The contest for influence in the Pacific is no longer confined to diplomacy, aid projects or infrastructure.

Increasingly, it is being waged through information, media and communications networks.

A recent report, Understanding China’s Footprint in the Pacific Island Media Landscape, paints a picture of a region where newsrooms are under financial pressure, audiences are migrating online and foreign powers are competing to shape narratives.

• READ MORE: Understanding China’s Footprint in the Pacific Island Media Landscape
• Why Australia’s cuts to news services in the Indo‑Pacific are a failure of soft diplomacy
• Other Pacific media reports

The findings are drawn from a major study conducted by researchers from the Washington DC-based Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a United States non-profit organisation specialising in security, strategic and public policy issues.

The report examined media systems and China’s engagement across 15 Pacific Island countries and territories between 2024 and 2025 through fieldwork, interviews and consultations with media practitioners, academics and policymakers.

The report was launched during a virtual panel discussion on May 20, 2026, featuring presentations by CNA researchers Heidi Holz, Genevieve Collins, John Mahoney and Darlene Onuorah.

They were joined by regional academics Dr Shailendra Singh, associate professor and head of journalism at the University of the South Pacific, and Professor Stephen Noakes, head of politics and international relations at the University of Auckland.

Broader questions
While the report focuses on China’s growing media footprint, it also raises broader questions about the future of journalism, media independence and information sovereignty in Pacific Island countries.

For Fiji, the findings are particularly significant. As one of the region’s largest media markets and a diplomatic hub for the Pacific, Fiji has become a focal point for Chinese engagement through media partnerships, journalist exchanges and government-to-government cooperation.

The report also argues that media organisations across the Pacific are facing some of the most challenging operating conditions in decades.

Researchers found widespread concerns about declining newspaper circulation, shrinking advertising revenues and the growing dominance of social media platforms. One Pacific media practitioner described the situation as “the worst in history” for the region’s media industry, while another said many newsrooms had become a “revolving door” because journalists frequently leave for better-paying jobs.

The report warns that these financial pressures are creating vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit through media assistance, training programmes and content partnerships, making media sustainability not only an economic issue but increasingly a geopolitical one.

At the same time, researchers concluded that China’s overall influence remains limited compared with the longstanding reach and credibility of Australian and New Zealand media organisations.

The report has sparked wider discussion among Pacific media leaders about foreign aid, editorial independence and the long-term sustainability of journalism in the region.

Support for democracy
Dr Singh argues that aid to the media sector is often portrayed as support for democracy and media freedom, but is also shaped by geopolitics, donor interests and soft power.

“Even media aid comes with strings attached, regardless of who the donor is or what they claim,” he said.

According to Dr Singh, the Pacific’s media crisis is not new. The region continues to experience high levels of journalist attrition, while journalism schools that train future reporters receive little attention from major donor-funded media programmes.

He argues that much of the support provided to the media sector is driven by strategic interests rather than long-term capacity building.

Dr Singh’s assessment mirrors one of the CNA report’s central observations — that foreign interest in Pacific media is increasingly being shaped by strategic competition, particularly concerns over China’s growing influence in the region.

Fiji Media Association general secretary Stanley Simpson says the issue is less about who is offering support and more about whether that support responds to the needs of Pacific media organisations.

“Too much ‘let’s help ourselves and give more money to ourselves so we can help the Pacific’ and not enough ‘let’s work with Pacific media so they can help themselves and be our partner’,” he said.

Inconsistent support
Simpson was responding to an article by Australian journalism academic Professor Alexandra Wake of RMIT University, who argued that Australia risks weakening its soft-power influence through inconsistent support for international broadcasting and regional journalism initiatives.

Dr Wake contended that trusted news services remain critical to regional stability, particularly as misinformation spreads and other powers expand their influence.

However, Simpson says the issue is not simply the amount of funding available, but where it is directed.

“We are looking for real funding and support that makes a difference,” he said.

“Not one-sided funding which seems to help Australian organisations more than Fijians.”

He argues that Fiji media organisations have repeatedly sought practical assistance such as cameras, editing equipment, software and broadcast technology, but have often been offered training programmes instead.

His comments highlight a recurring theme in the debate over media aid in the Pacific. While Australia remains one of the region’s most trusted media partners through the ABC and programs such as PACMAS, there is continuing discussion over whether media assistance is sufficiently aligned with Pacific priorities.

Simply struggling
For all the discussion about foreign influence, many Pacific media organisations are simply struggling to survive.

The CNA report notes that declining revenues, digital disruption and staffing shortages have weakened media resilience throughout the region. These challenges were compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and continue to affect both commercial and public-interest journalism.

Dr Singh says this financial pressure helps explain why Pacific organisations increasingly engage with a range of development partners.

While Australia is understandably reluctant to create dependency, he argues that Pacific media systems operate in small markets where economies of scale do not exist and long-term support remains necessary.

To illustrate the situation, Dr Singh cited veteran Tongan publisher and Pacific Islands News Association president Kalafi Moala.

“When you are drowning, you will grab at any hand that is outstretched. You don’t care whether it is China, Australia or America.”

That sentiment may help explain why China’s media engagement efforts have attracted increasing attention.

Digital media
According to the CNA report, China has expanded media cooperation agreements, journalist exchanges, training programmes and diplomatic engagement throughout the Pacific. Fiji has featured prominently in these efforts, including agreements on digital media cooperation and journalist training.

At the same time, the report concludes that Chinese state media outlets still have relatively limited reach among Pacific audiences. Broadcasters such as Australia’s ABC and New Zealand’s RNZ remain among the most trusted international news providers in the region.

Trust, however, cannot be taken for granted.

Simpson argues that Pacific media organisations demonstrated resilience during Fiji’s years of political restrictions and economic hardship, often with limited international support.

“When we were being beaten, threatened and censored, and almost closing down due to political and economic pressure, where was Australian support for the Fiji media?” he asked.

The question challenges traditional development partners to consider whether support for Pacific media has always matched their stated commitment to democratic values and press freedom.

Broader geopolitical contest
As the CNA report makes clear, Pacific media organisations now find themselves at the centre of a broader geopolitical contest.

Foreign governments will continue to compete for influence and aid priorities will continue to be shaped by strategic interests. Yet for Pacific journalists confronting shrinking revenues, digital disruption and rising public expectations, the more pressing issue is sustainability.

The real challenge is not who provides support, but whether that support genuinely strengthens Pacific media organisations, protects editorial independence and helps ensure they remain accountable to the communities they serve.

Alifereti Sakiasi is a journalist with The Fiji Times. Based in Suva, he primarily contributes to The Sunday Times, where he covers a wide array of human interest, social, cultural, and sports events. This article is republished from The Fiji Times with permission.

SPECIAL REPORT: By Ben Bohane

South of Vanuatu, in deep ocean teeming with fish and birdlife, lie two contested islands being fought over by Vanuatu (population 350,000) and France, which has the largest EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) in the world, totalling 11 million square kilometres.

Little wonder Vanuatu is framing this as a “David versus Goliath” fight. Vanuatu calls these islands by their ancient kastom names: Umaenupne and Umaeneg.

On most maps, however, they are called by what British sea captains named them: Matthew and Hunter islands. France has controlled them since 1965.

• READ MORE: France in the Pacific and decolonisation
  
• Other Ben Bohane articles at Asia Pacific Report

France derives much prestige, wealth and a permanent UN Security Council seat thanks to its overseas territories and vast maritime domain, spread across multiple oceans. Now some politicians and security analysts in France are worried these two islands taken from Vanuatu before its independence in 1980 could prompt sovereignty claims in other jurisdictions, from Mexico to Madagascar, if Matthew and Hunter are returned to Vanuatu.

Responding to a story in Le Figaro newspaper that discussed the possibility of French President Emmanuel Macron ceding these islands as a “major symbolic turning point”, French far-right politician Marie Le Pen tweeted in December last year:

“Let’s be clear: national sovereignty is not negotiable and cannot be surrendered. The French people do not expect Macron’s government to carve up our overseas territories, which are real levers of power, influence and economic development, behind their backs, but to give itself the means to protect and defend them.”

Rising in Parliament in late May, Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Jotham Napat issued a response of sorts. He thundered that France was “dragging its feet” on negotiations following two postponements and was withholding relevant historical documents relating to France’s claim.

A commitment, but no resolution
French President Macron agreed to formal negotiations to resolve the issue when he visited Vanuatu in 2023, saying it could be “resolved by Christmas”. He renewed this commitment in a meeting with Prime Minister Napat in July 2025.

Years later, there is still no resolution. PM Napat warned:

“We will not take a passive approach. And we will not abandon our claim. We will defend our sovereignty with determination…
“We have carefully evaluated all of the legal options that are available to us. We are trying the diplomatic pathway, but we are also ready to change strategy as soon as is necessary.”

The escalating rhetoric comes after diplomatic confrontations embroiling France, Vanuatu and Kanaky New Caledonia. A trade delegation from New Caledonia arrived in Port Vila in May to boost economic ties but was quickly overshadowed by a diplomatic spat when one of the delegation, the new president of New Caledonia’s pro-independence FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) movement, Christian Téin, met with Vanuatu’s PM Napat.

Vanuatu has long supported independence for its indigenous “Kanaky” neighbours and meetings between Vanuatu and the FLNKS are quite routine. But when Téin affirmed to the local Daily Post newspaper in a front page splash that “Matthew and Hunter islands belong to Vanuatu” then France’s ambassador weighed in on social media and the New Caledonia government suspended all trade ties with Vanuatu.

Again, this is nothing new — indigenous Kanak chiefs have long recognised Vanuatu’s claims to Matthew and Hunter islands, declaring they had no kastom links to them and France should not have included them as part of New Caledonia, which France did in 1965.

Chiefs signed Keamu Accord
In 2009 Vanuatu and Kanak chiefs signed the Keamu Accord acknowledging that Matthew and Hunter belonged to Vanuatu.

France finds itself battling on three fronts in the Pacific at the moment — rising independence movements in New Caledonia, Tahiti (French Polynesia), and now an increasingly heated dispute with Vanuatu over Matthew and Hunter islands.

Vanuatu claims its southern islanders from Tanna, Aneityum and Futuna were regularly visiting these two disputed islands long before the first European got wet in the Pacific Ocean. These islands weren’t of much interest to British and French ships navigating the seas of the 18th and 19th century due to their small size and remoteness.

Both are volcanic but only Matthew remains an active volcano. Matthew (Umaenupne) was first named by British sea captain Thomas Gilbert in 1788 who named it after the owner of his ship. Gilbert would later bequeath his name to the Gilbert and Ellice islands which today form the nation of Kiribati.

Hunter (Umaeneg) island was named by British captain Thomas Fearn aboard his trading ship Hunter in 1798. It is thought he also named it Hunter to honour Vice-Admiral John Hunter who was then the Governor of NSW in Australia, the second after Arthur Phillip.

Hunter Street in Sydney and the Hunter Valley are similarly named after him.

The dispute over the islands primarily has its origins in the actions of another Australian named Bob Paul, who was a planter and aviation pioneer living on Tanna Island in the 1950s and 1960s, back when Vanuatu was known as the “Condominium of the New Hebrides” and jointly administered by Britain and France.

‘He did a lot for our island’
Today Bob Paul is well remembered by chiefs on Tanna, including Peter Marcel, president of the Nikolaten Council of Chiefs. He told me that “Bob Paul was the first to show us how to run a business, how to run trade stores and bring in tourists. He did a lot for our island”.

In 1962, Paul flew over Matthew and Hunter islands and assessing from his map the two islands had not been claimed by anyone, he decided to claim them for himself and his flying friend Henri Martinet.

“It was a bit of a lark when he claimed them” says Paul’s son Brett from his home in Queensland, who remembers an idyllic childhood growing up on Tanna. “But my father always believed the islands ultimately belong to Vanuatu.”

Paul and Martinet’s claim in 1962 prompted the British and French Resident Commissioners to make inquiries about who the islands belonged to.

The British consulted their Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Admiralty. They also asked France and Australia.

The French then made internal inquiries and concluded that, based on its own internal investigation, France considered the islands to be part of New Caledonia. Britain was content with that view, and together they wrote to the Joint Court to advise that the islands belonged to New Caledonia.

Paul and Martinet’s claim was struck off.

Ni-Vanuatu never consulted
At no stage in the process were any Ni-Vanuatu consulted, so the decision was made by European colonial powers before Vanuatu’s independence. France’s claim to sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter islands has been recognised internationally ever since they were handed to them in 1965.

Vanuatu’s claim is rooted in kastom (culture) and its ancient connections to the islands, long before the first French sailor turned up on their shores. Vanuatu enshrined their own sovereignty over the islands in legislation upon the declaration of their independence.

Many would also argue that any deal done by Britain and France in the colonial period, with no consultation of the Indigenous population, is legally null and void today.

While a European mindset focuses on the strategic and resource value of such islands, what they ignore is the kastom value of these islands to Vanuatu. Matthew and Hunter islands play a crucial role in the kastom and spiritual life of Vanuatu’s southern islanders.

Indeed these islands aren’t just “rocks in the sea” but the home of their god Matjajiki. Chiefs from Vanuatu’s southern islands claim the two islands also contain ancient cemeteries where their ancestors had elected to be buried close to their god Matjajiki and were tabu for any visitors.

More importantly, chiefs say they need Matjajiki as the spirit who brings their food and fish.

“Matjajiki works to bring life to our gardens for six months every year — he is our gardening spirit. After the annual yam harvest he eats the first yam, drinks some kava and goes to rest for the rest of the year on Umaenupne and Umaeneg,” says chief Peter Marcel on Tanna. “Without the power of Matjajiki, nothing would grow.”

Veneration of ancestral spirits
While the islanders all identify as Christian, their veneration of ancestral spirits and the benevolent work of Matjajiki is at the heart of their identity. Magic stones can still be found in their gardens and rituals of thanks still performed through the cycle of yam planting and harvesting.

Matthew and Hunter are important places in the cosmology and some even say survival of southern Vanuatu.

France’s possession of these islands has cut the ability of Ni-Vanuatu from visiting and paying respect to their god. When a boat carrying chiefs in 1983 to plant the Vanuatu flag and perform kastom rituals arrived at the two islands, they were intercepted by a French navy ship and forced to turn around. No chiefs or ships from Vanuatu have been allowed since.

According to Tony Tevi, a geologist who is Vanuatu’s Director of Oceans and Marine Resources, geology and tectonic plates affirm Vanuatu’s ownership since “Matthew and Hunter sit on the Pacific plate, not the Australian plate which New Caledonia is on. Also there are no volcanoes in New Caledonia but plenty here in Vanuatu”.

