Group was made up of a modern stealth guided missile destroyer Zunyi, the frigate Hengyang, and the Weishanhu, a 20,500 tonne supply ship carrying fuel, fresh water, cargo and ammunition. The Hengyang moved eastwards through the Torres Strait, while the Zunyi and Weishanhu passed south near Bougainville and Solomon Islands, meeting in the Coral Sea.

As the Chinese ships moved near northern Australia and through the Coral Sea heading further south, the Defence Department deployed Navy and Air Force assets to watch over the ships. These included various RAN warships including the frigate HMAS Arunta and a RAAF P-8A Poseidon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plane.

With unconfirmed reports a Chinese nuclear submarine may also be accompanying the surface ships, the monitoring may have also included one of the RAN’s Collins-class submarines, with their active range of sonar, radar and radio monitoring – however it is uncertain whether one was able to be made available from the fleet.

“From the point of time the first of the vessels entered into our more immediate region, we have been conducting active surveillance of their activities,” the Defence chief confirmed.

As the Chinese ships moved into the southern Tasman Sea, New Zealand navy ships joined in the monitoring alongside Australia’s Navy and Air Force.

The range of signals intelligence (SIGINT) that theoretically can be intercepted emanating from a naval ship at sea includes encrypted data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, aerial drone data and communications, as well as data of radar, gunnery, and weapon launches.

There are a number of surveillance facilities in Australia that would have been able to be directed at the Chinese ships.

Australian Signals Directorate’s (ASD) Shoal Bay Receiving Station outside of Darwin, picks up transmissions and data emanating from radio signals and satellite communications from Australia’s near north region. ASD’s Cocos Islands receiving station in the mid-Indian ocean would have been available too.

The Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) over-the-horizon radar network, spread across northern Australia, is an early warning system that monitors aircraft and ship movements across Australia’s north-western, northern, and north-eastern ocean areas — but its range off the eastern coast is not thought to presently reach further south than the sea off Mackay on the Queensland coast.

Of land-based surveillance facilities, it is the American Pine Gap base that is believed to have the best capability of intercepting the ship’s radio communications in the Tasman Sea.

Enter, Pine Gap and the Americans
The US satellite surveillance base at Pine Gap in Central Australia is a US and Australian jointly-run satellite ground station. It is regarded as the most important such American satellite base outside of the USA.

The role of ASD in supporting the extensive US surveillance mission against China is increasingly valued by Australia’s large Five Eyes alliance partner.

A Top Secret ‘Information Paper’, titled “NSA Intelligence Relationship with Australia”, leaked from the National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden and published by ABC’s Background Briefing, spells out the “close collaboration” between the NSA and ASD, in particular on China:

“Increased emphasis on China will not only help ensure the security of Australia, but also synergize with the U.S. in its renewed emphasis on Asia and the Pacific . . .   Australia’s overall intelligence effort on China, as a target, is already significant and will increase.”

The Pine Gap base, as further revealed in 2023 by Declassified Australia, is being used to collect signals intelligence and other data from the Israeli battlefield of Gaza, and also Ukraine and other global hotspots within view of the US spy satellites.

It’s recently had a significant expansion (reported by this author in The Saturday Paper) which has seen its total of satellite dishes and radomes rapidly increase in just a few years from 35 to 45 to accommodate new heightened-capability surveillance satellites.

Pine Gap base collects an enormous range and quantity of intelligence and data from thermal imaging satellites, photographic reconnaissance satellites, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites, as expert researchers Des Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute have detailed.

These SIGINT satellites intercept electronic communications and signals from ground-based sources, such as radio communications, telemetry, radar signals, satellite communications, microwave emissions, mobile phone signals, and geolocation data.

Alliance priorities
The US’s SIGINT satellites have a capability to detect and receive signals from VHF radio transmissions on or near the earth’s surface, but they need to be tasked to do so and appropriately targeted on the source of the transmission.

For the Pine Gap base to intercept VHF radio signals from the Chinese Navy ships, the base would have needed to specifically realign one of those SIGINT satellites to provide coverage of the VHF signals in the Tasman Sea at the time of the Chinese ships’ passage. It is not known publicly if they did this, but they certainly have that capability.

However, it is not only the VHF radio transmission that would have carried information about the live-firing exercise.

Pine Gap would be able to monitor a range of other SIGINT transmissions from the Chinese ships. Details of the planning and preparations for the live-firing exercise would almost certainly have been transmitted over data and voice satellite communications, ship-to-ship communications, and even in the data of radar and gunnery operations.

But it is here that there is another possibility for the failure.

The Pine Gap base was built and exists to serve the national interests of the United States. The tasking of the surveillance satellites in range of Pine Gap base is generally not set by Australia, but is directed by United States’ agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) together with the US Defense Department, the National Security Agency (NSA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Australia has learnt over time that US priorities may not be the same as Australia’s.

Australian defence and intelligence services can request surveillance tasks to be added to the schedule, and would have been expected to have done so in order to target the southern leg of the Chinese Navy ships’ voyage, when the ships were out of the range of the JORN network.

The military demands for satellite time can be excessive in times of heightened global conflict, as is the case now.

Whether the Pine Gap base was devoting sufficient surveillance resources to monitoring the Chinese Navy ships, due to United States’ priorities in Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, North Korea, and to our north in the South China Sea, is a relevant question.

It can only be answered now by a formal government inquiry into what went on — preferably held in public by a parliamentary committee or separately commissioned inquiry. The sovereign defence of Australia failed in this incident and lessons need to be learned.

Who knew and when did they know
If the Pine Gap base had been monitoring the VHF radio band and heard the Chinese Navy live-fire alert, or had been monitoring other SIGINT transmissions to discover the live-fire drill, the normal procedure would be for the active surveillance team to inform a number of levels of senior officers, a former Defence official familiar with the process told Declassified Australia.

Expected to be included in the information chain are the Australian Deputy-Chief of Facility at the US base, NSA liaison staff at the base, the Australian Signals Directorate head office at the Defence complex at Russell Hill in Canberra, the Defence Force’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, in Bungendore, and the Chief of the Defence Force. From there the Defence Minister’s office would need to have been informed.

As has been reported in media interviews and in testimony to the Senate Estimates hearings, it has been stated that Defence was not informed of the Chinese ships’ live-firing alert until a full 38 minutes after the drill window had commenced.

The former Defence official told Declassified Australia it is vital the reason for the failure to detect the live-firing in a timely fashion is ascertained.

Either the Australian Defence Force and US Pine Gap base were not effectively actively monitoring the Chinese flotilla at this time — and the reasons for that need to be examined — or they were, but the information gathered was somewhere stalled and not passed on to correct channels.

If the evidence so far tendered by the Defence chief and the Minister is true, and it was not informed of the drill by any of its intelligence or surveillance assets before that phone call from Airservices Australia, the implications need to be seriously addressed.

A final word
In just a couple of weeks the whole Defence environment for Australia has changed, for the worse.

The US military announces a drawdown in Europe and a new pivot to the Indo-Pacific. China shows Australia it can do tit-for-tat “navigational freedom” voyages close to the Australian coast. US intelligence support is withdrawn from Ukraine during the war. Australia discovers the AUKUS submarines’ arrival looks even more remote. The prime minister confuses the limited cover provided by the ANZUS treaty.

Meanwhile, the US militarisation of Australia’s north continues at pace. At the same time a senior Pentagon official pressures Australia to massively increase defence spending. And now, the country’s defence intelligence system has experienced an unexplained major failure.

Australia, it seems, is adrift in a sea of unpredictable global events and changing alliance priorities.

Peter Cronau is an award-winning, investigative journalist, writer, and film-maker. His documentary, The Base: Pine Gap’s Role in US Warfighting, was broadcast on Australian ABC Radio National and featured on ABC News. He produced and directed the documentary film Drawing the Line, revealing details of Australian spying in East Timor, on ABC TV’s premier investigative programme Four Corners. He won the Gold Walkley Award in 2007 for a report he produced on an outbreak of political violence in East Timor. This article was first published by Declassified Australia and is republished here with the author’s permission.

France’s naval flagship, the 261m aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, is to be deployed to the Pacific later this year, as part of an exercise codenamed “Clémenceau 25”.

French Naval Command Etat-Major’s Commodore Jacques Mallard told a French media briefing that the main objective of the planned exercise, labelled a “high-level strategic posture”, was to boost aero naval “interoperability”, as well as information and intelligence sharing.

The exact date of the 2025 deployment has not yet been disclosed, even though Commodore Mallard said last November it would be “very soon”.

• READ MORE: Other Indo-Pacific reports

Clémenceau 25, spanning over “almost four months”, would fall under an international 20-year Strategic Interoperability Framework signed between French and US naval forces in 2021.

Apart from the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet, the Royal Australian Navy and Japan’s Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force are also part of the deployment.

France’s main naval bases in the Pacific are located in French Polynesia — Pacific naval command, ALPACI — and New Caledonia.

As part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, France also intends to show it has the capacity to deploy significant means — including the 42,000-tonne aircraft carrier — in the most distant regions, including the Pacific.

“To deploy a significant naval force in an area which, during the next 10 years, will be the transit point for more than 40 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product, shows France’s interest in this area,” Mallard told French media.

“The roadmap, with our regional partners, is to foster a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific space within the framework of international law, and to contribute to the protection of our populations and our interests.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

French authorities have imposed a curfew on New Caledonia’s capital Nouméa and banned public gatherings after supporters of the Pacific territory’s independence movement blocked roads, set fire to buildings and clashed with security forces.

Tensions in New Caledonia have been inflamed by French government’s plans to give the vote to tens of thousands of French immigrants to the Melanesian island chain.

The enfranchisement would create a significant obstacle to the self-determination aspirations of the indigenous Kanak people.

• READ MORE:  ‘A lot of fire, violence’: Nouméa erupts as protests halt New Caledonia
• NZ foreign minister Peters cancels New Caledonia visit as unrest erupts
• Botched prison mutiny, protests ahead of New Caledonia constitution vote
• Other New Caledonia reports

“Very intense public order disturbances took place last night in Noumea and in neighboring towns, and are still ongoing at this time,” French High Commissioner to New Caledonia Louis Le Franc said in a statement today.

About 36 people were arrested and numerous police were injured, the statement said.

French control of New Caledonia and its surrounding islands gives the European nation a security and diplomatic role in the Pacific at a time when the US, Australia and other Western countries are pushing back against China’s inroads in the region.

Kanaks make up about 40 percent of New Caledonia’s 270,000 people but are marginalised in their own land — they have lower incomes and poorer health than Europeans who make up a third of the population and predominate positions of power in the territory.

