The UN General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly to grant Palestine new rights and privileges, calling on the Security Council to reconsider its bid for full UN membership, reports TrimFeed.

The resolution on Friday was opposed by the US, Israel, and seven other countries — four of them island nations from the Pacific — citing concerns over direct negotiations and a two-state solution.

Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau were among the countries voting against Palestine.

• READ MORE: How the countries voted on the UN Palestine resolution
• Fiji’s position over Israeli war on Gaza – international blunder or a domestic strategy?

The UN General Assembly called on the Security Council to reconsider Palestine’s request to become the 194th member of the United Nations.

The overwhelming vote in favour by 143-9, with 25 abstentions, reflects wide global support for full membership of Palestine in the world body.

The outcome of this vote has significant implications for the Israel-Palestine conflict, as it may influence the trajectory of future negotiations and the prospects for a two-state solution.

Furthermore, the level of international support for Palestinian statehood may impact on the balance of power in the region and beyond.

Fiji, Vanuatu, and Marshall Islands were among the countries that abstained from the vote, alongside the United States, Israel, Argentina, Czechia, Hungary, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, and Papua New Guinea voting against.

US will veto statehood
The US has made clear that it would block Palestinian membership and statehood until direct negotiations with Israel resolve key issues and lead to a two-state solution.

The vote comes amid escalating violence and rising death tolls on the Palestinian people — more than 35,000 have been killed and almost 79,000 wounded in the War on Gaza

Many countries have expressed outrage at the situation and fears of a major Israeli ground offensive in Rafah.

Riyad Mansour, the Palestinian UN Ambassador, delivered an emotional speech, saying, “No words can capture what such loss and trauma signifies for Palestinians, their families, communities, and for our nation as a whole.”

Israel’s UN Ambassador Gilad Erdan vehemently opposed the resolution, accusing UN member nations of not mentioning Hamas’ October 7 attack that killed 1139 people and he shredded a copy of the UN charter in protest.

US Deputy Ambassador Robert Wood said: “For the US to support Palestinian statehood, direct negotiations must guarantee Israel’s security and future as a democratic Jewish state, and that Palestinians can live in peace in a state of their own.”

While the resolution grants Palestine some new rights and privileges, it reaffirms that it remains a non-member observer state without full UN membership and voting rights in the General Assembly.

Humanitarian ceasefire vote
Palestine became a UN non-member observer state in 2012. The United States vetoed a widely-backed council resolution on April 18 that would have paved the way for full United Nations membership for Palestine.

The General Assembly’s vote calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza on October 27 and the ongoing violence underscore the urgent need for a resolution to the long-standing crisis.

As the international community remains divided on the issue of Palestinian statehood, the path to lasting peace remains uncertain.

Republished from TrimFeed.

Australian Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price’s recent claim that New Zealand’s Waitangi Tribunal has veto powers over Parliament was met with surprise in New Zealand, especially by the members of the tribunal itself.

That’s because it is just plain wrong.

As the debate around the Voice to Parliament ramps up, we can probably expect similar claims to be made ahead of this year’s referendum. But the issue is so important to Australia’s future that such misinformation should not go unchallenged.

• READ MORE: What Australia could learn from New Zealand about Indigenous representation
• Solicitor-general confirms Voice model is legally sound, will not ‘fetter or impede’ Parliament
• Explainer: the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi
• What actually is a treaty? What could it mean for Indigenous people?

From an Australian perspective, New Zealand may appear ahead of the game in recognising Indigenous voices constitutionally. But that has certainly not extended to granting a parliamentary power of veto to Māori.

The Waitangi Tribunal was originally established as a commission of inquiry in 1975, given the power only to make recommendations to government. And so it remains. The Crown alone appoints tribunal members and many are non-Māori.

As with all commissions of inquiry, it is up to the government of the day to make a political decision about whether or not to implement those recommendations.

Deceptive and wrong
Price’s claim echoed a February article and paper published by the Institute of Public Affairs, aimed at influencing the Voice referendum. Titled “The New Zealand Māori voice to Parliament and what we can expect from Australia”, it was written by the director of the institute’s legal rights program, John Storey.

The paper makes a number of assertions: the Waitangi Tribunal has a veto over the New Zealand parliament’s power to pass certain legislation; the Waitangi Tribunal was established to hear land claims but its brief has expanded to include all aspects of public policy; and the Waitangi Tribunal “shows the Voice will create new Indigenous rights”.