For him, a further “insult” comes from France conducting military exercises on the islands every year, using a place reserved for the gods as target practice.

“The French military visit every year with their patrol boats to claim ‘effective occupation’ and do their live firing exercises on the very place — the very place! — that for us in Vanuatu is one of the most sacred and important places. That is very unacceptable”.

Vanuatu and France are expected to resume their next round of negotiations, in Paris, at the end of this month.

Ben Bohane is a Vanuatu-based photojournalist, producer and policy analyst who has reported the Asia-Pacific region for nearly 30 years. He has contributed articles to Asia Pacific Report. This article was first published by The Sydney Morning Herald and is republished with the author’s permission.

A New Zealand policy research and advocacy group released a detailed blueprint today for a fresh “independent” Te Tiriti and Pacific-based approach to foreign policy, and called for greater transparency in election year.

The current coalition government has “radically shifted New Zealand’s longstanding foreign policy traditions” — including by moving the country away from a principled defence of its independent values to “unquestioning support” for the actions of the Trump administration, said Te Kuaka spokesperson Dr Marco de Jong.

“New Zealand’s slide under this government towards a tightly aligned, militaristic foreign policy is not inevitable,” he added.

• READ MORE: Other Aotearoa New Zealand foreign policy reports
• Other Te Kuaka reports

Te Kuaka — a group made up of academics such as Dr de Jong and Dr Arama Rata, and lawyers with expertise in international and constitutional law like Fuimaono Dylan Asafo and Gabriella Brayne — released a policy brief, “A Foreign Policy Alternative for the 2026 New Zealand Election”.

The group refers to the need to revitalise “an independent, Te Tiriti-based, Pacific-centred, internationalist foreign policy”.

Last year has witnessed “tumultuous developments in world affairs” such as Israel’s genocide in Gaza, US aggression in Venezuela, and US and Israel waging war on Iran.

Independent values
Te Kuaka’s policy brief says the current government “has radically shifted New Zealand’s longstanding foreign policy traditions”, including by moving NZ away from a principled defence of its independent values and interests towards total, unquestioning support for the actions of the Trump administration.

The brief calls for:

• greater transparency around trade agreements;
• a War Powers Act to ensure parliamentary authorisation for going to war,;
• shifts in New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific towards non-militarisation;
• NZ intervention in support of South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) genocide case against Israel; and
• other changes.

“How New Zealand acts in the world has always mattered,” said Dr de Jong. “And we need our political parties speaking more openly about their plans on how to maintain and strengthen our independent foreign policy.”

The policy brief also calls for New Zealand to take more strident steps in relation to Indigenous self-determination in Kanaky New Caledonia and to support a human rights visit to West Papua.

The coalition government did not have a mandate for this “dramatic repositioning” in support of the Trump administration, Dr de Jong said.

Call for ‘greater clarity’
“Before the coming election we are calling for greater clarity from political parties about what the public can expect to see from them in relation to New Zealand’s position in the world.”

The policy brief notes that Te Tiriti o Waitangi has not been sufficiently honoured in foreign policy, and also proposes formalising requirements for Māori representation alongside official New Zealand delegations to international forums.

“We are in a rupturing world,” said Dr de Jong. “We need to ensure we’re not unthinkingly caught in the riptide of major powers’ priorities, and that instead we chart our own course, appropriate to our histories and our location in the Pacific.”

• Te Kuaka has previously published reports on conflict prevention and peace mediation, New Zealand’s positioning on AUKUS, and civilian casualties and the NZ Defence Force.

French Polynesia’s President Moetai Brotherson says growing global instability is a reminder that Pacific nations must strengthen cooperation within the region.

Speaking to PMN News in an exclusive interview, Brotherson said the Pacific must focus on deeper partnerships with neighbours such as New Zealand to build resilience against external shocks.

“When we see the turmoil in the world, it’s a reminder to us, as all the Pacific Island nations, that our first and foremost vicinity is our region,” Brotherson said.

• READ MORE:  Iran says US, Israel have hit nearly 10,000 civilian sites since war began
• Other Pacific geopolitics reports

“We have to increase cooperation between ourselves to make us more resilient to outside crises.”

Brotherson has held the presidency since 2023 and previously represented French Polynesia’s third constituency in the French National Assembly from 2017.

He made the comments following discussions with New Zealand Foreign Minister Vaovasamanaia Winston Peters during Peters’ visit to French Polynesia.

Peters described the meeting as a unique opportunity to strengthen ties between Pacific neighbours.

“We had a very good, quite unique discussion,” he said.

‘Pretty special’
“Where in the world would you sit down like that, with a president, and have a friendly New Zealand-type discussion, or Pacific-type discussion? It’s pretty special.”

Peters said New Zealand must place greater importance on its relationships in the region.

“We underrate the value of this. Because when we talk about the Pacific, it’s not our backyard like we used to say decades ago,” he said.

“It’s our front yard. And the sooner we understand that, the better.”

Brotherson said the historical, cultural, and genealogical ties between the two nations provided a foundation for closer cooperation.

He said collaboration could cover areas such as climate adaptation, maritime and air connectivity, digital infrastructure, and economic development.

“We have many areas of cooperation that needed to be discussed, and these were the topics that were addressed during our meeting,” he said.

Geopolitical competition
The French Polynesian leader also raised concerns about the growing geopolitical competition in the Pacific, particularly between the United States and China.

“We don’t want to align with anyone. I mean, either China or the US,” he said. “We want to be able to discuss with everyone and to have relationships, be it cultural or economic relationships with everyone.”

The Pacific has become an increasingly contested strategic region in recent years, with China expanding its economic and infrastructure partnerships with several island nations.

The United States and its allies have also increased diplomatic engagement, development funding, and security cooperation.

Climate change remains another major concern, particularly for the low-lying atolls of the Tuamotu archipelago — the world’s largest chain of coral atolls, located in French Polynesia northeast of Tahiti.

The French territory consists of 118 volcanic islands and coral atolls across five archipelagos in the South Pacific. Comprising 78 low-lying atolls (like Rangiroa and Fakarava) spread over 3.1 million sq km, this destination is renowned for its remote, pristine lagoons, world-class scuba diving, and black pearl farming

“They are facing the same issues as Tuvalu or other Pacific island nations that are at the forefront of climate change and the sea level rise,” Brotherson said.

‘Salination of water’
“What we are seeing currently is a salination of the water lentils on those atolls, rendering life very hard. It’s not impossible.

“So water management is going to be a real issue in the upcoming years related to climate change but you also have the coastal erosion that we have to tackle.”

The President of the Government of French Polynesia and the Foreign Minister of New Zealand.

pic.twitter.com/z8QeiVsagB

— Winston Peters (@NewZealandMFA) March 8, 2026

For communities on these low-lying atolls, the impacts of climate change are already being felt through declining freshwater supplies, erosion, and pressure on traditional food sources.

Brotherson also reiterated his support for greater political sovereignty for French Polynesia. He said economic development and resilience must come first.

French Polynesia enjoys a high degree of autonomy under France, which retains control over defence, currency, and aspects of foreign policy.

Brotherson said the pathway toward greater sovereignty must be gradual and carefully managed.

He added that economic resilience will be key before any move toward full independence and said the territory could achieve political sovereignty within the next 10 to 15 years.

“It’s all about interdependencies, that’s how we’re going to build independence. When it comes to strengthening our economy, you know, we still have a lot of work to do on food security, on energy transition, and then we’ll be able to be more confident as a nation.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ and PMN News.

New Zealand protesters have again spotlighted the country’s stake in US space militarisation today and speakers branded Rocket Lab as an alleged key link in the “IDF kill chain” as part of the Gaza genocide.

“Rocket Lab is a celebrated New Zealand success story, with a stated mission to open access to space and improve life on Earth,” said Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa  (PSNA) advocate Brendan Corbett.

“Yet many of its key contracts are with the US military and their suppliers.

• READ MORE: Government increases New Zealand space launch limit to 1000
• Other Rocket Lab reports

“It is driven by share price increases and creating value for shareholders.”

Corbett said the global space militarisation market size was valued at US$61 billion (about NZ$100 billion) in 2025 and was projected to grow from US$66 billion this year to US$116 billion by 2034.

North America dominated space militarisation last year with a market share of more than 40 percent.

‘World war threat’
“The overwhelming majority of our human family are totally appalled at this march to militarisation of space and the threat of world war,” Corbett told the crowd in Te Komititanga Square as they marked the 123rd week of protest over the Gaza genocide.

“But not the war mongering investor class. They make more money.

“Guess what people? Increasing geopolitical rivalry and security threats propels market growth.”

A so-called “ceasefire” came into effect in Gaza on October 10, but since then Israeli violations almost daily have killed 591 Palestinians and wounded 1578 – and children dying at a rate of about two a day — with the besieged enclave facing a severe humanitarian crisis.

Overall, the death toll in the Gaza Strip has topped 72,049 with 171,691 wounded – mostly women and children — since the start of the war, according to Palestinian health authorities.

The government has raised the total number of launches allowed for Rocket Lab at its Mahia launch pad tenfold to 1000, as the cap set at 100 in 2017 is close to being breached.

However, a physics professor at Auckland University, Dr Richard Easther, told RNZ News this week that he did not trust the New Zealand Space Agency to make good decisions while the agency said it had assessed all space activities against clear legislative criteria.

Geopolitical tension
Corbett stressed the increasing geopolitical tension, rivalries and escalating security threats across the globe.

This situation was expected to encourage countries to strengthen space-based defence capabilities.

Military forces of various nations required satellites and space systems to maintain secure communications, surveillance, and navigation under hostile conditions.

“This is the Rocket Lab, Black Sky, Palantir, IDF kill chain,” said Corbett, referring to the Israeli Defence Forces, although critics prefer to characterise IDF as the IOF – “Israeli Offence Forces” in view of Tel Aviv having attacked five countries in the region last year.

“This demand drives procurement of hardened, redundant, and cyber-secure space infrastructure — ”these are the factors contributing to space militarisation market growth”.

Corbett quoted Palantir chief executive officer Alex Karp telling investors in a call last month: “Palantir is here to disrupt and make the institutions we partner with the best in the world, and when it’s necessary to scare our enemies and, on occasion, kill them.”

“Military tech companies no longer pretend they are ethical and humane,” Corbett said.

Space technologies
He explained how space militarisation included deployment and use of space technologies for military applications such as reconnaissance, communications, navigation and so on.

It involved satellites, ground systems and related technologies for defence.

“This is the market niche that fuels Rocket Lab’s business plan,” he said.

Some countries used space and counter-space capabilities and integrated them into regular military exercises.

With space militarisation, countries integrated space assets such as satellites, ground stations, and launch systems into defence operations.

“These factors are driving the overall market growth,” Corbett said. “These are the activities that are driving us to war.”

RIMPAC 2026 exercises
He cited some of the major companies involved, including Lockheed Martin Corporation, Raytheon Technologies — both investors in Rocket Lab — Northrop Gumman Corporation, Airbus Defence and Space, and others.

Other speakers included Kia Ora Gaza activist Patrick O’Dea – who reminded the crowd of nuclear-free protest success in blocking visits by US warships in the 1980s – PSNA’s Neil Scott, and Maire Leadbeater of West Papua Action Tāmaki.

O’Dea challenged the crowd top campaign against New Zealand taking part in the RIMPAC 2026 military exercises in Hawai’i during June to August and “collaborating with the IDF”.

Protesters marched with banners declaring “Break the Rocket Lab kill chain” and “Rocket Lab – death for money” to Queens Wharf where a visiting Norwegian cruise ship Viking Orion (1000 passengers) was moored.

The United States has designated two high-profile public office holders from Palau and the Marshall Islands for “significant corruption”, the US Department of State says.

Palau’s Senate president Hokkons Baules has been designated “for his involvement in significant corruption on behalf of China-based actors,” while the former mayor of the Kili/Bikini/Ejit community in the Marshall Islands Anderson Jibas has been designated “for his involvement in significant corruption and misappropriation of US provided funds during his time in public office”, the department said in a news release.

The designations render Baules, Jibas, and their immediate family members ineligible for entry into the US.

According to the State Department, Baules abused his public position by accepting bribes in exchange for providing advocacy and support for government, business, and criminal interests from China.

“His actions constituted significant corruption and adversely affected US interests in Palau.”

Baules has dismissed the allegations, telling news media last April he was the target of a smear campaign aimed at ruining his name.

The department said Jibas abused his public position “by orchestrating and financially benefiting from multiple misappropriation schemes involving theft, misuse, and abuse of funds from the US-provided Bikini Resettlement Trust”.

Stolen funds
It added Jibas’ actions resulted in most of the funds being stolen from the Kili/Bikini/Ejit people who are survivors and descendants of survivors of nuclear bomb testing in the 1940s and 1950s.

“The theft, misuse, and abuse of the US-provided money for the fund wasted US taxpayer money and contributed to a loss of jobs, food insecurity, migration to the United States, and lack of reliable electricity for the Kili/Bikini/Ejit people.

“The lack of accountability for Jibas’ acts of corruption has eroded public trust in the government of the Marshall Islands, creating an opportunity for malign foreign influence from China and others.”

US laws allow the government to name foreign nationals and their close family if there is strong evidence they were involved in serious corruption or human rights violations.

The designations come at a time of intense strategic competition between the US and China over influence in the Pacific.

Both Palau and the Marshall Islands have Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the US, which grant the US exclusive military access in exchange for economic aid.

“The United States will continue to promote accountability for those who abuse public power for personal gain and steal from our citizens to enrich themselves. These designations reaffirm the United States’ commitment to countering global corruption affecting US interests,” the State Department said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Pacific media are facing one of their most challenging reporting environments in their history, marked by governance issues, political instability, geopolitical pressures and escalating climate threats, while simultaneously grappling with declining revenue streams and threats to their financial survival.

This is highlighted in the inaugural edition of the Pacific Media academic journal, by co-editors, associate professor and head of the University of the South Pacific (USP) Journalism Programme, Dr Shailendra Singh, and co-founder of The Australia Today, Dr Amit Sarwal.

In their editorial, Dr Singh and Dr Sarwal say Pacific media systems — already vulnerable due to their small scale — continue to be hit by the collapse of traditional advertising models that once kept legacy media afloat.

• READ MORE: Inaugural edition of Pacific Media
• Second edition of Pacific Media
• Pacific Media website

They point out that although small and geographically isolated, the regional media have not been spared the ravages of digital disruption, which continues to pose a threat to the media’s traditional advertising-based revenue model. This was compounded by losses from the covid-19 pandemic.