Buildings, cars set ablaze
Video and photos posted online showed buildings set ablaze, burned out vehicles at luxury car dealerships and security forces using tear gas to confront groups of protestors waving Kanaky flags and throwing petrol bombs at city intersections in the worst rioting in decades.

A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed today and could be renewed as long as necessary, the high commissioner’s statement said.

Public gatherings in greater Noumea are banned and the sale of alcohol and carrying or transport of weapons is prohibited throughout New Caledonia.

The violence erupted as the National Assembly, the lower house of France’s Parliament, debated a constitutional amendment to “unfreeze” the electoral roll, which would enfranchise relative newcomers to New Caledonia.

It is scheduled to vote on the measure this afternoon in Paris. The French Senate approved the amendment in April.

Local Congress opposes amendment
New Caledonia’s territorial Congress, where pro-independence groups have a majority, on Monday passed a resolution that called for France to withdraw the amendment.

It said political consensus has “historically served as a bulwark against intercommunity tensions and violence” in New Caledonia.

“Any unilateral decision taken without prior consultation of New Caledonian political leaders could compromise the stability of New Caledonia,” the resolution said.

L’Eau vive semble aux mains des manifestants pic.twitter.com/6qAuW4hMYI

— Charlotte Mannevy (@CMannevy) May 13, 2024

French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin told his country’s legislature that about 42,000 people — about one in five possible voters in New Caledonia — are denied the right to vote under the 1998 Noumea Accord between France and the independence movement that froze the electoral roll.

“Democracy means voting,” he said.

New Caledonia’s pro-independence government — the first in its history — could lose power in elections due in December if the electoral roll is enlarged.

New Caledonia voted by small majorities to remain part of France in referendums held in 2018 and 2020 under a UN-mandated decolonisation process. Three ballots were organised as part of the Noumea Accord to increase Kanaks’ political power following deadly violence in the 1980s.

Referendum legitimacy rejected
A contentious final referendum in 2022 was overwhelmingly in favour of continuing with the status quo. However, supporters of independence have rejected its legitimacy due to very low turnout — it was boycotted by the independence movement — and because it was held during a serious phase of the covid-19 pandemic, which restricted campaigning.

Representatives of the FLNKS (Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialist) independence movement did not respond to interview requests.

“When there’s no hope in front of us, we will fight, we will struggle. We’ll make sure you understand what we are talking about,” Patricia Goa, a New Caledonian politician said in an interview last month with Australian public broadcaster ABC.

“Things can go wrong and our past shows that,” she said.

Confrontations between protesters and security forces are continuing in Noumea.

Darmanin has ordered reinforcements be sent to New Caledonia, including hundreds of police, urban violence special forces and elite tactical units.

Copyright ©2015-2024, BenarNews. Used with the permission of BenarNews.

Helen Clark, how I miss you.  The former New Zealand Prime Minister — the safest pair of hands this country has had in living memory — gave a masterclass on the importance of maintaining an independent foreign policy when she spoke at an AUKUS symposium held in Parliament’s old Legislative Chambers yesterday.

AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) is first and foremost a military alliance aimed at our major trading partner China. It is designed to maintain US primacy in the “Indo-Pacific” region and opponents are sceptical of claims that China represents a threat to New Zealand or Australian security.

The recent proposal to bring New Zealand into the alliance under “Pillar II”  would represent a shift in our security and alliance settings that could dismantle our country’s independent foreign policy and potentially undo our nuclear free policy.

• READ MORE: Other AUKUS reports

Clark’s assessment is that the way the government has approached the proposed alliance lacks transparency.  National made no signal of its intentions during the election campaign and yet the move towards AUKUS seems well planned and choreographed.

Voters in the last election “were not sensitised to any changes in the policy settings,” Clark says, “and this raises huge issues of transparency.”

Such a significant shift should first secure a mandate from the electorate.

A key question the speakers addressed at the symposium was: is AUKUS in the best interest of this country and our region?

Highly questionable
“All of these statements made about AUKUS being good for us are highly questionable,” Clark says.  “What is good about joining a ratcheting up of tensions in a region?  Where is the military threat to New Zealand?”

Clark, PM from 1999-2008, has noticed a serious slippage in our independent position.  She contrasted current policy on the Middle East with the decision, under her leadership, of not joining the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Sceptical of US claims about weapons of mass destruction, New Zealand made clear it wanted no part of it — a stance that has proven correct. Our powerful allies the US, UK and Australia were wrong both on intelligence and the consequences of military action.

In contrast, New Zealand participating in the current bombardment of Yemen because of the Houthis disruption of Red Sea traffic in response to the Israeli war on Gaza is, says Clark, an indication of this change in fundamental policy stance:

“New Zealand should have demanded the root causes for the shipping route disruptions be addressed rather than enthusiastically joining the bombing.”

“There’s no doubt in my mind that if the drift we see in position continues, we will be positioned in a way we haven’t seen for decades –  as a fully-signed-up partner to US strategies in the region.

“And from that, will flow expectations about what is the appropriate level of defence expenditure for New Zealand and expectations of New Zealand contributing to more and more military activities.”

A hugely important interview with Helen Clark about AUKUS

Here are the highlights:

1- What are the issues here? How much are we prepared to spend? Where is this leading us to? https://t.co/mKVC21XSwQ pic.twitter.com/VHjWt3NboE

— Donna Miles دانا مجاب (@UnPressed) April 14, 2024

Economic security
Clark addressed another element which should add caution to New Zealand joining an American crusade against China: economic security.

China now takes 26 percent of our exports — twice what we send to Australia and 2.5 times what we send to the US.  She questioned the wisdom of taking a hostile stance against our biggest trading partner who continues to pose no security threat to this country.

So what is the alternative to New Zealand siding with the US in its push to contain China and help the US maintain its hegemon status?

“The alternative path is that New Zealand keeps its head while all around are losing theirs — and that we combine with our South Pacific neighbours to advocate for a region which is at peace,” Clark says, echoing sentiments that go right back to the dawn of New Zealand’s nuclear free Pacific, “so that we always pursue dialogue and engagement over confrontation.”

Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and is republished here with permission.

Pacific nations and smaller states are being urged to unite to avoid being caught in the crossfire of a possible nuclear conflict between China and the US.

On the cusp of a new missile age in the Indo-Pacific, a nuclear policy specialist suggests countries at the centre of the brewing geopolitical storm must rely on diplomacy to hold the superpowers accountable.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Ankit Panda said it was crucial smaller states and Pacific nations concerned about potential nuclear conflict “engage in meaningful risk reduction, arms control and broader diplomacy to reduce the possibility of war.”

“States [which] are not formally aligned with the United States or China were more powerful united,” and this “may create greater incentives for China and the United States to engage in these talks,” the think tank’s nuclear policy program Stanton senior fellow said.

North Korea and the United States have been increasing their inventories of short- to intermediate-range missile systems, he said.

“The stakes are potentially nuclear conflict between two major superpowers with existential consequences for humanity at large.”

The US military’s newest long-range hypersonic missile system, called the ‘Dark Eagle’, could soon be deployed to Guam, he said.

Caught in crossfire
A report issued by the Congressional Budget Office last year suggested the missile could potentially reach Taiwan, parts of mainland China, and the North Korean capital of Pyongyang if deployed to Guam, he said.

“Asia and Pacific countries need to put this on the agenda in the way that many European states that were caught in the crossfire between the United States and the Soviet Union were willing to do during the Cold War,” Panda said.

In 2022, North Korea confirmed it had test-launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Guam.

Guam is a US Pacific territory with a population of at least 170,000 people and home to US military bases.

Guam’s unique position
Panda said it could be argued that Guam’s unique position and military use by the US as a nuclear weapons base makes it even more of a target to North Korea.

He said North Korea will likely intensify its run of missile tests ahead of America’s presidential election in November.

“If [President] Biden is re-elected, they will continue to engage with China in good faith on arms control.

“But if [Donald] Trump gets elected then we can expect the opposite. We’ll see an increase in militarism and a race-to-arms conflict in the Indo-Pacific,” he said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Papua New Guinea’s Defence Minister Dr Billy Joseph attended the second Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue (JPIDD) in Tokyo, Japan, this week on his first overseas engagement.

The JPIDD is one of the pillars of the regional security architecture initiated by Japan and contributes to regional peace and security by fostering trust and sustained practical cooperation among its members and dialogue partners.

During the meeting, Dr Joseph and his counterparts and dialogue partners exchanged views on the regional security environment, issues and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

• READ MORE: Other PNG Indo-Pacific reports

He stressed the importance of the Pacific Island countries and their security partners in the region to cooperate and collaborate to uphold and enforce the “rules-based international order” to maintain peace and stability in the region.

“As a Pacific family, we must stand united in response to the current and emerging security challenges posed by the intensification of geo-strategic competition, climate change, maritime security, non-traditional security challenges such as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, transnational crime as well as space and cyber security threats,” Dr Joseph said.

“It is our common resolve to realise our shared vision for a Blue Pacific Continent, a resilient Pacific region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, that ensures everybody live a free, healthy and productive life.”

He acknowledged the important roles played by Japan and “our traditional friends and dialogue partners Australia, New Zealand and the United States” in the JPIDD process and urged them to elevate their support for Pacific Island countries to collaborate and promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific for peace and economic prosperity for all”.

Regional training focus
“We call for our partners to genuinely assist the individual Pacific Island countries with a regional focus on capacity building in the areas of training, equipment support and infrastructure development with the principle of ‘helping us to help ourselves’,” Dr Joseph said.

“In doing so, we envisage our region to be a region that is capable of looking after itself, a region that is led by Pacific Islands, and a region that promotes collective regional response in addressing its regional security challenges.”

Fiji and Papua New Guinea have sent their defence ministers to the talks, with the crown prince of Tonga representing his country.

From the other 11 participating nations that have no military forces, senior officials have joined the meeting, either in person or online.

Defence ministers and the representatives of Australia, Canada, Cook Islands, France, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Japan, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, and Vanuatu have been attending.

Jeffrey Elapa is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

Papua New Guinea and Australia created another piece of history yesterday when James Marape became the first international leader to address the Australian Federal Parliament since 2020.

In a speech laden with heartfelt gratitude and sentimental recollections of the shared history of both nations, the PNG Prime Minister thanked Australia for all it had done for his country – from giving it independence, to sending missionaries and public servants to help develop the country, to fighting together with Papua New Guineans during World War II, to all the current economic and other assistance.

Marape had said before leaving for Canberra that he would not be asking Australia for any help.

• READ MORE: Marape thanks Australia for providing an ‘anchor’ for independent PNG
• Other PNG reports

He repeated that in his address yesterday — even though he really shouldn’t have, for help from Australia has, is, and will be constant going into the future.