The last of the statements is deceptive and the others are completely wrong. The Waitangi Tribunal’s jurisdiction was largely set in stone by the New Zealand parliament in 1975 when it was established.

Far from investigating land claims, it initially wasn’t able to examine any claims dating from before 1975. Parliament changed the tribunal’s jurisdiction in 1985, giving it retrospective powers back to 1840 (when the Treaty of Waitangi/te Tiriti o Waitangi was signed).

The tribunal then started hearing land claims. But in its first decade, it focused on fisheries, planning issues, the loss of Māori language, government decisions being made at the time and general issues of public policy.

Historic grievances
Over the past 38 years, the tribunal has focused on what are called “historical Treaty claims”, covering the period 1840 to 1992. In 1992 a major settlement of fishing claims began an era of negotiation and settlement of these claims, quite separate from the tribunal itself.

With the majority of significant historic claims now settled or in negotiation, that aspect of the tribunal’s work is coming to an end. It has returned to hearing claims about social issues and other more contemporary issues.

Far from expanding its jurisdiction, the tribunal’s powers have been steadily reduced in recent decades. In 1993, it lost the power to make recommendations involving private land — that is, land not owned by the Crown.

In 2008, it lost the power to investigate new historical claims, as the government looked to close off new claims that could undermine current settlements.

There is one area where the tribunal was given the power to force the Crown to return land. The 1984-1990 Labour government set a policy to rid itself of what were seen as surplus Crown assets.

A deal was struck between Māori claimants and the Crown to allow the tribunal to make binding recommendations to return land in very special cases.

This compromise was not created by the tribunal but through ambiguity in legislation, which was resolved in favour of Māori claimants in the Court of Appeal. The ability to return land has almost never been used and is being progressively repealed across the country as Treaty settlements are implemented in legislation.

Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price made the erroneous comments while appearing at a debate on the Voice to Parliament referendum in Australia. https://t.co/XGBfteJDaM

— Stuff (@NZStuff) April 27, 2023

Wide political support
Storey quotes a number of tribunal reports, which make findings about the Crown’s responsibilities, as if these findings are binding on the Crown or even on Parliament. This is not the case. The Waitangi Tribunal investigates claims that the Crown has acted contrary to the “principles of the Treaty”.

The Waitangi Tribunal establishes what those principles are, but they are binding on neither the courts nor Parliament. Having made findings, the tribunal makes recommendations — not to Parliament, as Storey suggests, but to ministers of the Crown.

Some recommendations are implemented, others are not.

Where there is a dispute between the Crown and Māori, the tribunal has often recommended negotiation rather than make specific recommendations for redress.

Storey has elsewhere referred to the tribunal as a “so-called advisory, now binding, Māori Voice to Parliament” that has “decreed” certain things. In the longer paper he does admit the “tribunal cannot dictate the exact form any redress offered by government must take”.

But he then falls back on the notion of a “moral veto” — that its status is so elevated that parliament is forced, however reluctantly, to do its bidding.

Yet not only does the Crown ignore tribunal recommendations as it chooses, it refuses even to be bound by the tribunal’s expert findings on history in negotiating settlements.

The Waitangi Tribunal will remain a permanent commission of inquiry because there is wide political support for its work. Nor can be it held solely responsible for increasing Māori assertiveness or political engagement with government, even if this was in any way a bad thing.

A larger social shift has taken place in Aotearoa New Zealand over the past few decades. No fiat from the Waitangi Tribunal has eliminated the cultural misappropriation of Māori faces and imagery — something Storey warns could mean “tea towels with a depiction of Uluru/Ayers Rock, or boomerang fridge magnets, would become problematic”.

The Waitangi Tribunal has often done no more than make Māori histories, Māori perspectives and Māori values accessible to a non-Māori majority. It has certainly had no power to control where debates on Indigenous issues fall.

Dr Michael Belgrave is professor of history, Massey University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

With the cabinet meeting on Monday agreeing to targeted Russian sanctions legislation, New Zealand is preparing to circumvent its normal United Nations-based response to international crises.

The Russia Sanctions Bill will allow additional sanctions against Russia, including the ability to:

• freeze assets in NZ;
• prevent people and companies from moving their money and assets to NZ to escape sanctions imposed by other countries; and
• stop super yachts, ships and aircraft from entering NZ waters or airspace.

Passing the law under urgency this week is justified due to Russia being one of the UN Security Council member states, allowing it to use its veto power to block any proposed UN sanctions.