These issues, and more, re-surfaced at the 2024 Pacific International Media Conference in Suva, Fiji. The conference, the first of its kind in 20 years, was hosted by the USP’s School of Pacific Arts, Communication and Education (Journalism), in partnership with the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA), the United States Embassy in Suva and Asia Pacific Media Network.

Selected blind peer reviewed conference papers published in Pacific Media highlight how Pacific news reporting is becoming increasingly complex and contentious, even as newsrooms face unprecedented financial and editorial pressures.

A key question explored at the conference, and a recurring theme in the journal, is how Pacific media are responding to and reporting on the overlapping challenges in the region, which have compounded the long-standing struggles to achieve sustainable development.

In his paper, Frontline media faultlines: How critical journalism can survive against the odds, the journal’s production and managing editor, veteran Pacific journalist and educator Dr David Robie warned that Pacific media face a “plethora of emerging and entrenched problems” — from collapsing business models to the rise of fake news, leadership failures, and political corruption.

Despite reporting on these issues for decades, little progress has been made even as new challenges emerge.

In The History of the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) 1972–2023, Marsali Mackinnon and Kalafi Moala, while paying tribute to the region’s media pioneers, explore enduring questions about the state of Pacific media, especially in the context of digital disruption and revenue losses. They ask whether the industry has lost its vitality and if journalists and media workers still uphold core values like freedom of speech and impartial reporting.

The article, based on their forthcoming book chronicling PINA’s 50-year history, looks at the challenges facing Pacific media — economic, political, technological, and cultural pressures — and examines whether the principles established by postcolonial pioneers in the 1970s have been compromised.

Another paper, Women’s political empowerment in the Asia-Pacific region: The role of social media, by associate professor Baljeet Singh, Dr Singh, Nitika Nand and Shasnil Chand, examines how social media positively influences women’s political empowerment across 20 Asia-Pacific countries. Based on their findings, the authors recommend that regional governments and development partners prioritise improved connectivity and online access in deprived areas as a key strategy to empower women and strengthen their participation in politics and political leadership.

In his paper, Reporting the nuclear Pacific: Facing new geopolitical challenges, journalist and researcher Nic Maclellan revisits the Pacific’s nuclear testing legacy, highlighting the crucial role of journalists in preserving survivors’ stories. He argues that the nuclear threat in the Pacific is far from over and has re-emerged in new forms, requiring sustained media attention and critical reporting.

In his commentary, Behind the Mic: How Sashi Singh’s Talking Point helped shape Fiji’s political landscape, Sashimendra Singh reflects on the impact of his Sydney-based podcast in the lead-up to Fiji’s 2022 General Election. The former Fiji-based broadcaster interviewed key political figures, including Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and the three Deputy Prime Ministers, while they were still in opposition.

Singh’s podcast tackled issues that Fiji’s suppressed national media were reluctant to address and went on to attract a large following. The article demonstrates the growing importance of diaspora media and new media technologies, showing how social media can positively circumvent censorship imposed by national authorities.

In The “Coconut Wireless”: Ways that community news endures and spreads in a news desert, Krista Rados and Brett Oppegaard address the concept of “news deserts” in the Pacific — areas where communities urgently need local information but lack trustworthy sources. This paper highlights the enduring strengths of social media in fostering journalism in remote, sparsely populated, and underdeveloped communities.

Pacific Media, launched last year, succeeds the long-running Pacific Journalism Review, which began at the University of Papua New Guinea in 1994 and was archived after 30 years of publication. PJR is now a public database for research.

The journal is designed by Del Abcede and the series editor is Khairiah A Rahman.

This inaugural edition is a collaboration between USP, the Asia Pacific Media Network (APMN), and Tuwhera Open Access platform, aimed at documenting the rapid transformations shaping journalism in the region — and how Pacific media can navigate an increasingly turbulent future.

Some other key papers include:

• Weaponising the partisan WhatsApp group: The circulation of disinformation and artificial intelligence (AI) content in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election by Mochamad Achir Taher. The paper examines the spread of disinformation partisan messages within a politically aligned WhatsApp group during Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election. The study finds that presidential candidates used social media platforms to distribute biased and misleading content to influence voters.
• Blood on the Tracks: Countering symbolic violence — A case study in reciprocal investigative journalism practice by Bonita Mason. In this paper, she examines a six-year investigation by Australian journalist and First Nations man Allan Clarke into the suspicious death of First Nations teenager Mark Haines. Haines’s family never accepted police claims of suicide. On the 25th anniversary of the death, Clarke, moved by the injustices suffered by the dead man’s family, reignited the investigation.
• Your weather: Digital weather producer WeatherWatch NZ and its Pacific coverage by Melissa Beattie. The paper situates WeatherWatch within the broader digital journalism landscape and then examines its Pacific-focused weekly forecasts in Melanesia and Polynesia.

This article was first published by Wansolwara News and is republished by Asia Pacific Report as a collaboration between the University of the South Pacific and Asia Pacific Media Network.

The signing of the Papua New Guinea-Australia Mutual Defence Treaty — officially known as the Pukpuk Treaty — marks a defining moment in the modern Pacific order.

Framed as a “historic milestone”, the pact re-casts security cooperation between Port Moresby and Canberra while stirring deeper debates about sovereignty, dependency, and the shifting balance of power in the region.

At a joint press conference in Canberra, PNG Prime Minister James Marape called the treaty “a product of geography, not geopolitics”, emphasising the shared neighbourhood and history binding both nations.

• READ MORE: Papua New Guinea may sit out potential conflict between Australia and China despite Pukpuk defence treaty

“This Treaty was not conceived out of geopolitics or any other reason, but out of geography, history, and the enduring reality of our shared neighbourhood,” Marape said.

Described as “two houses with one fence,” the Pukpuk Treaty cements Australia as PNG’s “security partner of choice.” It encompasses training, intelligence, disaster relief, and maritime cooperation while pledging full respect for sovereignty.

“Papua New Guinea made a strategic and conscious choice – Australia is our security partner of choice. This choice was made not out of pressure or convenience, but from the heart and soul of our coexistence as neighbours,” Marape said.

For Canberra, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese cast the accord as an extension of “family ties” – a reaffirmation that Australia “will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with PNG to ensure a peaceful and secure Pacific family.”

Intensifying competition
It comes amid intensifying competition for influence across the Pacific, where security and sport now intersect in Canberra’s broader regional strategy.

The Treaty promises to bolster the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) through joint training, infrastructure upgrades, and enhanced maritime surveillance. Marape conceded that the country’s forces have long struggled with under-resourcing.

“The reality is that our Defence Force needs enhanced capacity to defend our sovereign territorial integrity. This Treaty will help us build that capacity – through shared resources, intelligence, technology, and training,” he said.

Yet, retired Major-General Jerry Singirok, former PNGDF commander, has urged caution.

“Signing a Defence Pact with Australia for the purposes of strengthening our military capacity and capabilities is most welcomed, but an Act of Parliament must give legal effect to whatever military activities a foreign country intends,” Singirok said in a statement.

He warned that Sections 202 and 206 of PNG’s Constitution already define the Defence Force’s role and foreign cooperation limits, stressing that any new arrangement must pass parliamentary scrutiny to avoid infringing sovereignty.

The sovereignty debate
Singirok’s warning reflects a broader unease in Port Moresby — that the Pukpuk Treaty could re-entrench post-colonial dependency. He described the PNGDF as “retarded and stagnated”, spending just 0.38 percent of GDP on defence, with limited capacity to patrol its vast land and maritime borders.

“In essence, PNG is in the process of offloading its sovereign responsibilities to protect its national interest and sovereign protection to Australia to fill the gaps and carry,” he wrote.

“This move, while from face value appeals, has serious consequences from dependency to strategic synergy and blatant disregard to sovereignty at the expense of Australia.”

Former leaders, including Sir Warren Dutton, have been even more blunt: “If our Defence Force is trained, funded, and deployed under Australian priorities, then whose sovereignty are we defending? Ours — or theirs?”

Canberra views the NRL deal not simply as a sporting venture but as “soft power in action” — embedding Australian culture and visibility across the Pacific through a sport already seen as a regional passion.

Marape called it “another platform of shared identity” between PNG and Australia, aligning with the spirit of the Pukpuk Treaty: partnership through shared interests.

However, critics argue the twin announcements — a defence pact and an NRL team — reveal a coordinated Australian effort to strengthen influence at multiple levels: security, economy, and society.

The US factor and overall strategy
The Pukpuk Treaty follows last year’s Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed between Papua New Guinea and the United States, which grants US forces access to key PNG military facilities, including Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.

That deal drew domestic protests over transparency and the perception of external control.

The Marape government insisted the arrangement respected PNG’s sovereignty, but combined with the new Australian treaty, it positions the country at the centre of a US-led security network stretching from Hawai’i to Canberra.

Analysts say the two pacts complement each other — with the US providing strategic hardware and global deterrence, and Australia delivering regional training and operational partnership.

Together, they represent a deepening of what one defence analyst called “the Pacific’s most consequential alignment since independence”.

PNG’s deepening security ties with the United States also appear to have shaped its diplomatic posture in the Middle East.

As part of its broader alignment with Washington, PNG in September 2023 opened an embassy in Jerusalem — becoming one of only a handful of states to do so, and signalling strong support for Israel.

In recent UN votes on Gaza, PNG has repeatedly voted against ceasefire resolutions, siding with Israel and the US. Some analysts link this to evangelical Christian influence in PNG’s politics and to the strategic expectation of favour with major powers.

China has been one of PNG’s longest and most consistent diplomatic partners since formal relations began in 1976.

China’s role in Papua New Guinea is not limited to diplomatic signalling — it remains a major provider of loans, grants and infrastructure projects across the country, even as the strategic winds shift. Chinese state-owned enterprises and development funds have backed highways, power plants, courts, telecoms and port facilities in PNG.

In recent years, PNG has signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and observers count at least 40 Chinese SOEs currently operating in Papua New Guinea, many tied to mining, construction, and trade projects.

While Marape has repeatedly said PNG “welcomes all partners,” the growing web of Western defence agreements has clearly shifted regional dynamics. China views the Pukpuk Treaty as another signal of Canberra and Washington’s determination to counter its influence in the Pacific — even as Port Moresby maintains that its foreign policy is one of “friends to all, enemies to none”.

A balancing act
For Marape, the Treaty is not about choosing sides but strengthening capacity through trust.

“Our cooperation is built on mutual respect, not dominance; on trust, not imposition. Australia never imposed this on us – this was our proposal, and we thank them for walking with us as equal partners,” he said.

He stressed that parliamentary ratification under Section 117 of the Constitution will ensure accountability.

“This is a fireplace conversation between neighbours – Papua New Guinea and Australia. We share this part of the earth forever, and together we will safeguard it for the generations to come,” he added.

The road ahead
Named after the Tok Pisin word for crocodile — pukpuk, a symbol of endurance and guardianship — the Treaty embodies both trust and caution. Its success will depend on transparency, parliamentary oversight, and a shared understanding of what “mutual defence” means in practice.

As PNG moves to ratify the agreement, it stands at a delicate crossroads — between empowerment and dependency, regional cooperation and strategic competition.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Leaders of the three Pacific nations with diplomatic ties to Taiwan are united in a message to the Pacific Islands Forum that the premier regional body must not allow non-member countries to dictate Forum policies — a reference to the China-Taiwan geopolitical debate.

Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, in remarks to the opening of Parliament in Majuro yesterday, joined leaders from Tuvalu and Palau in strongly worded comments putting the region on notice that the future unity and stability of the Forum hangs in the balance of decisions that are made for next month’s Forum leaders’ meeting in the Solomon Islands.

This is just three years since the organisation pulled back from the brink of splintering.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific Islands Forum unity articles

Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu are among the 12 countries globally that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

At issue is next month’s annual meeting of leaders being hosted by Solomon Islands, which is closely allied to China, and the concern that the Solomon Islands will choose to limit or prevent Taiwan’s engagement in the Forum, despite it being a major donor partner to the three island nations as well as a donor to the Forum Secretariat.

China worked to marginalise Taiwan and its international relationships including getting the Forum to eliminate a reference to Taiwan in last year’s Forum leaders’ communique after leaders had agreed on the text.

“I believe firmly that the Forum belongs to its members, not countries that are non-members,” said President Heine yesterday in Parliament’s opening ceremony. “And non-members should not be allowed to dictate how our premier regional organisation conducts its business.”

Heine continued: “We witnessed at the Forum in Tonga how China, a world superpower, interfered to change the language of the Forum Communique, the communiqué of our Pacific Leaders . . . If the practice of interference in the affairs of the Forum becomes the norm, then I question our nation’s membership in the organisation.”

She cited the position of the three Taiwan allies in the Pacific in support of Taiwan participation at next month’s Forum.

“There should not be any debate on the issue since Taiwan has been a Forum development partner since 1993,” Heine said.

Heine also mentioned that there was an “ongoing review of the regional architecture of the Forum” and its many agencies “to ensure that their deliverables are on target, and inter-agency conflicts are minimised.”

The President said during this review of the Forum and its agencies, “it is critical that the question of Taiwan’s participation in Forum meetings is settled once and for all to safeguard equity and sovereignty of member governments.”

The recent series of high-level agreements between Papua New Guinea and France marks a significant development in PNG’s geopolitical relationships, driven by what appears to be a convergence of national interests.

The “deepening relationship” is less about a single personality and more about a calculated alignment of economic, security, and diplomatic priorities with PNG, taking full advantage of its position as the biggest, most strategically placed island player in the Pacific.

An examination of the key outcomes reveals a partnership of mutual benefit, reflecting both PNG’s strategic diversification and France’s own long-term ambitions as a Pacific power.

• READ MORE: Other France in the Pacific reports

A primary driver is the shared economic rationale. From Port Moresby’s perspective, the partnership offers a clear path to economic diversification and resilience.

But many in PNG have been watching with keen interest and asking: how badly does PNG want this?

While Prime Minister James Marape offered France a Special Economic Zone in Port Moresby (SEZ) for French businesses, he also named the lookout at Port Moresby’s Variarata National Park after President Emmanuel Macron drawing the ire of many in the country.

The proposal to establish a SEZ specifically for French industries is a notable attempt to attract capital from beyond PNG’s traditional partners.

Strategically coupled
This is strategically coupled with securing the future of the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project.

Macron’s personal undertaking to work with TotalEnergies to keep the project on schedule provides crucial stability for one of PNG’s most significant economic ventures.