But he did appeal to the Australians not to forget Papua New Guinea during its current, ongoing challenges.

“Today, I carry the humble and deep, deep gratitude of my people, the thousand tribes. On behalf of my people, I thank Australia for everything you have done and continue to do for us,” Marape said.

“I appreciate all governments of Australia which have assisted our governments since 1975.

‘Crucial role in develoment’
“Thank you for continuing to support us throughout the life of our nationhood. Your assistance in education, health, infrastructure development in ports, roads and telecommunications continue to a play a crucial role in our development as a country.

“I appreciate, also, all Australian investors, who, to date, comprise the biggest pool of investors in Papua New Guinea.

“We realise our success as a nation will be the ultimate payoff for the work put in by many Australians.

“Thus, I commit my generation of Papua New Guineans to augmenting the sanctity of our democracy and progressing our economy.

“We pledge to work hard to ensure that PNG emerges as an economically self-sustaining nation so that we too help keep our region safe, secure and prosperous for our two people and those in our Indo-Pacific family.”

Marape’s address comes during a period of constant domestic and external challenges.

He is facing a potential vote of no confidence on his leadership this month and his government is also dealing with competition for influence from world powers, including China, USA, India, Indonesia, France and Australia.

Australia’s ‘real friend’
But he assured Australia that Papua New Guinea is its “real friend”.

This is despite revelations last week that his government was in talks with China over a potential security deal, a revelation that has worried Australia and the United States.

“In a world of many relations with other nations, nothing will come in between our two nations because we are family and through tears, blood, pain and sacrifice plus our eternal past our nations are constructed today,” he promised.

“These have all been our challenges. But as I visit with you in Australia today, I ask of you please, do not give up hope on Papua New Guinea.

“We have always bounced back from low moments and we will continue to grow,” Marape said.

Republished with permission.

Macron said tensions in the Indo-Pacific zone were a matter for concern because France was an integral part of the Indo-Pacific — both in the Indian and the Pacific oceans.

He recalled the French version of the Indo-Pacific had been masterminded in 2018 and had since been developed in partnership with such key allies as India, Australia, Japan and the United Arab Emirates.

• READ MORE: Other France in Pacific reports

“But we have also consolidated it and, may I say entrenched it, in our own (overseas) territories,” he said, citing New Caledonia as an example of French army presence to defend France’s sovereignty and “the capacity for our air force to deploy (from mainland France) to Oceania within 48 hours”.

He also praised the recent South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting held in Nouméa last month when “France was the inviting power”.

He said Paris was able to strike “strategic partnerships” with neighbouring armed forces.

“The year 2024 will see us maintain without fail the protection of our overseas territories,” he told the troops.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Defence ministers from several Asian and Pacific states are scheduled to meet in New Caledonia for two days during the first week of December, French Armed Forces in New Caledonia (FANC) commander General Yann Latil announced at the weekend.

He added that French Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu was also scheduled to attend.

The high-level meeting would also see the attendance of other defence ministers, including Australia’s Richard Marles, who has met Lecornu on several occasions over the past few months.

• READ MORE: French criticism of nuclear ban treaty highlights Canberra’s dilemma
• Other France in the Pacific reports

In October 2022, a previous regional meeting took place in Tonga and it included defence ministers from the host country and also from Australia, New Zealand, France, Chile, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

Hosting the meeting in New Caledonia by France is widely regarded as in line with the French Indo-Pacific strategy to reaffirm its presence in the region through its three overseas territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna.

In this context, New Caledonia is perceived as the hub of French presence in the Pacific.

During his recent visit in New Caledonia in late July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a budget increase for the Pacific base and plans to set up a “Pacific Military Academy Military” in Nouméa to train soldiers from neighbouring Pacific island states under the principle of “partnership”.

The number of soldiers permanently posted in New Caledonia is also scheduled to increase from the current 1350 to more than 2000 by the end of 2023, General Latil told French media.

Last week, French and Japanese armed forces also concluded for the first time a three-week joint terrestrial exercise that took place in New Caledonia.

It involved about 350 French soldiers and and about 50 Japanese troops.

“This is a new step in strengthening our ties with Japan, which shares France’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” General Latil said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Vanuatu Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau have reached an agreement to settle the “land problem” in the southern region of Vanuatu before the end of this year.

Prime Minister Kalsakau made this declaration during his speech at the 7th Melanesian Arts and Cultural Festival (MACFEST) in Saralana Park yesterday afternoon, coinciding with President Macron’s visit to the festival.

“We have talked about a topic that is important to the people of Vanuatu in relation to the problem for us in the Southern Islands. The President has said that we will resolve the land problem between now and December,” he said.

• READ MORE: Macron to ditch Noumea Accord for self-determination and introduce new statute for New Caledonia
• Vanuatu traditional leaders call for Macron to address islands dispute
• Other France in the Pacific reports

Though not explicitly naming them, it is evident that the southern land problem mentioned refers to the islands of Matthew and Hunter, located in the southern portion of Vanuatu, over which significant demands have been made.

In addition to this issue, the boundary between New Caledonia and Vanuatu remains unresolved.

The hope was that during President Macron’s visit, Prime Minister Kalsakau — carried in a traditional basket by Aneityum bearers during the opening of MACFEST 2023 — would address the Matthew and Hunter issue with the French leader.

As part of Vanuatu’s traditional practice, Kalsakau and President Macron participated in a kava-drinking ceremony, expressing their wish for the fruitful resolution of the discussed matters.

Matthew and Hunter are two small and uninhabited volcanic islands in the South Pacific, located 300 kilometres east of New Caledonia and south-east of Vanuatu.

Both islands are claimed by Vanuatu as part of Tafea province, and considered by the people of Aneityum to be part of their custom ownership. However, since 2007 they had also been claimed by France as part of New Caledonia.

Elation over statement
The announcement of the two leaders’ commitment to resolving the southern land issue was met with elation among the people of Vanuatu, particularly in the Tafea province.

“France has come back to Vanuatu; President Macron has told me that it has been a long time, but he has come back today with huge support to help us more,” said Prime Minister Kalsakau, expressing gratitude.

The Vanuatu government head revealed that France had allocated a “substantial sum” of money to be signed-off soon, which would lead to significant development in Vanuatu.

This would include the reconstruction of French schools and hospitals, such as the Melsisi Hospital in Pentecost, which had been damaged by past cyclones.

In response to the requests made by PM Kalsakau and President Macron, the chiefs of the Tafea province conducted another customary ceremony to acknowledge and honour the visiting leaders.

President Macron at MACFEST 2023
More than 4000 people gathered yesterday at Saralana Park to witness the presence of President Macron and warmly welcome him to MACFEST 2023.

He delighted the crowd by delivering a speech in Bislama language, noting the significance of Vanuatu’s relationship with France and highlighting its special and historical nature.

“Let me tell you how pleased I am to be with you, not only as a foreign head of state but as a neighbour, coming directly from Noumea,” President Macron said.

He praised Prime Minister Kalsakau for fostering a strong bond between the two countries amid “various challenges and foreign interactions”, emphasising that their connection went beyond bilateral relations, rooted in their shared history.

President Macron further shared his satisfaction with the discussions he had with Kalsakau, expressing joy that his day could culminate with the celebration of MACFEST, symbolising the exchange between himself and Vanuatu’s PM.

“My delegation is thrilled to participate in the dances and demonstrations that bring together delegations from across the region, celebrating the strength and vitality of Melanesia and the spirit of exchange and sharing,” he said.

The President expressed his pride in being part of the region, particularly in New Caledonia, and witnessing the young teenagers of Melanesia coming together, dancing, and singing, driven by the belief that they will overcome the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Last night, President Macron departed for Papua New Guinea to continue his historic Pacific visit. He expressed his happiness in meeting members from PNG, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and other participating nations during MACFEST.

Doddy Morris is a Vanuatu Daily Post journalist. Republished with permission.

French President Emmanuel Macron has urged New Caledonia to forge a common future after the most recent “no” independence vote.

During his visit to the capital Noumea, AFP reports Macron called the three independence referendums over the past five years “unprecedented”, and said “the choice that was expressed was to stay in France and the Republic”.

Pro-independence, indigenous Kanaks boycotted the third independence referendum in 2021, arguing a fair campaign was impossible during the covid-19 pandemic.

• READ MORE:PNG plans 21-gun salute for Macron in historic visit to an independent Pacific state
• Macron in New Caledonia to bolster France’s Indo-Pacific strategy
• Other French Pacific reports

Aux Calédoniennes et Calédoniens. https://t.co/OpMZanyN3q

— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) July 26, 2023

He held out the prospect of a “slow, humble, demanding” process to build a “shared history” for New Caledonia through a process of “truth and reconciliation”.

“It is not a full stop, it is a semi-colon”, Macron said.

“I am with our compatriots during these days to define together the basis for this new path, of this new project for the future of New Caledonia — respectful of its identity, of its history but in the light of the choice that has been made.”

Macron is also seeking to reassert his country’s importance in the Pacific region, where China and the United States are vying for influence.

1.5m ‘overseas’ citizens
France has nearly 1.5 million citizens in its Pacific and Indian Ocean territories, as well as several thousand troops, including 1600 in New Caledonia.

After his first stop in New Caledonia, Macron will travel to Vanuatu on Wednesday night for a two-day visit before heading to Papua New Guinea, where he is expected to lay out a “French alternative” for the region.

He is the first French President to visit non-French territories in the Pacific.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

France has deployed Rafale jet fighters during a military ceremony in New Caledonia, marking President Emmanuel Macron’s first official day in the Pacific.

Macron arrived in Noumea overnight on a visit aimed at bolstering his Indo-Pacific strategy and reaffirming France’s role in the region.

The historic five-day trip includes a visit to Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. It is the first time a French president has visited independent Pacific Islands, according to French officials.

• LISTEN TO RNZ PACIFIC WAVES: French President begins tour of the Pacific
• Other Kanaky New Caledonia decolonisation reports

A big focus will be asserting France’s role in what Macron has called a “balancing force” between the United States and China.

France assumes sovereignty for three Pacific territories: New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna.

However, not everyone was happy about the presidential visit.

New Caledonia was politically divided and seeking a way forward after three referendums on independence.

Referendum boycott
The outcome of all three polls was a “no” to independence but the result of the third vote, which was boycotted by Kanaks, was disputed.

Rallies were expected during the French President’s visit.

Local committees of the main pro-independence party the Caledonian Union have called for “peaceful” but determined rallies.

Their presence will be felt particularly when Macron heads north today to the east coast town of Tuoho, as well as when he gathers the New Caledonian community together tomorrow afternoon for a speech, where he is expected to make a major announcement.