• READ MORE: Ukraine crisis: how do small states like New Zealand respond in an increasingly lawless world?
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• Russian sanctions are biting harder than it could have imagined, and it’ll get worse

But this is a sad development, and a break with 30 years of diplomatic history. Since 1991, New Zealand has worked within the UN framework and largely based its sanctions regimes around what the UN has mandated.

Over Ukraine, New Zealand has taken some small and supplementary steps against Russia, such as travel bans and export controls over technologies that may have military value. But this has been inadequate compared with the actions of its allies, and the rapidly worsening situation.

Ukrainians in NZ urge Govt to seize Russian financial interests https://t.co/F0CfTrl7zI pic.twitter.com/XMgJeV8GAn

— 1News (@1NewsNZ) February 28, 2022

NZ must align with allies
To create a new sanctions regime outside the UN system, New Zealand will need to take into account various important factors, including the law’s scope and how it fits with the actions of its allies.

Above all, the legislation must recognise this is a unique situation and must not create a precedent that enables other actions outside the UN system. The new law must expressly state why the urgent actions are justified and the objectives it wants to achieve, and it should have a sunset clause whereby it will lapse on a set date unless expressly renewed.

The law must be effective, proportionate and targeted. Anti-Russian hysteria must be avoided. Due process, fairness to those involved, and compliance with existing international obligations, must be uppermost.

Detail must be applied to the creation of a cross-party sanctions committee and a monitoring group. The evidence used to justify sanctions should come from secure and robust sources, which should be as transparent as possible.

Coordination with friends and allies is uppermost. It’s not a question of how large New Zealand’s sanctions are, but rather that they are consistent with those of other countries. If there are inconsistencies, these risk being exploited both politically and economically.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken says the U.S. and its allies are having a “very active discussion” about banning the import of Russian oil and natural gas in the latest escalation of their sanctions in retaliation for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. https://t.co/qk2wtRvSS6

— The Associated Press (@AP) March 6, 2022

Military aid an option
In a normal situation, a “laddering” process for sanctions is used: sanctions start softly (sporting or cultural events, for instance) and escalate (with some diplomatic restrictions) towards increasingly harsh trade restrictions prohibiting goods, from luxuries to near essentials.

Exclusion from airspace, maritime zones and even travel restrictions for ordinary citizens may be added to the mix, as Russia is increasingly isolated from the wider world. With events moving so fast already, New Zealand is already halfway up the ladder.

Military aid needs to be an option, too. The goal is to help the Ukrainians fight for their own freedom, without putting foreign “boots on the ground”. A distinction between lethal and non-lethal aid (such as body armour, communications equipment, food and medical kit) will need to be made.

Again, the question is not one of scale but consistency with friends and allies. The symbolism of such support is important. Supplementing the efforts of Australia, for example, would be useful.

The new law may also need to cover those New Zealanders who want to fight in Ukraine — on either side. New Zealanders without dual Ukrainian citizenship are unlikely to be given prisoner of war status if they’re captured.

Such volunteers will be in a grey area of domestic law, too, as current legislation covering the activities of mercenaries, or those who seek to go overseas to fight for terrorist groups, is inadequate.

Fighting the Russian invasion of a sovereign country is not an act of terrorism, and some may be willing to fight without significant financial incentives. The government should make the rules clear — again, consistent with friends and allies.

Putin says sanctions over Ukraine are like a declaration of war https://t.co/znr6yxpxEG

— BBC News (World) (@BBCWorld) March 5, 2022

Risk of unintended consequences
Despite what Vladimir Putin has suggested, sanctions are not an act of war. They are an unfortunate but sometimes necessary non-military strategy aimed at changing or ending a country’s harmful actions.

But even if New Zealand and other like-minded countries apply maximum pressure through sanctions, there is no guarantee Putin will change his policies.

Sanctions have the best chances of success when a country’s leadership feels affected by the pressure of its own citizens — or in Russia’s case, its oligarch class, as the prime minister hinted.

So, sanctions may work better with Russia than North Korea. But there is also a risk, if Putin starts to feel this pain, that he will respond in unexpected ways.

The only real certainty is significant collateral economic damage — for Russia and the world, including New Zealand. Everyone will see or feel the impact as economic and diplomatic relationships hit turbulence. Right now, however, there is no viable alternative.

Dr Alexander Gillespieis professor of law, University of Waikato. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.