For France, these arrangements secure a major energy investment for its national corporate champion and establish a stronger economic foothold in a strategically vital region between Asia and the Pacific.

In the area of security, the relationship addresses tangible needs for both nations.

PNG is faced with the immense challenge of monitoring a 2.4 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, making it vulnerable to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The finalisation of a Shiprider Agreement with France provides a practical force-multiplier, leveraging French naval assets to enhance PNG’s maritime surveillance capabilities. This move, along with planned defence talks on air and maritime cooperation, allows PNG to diversify its security architecture.

For France, a resident power with Pacific territories like New Caledonia and French Polynesia, participating in regional security operations reinforces its role and commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Elevating diplomatic influence
The partnership is also a vehicle for elevating diplomatic influence.

Port Moresby has noted the significance of engaging with a partner that holds permanent membership on the UN Security Council and seats at the G7 and G20.

This alignment provides PNG with a powerful channel to global decision-making forums. The reciprocal move to establish a PNG embassy in Paris further cements the relationship on a mature footing.

The diplomatic synergy is perhaps best illustrated by France’s full endorsement of PNG’s bid to host a future UN Ocean Conference. This support provides PNG with a major opportunity to lead on the world stage, while allowing France to demonstrate its credentials as a key partner to the Pacific Islands.

This deepening PNG-France partnership does not exist in a vacuum.

It is unfolding within a broader context of heightened geopolitical competition across the Pacific.

The West’s view of China’s rapid emergence as a dominant economic and military force in the region has reshaped the strategic landscape, prompting traditional powers to re-engage with renewed urgency.

increased diplomatic footprint
The United States has responded by significantly increasing its diplomatic and security footprint, a move marked by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Port Moresby to sign the Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Similarly, Australia, PNG’s traditional security partner, is working to reinforce its long-standing influence through initiatives like the multi-million-dollar deal to establish a PNG team in its National Rugby League (NRL), a soft-power exercise reportedly linked to security outcomes.

This competitive environment has, in turn, created greater agency for Pacific nations, allowing them to diversify their partnerships beyond old allies and providing a fertile ground for European powers like France to assert their own strategic interests.

A strong foundation for the relationship is a shared public stance on environmental stewardship. The agreement on the need for rigorous scientific studies before any deep-sea mining occurs aligns PNG’s national policy with a position of environmental caution.

This common ground extends to broader climate action, where France’s commitment to conservation in the Pacific resonates with PNG’s status as a frontline nation vulnerable to climate change.

This alignment on values provides a durable and politically important basis for cooperation, allowing both nations to jointly advocate for climate justice and ocean protection.

For the Papua New Guinea economy, this deepening partnership with France is critically important as it provides high-level stability for the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project and creates a direct pathway for new investment through a proposed SEZ for French businesses.

Vital economic resource
Furthermore, by moving to finalise a Shiprider Agreement to combat illegal fishing, the government is actively protecting a vital economic resource.

For Marape’s credibility in local politics, these outcomes are tangible successes he can present to the nation as he battles a massive credibility dip in recent years.

Securing a personal undertaking from the leader of a G7 nation, gaining support for PNG to host a future UN Ocean Conference, and enhancing national security demonstrates effective leadership on the world stage.

This allows him to build a narrative of a competent statesman who, through “warm, personal relationships”, can deliver on promises of economic opportunity and national security while strengthening his political standing at home.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

How global power struggles are impacting in local communities, culture and sovereignty in Kanaky, New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands and Samoa.

In episode one, The Battlefield, broadcast today, tensions between the United States and China over the Pacific escalate, affecting the lives of Pacific Islanders.

Key figures like former Malaita Premier Daniel Suidani and tour guide Maria Loweyo reveal how global power struggles impact on local communities, culture and sovereignty in the Solomon Islands and Samoa.

• WATCH: The first episode of this new series

The episode intertwines these personal stories with the broader geopolitical dynamics, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of the Pacific’s role in global diplomacy.

Fight for the Pacific, a four-part series by Tuki Laumea and Cleo Fraser, showcases the Pacific’s critical transformation into a battleground of global power.

This series captures the high-stakes rivalry between the US and China as they vie for dominance in a region pivotal to global stability.

The series frames the Pacific not just as a battleground for superpowers but also as a region with its own unique challenges and aspirations.

Republished from Al Jazeera.

The Trump administration might let hundreds of millions of dollars in aid pledged to Pacific island nations during former President Joe Biden’s time in office stand, says New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters.

The Biden administration pledged about $1 billion in aid to the Pacific to help counter China’s influence in the strategic region.

However, Trump last month froze all disbursements of aid by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), for 90 days pending a “review” of all aid spending under his “America First” policy.

• READ MORE: Political analyst hopes NZ, Australia will ‘step up’ over USAID cuts gap
• Other USAID reports

Peters told reporters on Monday after meetings with Trump’s USAID acting head, Peter Marocco, and his national security adviser, Mike Waltz, “more confident” about the prospects of the aid being left alone than he was before.

Peters said he had a “very frank and open discussion” with American officials about how important the aid was for the Pacific, and insisted that they “get our point of view in terms of how essential it is”.

“In our business, it’s wise to find out the results before you open your mouth, but we are looking ahead with more confidence than when we arrived,” Peters said, pushing back against claims that the Trump administration would be “pulling back” from the Pacific region.

“We don’t know that yet. Let’s find out in April, when that full review is done on USAID,” he said. “But we came away more confident than some of the alarmists might have been before we arrived.”

Frenzied diplomatic battle
The Biden administration sought to rapidly expand US engagement with the small island nations of the Pacific after the Solomon Islands signed a controversial security pact with China three years ago.

The deal by the Solomon Islands sparked a frenzied diplomatic battle between Washington and Beijing for influence in the strategic region.

Biden subsequently hosted Pacific island leaders at back-to-back summits in Washington in September 2022 and 2023, the first two of their kind. He pledged hundreds of millions of dollars at both meets, appearing to tilt the region back toward Washington.

The first summit included announcements of some $800 billion in aid for the Pacific, while the second added about $200 billion.

But the region has since been rocked by the Trump administration’s decision to freeze all aid pending its ongoing review. The concerns have not been helped by a claim from Elon Musk, who Trump tasked with cutting government waste, that USAID would be shut down.

“You’ve got to basically get rid of the whole thing. It’s beyond repair. We’re shutting it down,” Musk said in a February 3 livestreamed video.

However, the New Zealand foreign minister, who also met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, said he held out hope that Washington would not turn back on its fight for influence in the Pacific.

“The first Trump administration turned more powerfully towards the Pacific . . .  than any previous administration,” he said, “and now they’ve got Trump back again, and we hope for the same into the future.”

Radio Free Asia is an online news service affiliated with BenarNews. Republished from BenarNews with permission.

Ongoing wars and conflict around the world expose how international law and norms can be co-opted. With the US pulling out again from the Paris Climate Agreement, and other international commitments, this volatility is magnified.

And with the intensifying US-China rivalry in the Pacific posing the real risk of a new “arms race”, the picture becomes unmistakable: the international global order is rapidly shifting and eroding, and the stability of the multilateral system is increasingly at risk.

In this turbulent landscape, the Pacific must move beyond mere narratives such as the “Blue Pacific” and take bold steps toward establishing a set of rules that govern and protect the Blue Pacific Continent against outside forces.

• WATCH: The authors discuss this issue at an ANU Department of Pacific Affairs seminar on 5 March 2025
• Other Pacific geopolitics reports

If not, the region risks being submerged by rising geopolitical tides, the existential threat of climate change and external power projections.

For years, the US and its allies have framed the Pacific within the “Indo-Pacific” strategic construct — primarily aimed at maintaining US primacy and containing a rising and more ambitious China. This frame shapes how nations in alignment with the US have chosen to interpret and apply the rules-based order.

On the other side, while China has touted its support for a “rules-based international order”, it has sought to reshape that system to reflect its own interests and its aspirations for a multipolar world, as seen in recent years through international organisations and institutions.

In addition, the Taiwan issue has framed how China sets its rules of engagement with Pacific nations — a diplomatic redline that has created tension among Pacific nations, contradicting their long-held “friends to all, enemies to none” foreign policy preference, as evidenced by recent diplomatic controversies at regional meetings.

Confusing and divisive
For Pacific nations these framings are confusing and divisive — they all sound the same but underneath the surface are contradictory values and foreign policy positions.

For centuries, external powers have framed the Pacific in ways that advance their strategic interests. Today, the Pacific faces similar challenges, as superpowers compete for influence — securitising and militarising the region according to their ambitions through a host of bilateral agreements. This frame does not always prioritise Pacific concerns.

Rather it portrays the Pacific as a theatre for the “great game” — a theatre which subsequently determines how the Pacific is ordered, through particular value-sets, processes, institutions and agreements that are put in place by the key actors in this so-called game.

But the Pacific has its own story to tell, rooted in its “lived realities” and its historical, cultural and oceanic identity. This is reflected in the Blue Pacific narrative — a vision that unites Pacific nations through shared values and long-term goals, encapsulated in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

The Pacific has a proud history of crafting rules to protect its interests — whether through the Rarotonga Treaty for a nuclear-free zone, leading the charge for the Paris Climate Agreement or advocating for SDG 14 on oceans. Today, the Pacific continues to pursue “rules-based” climate initiatives (such as the Pacific Resilience Facility), maritime boundaries delimitation, support for the 2021 and 2023 Forum Leaders’ Declarations on the Permanency of Maritime Boundaries and the Continuation of Statehood in the face of sea level rise, climate litigation through the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and a host of other rules-based regional environmental, economic and social initiatives.

However, these efforts often exist in isolation, lacking a cohesive framework to bring them all together, and to maximise their strategic impact and leverage. Now must be the time to build on these successes and create an integrated, long-term, visionary, Pacific-centric “rules-based order”.

This could start by looking to consolidate existing Pacific rules: exploring opportunities to take forward the rules through concepts like the Ocean of Peace currently being developed by the Pacific Islands Forum, and expanding subsequently to include something like a “code of conduct” for how Pacific nations should interact with one another and with outside powers.

Responding as united bloc
This would enable them to respond more effectively and operate as a united bloc, in contrast to the bilateral approach preferred by many partners.

Over time this rules-based approach could be expanded to include other areas — such as the ongoing protection and preservation of the ocean, inclusive of deep-sea mining; the maintenance of regional peace and security, including in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflict and demilitarisation; and movement towards greater economic, labour and trade integration.

Such an order would not only provide stability within the Pacific but also contribute to shaping global norms. It would serve as a counterbalance to external strategic frames that look to define the rules that ought to be applied in the Pacific, while asserting the position of the Pacific nations in global conversations.

This is not about diminishing Pacific sovereignty but about enhancing it — ensuring that the region’s interests are safeguarded amid the geopolitical manoeuvring of external powers, and the growing wariness in and of US foreign policy.

The Pacific’s geopolitical challenges are mounting, driven by climate change, shifting global power dynamics and rising tensions between superpowers. But a collective, rules-based approach offers a pathway forward.

Cohesive set of standards
By building on existing frameworks and creating a cohesive set of standards, the Pacific can assert its autonomy, protect its environment and ensure a stable future in an increasingly uncertain world.

The time to act is now, as Pacific nations are increasingly being courted, and before it is too late. This implies though that Pacific nations have honest discussions with each other, and with Australia and New Zealand, about their differences and about the existing challenges to Pacific regionalism and how it can be strengthened.

By integrating regional arrangements and agreements into a more comprehensive framework, Pacific nations can strengthen their collective bargaining power on the global stage — while in the long-term putting in place rules that would over time become a critical part of customary international law.

Importantly, this rules-based approach must be guided by Pacific values, ensuring that the region’s unique cultural, environmental and strategic interests are preserved for future generations.

Sione Tekiteki is a senior lecturer at the Auckland University of Technology. He previously served at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in three positions over nine years, most recently as director, governance and engagement. Joel Nilon is currently senior Pacific fellow at the Pacific Security College at the Australian National University. He previously served at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat for nine years as policy adviser.  The article was written in close consultation with Professor Transform Aqorau, vice-chancellor of Solomon Islands National University. Republished from DevBlog with permission.

More than 400 people have taken to the streets to protest against Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown’s recent decisions, which have led to a diplomatic spat with New Zealand.

The protest, led by Opposition MP and Cook Islands United Party leader Teariki Heather, has taken place outside the Cook Islands Parliament in Avarua — a day after Brown returned from China.

Protesters have come out with placards, stating: “Stay connected with New Zealand.”

• READ MORE:  ‘No areas of concern’, says Cook Islands PM on NZ’s China deal fears
• Cook Islands’ deal with China takes NZ government by surprise
• NZ media in the middle of Asia-Pacific diplomatic drama
• Other Cook islands reports

The protest in Avarua today.    Video: RNZ

Some government ministers have been standing outside Parliament, including Foreign Minister Tingika Elikana.

Heather said he was present at the rally to how how much Cook Islanders cared about the relationship with New Zealand and valued the New Zealand passport.

He has apologised to the New Zealand government on behalf of the Cook Islands government.

Leader of the opposition and Democratic Party leader Tina Browne said she wanted the local passport to be off the table “forever and ever”.

“We have no problem with our government going and seeking assistance,” she said.

“We do have a problem when it is risking our sovereignty, risking our relationship with New Zealand.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark maintains that Cook Islands, a realm of New Zealand, should have consulted Wellington before signing a “partnership” deal with China.

“[Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown] seems to have signed behind the backs of his own people as well as of New Zealand,” Clark told RNZ Pacific.

Brown said the deal with China complements, not replaces, the relationship with New Zealand.

• READ MORE: China deal ‘complements, not replaces’ NZ relationship, says Cook Islands PM
• Other China in Pacific reports
• The Joint Centenary Declaration of 2001

The contents of the deal have not yet been made public.

“The Cook Islands public need to see the agreement — does it open the way to Chinese entry to deep sea mining in pristine Cook Islands waters with huge potential for environmental damage?” Clark asked.

“Does it open the way to unsustainable borrowing? What are the governance safeguards? Why has the prime minister damaged the relationship with New Zealand by acting in this clandestine way?”

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Clark went into detail about the declaration she signed with Cook Islands Prime Minister Terepai Maoate in 2001.

“There is no doubt in my mind that under the terms of the Joint Centenary Declaration of 2001 that Cook Islands should have been upfront with New Zealand on the agreement it was considering signing with China,” Clark said.

“Cook Islands has opted in the past for a status which is not independent of New Zealand, as signified by its people carrying New Zealand passports. Cook Islands is free to change that status, but has not.”