About 40 percent of the population are indigenous Kanak, most of whom support independence. Pro-independence parties, which have been in power since 2017, want full sovereignty by 2025.

Macron is expected to meet with all sides in Noumea this week.

A large delegation has joined Macron on his visit, including Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna and Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu.

Foreign minister in Suva
Colonna will also travel to Suva, Fiji today, the first visit of a French foreign affairs minister to the country.

She will meet with the Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and the Pacific Islands Forum Deputy Secretary General Filimon Manoni.

The move was to “strengthen its commitment in the region”, French officials have said.

Meetings have also been set with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape when the delegation travels there on Friday.

France has investments in PNG to develop its gas resources under French-owned multinational oil and gas company TotalEnergies.

Vanuatu chiefs appeal
Emmanuel Macron will be in Port Vila on Wednesday.

Vanuatu’s Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs want Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau to let President Macron know that the Mathew and Hunter Islands belong to Vanuatu and are not part of New Caledonia.

Tanna chief Jean Pierre Tom said ni-Vanuatu people were expecting his visit to be a “game changer and not a re-enforcement of colonial rule”.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

En vol vers la Nouvelle-Calédonie, accueilli par nos Rafale qui viennent confirmer que la France est une puissance de l’Indo-Pacifique ! pic.twitter.com/yj8r1PHOMi

— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) July 24, 2023

French President Emmanuel Macron will make a first official visit to Papua New Guinea next Friday as part of a short Pacific trip.

AFP news agency reports that Macron’s trip will start in New Caledonia before he travels to Vanuatu and Port Moresby.

A French official told the news agency the trip was “historic” because no French president had ever visited non-French islands in the region.

• READ MORE: Other French Indo-Pacific policy reports

Macron will use those two stops to outline his Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at “recommitting” France to the region, the official said.

PNG Prime Minister James Marape said he would meet one-on-one with Macron, and the itinerary for the visit also included a courtesy call on Governor-General Sir Bob Dadae and the signing of various agreements.

Marape emphasised the significance of Macron’s visit in strengthening bilateral relations between France and Papua New Guinea.

“Under my leadership, France and PNG have been actively enhancing our bilateral relationship, along with other nations,” he said on his website.

“I appreciate President Macron’s commitment, as demonstrated by his decision to visit PNG and engage in discussions on matters of mutual interest between our countries.”

Final LNG decision
Macron’s visit comes on the eve of the final investment decision (FID) by French super-major TotalEnergies on the Papua LNG Project.

TotalEnergies is also involved in downstream processing of natural resources such as forests.

“In the midst of the evolving geopolitical landscape in the region, Papua New Guinea serves as ‘neutral ground,’ and I will urge France to consider PNG’s strategic position amid the changing regional dynamics,” Marape added.

“The visit of President Macron to PNG will further solidify the growing cooperation and shared goals between our two nations, particularly in the areas of forest conservation, French investments in PNG such as TotalEnergies, mobilising resources to support small Pacific Island countries and communities, and other relevant matters.”

Macron last year relaunched France’s Indo-Pacific approach in the aftermath of a bitter row over a cancelled submarine contract with Australia, casting France as a balancing power in a region dominated by the tussle between China and the United States.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

A Pacific elder and former secretary-general of the Pacific Islands Forum says Pacific leaders need to sit up and pay closer attention to AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s response to them.

Speaking from Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, Dame Meg Taylor said Pacific leaders were being sidelined in major geopolitical decisions affecting their region and they need to start raising their voices for the sake of their citizens.

“The issue here is that we should have paid much more attention to the Indo-Pacific strategy as it emerged,” she said.

• LISTEN TO RNZ PACIFIC WAVES: Dame Meg Taylor on AUKUS

“And we were not ever consulted by the countries that are party to that, including some of our own members of the Pacific Island Forum. Then the emergence of AUKUS — Pacific countries were never consulted on this either,” she said.

Last week in San Diego, the leaders of the United States, the UK and Australia — President Joe Biden, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese respectively — formally announced the AUKUS deal.

It will see the Australian government spending nearly $US250 billion over the next three decades to acquire a fleet of US nuclear submarines with UK tech components — the majority of which will be built in Adelaide — as part of the defence and security pact.

Its implementation will make Australia one of only seven countries in the world to have nuclear-powered submarines alongside China, France, India, Russia, the UK, and the US.

“We believe in a world that protects freedom and respects human rights, the rule of law, the independence of sovereign states, and the rules-based international order,” the leaders said in a joint statement.

“The steps we are announcing today will help us to advance these mutually beneficial objectives in the decades to come,” they said.

Following the announcement, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wengbin said by going ahead with the pact the US, UK and Australia disregarded the concerns of the international community and have gone further down “the wrong path”.

“We’ve repeatedly said that the establishment of the so-called AUKUS security partnership between the US, the UK and Australia to promote cooperation on nuclear submarines and other cutting-edge military technologies, is a typical Cold War mentality,” Wang said.

“It will only exacerbate the arms race, undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and hurt regional peace and stability,” he said.

The 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy is the United States’ programme to ” advance our common vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.”

The Rarotonga Treaty
On his return from San Diego, Australia’s Albanese stopped over in Suva where he met his Fijian counterpart Sitiveni Rabuka.

After the meeting, Rabuka told reporters he supported AUKUS and that Albanese had assured him the nuclear submarine deal would not undermine the Treaty of Rarotonga — to which Australia is a party — that declares the South Pacific a nuclear weapon free zone.

But an Australian academic said Pacific countries cannot take Canberra at face value when it comes to AUKUS and its committment to the Rarotonga Treaty.

Dr Matthew Fitzpatrick, a professor in international history at Flinders University in South Australia, said Pacific leaders need to hold Australia accountable to the treaty.

“Australia and New Zealand have always differed on what that treaty extends to in the sense that for New Zealand, that means more or less that you haven’t had US vessels with nuclear arms [or nuclear powered] permitted into the ports of New Zealand, whereas in Australia, those vessels more or less have been welcomed,” he said.

Professor Fitzpatrick said Australia had declared that it did not breach it, or it did not breach any of those treaty commitments, but the proof of the pudding would be in the eating.

“I think it’s something that certainly nations around the Pacific should be very careful and very cautious in taking at face value, what Australia says on those treaty requirements and should ensure that they’re rigorously enforced,” Professor Fitzpatrick said.

Parties to the Rarotonga Treaty include Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

Notably absent are three north Pacific countries who have compacts of free association with the United States — Palau, Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.

Dame Meg Taylor said Sitiveni Rabuka’s signal of support for AUKUS by no means reflected the positions of other leaders in the region.

“I think the concern for us is that we in the Pacific, particularly those of us who are signatories to the Treaty of Rarotonga, have always been committed to the fact that we wanted a place to live where there was no proliferation of nuclear weapons.

“The debate, I think that will emerge within the Pacific is ‘are nuclear submarines weapons’?”

Self-fulfilling prophecy
Meanwhile, a geopolitical analyst, Geoffrey Miller who writes for political website Democracy Project, said the deal could become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” for conflict.

“Indo-Pacific countries all around the region are re-arming and spending more on their militaries,” Miller said.

Japan approved its biggest military buildup since the Second World War last year and Dr Miller said New Zealand was reviewing its defence policy which would likely lead to more spending.

“I worry that the AUKUS deal will only make things worse,” he said.

“The more of these kinds of power projections, and the less dialogue we have, the more likely it is that we are ultimately going to bring about this conflict that we’re all trying to avoid.

“I think we do need to think about de-escalation even more and let’s not talk ourselves into World War III.”

Miller said tensions had grown since Russia invaded Ukraine and analysts had changed their view on how likely China was to invade Taiwain.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating’s recent strident criticism of the A$368 billion nuclear-powered submarine deal announced under the AUKUS security pact
will have little effect on Australian policy.

Canberra’s deepening level of security cooperation is underpinned by a deep political consensus.

But the clarity of Australian policy stands in stark contrast with New Zealand’s position on AUKUS, the trilateral technology-sharing agreement between Australia, the UK and US. In fact, New Zealand’s AUKUS policy can be summed up in one word — ambiguity.

• READ MORE: Paul Keating lashes Albanese government over AUKUS, calling it Labor’s biggest failure since WW1
• AUKUS submarine plan will be the biggest defence scheme in Australian history. So how will it work?
• Nukes, allies, weapons and cost: 4 big questions NZ’s defence review must address
• Other China and the Pacific reports

The establishment of AUKUS in September 2021 was met with an equivocal endorsement by New Zealand. On the one hand, the prime minister at the time, Jacinda Ardern, was “pleased to see” the initiative, declaring she “welcome[d] the increased engagement of the UK and the US in our region”.

On the other hand, Ardern noted the country’s longstanding nuclear-free policy meant any nuclear-propelled submarines developed by our Australian ally would be prohibited from New Zealand waters.

After Tuesday’s joint AUKUS leaders’ statement in San Diego by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, it is time to start counting the opportunity cost to New Zealand of maintaining this ambiguous policy posture.

‘Worst deal in all history’: Former Labor PM Paul Keating savages AUKUS submarine deal https://t.co/wp5VXqEAdx

— ABC News (@abcnews) March 15, 2023

Bets both ways
It may be surprising to hear, but Wellington’s AUKUS policy is ambiguous by design, reflecting a broader policy of “hedging”. This deliberately seeks to maximise the economic gains from trade with China, while supporting a US-constructed international order that aligns with New Zealand’s interests and values.

Unfortunately for New Zealand, the geopolitical environment that underpinned this policy has been torpedoed by the deterioration in US-China relations. It began during the Obama administration and has escalated during the Trump and Biden administrations.

The creation of AUKUS is a reflection of this broader strategic environment. And it has a direct effect on New Zealand’s security in two respects.

First, New Zealand’s leading trade partner, China, views AUKUS as contributing negatively to regional security dynamics. And Beijing cannot be expected to placidly accept this démarche.

China responded to the formation of AUKUS with the China-Solomon Islands security agreement in April 2022. What will its response be this time?

It is likely to involve some attempt to reduce Australian security, such as a Solomon Islands-style partnership with any number of states in the Pacific Islands Forum. This will have knock-on effects for New Zealand’s own security.

Regional instability
The possible scenarios are limited only by China’s capabilities and level of resolve to respond to AUKUS. As it stands, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, reacted critically to the AUKUS leaders’ statement. According to Wang:

The latest joint statement from the US, UK and Australia demonstrates that the three countries, for the sake of their own geopolitical interests, completely disregard the concerns of the international communities and are walking further and further down the path of error and danger.

To put it mildly, such criticism is misplaced. Truth be told, while there is clearly an interactive dynamic at work, AUKUS is much more an effect of a deteriorating security environment than a cause of it.

Like all countries, China has legitimate security concerns and interests. And it is clearly misleading, as many hawks in the US are doing, to paint China as an unvarnished threat to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

But it is equally misleading to overlook China’s role in the increased regional instability over the past decade or more, which has led to the creation of AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) involving Australia, India, Japan and the US.

Historic turning point
Second, the latest AUKUS developments have clear implications for New Zealand’s alliance with Australia, which is at a historic turning point. The principle at play here is clear — investment signals commitment, while lack of investment signals lack of commitment.

What is New Zealand’s level of commitment to the alliance? We will soon find out.

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence is conducting a major review that will release its report after the 2023 general election.

It is a fair bet Canberra is open to a serious discussion with Wellington on investing in a retooled ANZAC alliance. This would secure both countries’ national interests, not least their maritime, cyber and regional security.

Australia has chosen to invest in AUKUS. As Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles stated at a press conference in Canberra timed to occur immediately after Albanese’s joint ceremony with Biden and Sunak:

This is an investment in our nation’s security. It is an investment in our economy. And it is an investment that we cannot afford not to make.

AUKUS is both a catalyst and a mirror reflecting a swiftly changing strategic environment. New Zealand now needs to make some considered decisions on how to respond.

Dr Nicholas Khoo, Associate Professor of International Politics, University of Otago. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

In his recently published article “Sea of many flags”, the head of the ANU National Security College Rory Medcalf makes the case for why Pacific Island states should regard the deep regional involvement of a Western coalition of powers, “quietly” led by Australia, as an effective and attractive “Pacific way to dilute China’s influence”.

Although presented as a new proposal, the increased regional engagement of this Western coalition is already well advanced, in the form of proposed new military bases and joint-use facilities, new security treaties, increased aid programmes, new embassies, as well as a new regional institution, Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP).

Medcalf’s main task is not to persuade Canberra of the merits of this approach, but rather to demonstrate to a sceptical Pacific audience that this Western coalition’s Indo-Pacific strategy is compatible with the Blue Pacific strategy of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

• READ MORE: Other China in the Pacific reports

Medcalf argues that an Indo-Pacific strategy of containing China supports the broad concept of human security embraced by Pacific Island leaders in their 2018 Boe Declaration, which includes the key demand for climate change action.

He also argues that the strategy would support the Blue Pacific emphasis on Pacific Island sovereignty by countering Chinese attempts to dominate the region. Thus he moves beyond the argument (made for example by Sandra Tarte) that there are some meeting points between these two world views and posits their complete compatibility.

His purpose is to counter the position of Pacific insiders, like former Secretary-General of PIF Dame Meg Taylor, and Professor Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, who argue that these security narratives are antithetical.

Medcalf proposes a model of security governance dominated by a Western coalition of interests operating through institutions like the Quad, AUKUS and PBP, where Pacific Islander influence is marginal or non-existent. Australia is seen as the “hub” for Western alliance management of the Pacific, acting as a “guide and informal coordinator”, ensuring that investments are organised efficiently and “in line with what Pacific communities want”.

PBP aid projects deployed
PBP aid projects would be deployed in support of the objectives outlined in the Boe Declaration as well as PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

The problem here is that, at best, this security model operates on behalf of Pacific interests, but not under the control of Pacific governments or regional institutions created for that purpose.

The argument for compatibility between the Indo-Pacific and Blue Pacific strategies does not consider key aspects of the Pacific vision for the future, such as urgent climate action, where there are clear discrepancies, especially regarding limiting emissions. Asking Island leaders to curtail China’s regional role requires them to compromise their long-standing foreign policy ethos of “friends to all and enemies to none”.

Nor is it clear that Medcalf’s approach would support Island sovereignty, when the major threats seem to come from Western actors, including increased military activity in Micronesia, the undermining of regional institutions by external initiatives such as PBP, continuing colonial rule in French Polynesia and New Caledonia, and ongoing American control (and deepening militarisation) of Guam.

[Pacific Media Watch adds that this includes continuing colonial rule by Indonesia in the expanded five provinces that make up the West Papua region].

Australian military plans to allow US stationing and storage of nuclear weapons in north Australia appear to violate the terms of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and Japan’s proposal to release into the ocean nuclear waste from the Fukushima power plant meltdown is causing considerable consternation in the region.

Medcalf’s argument that adoption of the Indo-Pacific mental map could bring together Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean islands to discuss common challenges misses the 30-year history of such collaboration within the Alliance of Small Island States.

Unhelpful characterisation of China
Another problem with this analysis is its frankly unhelpful characterisation of China’s Pacific engagement. According to Medcalf, China “has a rightful place in the Pacific, just not a right to dominate”.

However, he provides no evidence that China does in fact seek regional hegemony, and cites no examples where its behaviour in the Pacific Islands might be regarded as “bullying” or “coercive”.

The 10 island countries that recognise Beijing have signed up to participate in the much-maligned Belt and Road Initiative without any apparent coercion.

Nor does Medcalf provide Pacific examples of the debt-for-equity argument often levelled at China’s lending practices in the Global South. When Tonga had difficulty servicing Chinese loans, Beijing agreed to extend their terms. Even the claim that China seeks to establish a military base in the region, a central plank in Western narratives, remains unsubstantiated.

Recent studies by the RAND Corporation (funded by the US military) provide some useful perspective by ranking Fiji and Papua New Guinea of “medium desirability” but “low feasibility” for Chinese military initiatives. Other Pacific locations, including Solomon Islands and Kiribati, are not seen as feasible.

To describe Beijing’s engagement as “neocolonial” is to invite comparisons with the activities of the Western coalition, key members of which retain actual colonies in the region. Nor is Australia in a strong position to accuse others of manipulative behaviour.

For example, Canberra’s efforts to protect its coal industry by working to weaken PIF statements about climate change mitigation are well documented, date back to the beginning of the COP negotiations, and continue today.

Self-determination issue at heart
Ultimately Medcalf’s central argument falls because it does not consider the issue of self-determination which is at the heart of the Blue Pacific strategy. Although Medcalf calls for “a premium on self-awareness, inclusion, and genuine diplomacy”, his proposal effectively devalues Pacific agency and marginalises Pacific decision makers.

“Sea of many flags” claims to promote strategic equilibrium in the Pacific, yet it really aims to create the conditions for continuing Western hegemony. It claims to counter geopolitical competition and militarisation while shoring up and expanding Western military domination.

It claims to act in the interests of Pacific peoples, yet seems designed to moderate opposition to recent anti-China initiatives established under the auspices of the Indo-Pacific strategy and without meaningful consultation.

By allowing some role for China, albeit a limited one, Medcalf is advocating a softer form of strategic denial than that imposed by Western powers during the Cold War. But his warnings to island states about the dangers of economic engagement with Beijing seem hollow indeed, given Australia’s massive trade dependence on China.

In advocating “a Pacific kind of leadership”, the author (perhaps inadvertently) evokes the principles guiding Pacific leaders in the early days of independence. But it is worth remembering that the essence of the Pacific Way advanced by Ratu Mara and others was Pacific control and regional self-determination.

In contrast, what Rory Medcalf is advocating would subsume all of this under the control of the Western alliance, led quietly (or not so quietly) by Australia.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has analysed thousands of suspicious tweets posted in 2021 relating to the Indonesian region of West Papua and assessed that they are inauthentic and were crafted to promote the policies and activities of the Indonesian government while condemning opponents such as Papuan pro-independence activists.

This work continues ASPI’s research collaboration with Twitter focusing on information manipulation in the Indo-Pacific to encourage transparency around these activities and norms of behaviour that are conducive to open democracies in the region.

It follows our August 24 analysis of a dataset made up of thousands of tweets relating to developments in Indonesia in late 2020, which Twitter had removed for breaching its platform manipulation and spam policies.

• READ MORE: West Papua atrocity – a warning to Jakarta for impartial investigation
• Other West Papua reports

This report on Papua focuses on similar Twitter activity from late February to late July 2021 that relates to developments in and about Indonesia’s easternmost region.

This four-month period was noteworthy for several serious security incidents as well as an array of state-supported activities and events in the Papua region, then made up of the provinces of West Papua and Papua.

These incidents were among many related to the long-running pro-independence conflict in the region.

A report from Indonesia’s Human Rights Commission detailed 53 violent incidents in 2021 across the Papua region in which 24 people were killed at the hands of both security forces and the armed wing of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM) separatist movement, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).

‘Armed criminal group’
Jakarta normally referred to this group by the acronym “KKB”, which stands for “armed criminal group”.

This upsurge in violence followed earlier cases involving multiple deaths. The most notorious took place in December 2018, when TPNPB insurgents reportedly murdered a soldier and at least 16 construction workers working on a part of the Trans-Papua Highway in the Nduga regency of Papua province (official Indonesian sources have put the death toll as high as 31).

The Indonesian government responded by conducting Operation Nemangkawi, a major national police (POLRI) security operation by a taskforce comprising police and military units, including additional troops brought in from outside the province.

The security operation led to bloody clashes, allegations of human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings, and the internal displacement of many thousands of Papuans, hundreds of whom, according to Amnesty International Indonesia, later died of hunger or illness.

Besides anti-insurgency actions, an important component of the operation was the establishment of Binmas Noken Polri, a community policing initiative designed to conduct “humanitarian police missions or operations” and assist “community empowerment” through programmes covering education, agriculture and tourism development.

“Noken” refers to a traditional Papuan bag that indigenous Papuans regard as a symbol of “dignity, civilisation and life”. Binmas Noken Polri was initiated by the then national police chief, Tito Karnavian, the same person who created the recently disbanded, shadowy Red and White Special Task Force highlighted in our August 24 report.

A key development occurred in April 2021 when pro-independence militants killed the regional chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) in an ambush. Coming on the back of other murders by independence fighters (including of two teachers alleged to be police spies earlier that month), this prompted the government to declare the KKB in Papua—that is, the TPNPB “and its affiliated organisations”—”terrorists” and President Joko Widodo to order a crackdown on the group.

9 insurgents killed
Nine alleged insurgents were killed shortly afterwards.

In May 2021, hundreds of additional troops from outside Papua deployed to the province, some of which were part of an elite battalion nicknamed “Satan’s forces” that had earned notoriety in earlier conflicts in Indonesia’s Aceh province and Timir-Leste.

During the same month, there were large-scale protests in Papua and elsewhere over the government’s moves to renew and revise the special autonomy law, under which the region had enjoyed particular rights and benefits since 2001.