Missing the mark
A Pacific law expert said there was a clear misunderstanding on what the 2001 agreement legally required New Zealand and Cook Islands to consult on.

Brown has argued that New Zealand does not need to be consulted with to the level they want, something Foreign Minister Winston Peters disagrees with.

AUT senior law lecturer and former Pacific Islands Forum policy advisor Sione Tekiteki told RNZ Pacific the word “consultation” had become somewhat of a sticking point:

“From a legal perspective, there’s an ambiguity of what the word consultation means. Does it mean you have to share the agreement before it’s signed, or does it mean that you broadly just consult with New Zealand regarding what are some of the things that, broadly speaking, are some of the things that are in the agreement?

“That’s one avenue where there’s a bit of misunderstanding and an interpretation issue that’s different between Cook Islands as well as New Zealand.”

Unlike a treaty, the 2001 declaration is not “legally binding” per se but serves more to express the intentions, principles and commitments of the parties to work together in “recognition of the close traditional, cultural and social ties that have existed between the two countries for many hundreds of years”, he added.

Tekiteki said that the declaration made it explicitly clear that Cook Islands had full conduct of its foreign affairs, capacity to enter treaties and international agreements in its own right and full competence of its defence and security.

There was, however, a commitment of the parties to “consult regularly”, he said.

For Clark, the one who signed the all-important agreement all those years ago, this is where Brown had misstepped.

Pacific nations played off against each other
Tekiteki said it was not just the Joint Centenary Declaration causing contention. The “China threat” narrative and the “intensifying geopolitics” playing out in the Pacific was another intergrated issue.

An analysis in mid-2024 found that there were more than 60 security, defence and policing agreements and initiatives with the 10 largest Pacific countries.

Australia was the dominant partner, followed by New Zealand, the US and China.

A host of other agreements and “big money” announcements have followed, including the regional Pacific Policing Initiative and Australia’s arrangements with Nauru and PNG.

“It would be advantageous if Pacific nations were able to engage on security related matters as a bloc rather than at the bilateral level,” Tekiteki said.

“Not only will this give them greater political agency and leverage, but it would allow them to better coordinate and integrate support as well as avoid duplications. Entering these arrangements at the bilateral level opens Pacific nations to being played off against each other.

“This is the most worrying aspect of what I am currently seeing.

“This matter has greater implications for Cook Islands and New Zealand diplomatic relations moving forward.”

Protecting Pacific sovereignty
The word sovereignty is thrown around a lot. In this instance Tekiteki does not think “there is any dispute that Cook Islands maintains sovereignty to enter international arrangements and to conduct its affairs as it determines”.

But he did point out the difference between “sovereignty — the rhetoric” that we hear all the time, and “real sovereignty”.

“For example, sovereignty is commonly used as a rebuttal to other countries to mind their own business and not to meddle in the affairs of another country.

“At the regional level is tied to the projection of collective Pacific agency, and the ‘Blue Pacific’ narrative.

“However, real sovereignty is more nuanced. In the context of New Zealand and Cook Islands, both countries retain their sovereignty, but they have both made commitments to “consult” and “cooperate”.

Now, they can always decide to break that, but that in itself would have implications on their respective sovereignty moving forward.

“In an era of intensifying geopolitics, militarisation, and power posturing — this becomes very concerning for vulnerable but large Ocean Pacific nations without the defence capabilities to protect their sovereignty.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown says the deal with China “complements, not replaces” the relationship with New Zealand after signing it yesterday.

Brown said “The Action Plan for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) 2025-2030” provides a structured framework for engagement between the Cook Islands and China.

“Our relationship and engagement with China complements, not replaces, our long-standing relationships with New Zealand and our various other bilateral, regional and multilateral partners — in the same way that China, New Zealand and all other states cultivate relations with a wide range of partners,” Brown said in a statement.

• READ MORE: China confirms ‘in-depth exchange’ with Cook Islands as New Zealand faces criticism for bullying
• Cook Islands signs China deal at centre of diplomatic row with New Zealand
• Other China in Pacific reports

The statement said the agreement would be made available “in the coming days” on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration online platforms.

Brown said his government continued to make strategic decisions in the best long-term interests of the country.

He said China had been “steadfast in its support” for the past 28 years.

“It has been respectful of Cook Islands sovereignty and supportive of our sustained and concerted efforts to secure economic resilience for our people amidst our various vulnerabilities and the many global challenges of our time including climate change and access to development finance.”

Priority areas
The statement said priority areas of the agreement include trade and investment, tourism, ocean science, aquaculture, agriculture, infrastructure including transport, climate resilience, disaster preparedness, creative industries, technology and innovation, education and scholarships, and people-to-people exchanges.

At the signing was China’s Premier Li Qiang and the minister of Natural Resources Guan Zhi’ou.

On the Cook Islands side, was Prime Minister Mark Brown and Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration Tukaka Ama.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson for New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs Winston Peters released a statement earlier on Saturday, saying New Zealand would consider the agreements closely, in light of New Zealand and the Cook Islands’ mutual constitutional responsibilities.

“We know that the content of these agreements will be of keen interest to the people of the Cook Islands,” the statement said.

“We note that Prime Minister Mark Brown has publicly committed to publishing the text of the agreements that he agrees in China.

“We are unable to respond until Prime Minister Brown releases them upon his return to the Cook Islands.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Fiji has reaffirmed its commitment to establishing an embassy in Israel, with plans to open the embassy in Jerusalem, despite global condemnation of Tel Aviv over the war in Gaza.

This announcement came as the Coalition Cabinet prepared to discuss the matter in Suva next week, reports Fiji One News.

Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka made these remarks during a bilateral meeting with Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Sa’ar Gideon Moshe on the sidelines of the 61st session of the Munich Security Conference, which opened yesterday in Germany.

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The discussions between the two leaders focused on deepening the partnership in various areas of mutual interest, including agriculture, security and peacekeeping, and climate action initiatives.

Prime Minister Rabuka expressed gratitude to the Israeli government for their continued support over the years.

Fiji and Israel have maintained diplomatic relations since 1970, and their cooperation has spanned areas such as security, peacekeeping, and climate change.

In recent years, Israeli technology has played a crucial role in Fiji’s efforts to combat climate change.

Invitation to Rabuka to visit Israel
During the meeting, Minister Moshe extended an invitation to Prime Minister Rabuka to visit Israel as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen diplomatic ties.

The Israeli government also expressed readiness to assist Fiji in its plans to establish an embassy in Jerusalem.

Additionally, in response to a request from Prime Minister Rabuka, Minister Moshe offered support for providing patrol boats to enhance Fiji’s fight against illicit drugs.

The last time Israel provided patrol boats to Fiji was in 1987, when four Dabur-class boats were supplied to the Fiji Navy.

Both leaders acknowledged significant opportunities for collaboration and expressed optimism about further strengthening bilateral relations in the future.

Pariah State: Israeli Soldiers Face Arrests and Travel Bans Worldwide

Fiji defies UN, global condemnation of Israel
Asia Pacific Report comments: Fiji has been consistently the leading Pacific country supporting Israel, in defiance of United Nations resolutions and global condemnation of Tel Aviv in the 15-month war on Gaza that has killed at least 47,000 Palestinians — mostly women and children.

Israel currently faces allegations of genocide in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by South Africa and a growing number of other countries, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minster Yoav Gallant are wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Last September, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in a resolution (124-43) that Israel end its “unlawful presence” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and demanded that it withdraw without delay.

Vanuatu was the only Pacific island country to vote for this resolution.

East Jerusalem is planned to become the capital of an independent Palestinian state.

COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle

The country’s leading daily newspaper, The New Zealand Herald, screamed out this online headline by a columnist on February 10: “Should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands?”

The New Zealand government and the mainstream media have gone ballistic (thankfully not literally just yet) over the move by the small Pacific nation to sign a strategic partnership with China in Beijing this week.

It is the latest in a string of island nations that have signalled a closer relationship with China, something that rattles nerves and sabres in Wellington and Canberra.

• READ MORE: Should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands?
• Cook Islands opposition files no-confidence motion against PM
• China: Cook Islands’ relationship with Beijing ‘should not be restrained’
• Cook Islands crisis: Haka with the taniwha or dance with the dragon?
• Explainer: The diplomatic row between New Zealand and the Cook Islands
• Cook Islands’ diplomatic snub to NZ will be noticed – commentator
• Mark Brown on China deal: ‘No need for NZ to sit in the room with us’
• No debt in China deal – Mark Brown
• Mediawatch: NZ media in the middle of Asia-Pacific diplomatic drama
• Other China in Pacific reports

The Chinese have politely told the Kiwis to back off.  Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters that China and the Cook Islands have had diplomatic relations since 1997 which “should not be disrupted or restrained by any third party”.

“New Zealand is rightly furious about it,” a TVNZ Pacific affairs writer editorialised to the nation. The deal and the lack of prior consultation was described by various journalists as “damaging”, “of significant concern”, “trouble in paradise”, an act by a “renegade government”.

Foreign Minister Winston Peters, not without cause, railed at what he saw as the Cook Islands government going against long-standing agreements to consult over defence and security issues.

‘Clearly about secession’
Matthew Hooton, who penned the article in The Herald, is a major commentator on various platforms.

“Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown’s dealings with China are clearly about secession from the realm of New Zealand,” Hooton said without substantiation but with considerable colonial hauteur.

“His illegal moves cannot stand. It would be a relatively straightforward military operation for our SAS to secure all key government buildings in the Cook Islands’ capital, Avarua.”

This could be written off as the hyperventilating screeching of someone trying to drum up readers but he was given a major platform to do so and New Zealanders live in an oxygen-starved media environment where alternative analysis is hard to find.

China and the Cook Islands’ relationship “should not be disrupted or restrained by any third party”, says Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun, as opposition leaders in Rarotonga express a loss of confidence in Prime Minister Mark Brown.

In response to questions from the Associated Press about New Zealand government’s concerns regarding Brown’s visit to Beijing this week, Guo said Cook Islands was an important partner of China in the South Pacific.

“Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1997, our two countries have respected each other, treated each other as equals, and sought common development, achieving fruitful outcomes in exchanges and cooperation in various areas,” he said.

• READ MORE: Cook Islands crisis: Haka with the taniwha or dance with the dragon?
• Explainer: The diplomatic row between New Zealand and the Cook Islands
• Cook Islands’ diplomatic snub to NZ will be noticed – commentator
• Mark Brown on China deal: ‘No need for NZ to sit in the room with us’
• No debt in China deal – Mark Brown
• Mediawatch: NZ media in the middle of Asia-Pacific diplomatic drama
• Other China in Pacific reports

“China stands ready to work with the Cook Islands for new progress in bilateral relations.”

Guo said China viewed both New Zealand and the Cook Islands as important cooperation partners.

“China stands ready to grow ties and carry out cooperation with Pacific Island countries, including the Cook Islands,” he said.

“The relationship between China and the Cook Islands does not target any third party, and should not be disrupted or restrained by any third party.”

Information ‘in due course’
Guo added that Beijing would release information about the visit and the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement “in due course”.

However, Cook Islanders, as well as the New Zealand government, have been left frustrated with the lack of clarity over what is in the deal which is expected to be penned this week.

United Party leader Teariki Heather is planning a protest on February 17 against Brown’s leadership.

He previously told RNZ that it seemed like Brown was “dictating to the people of the Cook Islands, that I’m the leader of this country and I do whatever I like”.

Another opposition MP with the Democratic Party, Tina Browne, is planning to attend the protest.

She said Brown “doesn’t understand the word transparent”.

“He is saying once we sign up we’ll provide copies [of the deal],” Browne said.

“Well, what’s the point? The agreement has been signed by the government so what’s the point in providing copies.

“If there is anything in the agreement that people do not agree with, what do we do then?”

Repeated attempts by Peters
New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs office said Winston Peters had made repeated attempts for the government of the Cook Islands to share the details of the proposed agreement, which they had not done.

Peters’ spokesperson, like Browne, said consultation was only meaningful if it happened before an agreement was reached, not after.

“We therefore view the Cook Islands as having failed to properly consult New Zealand with respect to any agreements it plans to sign this coming week in China,” the spokesperson said.

Prime Minister Brown told RNZ Pacific that he did not think New Zealand needed to see the level of detail they are after, despite being a constitutional partner.

Ocean Ancestors, an ocean advocacy group, said Brown’s decision had taken people by surprise, despite the Cook Islands having had a long-term relationship with the Asia superpower.

“We are in the dark about what could be signed and so for us our concerns are that we are committing ourselves to something that could be very long term and it’s an agreement that we haven’t had consensus over,” the organisation’s spokesperson Louisa Castledine said.

The details that Brown has shared are that he would be seeking areas of cooperation, including help with a new inter-island vessel to replace the existing ageing ship and for controversial deep-sea mining research.

Castledine hopes that no promises have been made to China regarding seabed minerals.

“As far as we are concerned, we have not completed our research phase and we are still yet to make an informed decision about how we progress [on deep-sea mining],” she said.

“I would like to think that deep-sea mining is not a point of discussion, even though I am not delusional to the idea that it would be very attractive to any agreement.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

By the time US President Donald Trump announced tariffs on China and Canada last Monday which could kickstart a trade war, New Zealand’s diplomats in Washington, DC, had already been deployed on another diplomatic drama.

Republican Senator Ted Cruz had said on social media it was “difficult to treat New Zealand as a normal ally . . .  when they denigrate and punish Israeli citizens for defending themselves and their country”.

He cited a story in the Israeli media outlet Ha’aretz, which has a reputation for independence in Israel and credibility abroad.

• READ MORE: Mark Brown on China deal: ‘No need for NZ to sit in the room with us’
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But Ha’aretz had wrongly reported Israelis must declare service in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) as part of “new requirements” for visa applications.

Winston Peters replied forcefully to Cruz on X, condemning Ha’aretz’s story as “fake news” and demanding a correction.

But one thing Trump’s Republicans and Winston Peters had in common last week was irritating Mexico.

His fellow NZ First MP Shane Jones had bellowed “Send the Mexicans home” at Green MPs in Parliament.

Winston Peters then told two of them they should be more grateful for being able to live in New Zealand.

‘We will not be lectured’
On Facebook he wasn’t exactly backing down.

“We . . .  will not be lectured on the culture and traditions of New Zealand from people who have been here for five minutes,” he added.

While he was at it, Peters criticised media outlets for not holding other political parties to account for inflammatory comments.