The protests included demonstrations staged by Papuan activists and students in Jakarta and the Javanese cities of Bandung and Yogyakarta from May 21-24. The revised law was ushered in by Karnavian, who was then (and is still) Indonesia’s Home Affairs Minister.

The period also saw ongoing preparations for the staging of the National Sports Week (PON) in Papua. Delayed by one year because of the covid-19 pandemic, the event eventually was held in October at several specially built venues across the province.

The dataset we analysed represents a diverse collection of thousands of tweets put out under such hashtags as #BinmasNokenPolri, #MenolakLupa (Refuse to forget), #TumpasKKBPapua (Annihilate the Papuan armed criminal group), #PapuaNKRI (Papua unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia), #Papua and #BongkarBiangRusuh (Take apart the culprits of the riots).

Most were overtly political, either associating the Indonesian state with success and public benefits for Papuans or condemning the state’s opponents as criminals, and sometimes doing both in the same tweet.

Papuan Games tweets
Among several tweets under #Papua proclaiming that the province was ready to host the forthcoming PON thanks to Jakarta’s investment in facilities and security, 18 dispatched on June 25 proclaimed: “PAPUA IS READY TO IMPLEMENT PON 2020!!! Papua is safe, peaceful and already prepared to implement PON 2020. So there’s no need to be afraid. Shootings by the KKB … are far from the PON cluster [the various sports facilities] … Therefore everyone #ponpapua #papua”.

Many tweets were clearly aimed at shaping public perceptions of the pro-independence militia and others challenging the state.

Under #MenolakLupa in particular, numerous tweets related to past and contemporary acts of violence by the pro-independence militants. Two sets of tweets from March 22 and 24 that recall the 2018 attack at Nduga are especially noteworthy, in that both injected the term “terrorist” into the armed criminal group moniker that the state had been using hitherto, making it “KKTB”. This was a month before the formal designation of the OPM as a “terrorist” organisation.

As if to stress the OPM’s terrorist nature, subsequent tweets under #MenolakLupa carried through with this loaded terminology. For example, tweets on June 15 stated that in 2017 “KKTB committed sexual violence” against as many as 12 women in two villages in Papua.

A fortnight later, another set of tweets said that in 2018 the “armed terrorist criminal group” had held 14 teachers hostage and had taken turns in raping one of them, causing her “trauma”. Others claimed former pro-independence militants had converted to the cause of the Indonesian unitary state and therefore recognised its sovereignty over Papua.

Some tweets relate directly to specific contemporary events. Examples are flurries of tweets posted on July 24-25 in response to the protests against the special autonomy law’s renewal that highlight the alleged irresponsibility of demonstrations during the pandemic, such as: “Let’s reject the invitation to demo and don’t be easily provoked by irresponsible [malign] people. Stay home and stay healthy always.”

Others are tweets put out under #TumpasKKBPapua after the shooting of the two teachers, such as: “Any religion in the world surely opposes murder or any other such offence, let alone of this teacher. Secure the land of the Bird of Paradise.”

Warning over ‘hoax’ allegations
Other tweets warn Papuans not to succumb to “hoax” allegations about the security forces’ behaviour or other claims by overseas-based spokespeople such as United Liberation Movement of West Papua’s Benny Wenda and Amnesty International human rights lawyer Veronica Koman.

Tweets on April 1 under #PapuaNKRI, for example, warned recipients not to “believe the KKB’s Media Propaganda, let’s be smart and wise in using the media lest we be swayed by fake news.”

Many of the tweets in the dataset are strikingly mundane, with content that state agencies already were, or would have been, publicising openly. A tweet on February 27 under #Papua, for example, announced that the Transport Minister would prioritise the construction of transport infrastructure in the two provinces.

Those under #BinmasNokenPolri often echoed advice that receivers of the tweet could just as easily see on other media, such as POLRI’s official Binmas Noken website.

Some were public announcements about market conditions and community policing events where, for example, people could receive government assistance such as rice, basic items and other support.

Most reflected Binmas Noken’s community engagement purpose, ranging from a series on May 20 promoting a child’s “trauma healing” session with Binmas Noken personnel to another tweeted out on June 20 advising of a badminton contest involving villages and police arranged under the Nemangkawi Task Force.

‘Healthy body, strong spirit’
A further 34 tweets on June 20 advised that “inside a healthy body is a strong spirit”, of which the first nine began with the same broad sentiment expressed in the Latin motto derived from the Roman poet Juvenal, “Mens sana in corpore sano.” (Presumably, after this first group of tweets it dawned on the sender that his or her classical erudition was likely to be lost on indigenous Papuan residents.)

As with the tweets analysed in our August 24 report, based on behavioural patterns within the data, we judge that these tweets are likely to be inauthentic—that is, they were the result of coordinated and covert activity intended to influence public opinion rather than organic expressions by genuine users on the platform.

Without conclusively identifying the actors responsible, we assess that the tweets mirror the Widodo government’s general position on the Papuan region as being an inalienable part of the Indonesian state, as well as the government’s security policies and development agenda in the region.

The vast majority are purposive: by promoting the government’s policies and activities and condemning opponents of those policies (whether pro-independence militia or protesters), the tweets are clearly designed to persuade recipients that the state is providing vital public goods such as security, development and basic support in the face of malignant, hostile forces, and hence that being Indonesian is in their interests.

Dr David Engel is senior analyst on Indonesia in ASPI’s Defence and Strategy Programme. Albert Zhang is an analyst with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. His research interests include information and influence operations, and disinformation. Dr Jake Wallis is the Head of Programme, Information Operations and Disinformation with ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre. This article is republished from The Strategist with permission.

The Australian government is moving fast to reset relations with Australia’s Pacific partners, including a larger Pacific role for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Detailed research undertaken late last year for the ABC in our six key Pacific markets (Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and Tonga) confirms that the ABC today is used, valued and highly trusted by Pacific audiences.

This result has been made possible through the ABC’s multi-channel approach, and by thoughtful programming made with Pacific partners and designed specifically for Pacific audiences.

• READ MORE: Other reports on Radio Australia in the Pacific

In terms of reach, access to AM/FM radio today is significantly higher than access to shortwave across the Pacific, and our research confirms that the most effective way today to engage audiences in urban and peri-urban regions is through FM radio transmission.

ABC Radio Australia currently has 13 transmitters across the Pacific. ABC Australia (TV) broadcasts to 16 Pacific island nations and territories under more than 25 distribution deals.

Meanwhile, a transition to digital and social media in the Pacific is also well underway. Smartphone use is high in urban areas, and increasingly, the ABC connects to its Pacific audiences via Facebook and through our digital offerings.

Our multi-channel approach is paying off. Total Pacific user interactions late last year with the ABC, whether via the ABC website, the ABC app or social media channels, were reportedly higher than usage and interactions with any other international provider, including the BBC, CNN, RNZ and CGTN.

Big jump in numbers
In the Papua New Guinea market, the research showed that more than half of all respondents had either watched ABC Australia (TV), listened to ABC Radio Australia or accessed the ABC online in the second half of 2021. That’s a big jump in audience numbers within just a few years.

The Australian government has plans to review the merits of restoring shortwave radio and the ABC will be contributing to that process. Part of that will include understanding how many people still have access to shortwave radios and the interest or need to use them as an information source.

In terms of content, the ABC’s unique advantage lies in its commitment to, and relationship with, Pacific audiences. We aim to be local. Our Asia–Pacific newsroom is the only one of its kind in Australia, with 50 journalists and producers telling the stories that matter to Indo-Pacific audiences, told in Bahasa Indonesia, Tok Pisin and Chinese as well as English.

Our flagship daily current affairs programme, Pacific Beat on ABC Radio Australia, features interviews with leaders and newsmakers, attracting audiences of all ages and genders. Then there’s Sistas, Let’s Talk (conversations with inspirational Pacific women), Wantok (Pacific-focused news and current affairs in Tok Pisin, Solomon Islands pidgin and Bislama), Island Music (reggae, dancehall and R’n’B with a focus on the Pacific region) and Pacific Playtime (for kids and families across the region).

A shared love of sport offers opportunities to strengthen social ties across the Pacific, and particularly to engage young people. ABC Radio Australia takes the men’s and women’s National Rugby League competitions to lovers of the sport across the region.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade supports the ABC to produce the only pan-Pacific sport-focused TV show, That Pacific Sports Show, and a fresh and humorous sport-oriented radio show and podcast, Can You Be More Pacific?, hosted by Australian and Pacific sportspeople.

This commitment to genuine partnership with the Pacific is paying off. The proportion of respondents in Pacific markets last year who valued the ABC across all its channels as a “trusted source of news and information” was comparable to that in Australia, at a very high 75 percent.

Pacific content locally available
It’s also worth noting that all the content we produce for Pacific audiences is available domestically in Australia, helping to maintain regional ties and build greater Australian awareness about our Pacific neighbours.

The ABC’s International Development Unit, supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and donors like USAID and the United Nations, works with partners across the region to enhance journalism skills and media capacity.

The ABC also provides skills development training for specific challenges like election coverage and emergency broadcasting, plus support for media associations, like the Media Association of the Solomon Islands, which has been active in campaigning for press access and freedom in the Solomons.

The government has committed to increase funding to the ABC’s international programme by $8 million a year over the next four years. The focal points of this strategy are enhanced regional transmission, more content production, and increased media capacity training for Pacific partners.

This approach has been informed by the ABC’s own proposals.

Over recent years, various ideas have been floated for a new administrative process or organisation to “manage” Australia’s media presence in the Pacific. That would add unnecessary bureaucracy.

There’s a lot more the ABC could do in and for the Pacific. The ABC today has the strategy, systems and relationships in the Pacific to enable rapid expansion, given funding support.

And our research confirms there is a demand for it.

Claire M. Gorman is the head of international services at the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Republished from The Strategist with the author’s permission.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s decision to embark on a diplomatic offensive to outflank China in the Pacific within days of being sworn in has yielded what appears to have been an early success.

Whether Wong’s intervention gave Pacific leaders pause about a wide-ranging economic and security pact with China or they would have baulked anyway, the fact is Australian diplomacy can claim a dividend.

In the process, the country appears to have a new foreign minister who will engage in more creative and activist foreign policy then her predecessor.

• READ MORE: With a new Australian government and foreign minister comes fresh hope for Australia-China relations
• As Australian-Chinese writer Yang Hengjun’s trial begins, his prospects remain bleak

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s extensive tour of the Pacific has been aimed at extending Beijing’s influence in the region at a moment when regional leaders had grown restive about Australia’s commitment to its immediate neighbourhood.

The Morrison government’s equivocation on climate has not sat well with leaders of the Pacific’s micro-states.