Peters was posting that as a politician — not a foreign minister, but the Mexican ambassador complained to MFAT. (It seems the so-called “Mexican standoff” was resolved over a pre-Waitangi lunch with Ambassador Bravo).

But the next day — last Wednesday — news of another diplomatic drama broke on TVNZ’s 1News.

“A deal that could shatter New Zealand’s close relationship with a Pacific neighbour,” presenter Simon Dallow declared, in front of a backdrop of a stern-looking Peters.

TVNZ’s Pacific correspondent Barbara Dreaver reported the Cook Islands was about to sign a partnership agreement in Beijing.

“We want clarity and at this point in time, we have none. We’ve got past arrangements, constitutional arrangements, which require constant consultation with us, and dare I say, China knows that,” Peters told 1News.

Passports another headache
Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown also told Barbara Dreaver TVNZ’s revelations last month about proposed Cook Island passports had also been a headache for him.

“We were caught by surprise when this news was broken by 1News. I thought it was a high-level diplomatic discussion with leaders to be open and frank,” he told TVNZ this week.

“For it to be brought out into the public before we’ve had a time to inform our public, I thought was a breach of our political diplomacy.”

Last week another Barabara Dreaver scoop on 1News brought the strained relationship with another Pacific state into the headlines:

“Our relationship with Kiribati is at breaking point. New Zealand’s $100 million aid programme there is now on hold. The move comes after President [Taneti] Maamau pulled out of a pre-arranged meeting with Winston Peters.”

The media ended up in the middle of the blame game over this too — but many didn’t see it coming.

Caught in the crossfire
“A diplomatic rift with Kiribati was on no one’s 2025 bingo card,” Stuff national affairs editor Andrea Vance wrote last weekend in the Sunday Star-Times.

“Of all the squabbles Winston Peters was expected to have this year, no one picked it would be with an impoverished, sinking island nation,” she wrote, in terms that would surely annoy Kiribati.

“Do you believe Kiribati is snubbing you?” RNZ Morning Report’s Corin Dann asked Peters.

“You can come to any conclusion you like, but our job is to try and resolve this matter,” Peters replied.

Kiribati Education Minister Alexander Teabo told RNZ Pacific there was no snub.

He said Kiribati President Maamau — who is also the nation’s foreign minister — had been unavailable because of a long-planned and important Catholic ordination ceremony on his home island of Onotoa — though this was prior to the proposed visit from Peters.

On Facebook — at some length — New Zealand-born Kiribati MP Ruth Cross Kwansing blamed “media manufactured drama”.

“The New Zealand media seized the opportunity to patronise Kiribati, and the familiar whispers about Chinese influence began to circulate,” she said.

She was more diplomatic on the 531pi Pacific Mornings radio show but insistent New Zealand had not been snubbed.

Public dispute “regrettable’
Peters told the same show it was “regrettable” that the dispute had been made public.

On Newstalk ZB Peters was backed — and Kiribati portrayed as the problem.

“If somebody is giving me $100m and they asked for a meeting, I will attend. I don’t care if it’s my mum’s birthday. Or somebody’s funeral,” Drive host Ryan Bridge told listeners.

“It’s always very hard to pick apart these stories (by) just reading them in the media. But I have faith and confidence in Winston Peters as our foreign minister,” PR-pro Trish Shrerson opined.

So did her fellow panellist, former Labour MP Stuart Nash.

“He’s respected across the Pacific. He’s the consummate diplomat. If Winston says this is the story and this is what’s happening, I believe 100 percent. And I would say, go hard. Winston — represent our interests.”

‘Totally silly’ response
But veteran Pacific journalist Michael Field contradicted them soon after on ZB.

“It’s totally silly. All this talk about cancelling $104 million of aid is total pie-in-the-sky from Winston Peters,” he said.

“Somebody’s lost their marbles on this, and the one who’s possibly on the ground looking for them is Winston Peters.

“He didn’t need to be in Tarawa in early January at all. This is pathetic. This is like saying I was invited to my sister’s birthday party and now it’s been cancelled,” he said.

Not a comparison you hear very often in international relations.

In his own Substack newsletter Michael Field also insisted the row reflected poorly on New Zealand.

“While the conspiracy around Kiribati and China has deepened, no one is noticing the still-viable Kiribati-United States treaty which prevents Kiribati atolls [from] being used as bases without Washington approval,” he added.

Kiribati ‘hugely disrespectful’
But TVNZ’s Barbara Dreaver said Kiribati was being “hugely disrespectful”.

In a TVNZ analysis piece last weekend, she said New Zealand has “every right to expect better engagement than it has been getting over the past year.”

Dreaver — who was born in and grew up in Kiribati and has family there — also criticised “the airtime and validation” Kwansing got in the media in New Zealand.

“She supports and is part of a government that requires all journalists — should they get a visa to go there — to hand over copies of all footage/information collected,” Dreaver said.

Kwansing hit back on Facebook, accusing Dreaver of “publishing inane drivel” and “irresponsible journalism causing stress to locals.”

“You write like you need a good holiday somewhere happy. Please book yourself a luxury day spa ASAP,” she told TVNZ’s Pacific Affairs reporter.

Two days later — last Tuesday — the Kiribati government made percent2CO percent2CP-R an official statement which also pointed the finger at the media.

“Despite this media issue, the government of Kiribati remains convinced the strong bonds between Kiribati and New Zealand will enable a resolution to this unfortunate standoff,” it said.

Copping the blame
Another reporter who knows what it’s like to cop the blame for reporting stuff diplomats and politicians want to keep out of the news is RNZ Pacific’s senior journalist and presenter Lydia Lewis.

Last year, Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese questioned RNZ’s ethics after she reported comments he made to the US Deputy Secretary of State at the Pacific Islands Forum in Tonga — which revealed an until-then behind closed doors plan to pay for better policing in the Pacific.

She’s also been covering the tension with Kiribati.

Is the heat coming on the media more these days if they candidly report diplomatic differences?

“There’s no study that says there are more people blaming the media. So it’s anecdotal, but definitely, both the public and politicians are saying the media (are) making a big deal of things,” Lewis told Mediawatch.

“I would put the question back to the public as to who’s manufacturing drama. All we’re doing is reporting what’s in front of us for the public to then make their decision — and questioning it. And there were a lot of questions around this Kiribati story.”

Lewis said it was shortly before 6pm on January 27, that selected journalists were advised of the response of our government to the cancellation of the meeting with foreign minister Peters.

Vice-President an alternative
But it was not mentioned that Kiribati had offered the Vice-President for a meeting, the same person that met with an Australian delegation recently.

A response from Kiribati proved harder to get — and Lewis spoke to a senior figure in Kiribati that night who told her they knew nothing about it.

Politicians and diplomats, naturally enough, prefer to do things behind the scenes and media exposure is a complication for them.

But we simply wouldn’t know about the impending partnership agreement between China and the Cook Islands if TVNZ had not reported it last Monday.

And another irony: some political figures lamenting the diplomatically disruptive impact of the media also make decidedly undiplomatic responses of their own online these days.

“It can be revealing in the sense of where people stand. Sometimes they’re just putting out their opinions or their experience. Maybe they’ve got some sort of motive. A formal message or email we’ll take a bit more seriously. But some of the things on social media, we just take with a grain of salt,” said Lewis.

“It is vital we all look at multiple sources. It comes back to balance and knowledge and understanding what you know about and what you don’t know about — and then asking the questions in between.”

Big Powers and the Big Picture
Kwansing objected to New Zealand media jumping to the conclusion China’s influence was a factor in the friction with New Zealand.

“To dismiss the geopolitical implications with China . . .  would be naive and ignorant,” Dreaver countered.

Michael Field pointed to an angle missing.

“While the conspiracy around Kiribati and China has deepened, no one is noticing the still viable Kiribati-United States treaty which prevents Kiribati atolls being used as bases without Washington approval,” he wrote in his Substack.

In the same article in which Vance called Kiribati “an impoverished, sinking island nation” she later pointed out that its location, US military ties and vast ocean territory make it strategically important.

Questions about ‘transparency and accountability’
“There’s a lot of people that want in on Kiribati. It has a huge exclusive economic zone,” Lewis said.

She said communication problems and patchy connectivity are also drawbacks.

“We do have a fuller picture now of the situation, but the overarching question that’s come out of this is around transparency and accountability.

“We can’t hold Kiribati politicians to account like we do New Zealand government politicians.”

“I don’t want to give Kiribati a free pass here but it’s really difficult to get a response.

“They’re posting statements on Facebook and it really has raised some questions around the government’s commitment to transparency and accountability for all journalists . . .  committed to fair media reporting across the Pacific.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown says New Zealand is asking for too much oversight over its deal with China, which is expected to be penned in Beijing next week.

Brown told RNZ Pacific the Cook Islands-New Zealand relationship was reciprocal.

“They certainly did not consult with us when they signed their comprehensive partnership agreement [with China] and we would not expect them to consult with us,” he said.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific and China reports

“There is no need for New Zealand to sit in the room with us while we are going through our comprehensive agreement with China.

“We have advised them on the matter, but as far as being consulted and to the level of detail that they were requiring, I think that’s not a requirement.”

Brown is going to China from February 10-14 to sign the “Joint Action Plan for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”.

The Cook Islands operates in free association with New Zealand. It means the island nation conducts its own affairs, but Aotearoa needs to assist when it comes to foreign affairs, disasters, and defence.

NZ seeks more consultation
New Zealand is asking for more consultation over what is in the China deal.

Foreign Minister Winston Peters said neither New Zealand nor the Cook Island people knew what was in the agreement.

“The reality is we’ve been not told [sic] what the nature of the arrangements that they seek in Beijing might be,” he told RNZ Morning Report on Friday.

In 2023, China and Solomon Islands signed a deal on police cooperation as part of an upgrade of their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”.

Brown said he had assured New Zealand “over and over” that there would be no impact on the countries’ relationship and “no surprises”, especially on security aspects.

“But the contents of this agreement is something that our team are working on with our Chinese counterparts, and it is something that we will announce and provide once it is signed off.”

He said it was similar to an agreement New Zealand had signed with China in 2014.

Deep sea mining research
Brown said the agreement was looking for areas of cooperation, with deep sea mining research being one area.

However, he said the immediate area that the Cook Islands wanted help with was a new interisland vessel to replace the existing ageing ship.

Brown has backed down from his controversial passport proposal after facing pressure from New Zealand.

He said the country “would essentially punish any Cook Islander that would seek a Cook Islands passport” by passing new legislation that would not allow them to also hold a New Zealand passport.

“To me that is a something that we cannot engage in for the security of our Cook Islands people.

“Whether that is seen as overstepping or not, that is a position that New Zealand has taken.”

A spokesperson for Peters said the two nations did “not see eye to eye” on a number of issues.

Relationship ‘very good’
However, Brown said he always felt the relationship was very good.

“We can agree to disagree in certain areas and as mature nation states do, they do have points of disagreement, but it doesn’t mean that the relationship has in any way broken down.”

On Christmas Day, a Cook Islands-flagged vessel carrying Russian oil was seized by Finnish authorities. It is suspected to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet and cutting underwater power cables in the Baltic Sea near Finland.

Peters’ spokesperson said the Cook Islands shipping registry was an area of disagreement between the two countries.

Brown said the government was working with Maritime Cook Islands and were committed with aligning with international sanctions against Russia.

When asked how he could be aligned with sanctions when the Cook Islands flagged the tanker Eagle S, Brown said it was still under investigation.

“We will wait for the outcomes of that investigation, and if it means the amendments and changes, which I expect it will, to how the ship’s registry operates then we will certainly look to make those amendments and those changes.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

It didn’t come as a surprise to see President Donald Trump sign executive orders to again pull out of the Paris Agreement, or from the World Health Organisation, but the immediate suspension of US international aid has compounded the impact beyond what was imagined possible.

The slew of executive orders signed within hours of Trump re-entering the White House and others since have caused consternation for Pacific leaders and communities and alarm for those operating in the region.

Since Trump was last in power, US engagement in the Pacific has increased dramatically. We have seen new embassies opened, the return of Peace Corps volunteers, high-level summits in Washington and more.

• READ MORE: Trump 2.0 chaos and destruction — what it means Down Under
• Other Donald Trump reports

All the officials who have been in the region and met with Pacific leaders and thinkers will know that climate change impacts are the name of the game when it comes to security.

It is encapsulated in the Boe Declaration signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018 as their number one existential threat and has been restated many times since.

Now it is hard to see how US diplomats and administration representatives can expect to have meaningful conversations with their Pacific counterparts, if they have nothing to offer when it comes to the region’s primary security threat.

The “on again, off again” approach to cutting carbon emissions and providing climate finance does not lend itself to convincing sceptical Pacific leaders that the US is a trusted friend here for the long haul.

Pacific response muted
Trump’s climate scepticism is well-known and the withdrawal from Paris had been flagged during the campaign. The response from leaders within the Pacific islands region has been somewhat muted, with a couple of exceptions.

Vanuatu Attorney-General Kiel Loughman called it out as “bad behaviour”. Meanwhile, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape has sharply criticised Trump, “urging” him to reconsider his decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement, and plans to rally Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders to stand with him.

It is hard to see how this will have much effect.

The withdrawal from the World Health Organisation – to which the US provides US$500 million or about 15 percent of its annual budget – creates a deep funding gap.

In 2022, the Lowy Pacific aid map recorded that the WHO disbursed US$9.1 million in the Pacific islands across 320 projects. It contributes to important programmes that support health systems in the region.

In addition, the 90-day pause on disbursement of aid funding while investments are reviewed to ensure that they align with the president’s foreign policy is causing confusion and distress in the region.

Perhaps now the time has come to adopt a more transactional approach. While this may not come easily to Pacific diplomats, the reality is that this is how everyone else is acting and it appears to be the geopolitical language of the moment.

Meaningful commitment opportunities
So where the US seeks a security agreement or guarantee, there may be an opportunity to tie it to climate change or other meaningful commitments.

When it comes to the PIF, the intergovernmental body representing 18 states and territories, Trump’s stance may pose a particular problem.

The PIF secretariat is currently undertaking a Review of Regional Architecture. As part of that, dialogue partners including the US are making cases for whether they should be ranked as “Strategic Partners” [Tier 1] or “Sector Development Partners [Tier 2].

It is hard to see how the US can qualify for “strategic partner” status given Trump’s rhetoric and actions in the last week. But if the US does not join that club, it is likely to cede space to China which is also no doubt lobbying to be at the “best friends” table.

With the change in president comes the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He was previously known for having called for the US to cut all its aid to Solomon Islands when then Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare announced this country’s switch in diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.