Wong’s mission appears to have succeeded on three important fronts:

1. it has reassured Pacific neighbours that a new Labor government will do more than pay lip service to their concerns about climate and other issues
2. Wong has made it clear Canberra will not be reticent in contesting Beijing’s influence in the region
3. her mission has enabled her to assert her own authority early over the foreign policy and security reach of her portfolio.

This latter aspect will be important in how and in what form Australia responds to Chinese overtures aimed at achieving a re-set in relations.

Labor governments have long managed the relationship well
In one respect, the new Labor government has history on its side.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canberra and Beijing.

All these years later, another Labor government has the opportunity to re-set Australia’s relations with the dominant regional player at a moment when the Indo-Pacific is undergoing profound change.

Few would reasonably argue against the proposition that a “re-set” is overdue after years of drift and ill-will under the Morrison government.

The question for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his national security team is how to proceed in a way that conforms with Australia’s national interest, is faithful to its values, and enables Canberra’s voice to be inserted in regional councils.

Wong has, for some time, been sketching out a more creative foreign policy approach — evident in her Pacific initiative — that will seek to expand Australia’s regional relationships and, where appropriate, take the lead in alignment with the country’s national interest.

In this sense, the joint communique on December 21 1972, signalling the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, makes interesting reading.

Unlike Richard Nixon’s Shanghai communique of 1972, which fudged the Taiwan issue, the Whitlam government document is explicit.

The Australian government recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China, and has decided to remove its official representation from Taiwan before 25 January, 1973.

Albanese and his security policy team can be sure this document will not be gathering dust in a Chinese Foreign Ministry archive.

China’s attachment to anniversaries is one of the more notable features of its diplomacy. These occasions may be used for political purposes, but history weighs heavily on Beijing’s foreign policy calculations.

Albanese government should jump on the promise of a thaw
When Prime Minister Li Keqiang promptly sent a congratulatory message to Albanese on the latter’s success in the recent election, Labor’s historic shift towards Beijing back in 1972 will not have been overlooked.

The wording of Li’s message was pointed. It said, in part, that China was:

ready to work with the Australian side to review the past, face the future, uphold principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit.

Beijing talks a lot about “mutual respect” and “mutual benefit”. These are phrases that are, more often that not, designed to deflect criticism of China’s human rights abuses and other bad behaviour.

But taken together with overtures for a “re-set” by the new Chinese ambassador in Canberra, Xiao Qian, Beijing has clearly decided it is in China’s interests to turn the page on a sour period between the countries.

Asked at his press conference after the conclusion of Quad talks in Tokyo about his response to the conciliatory message from Li, Albanese simply said:

I welcome that. And we will respond appropriately in time when I return to Australia.

In other responses to questions about troubled relations with China, the new prime minister has said it is up to Beijing to start removing sanctions on Australian exports.

These Albanese responses are prudent. There is no point in rushing to acknowledge such overtures. However, he would be making a mistake if he seeks to prolong what has the makings of a thaw.

He might remind himself that virtually all of Australia’s western allies, including America, have working relations with Beijing that enable officials to engage in a constructive dialogue, despite differences.

Australia’s first ambassador to China, Stephen Fitzgerald, has some wise counsel for the new government in Canberra about how to better manage relations with Beijing.

Australia under a Labor government must now return to diplomacy, talking with the PRC, for which it is ready and putting away the megaphone of gratuitous criticism, insult and condemnation which were the hallmarks of Morrison’s China policy. If we do this, there will be many issues on which we can have constructive engagement.

One of these issues can — and should — be the continued detention in China of two Australian citizens, the journalist Cheng Lei and the democratic activist Yang Hengjun. Progress towards their release should be a condition of improved relations, along with removal of punitive tariffs on imports of such items as wine and barley.

Finally, Albanese’s security policy team should pay particular attention to US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s landmark foreign policy speech delivered to the Asia Society in Washington on May 26.

In that speech, Blinken laid down guidelines for the conduct of relations with Beijing in a world whose foundations are shifting. His words bear repeating as a template for Canberra’s own interactions with Beijing.

We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War […] We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power […] But we will defend [the international order] and make it possible for all countries – including the United States and China – to coexist and co-operate.

Blinken’s attempts to define a workable China policy should be regarded in the same vein as another important statement delivered 17 years ago by then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in New York. In that speech, Zoellick said:

We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

Blinken’s and Zoellick’s interventions, two decades apart, are important guardrails for a constructive relationship with China.

Dr Tony Walker is a vice-chancellor’s fellow, La Trobe University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s Pacific Minister Aupito William Sio is set to travel to Fiji tomorrow, while Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta is under increased pressure over Pacific relationships.

Sio, who is also associate foreign affairs minister, will travel to Fiji from tomorrow to meet with Pacific ministers, and return on Saturday.

He said he would be discussing shared concerns with other large ocean states, aiming to build and strengthen relationships after the Our Ocean Conference in Palau in March.

• READ MORE: Other China in the Pacific reports

“The Pacific is central to the lives, cultures and well-being of Aotearoa New Zealand and our Pacific whanau, aiga, kainga, kopu tangata, and fanau. At the Our Ocean Conference, I encouraged progress on issues such as the conservation of our marine environments and the sustainable use of ocean resources, and I intend to continue these dialogues during my visit,” he said in a statement.

He will also meet with Fiji’s minister of health.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Nanaia Mahuta has been under increasing pressure over New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific as China’s own Foreign Minister Wang Yi toured eight Pacific countries.

Wang secured co-operation agreements with Samoa and Kiribati after officially signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands.

Greater US attention
The United States has also been turning increased attention to the region, setting up the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework with 12 other countries including New Zealand.

China was unable to get its broader regional agreement signed by Pacific countries, however, and Mahuta said that reflected the Pacific’s view that regional measures should be discussed at a regional level — and she believed that would be discussed at the upcoming Pacific Islands Forum in July.

Mahuta has faced questions over why her Chinese counterpart was was able to do a full tour of the Pacific before she could, and this morning told reporters New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific was very good, and in good shape.

“In fact the Pacific rely on us to be consistent, respectful, reliable in the way that we work with them and partner their aspirations … I’ll be absolutely looking to meet with my Pacific foreign minister counterparts, which I already have for many of them.

“When the border opened for Fiji, which was one of the earliest border openings, I went there to demonstrate that we want to engage very quickly and as border settings allow I’m going to absolutely try and get to many of the places across the Pacific.”

China had the resources to do a full Pacific tour, had been working for a long time to build its relationship with the Pacific, and Chinese interests in the Pacific were not new, she said.

“They have the resources to do that obviously but they have over a period of time secured a strong relationship across the whole of the Pacific and they’re building on that.

“What is unusual is that they’ve done eight pacific countries… in a very short time.”

She planned to travel to Solomon Islands as soon as the country’s foreign minister, Jeremiah Manele, was available to meet with her.

Sio meanwhile will also participate in events to celebrate Samoa Language Week and the 60th Anniversary of Samoa’s independence upon his return to Aotearoa New Zealand.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

The Kanak people will not accept France’s attempt to “recolonise” New Caledonia, a pro-independence delegate has told the United Nations.

Addressing a UN Decolonisation Committee seminar on the Pacific in Saint Lucia, Dimitri Qenegei said since 2020 the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and his Overseas Minister Sebastien Lecornu had been taking unilateral decisions.

Qenegei said the signatories to the 1998 Noumea Accord stopped having their annual meetings in 2019 and the date for the referendum on independence last year was set without the consent of the Kanak people.

• READ MORE: Other Kanaky New Caledonia referendum reports

Paris decided to go ahead with the third and last referendum last December under the Noumea Accord despite pleas by the pro-independence camp to delay the vote because of the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on the Kanak people.

France insisted that the timetable for the vote had to be upheld.

Amid a boycott by the pro-independence camp, fewer than half of the voters took part in the referendum but of those who did vote more than 96 percent were in favour of staying with France.

Qenegei said Macron declared after the referendum that New Caledonia showed it wanted to stay French although it was known that 90 percent of Kanaks wanted independence.

Claims of manipulation and lies
To therefore proclaim that New Caledonia chose to stay French was not legitimate, he said, adding that it was a “manipulation and a lie” by France and the heirs of the colonial system.

He said France, as the administrative power, had reorientated its policies to the methods of bygone centuries to hold on to its non-autonomous territories.

Qenegei said France had reneged on its undertaking given in 1998 to accompany New Caledonia to its decolonisation.

He pointed out that in case of three rejections of independence in the referenda under the Noumea Accord, the political parties needed to be convened to discuss the situation.

Qenegei said nowhere did it say that in a case of three “no” votes, New Caledonia remained French.

He said on the international stage, France had been losing influence, which prompted President Macron in 2018 to work towards an Indo-Pacific axis from Paris to Noumea that included India and Australia.

However, he said France suffered a first humiliation when Australia backed out of a multi-billion dollar contract for French submarines.

New Caledonia becoming independent would be another blow to the military axis aimed at containing China, he said.

Parallel drawn with China
Qenegei drew a parallel between China and France, saying France decried the possibility of Chinese troops in Solomon Islands as imperialism while France had placed troops in New Caledonia to “contain the Kanaks”.

While France criticised China’s lending policies, Qenegei said France regarded its loans to New Caledonia, given with interest to be paid, as something different.

Qenegei said the recent French policies were nothing but a return to the source of colonisation.

He warned that France’s intention to open up the electoral rolls to French people who arrived after 1998 was the ultimate weapon to drown the Kanak people and recolonise New Caledonia.

The Kanaks would be made to disappear and that would not be accepted but inevitably lead to conflict.

Qenegei said his outline was not a threat a but a call for help to bring the administrative power to its senses.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

The Kanak people won’t accept France’s attempt to recolonise New Caledonia, a pro-independence delegate has told the United Nations. https://t.co/UBRq27EyTi

— RNZ Pacific (@RNZPacific) May 17, 2022

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and her Singaporean counterpart Lee Hsien Loong have added a focus on climate and sustainability to the enhanced relationship between the two countries.

Speaking after bilateral talks in Singapore, the pair jointly announced a fifth pillar would be added to the agreement on the New Zealand-Singapore Enhanced Partnership.

They announced the initial enhanced partnership in 2019 during Ardern’s last official visit, with the four pillars of trade and economics; security and defence; science, technology and innovation; and people-to-people links.

• READ MORE: Other New Zealand and Singapore trade reports
• China and Solomon Islands sign security pact

The fifth pillar added today will be “climate change and the green economy”.

Ardern said given the existential threat posed by climate change, it was fitting.

“When it comes to climate change this is not an area where countries are seeking to be competitive, or we shouldn’t be seeking to be competitive unless the competition is who can reduce emissions the fastest.