It is to be hoped that since then Rubio has learned that this type of megaphone diplomacy is not welcome in this part of the world.

Since taking office, he has made little mention of the Pacific islands region. In a call with New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters they “discussed efforts to enhance security cooperation, address regional challenges, and support for the Pacific Islands.”

It is still early days, a week is a long time in politics and there remain many “unknown unknowns”. What we do know is that what happens in Washington during the next four years will have global impacts, including in the Pacific. The need now for strong Pacific leadership and assertive diplomacy has never been greater.

Dr Tess Newton Cain is a principal consultant at Sustineo P/L and adjunct associate professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. She is a former lecturer at the University of the South Pacific and has more than 25 years of experience working in the Pacific islands region. This article was first published by BenarNews and is republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

Indonesia officially joined the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — consortium last week marking a significant milestone in its foreign relations.

In a statement released a day later on January 7, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that this membership reflected Indonesia’s dedication to strengthening multilateral cooperation and its growing influence in global politics.

The ministry highlighted that joining BRICS aligned with Indonesia’s independent and proactive foreign policy, which seeks to maintain balanced relations with major powers while prioritising national interests.

• READ MORE: Indonesia joins BRICS group of emerging economies
• Other West Papua independence reports

This pivotal move showcases Jakarta’s efforts to enhance its international presence as an emerging power within a select group of global influencers.

Traditionally, Indonesia has embraced a non-aligned stance while bolstering its military and economic strength through collaborations with both Western and Eastern nations, including the United States, China, and Russia.

By joining BRICS, Indonesia clearly signals a shift from its non-aligned status, aligning itself with a coalition of emerging powers poised to challenge and redefine the existing global geopolitical landscape dominated by a Western neoliberal order led by the United States.

Indonesia joining boosts BRICS membership to 10 countres — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — but there are also partnerships.

Supporters of a multipolar world, championed by China, Russia, and their allies, may view Indonesia’s entry into BRICS as a significant victory.

In contrast, advocates of the US-led unipolar world, often referred to as the “rules-based international order” are likely to see Indonesia’s decision as a regrettable shift that could trigger retaliatory actions from the United States.

The future will determine how Indonesia balances its relations with these two superpowers. However, there is considerable concern about the potential fallout for Indonesia from its long-standing US allies.

The smaller Pacific Island nations, which Indonesia has been endeavouring to win over in a bid to thwart support for West Papuan independence, may also become entangled in the crosshairs of geostrategic rivalries, and their response to Indonesia’s membership in the BRICS alliance will prove critical for the fate of West Papua.

Critical questions
The crucial questions facing the Pacific Islanders are perhaps related to their loyalties: are they aligning themselves with Beijing or Washington, and in what ways could their decisions influence the delicate balance of power in the ongoing competition between great powers, ultimately altering the Melanesian destiny of the Papuan people?

For the Papuans, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS or any other global or regional forums is irrelevant as long as the illegal occupation of their land continues driving them toward “extinction”.

The pressing question for Papuans is which force will ultimately dismantle Indonesia’s unlawful hold on their sovereignty.

Will Indonesia’s BRICS alliance open new paths for Papuan liberation fighters to re-engage with the West in ways not seen since the Cold War? Or does this membership indicate a deeper entrenchment of Papuans’ fate within China’s influence — making it almost impossible for any dream of Papuans’ independence?

While forecasting future with certainty is difficult on these questions, these critical critical questions need to be considered in this new complex geopolitical landscape, as the ultimate fate of West Papua is what is truly at stake here.

Strengthening Indonesia’s claims over West Papuan sovereignty
Indonesia’s membership in BRICS may signify a great victory for those advocating for a multipolar world, challenging the hegemony of Western powers led by the United States.

This membership could augment Indonesia’s capacity to frame the West Papuan issue as an internal matter among BRICS members within the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

Such backing could provide Jakarta with a cushion of diplomatic protection against international censure, particularly from Western nations regarding its policies in West Papua.

However, it is also crucial to note that for more than six decades, despite the Western world priding itself on being a champion of freedom and human rights, no nation has been permitted to voice concern or hold Indonesia accountable for the atrocities committed against Indigenous Papuans.

The pressing question to consider is what or who silences the 193 member states of the UN from intervening to save the Papuans from potential eradication at the hands of Indonesia.

Is it the United States and its allies, or is it China, Russia, and their allies — or the United Nations itself?

Indonesia’s double standard and hypocrisy
Indonesia’s support for Palestine bolsters its image as a defender of international law and human rights in global platforms like the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

This commitment was notably highlighted at the BRICS Summit in October 2024, where Indonesia reaffirmed its dedication to Palestinian self-determination and called for global action to address the ongoing conflict in line with international law and UN resolutions, reflecting its constitutional duty to oppose colonialism.

Nonetheless, Indonesia’s self-image as a “saviour for the Palestinians” presents a rather ignoble facade being promoted in the international diplomatic arena, as the Indonesian government engages in precisely the same behaviours it condemns Israel over in Palestine.

Military engagement and regional diplomacy
Moreover, Indonesia’s interaction with Pacific nations serves to perpetuate a façade of double standards — on one hand, it endeavours to portray itself as a burgeoning power and a champion of moral causes concerning security issues, human rights, climate change, and development; while on the other, it distracts the communities and nations of Oceania — particularly Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, which have long supported the West Papua independence movement — from holding Indonesia accountable for its transgressions against their fellow Pacific Islanders in West Papua.

On October 10, 2024, Brigadier-General Mohamad Nafis of the Indonesian Defence Ministry unveiled a strategic initiative intended to assert sovereignty claims over West Papua. This plan aims to foster stability across the Pacific through enhanced defence cooperation and safeguarding of territorial integrity.

The efforts to expand influence are characterised by joint military exercises, defence partnerships, and assistance programmes, all crafted to address common challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters.

However, most critically, Indonesia’s engagement with Pacific Island nations aims to undermine the regional solidarity surrounding West Papua’s right to self-determination.

This involvement encapsulates infrastructure initiatives, defence training, and financial diplomacy, nurturing goodwill while aligning the interests of Pacific nations with Indonesia’s geopolitical aspirations.

Indonesia has formally joined the BRICS group, a bloc of emerging economies featuring Russia, China and others that is viewed as a counterweight to the West https://t.co/WArU5O2PfT pic.twitter.com/IQKmPOJqlS

— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) January 7, 2025

Military occupation in West Papua
As Indonesia strives to galvanise international support for its territorial integrity, the military presence in West Papua has intensified significantly, instilling widespread fear among local Papuan communities due to heightened deployments, surveillance, and restrictions.

Indonesian forces have been mobilised to secure economically strategic regions, including the Grasberg mine, which holds some of the world’s largest gold and copper reserves.

These operations have resulted in the displacement of Indigenous communities and substantial environmental degradation.

As of December 2024, approximately 83,295 individuals had been internally displaced in West Papua due to armed conflicts between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua Liberation Army (TPNPB).

Recent reports detail new instances of displacement in the Tambrauw and Pegunungan Bintang regencies following clashes between the TPNPB and security forces. Villagers have evacuated their homes in fear of further military incursions and confrontations, leaving many in psychological distress.

The significant increase in Indonesia’s military presence in West Papua has coincided with demographic shifts that jeopardise the survival of Indigenous Papuans.

Government transmigration policies and large-scale agricultural initiatives, such as the food estate project in Merauke, have marginalised Indigenous communities.

These programmes, aimed at ensuring national food security, result in land expropriation and cultural erosion, threatening traditional Papuan lifestyles and identities.

For more than 63 years, Indonesia has occupied West Papua, subjecting Indigenous communities to systemic marginalisation and brink of extinction. Traditional languages, oral histories, and cultural values face obliteration under Indonesia’s colonial occupation.

A glimmer of hope for West Papua
Despite these formidable challenges, solidarity movements within the Pacific and global communities persist in their advocacy for West Papua’s self-determination.

These groups, united by a shared sense of humanity and justice, work tirelessly to maintain hope for West Papua’s liberation. Even so, Indonesia’s diplomatic engagement with Pacific nations, characterised by eloquent rhetoric and military alliances, represents a calculated endeavour to extinguish this fragile hope for Papuan liberation.

Indonesia’s membership in BRICS will either amplify this tiny hope of salvation within the grand vision of a new world re-engineered by Beijing’s BRICS and its allies or will it conceal West Papua’s independence dream on a path that is even harder and more impossible to achieve than the one they have been on for 60 years under the US-led unipolar world system.

Most significantly, it might present a new opportunity for Papuan liberation fighters to reengage with the new re-ordering global superpowers– a chance that has eluded them for more than 60 years.

From the 1920s to the 1960s, the tumult of the First and Second World Wars, coupled with the ensuing cries for decolonisation from nations subjugated by Western powers and Cold War tensions, forged the very existence of the nation known as “Indonesia.”

It seems that this turbulent world of uncertainty is upon us, reshaping a new global landscape replete with new alliances and adversaries, harbouring conflicting visions of a new world. Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS in 2025 is a clear testament to this.

The pressing question remains whether this membership will ultimately precipitate Indonesia’s disintegration as the US-led unipolar world intervenes in its domestic affairs or catalyse its growth and strength.

Regardless of the consequences, the fundamental existential question for the Papuans is whether they, along with their global solidarity networks, can reinvent themselves while nurturing the fragile hope of restoring West Papua’s sovereignty in a world rife with change and uncertainty?

Ali Mirin is a West Papuan academic and writer from the Kimyal tribe of the highlands bordering the Star mountain region of Papua New Guinea. He lives in Australia and contributes articles to Asia Pacific Report.

COMMENTARY: By Tess Newton Cain

Vanuatu’s devastating earthquake and dramatic political developments in Tonga and New Caledonia at the end of 2024 set the tone for the coming year in the Pacific.

The incoming Trump administration adds another level of uncertainty, ranging from the geostrategic competition with China and the region’s resulting militarisation through to the U.S. response to climate change.

And decolonisation for a number of territories in the Pacific will remain in focus as the region’s largest country celebrates its 50th anniversary of independence.

The deadly 7.3 earthquake that struck Port Vila on December 17 has left Vanuatu reeling. As the country moves from response to recovery, the full impacts of the damage will come to light.

The economic hit will be significant, with some businesses announcing that they will not open until well into the New Year or later.

Amid the physical carnage there’s Vanuatu’s political turmoil, with a snap general election triggered in November before the disaster struck to go ahead on January 16.

On Christmas Eve a new prime minister was elected in Tonga. ‘Aisake Valu Eke is a veteran politician, who has previously served as Minister of Finance. He succeeded Siaosi Sovaleni who resigned suddenly after a prolonged period of tension between his office and the Tongan royal family.

Eke takes the reins as Tonga heads towards national elections, due before the end of November. He will likely want to keep things stable and low key between now and then.

Fall of New Caledonia government
In Kanaky New Caledonia, the resignation of the Calédonie Ensemble party — also on Christmas Eve — led to the fall of the French territory’s government.

After last year’s violence and civil disorder – that crippled the economy but stopped a controversial electoral reform — the political turmoil jeopardises about US$77 million (75 million euro) of a US$237 million recovery funding package from France.

In addition, and given the fall of the Barnier government in Paris, attempts to reach a workable political settlement in New Caledonia are likely to be severely hampered, including any further movement to secure independence.

In France’s other Pacific territory, the government of French Polynesia is expected to step up its campaign for decolonisation from the European power.

Possibly the biggest party in the Pacific in 2025 will be the 50th anniversary of Papua New Guinea’s independence from Australia, accompanied hopefully by some reflection and action about the country’s future.

Eagerly awaited also will be the data from the country’s flawed census last year, due for release on the same day — September 16. But the celebrations will also serve as a reminder of unfinished self-determination business, with its Autonomous Region of Bougainville preparing for their independence declaration in the next two years.

The shadow of geopolitics looms large in the Pacific islands region. There is no reason to think that will change this year.

Trump administration unkowns
A significant unknown is how the incoming Trump administration will alter policy and funding settings, if at all. The current (re)engagement by the US in the region started with Trump during his first incumbency. His 2019 meeting with the then leaders of the compact states — Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands — at the White House was a pivotal moment.

Under Biden, billions of dollars have been committed to “securitise” the region in response to China. This year, we expect to see US marines start to transfer in numbers from Okinawa to Guam.

However, given Trump’s history and rhetoric when it comes to climate change, there is some concern about how reliable an ally the US will be when it comes to this vital security challenge for the region.

The last time Trump entered the White House, he withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement and he is widely expected to do the same again this time around.

In addition to polls in Tonga and Vanuatu, elections will be held in the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia and for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.

There will also be a federal election in Australia, the biggest aid donor in the Pacific, and a change in government will almost certainly have impacts in the region.

Given the sway that the national security community has on both sides of Australian politics, the centrality of Pacific engagement to foreign policy, particularly in response to China, is unlikely to change.

Likely climate policy change
How that manifests could look quite different under a conservative Liberal/National party government. The most likely change is in climate policy, including an avowed commitment to invest in nuclear power.

A refusal to shift away from fossil fuels or commit to enhanced finance for adaptation by a new administration could reignite tensions within the Pacific Islands Forum that have, to some extent, been quietened under Labor’s Albanese government.

Who is in government could also impact on the bid to host COP31 in 2026, with a decision between candidates Turkey and Australia not due until June, after the poll.

Pacific leaders and advocates face a systemic challenge regarding climate change. With the rise in conflict and geopolitical competition, the global focus on the climate crisis has weakened. The prevailing sense of disappointment over COP29 last year is likely to continue as partners’ engagement becomes increasingly securitised.

A major global event for this year is the Oceans Summit which will be held in Nice, France, in June. This is a critical forum for Pacific countries to take their climate diplomacy to a new level and attack the problem at its core.

In 2023, the G20 countries were responsible for 76 percent of global emissions. By capitalising on the geopolitical moment, the Pacific could nudge the key players to greater ambition.

Several G20 countries are seeking to expand and deepen their influence in the region alongside the five largest emitters — China, US, India, Russia, and Japan — all of which have strategic interests in the Pacific.

Given the increasingly transactional nature of Pacific engagement, 2025 should present an opportunity for Pacific governments to leverage their geostrategic capital in ways that will address human security for their peoples.

Dr Tess Newton Cain is a principal consultant at Sustineo P/L and adjunct associate professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. She is a former lecturer at the University of the South Pacific and has over 25 years of experience working in the Pacific islands region. The views expressed here are hers, not those of BenarNews/RFA. Republished from BenarNews with permission.