“Globally we have entered what must be an age of action, and that includes the private sector as well. No government can do this alone.”

Call for stronger global cooperation
Lee echoed that sentiment, calling for stronger global cooperation on climate change.

“Climate change is the existential challenge of our times … we need stronger cooperation among most countries.”

He said areas that could be worked on included workshops for building joint capacity in responding to climate change, improved pricing for emissions trading, and work on sustainable aviation initiatives.

“Aviation is one of the major sources of carbon emissions … and New Zealand is at the end of the world and Singapore is not so close to Europe either.

“If we are going to call for a low-carbon world this is something we should be focused on.”

Ardern said Singapore was a trade hub which 20 percent of New Zealand’s exports funnelled through, and there were opportunities in reducing emissions for both shipping — including hydrogen fuel — and food, including research into urban farming.

Ardern’s trade delegation to Asia — including Trade Minister Damien O’Connor, officials, a dozen business people and media — landed in Singapore last night.

They travel to Japan tomorrow for a three-night stay, although three members of the roughly 50 people returned weak positive covid-19 test results today, believed to be from previous infections.

Because of Japan’s entry rules, they will not be allowed to enter.

Regional cooperation, defence and trade
Asked about the increasing influence of China in the Asia-Pacific region, Ardern said China had acknowledged the effects of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and Lee saying Singapore was unaware of the details of agreement between China and the Solomon Islands.

They expressed concern that the war in Ukraine could lead to increased protectionism in the region however, and reiterated their shared commitment to an “open, inclusive, rules-based and resilient Indo-Pacific region”, including free trade, open markets, and respect for countries’ sovereignty.

Lee also said they welcomed interest from other countries including China and Korea in joining the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, an agreement signed in 2020 between New Zealand, Singapore and Chile.

The agreement aims to support digital economies and trade, and guarantees cooperation on digital identity, policies, emerging technologies, data protection and digital products.

They said they also welcomed the efforts of the United States in pursuing an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

It perhaps wasn’t a remarkable coincidence that last month Samoa’s former Ambassador to the United Nations called on the United States to ratify a treaty declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone.

Ali’ioaiga Feturi Elisaia, currently Samoa’s High Commissioner to Fiji, made the comments during a Blue Pacific Talanoa series last month to mark the August 29 International Day against Nuclear Tests.

The treaty created by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) was called the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of Rarotonga of which Samoa is a signatory.

• READ MORE: AUKUS pact strikes at heart of Pacific nuclear-free regionalism
• More articles on the Australian nuclear submarine deal

The virtual conference also featured high profile state actors including Fiji Prime Minister and PIF Chair Josaia Bainimarama, PIF Secretary-General Henry Puna and the secretary-general for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Ambassador Flavio Roberto Bonzanini.

The lineup of the presenters last month underscored the significance of the issue for the region, which very much remains relevant for Samoa and other Pacific Island nations some 25 years after the last nuclear test explosion by France at the Moruroa and Fangataufa atoll test sites on 27 January 1996.

Lest we forget the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands where the US unleashed 23 nuclear weapons between 1946 and 1958 to displace the Marshallese people for ever.

Discussions today around nuclear testing or the use of nuclear energy as an alternative energy source are likely to be associated with protest marches in the 1960s and 1970s with public opinion shifting due to the calamitous effect of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings towards the backend of World War Two in 1945.

The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power disaster in Ukraine (which was at that time part of The Soviet Union) claimed 31 lives, though in 2005 the United Nations reportedly projected that some 4000 people would eventually die due to radiation exposure.

In March 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake in Japan triggered a tsunami, which overran the seawall of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and flooded the nuclear reactor, triggering a failure of the emergency generators to lead to nuclear meltdowns and the leaking of contaminated water into the Pacific Ocean.

Over a decade later the Japan government announced in April this year that it would release 1 million tonnes of contaminated water from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific, triggering concerns within the region and leading to calls for an independent assessment.

And it appears we in the Pacific are not out of the woods just yet — as more developed and economically affluent nations dabble with this deadly form of energy in our part of the world — despite being privy to data collected showing how thousands of lives were lost and millions displaced due to the use of nuclear weapons or energy in war as well as peacetime over the past 76 years.

So it is disappointing to see reports emerge over the last couple of days on Australia penning an agreement with the US and the UK to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in a bid to beef up its military arsenal.

Why has Australia become a party to a military pact that could now see conflict return to our peaceful islands some 76 years after the end of World War Two?

We are not interested in your wars and the political ideologies that you continue to flout in your quest for global domination.

Nor are we keen on subscribing to a train of thought promoting oligarchy where all power is centred in an individual.

The Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, when defending his country’s decision to sign the military pact with the US and the UK, is of the view that there will be peace and stability in the region due to the partnership.

“She [Jacinda Ardern] was my first call because of the strength of our relationship and the relationship between our countries,” Morrison said when confirming that he had advised his New Zealand counterpart, reports the Associated Press.

“All in the region will benefit from the peace and the stability and security that this partnership will add to our region.”

So what peace and stability is Mr Morrison referring to in his defence of this agreement?

Barring the covid-19 pandemic and its impact on our fragile and vulnerable economies, we in the Pacific are happy where we are.

Our journeys as sovereign nations haven’t been without their challenges and we know the destinations we want to get to with the assistance of bigger nations as well as development partners.

But signing up to a military pact behind the closet and then declaring we in the region will benefit from the peace and stability it would bring is not how friends treat each other.

It is a relief seeing Prime Minister Ardern continuing to maintain the tradition of her predecessors by promoting a nuclear-free Pacific; probably she is the only true friend of the Pacific Islands.

Having lived with and witnessed the ravages of war for close to a century; brought to our doorstep and into our homes without our consent; we expect global leaders to respect the various sovereign nations and their people who make up this huge expanse of an ocean that is now known as the Pacific.

It would be appropriate for Samoa’s first female Prime Minister, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa bringing this to the attention of the international community, in her first maiden address to the United Nations General Assembly.

Samoa Observer editorial on 21 September 2021. Republished with permission.

We live, to borrow a phrase, in interesting times. The pandemic aside, relations between the superpowers are tense. The sudden arrival of the new AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the US and UK simply adds to the general sense of unease internationally.

The relationship between America and China had already deteriorated under the presidency of Donald Trump and has not improved under Joe Biden.

New satellite evidence suggests China might be building between 100 and 200 silos for a new generation of nuclear intercontinental missiles.

• READ MORE: Australia to build nuclear submarines in a new partnership with the US and UK
• C’est fini: can the Australia-France relationship be salvaged after scrapping the sub deal?
• Why nuclear submarines are a smart military move for Australia — and could deter China further
• ANZUS at 70: Together for decades, US, Australia, New Zealand now face different challenges from China

At the same time, the US relationship with North Korea continues to smoulder, with both North and South Korea conducting missile tests designed to intimidate.

And, of course, Biden has just presided over the foreign policy disaster of withdrawal from Afghanistan. His administration needs something new with a positive spin.

Enter AUKUS, more or less out of the blue. So far, it is just a statement launched by the member countries’ leaders. It has not yet been released as a formal treaty.

As The Conversation reports, the initiative coincides with the Morrison government deciding it is best for Australia to accelerate the production of a more capable, integrated, nuclear-powered submarine platform — at a vastly higher cost — with the US and the UK.

Australia’s previous A$90 billion deal with the French company DCNS to build up to 12 submarines has been canned.

The Indo-Pacific pivot
The new agreement speaks of “maritime democracies” and “ideals and shared commitment to the international rules-based order” with the objective to “deepen diplomatic, security and defence co-operation in the Indo-Pacific region”.

“Indo-Pacific region” is code for defence against China, with the partnership promising greater sharing and integration of defence technologies, cyber capabilities and “additional undersea capabilities”. Under the agreement, Australia also stands to gain nuclear-powered submarines.

To demonstrate the depth of the relationship, the agreement highlights how “for more than 70 years, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have worked together, along with other important allies and partners”.

At which point New Zealand could have expected a drum roll, too, having only just marked the 70th anniversary of the ANZUS agreement. That didn’t happen, and New Zealand was conspicuously absent from the choreographed announcement hosted by the White House.

Having remained committed to the Five Eyes security agreement and having put boots on the ground in Afghanistan for the duration, “NZ” appears to have been taken out of ANZUS and replaced with “UK”.

Ardern responds to new Australia, UK, US group, says NZ nuclear stance ‘unchanged’ https://t.co/Ot3Ehi0R92

— Newshub Politics (@NewshubPolitics) September 15, 2021

Don’t mention the nukes
The obvious first question is whether New Zealand was asked to join the new arrangement. While Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has welcomed the new partnership, she has confirmed: “We weren’t approached, nor would I expect us to be.”

That is perhaps surprising. Despite problematic comments by New Zealand’s trade minister about Australia’s dealings with China, and the foreign minister’s statement that she “felt uncomfortable” with the expanding remit of the Five Eyes, reassurances by Ardern about New Zealand’s commitment should have calmed concerns.

One has to assume, therefore, that even if New Zealand had been asked to join, it might have chosen to opt out anyway. There are three possible explanations for this:

The first involves the probable provision to Australia of nuclear-powered military submarines. Any mention of nuclear matters makes New Zealand nervous. But Australia has been at pains to reiterate its commitment to “leadership on global non-proliferation”.

Similar commitments or work-arounds could probably have been made for New Zealand within the AUKUS agreement, too, but that is now moot.

Ardern on NZ being left out of new AUKUS security pact https://t.co/zmjjWQWIuo pic.twitter.com/DEp13JUGWZ

— nzherald (@nzherald) September 16, 2021

The dragon in the room
The second reason New Zealand may have declined is because the new agreement is perceived as little more than an expensive purchasing agreement for the Australian navy, wrapped up as something else.

This may be partly true. But the rewards of the relationship as stated in the initial announcement go beyond submarines and look enticing. In particular, anything that offers cutting-edge technologies and enhances the interoperability of New Zealand’s defence force with its allies would not be lightly declined.

The third explanation could lie in an assumption that this is not a new security arrangement. Evidence for this can be seen in the fact that New Zealand is not the only ally missing from the new arrangement.

Canada, the other Five Eyes member, is also not at the party. Nor are France, Germany, India and Japan. If this really was a quantum shift in strategic alliances, the group would have been wider — and more formal than a new partnership announced at a press conference.

Nonetheless, the fact that New Zealand’s supposedly extra-special relationship with Britain, Australia and America hasn’t made it part of the in-crowd will raise eyebrows.

Especially while no one likes to mention the elephant – or should that be dragon? – in the room: New Zealand’s relationship with China.

Dr Alexander Gillespie is professor of law at the University of Waikato. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.