The A$140 million aid agreement between Australia and Nauru signed last week is a prime example of the geopolitical tightrope vulnerable Pacific nations are walking in the 21st century.

The deal provides Nauru with direct budgetary support, stable banking services, and policing and security resources. In return, Australia will have the right to veto any pact Nauru might make with other countries — namely China.

The veto terms are similar to the “Falepili Union” between Australia and Tuvalu signed late last year, which granted Tuvaluans access to Australian residency and climate mitigation support, in exchange for security guarantees.

• READ MORE: Pacific police chiefs open Australian base for regional rapid deployment force

And just last week, more details emerged about a defence deal between the United States and Papua New Guinea, now revealed to be worth US$864 million.

In exchange for investment in military infrastructure development, training and equipment, the US gains unrestricted access to six ports and airports.

Also last week, PNG signed a 10-year, A$600 million deal to fund its own team in Australia’s NRL competition. In return, “PNG will not sign a security deal that could allow Chinese police or military forces to be based in the Pacific nation”.

These arrangements are all emblematic of the geopolitical tussle playing out in the Pacific between China and the US and its allies.

This strategic competition is often framed in mainstream media and political commentary as an extension of “the great game” played by rival powers. From a traditional security perspective, Pacific nations can be depicted as seeking advantage to leverage their own development priorities.

But this assumption that Pacific governments are “diplomatic price setters”, able to play China and the US off against each other, overlooks the very real power imbalances involved.

The risk, as the authors of one recent study argued, is that the “China threat” narrative becomes the justification for “greater Western militarisation and economic dominance”. In other words, Pacific nations become diplomatic price takers.

Defence diplomacy
Pacific nations are vulnerable on several fronts: most have a low economic base and many are facing a debt crisis. At the same time, they are on the front line of climate change and rising sea levels.

The costs of recovering from more frequent extreme weather events create a vicious cycle of more debt and greater vulnerability. As was reported at this year’s United Nations COP29 summit, climate financing in the Pacific is mostly in the form of concessional loans.

The Pacific is already one of the world’s most aid-reliant regions. But considerable doubt has been expressed about the effectiveness of that aid when recipient countries still struggle to meet development goals.

At the country level, government systems often lack the capacity to manage increasing aid packages, and struggle with the diplomatic engagement and other obligations demanded by the new geopolitical conditions.

In August, Kiribati even closed its borders to diplomats until 2025 to allow the new government “breathing space” to attend to domestic affairs.

In the past, Australia championed governance and institutional support as part of its financial aid. But a lot of development assistance is now skewed towards policing and defence.

Australia recently committed A$400 million to the Pacific Policing Initiative, on top of a host of other security-related initiatives. This is all part of an overall rise in so-called “defence diplomacy”, leading some observers to criticise the politicisation of aid at the expense of the Pacific’s most vulnerable people.

Lack of good faith
At the same time, many political parties in Pacific nations operate quite informally and lack comprehensive policy manifestos. Most governments lack a parliamentary subcommittee that scrutinises foreign policy.

The upshot is that foreign policy and security arrangements can be driven by personalities rather than policy priorities, with little scrutiny. Pacific nations are also susceptible to corruption, as highlighted in Transparency International’s 2024 Annual Corruption Report.

Writing about the consequences of the geopolitical rivalry in the Solomon Islands, Transparency Solomon Islands executive director Ruth Liloqula wrote:

Since 2019, my country has become a hotbed for diplomatic tensions and foreign interference, and undue influence.

Similarly, Pacific affairs expert Distinguished Professor Steven Ratuva has argued the Australia–Tuvalu agreement was one-sided and showed a “lack of good faith”.

Behind these developments, of course, lies the evolving AUKUS security pact between Australia, the US and United Kingdom, a response to growing Chinese presence and influence in the “Indo-Pacific” region.

The response from Pacific nations has been diplomatic, perhaps from a sense they cannot “rock the submarine” too much, given their ties to the big powers involved. But former Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Meg Taylor has warned:

Pacific leaders were being sidelined in major geopolitical decisions affecting their region and they need to start raising their voices for the sake of their citizens.

While there are obvious advantages that come with strategic alliances, the tangible impacts for Pacific nations remain negligible. As the UN’s Asia and the Pacific progress report on sustainable development goals states, not a single goal is on track to be achieved by 2030.

Unless these partnerships are grounded in good faith and genuine sustainable development, the grassroots consequences of geopolitics-as-usual will not change.

Dr Sione Tekiteki, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Auckland University of Technology. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Northern Marianas Governor Arnold Palacios and Senator Celina Babauta have travelled to Guam to attend a luncheon with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.

Taiwan is officially known as the Republic of China (Taiwan). China claims Taiwan as its own territory, with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan strongly disputes.

Palacios welcomed the opportunity to meet Lai and said this could pave the way for improved relations with the East Asian country.

• READ MORE: Other Taiwan and the Pacific reports

“This meeting is an opportunity for the CNMI to foster relations with allies in the region.”

When asked if meeting the President would upset the People’s Republic of China, which considers Taiwan a rogue state and part of its territory, Palacios said: “As far as being in the crosshairs of China, we already are in many ways.”

Worldwide, a dozen countries maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taipei.

In January, Nauru cut ties with Taiwan and shifted its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing.

As the US election unfolds, American territories such as the Northern Marianas, American Samoa, and Guam, along with the broader Pacific region, will be watching the developments.

As the question hangs in the balance of whether the White House remains blue with Kamala Harris or turns red under Donald Trump, academics, New Zealand’s US ambassador, and Guam’s Congressman have weighed in on what the election means for the Pacific.

Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles said it would no doubt have an impact on small island nations facing climate change and intensified geopolitics, including the rapid expansion of military presence on its territory Guam, following the launch of an interballistic missile by China.

• READ MORE: Voiceless Guam feels ‘injustice’ of US presidential non-vote
• Other US elections reports

Pacific leaders lament the very real security threat of climate-induced natural disasters has been overshadowed by the tug-of-war between China and the US in what academics say is “control and influence” for the contested region.

Dr Powles said it came as “no surprise” that countries such as New Zealand and Australia had increasingly aligned with the US, as the Biden administration had been leveraging strategic partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan since 2018.

Despite China being New Zealand’s largest trading partner, New Zealand is in the US camp and must pay attention, she said.

“We are not seeing enough in the public domain or discussion by government with the New Zealand public about what this means for New Zealand going forward.”

Pacific leaders welcome US engagement but are concerned about geopolitical rivalry.

Earlier this month, Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Baron Waqa attended the South Pacific Defence Ministers meeting in Auckland.

He said it was important that “peace and stability in the region” was “prioritised”.

Referencing the arms race between China and the US, he said, “The geopolitics occurring in our region is not welcomed by any of us in the Pacific Islands Forum.”

While a Pacific Zone of Peace has been a talking point by Fiji and the PIF leadership to reinforce the region’s “nuclear-free stance”, the US is working with Australia on obtaining nuclear-submarines through the AUKUS security pact.

Dr Powles said the potential for increased tensions “could happen under either president in areas such as Taiwan, East China Sea — irrespective of who is in Washington”.

South Pacific defence ministers told RNZ Pacific the best way to respond to threats of conflict and the potential threat of a nuclear attack in the region is to focus on defence and building stronger ties with its allies.

New Zealand’s Defence Minister said NZ was “very good friends with the United States”, with that friendship looking more friendly under the Biden Administration. But will this strengthening of ties and partnerships continue if Trump becomes President?

US President Joe Biden, center, stands for a group photo with Pacific Islands Forum leaders following the Pacific Islands Forum Summit, at the South Portico of the White House in Washington on September 25, 2023. Photo: Jim Watson

US wants a slice of Pacific
Regardless of who is elected, US Ambassador to New Zealand Tom Udall said history showed the past three presidents “have pushed to re-engage with the Pacific”.

While both Trump and Harris may differ on critical issues for the Pacific such as the climate crisis and multilateralism, both see China as the primary external threat to US interests.

The US has made a concerted effort to step up its engagement with the Pacific in light of Chinese interest, including by reopening its embassies in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga.

On 12 July 2022, the Biden administration showed just how keen it was to have a seat at the table by US Vice-President Kamala Harris dialing in to the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Fiji at the invitation of the then chair former prime minister Voreqe Bainimarama. The US was the only PIF “dialogue partner” allowed to speak at this Forum.

However, most of the promises made to the Pacific have been “forward-looking” and leaders have told RNZ Pacific they want to see less talk and more real action.

Defence diplomacy has been booming since the 2022 Solomon Islands-China security deal. It tripled the amount of money requested from Congress for economic development and ocean resilience — up to US$60 million a year for 10 years — as well as a return of Peace Corps volunteers to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu.

Health security was another critical area highlighted in 2024 the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Declaration.

The Democratic Party’s commitment to the World Health Organisation (WHO) bodes well, in contrast to the previous Trump administration’s withdrawal from the WHO during the covid-19 pandemic.

It continued a long-running programme called ‘The Academy for Women Entrepreneurs’ which gives enterprising women from more than 100 countries with the knowledge, networks and access they need to launch and scale successful businesses.

Guam’s take
Known as the tip of the spear for the United States, Guam is the first strike community under constant threat of a nuclear missile attack.

In September, China launched an intercontinental ballistic test missile in the Pacific for first time in 44 years, landing near French Polynesian waters.

It was seen as a signal of China’s missile capabilities which had the US and South Pacific Defence Ministers on edge and deeply “concerned”.

China’s Defence Ministry said in a statement the launch was part of routine training by the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force, which oversees conventional and nuclear missile operations and was not aimed at any country or target.

The US has invested billions to build a 360-degree missile defence system on Guam with plans for missile tests twice a year over the next decade, as it looks to bolster its weaponry in competition with China.

Despite the arms race and increased military presence and weaponry on Guam, China is known to have fewer missiles than the US.

However, Guamanians are among the four million disenfranchised Americans living in US territories whose vote does not count due to an anomaly in US law.

“While territorial delegates can introduce bills and advocate for their territory in the US Congress, they have no voice on the floor. While Guam is exempted from paying the US federal income tax, many argue that such a waiver does not make up for what the tiny island brings to the table,” according to a BenarNews report.

US Congressman for Guam James Moylan has spent his time making friends and “educating and informing” other states about Guam’s existence in hopes to get increased funding and support for legislative bills.

Moylan said he would prefer a Trump presidency but noted he has “proved he can also work with Democrats”.

Under Trump, Moylan said Guam would have “stronger security”, raising his concerns over the need to stop Chinese fishing boats from coming onto the island.

Moylan also defended the military expansion: “We are not the aggressor. If we put our guard down, we need to be able to show we can maintain our land.”

Moylan defended the US military expansion, which his predecessor, former US Congressman Robert Underwood, was concerned about, saying the rate of expansion had not been seen since World War II.

“We are the closest there is to the Indo-Pacific threat,” Moylan said.

“We need to make sure our pathways, waterways and economy is growing, and we have a strong defence against our aggressors.”

“All likeminded democracies are concerned about the current leadership of China. We are working together…to work on security issues and prosperity issues,” US Ambassador to New Zealand Tom Udall said.

When asked about the military capabilities of the US and Guam, Moylan said: “We are not going to war; we are prepared to protect the homeland.”

Moylan said that discussions for compensation involving nuclear radiation survivors in Guam would happen regardless of who was elected.

The 23-year battle has been spearheaded by atomic veteran Robert Celestial, who is advocating for recognition for Chamorro and Guamanians under the RECA Act.

Celestial said that the Biden administration had thrown their support behind them, but progress was being stalled in Congress, which is predominantly controlled by the Republican party.

But Moylan insisted that the fight for compensation was not over. He said that discussions would continue after the election irrespective of who was in power.

“It’s been tabled. It’s happening. I had a discussion with Speaker Mike Johnson. We are working to pass this through,” he said.

If Trump wins
Dr Powles said a return to Trump’s leadership could derail ongoing efforts to build security architecture in the Pacific.

There are also views Trump would pull back from the Pacific and focus on internal matters, directly impacting his nation.

For Trump, there is no mention of the climate crisis in his platform or Agenda47.

This is in line with the former president’s past actions, such as withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2019, citing “unfair economic burdens” placed on American workers and businesses.

Trump has maintained his position that the climate crisis is “one of the great scams of all time”.

The America First agenda is clear, with “countering China” at the top of the list. Further, “strengthening alliances,” Trump’s version of multilateralism, reads as what allies can do for the US rather than the other way around.

“There are concerns for Donald Trump’s admiration for more dictatorial leaders in North Korea, Russia, China and what that could mean in a time of crisis,” Dr Powles said.

A Trump administration could mean uncertainty for the Pacific, she added.

While Trump was president in 2017, he warned North Korea “not to mess” with the United States.

“North Korea [is] best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met by fire and fury like the world has never seen.”

North Korea responded deriding his warning as a “load of nonsense”.

Although there is growing concern among academics and some Pacific leaders that Trump would bring “fire and fury” to the Indo-Pacific if re-elected, the former president seemed to turn cold at the thought of conflict.

In 2023, Trump remarked that “Guam isn’t America” in response to warning that the US territory could be vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear strike — a move which seemed to distance the US from conflict.

If Harris wins
Dr Powles said that if Harris wins, it was important to move past “announcements” and follow-through on all pledges.

A potential win for Harris could be the fulfilment of the many “promises” made to the Pacific for climate financing, uplifting economies of the Pacific and bolstering defence security, she said.

Pacific leaders want Harris to deliver on the Pacific Partnership Strategy, the outcomes of the two Pacific Islands-US summits in 2022 and 2023, and the many diplomatic visits undertaken during President Biden’s presidency.

The Biden administration recognised Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign and independent states and established diplomatic relationships with them.

Harris has pledged to boost funding to the Green Climate Fund by US$3 billion. She also promised to “tackle the climate crisis with bold action, build a clean energy economy, advance environmental justice, and increase resilience to climate disasters”.

Dr Powles said that delivery needed to be the focus.

“What we need to be focused on is delivery [and that] Pacific Island partners are engaged from the very beginning — from the outset to any programme right through to the final phase of it.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Pacific foreign ministers have given their nod of approval for United States territories Guam and American Samoa to be associate members of main regional decision-making body, but a political analyst says it is geopolitics at play.

The news was delivered by Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) chair and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown at the PIF Foreign Ministers Meeting on Friday.

Brown said both territories meet the current qualifying criteria for associate membership.

• LISTEN TO RNZ MORNING REPORT: Guam and American Samoa to become associate members of Pacific Islands Forum
• Other Pacific Islands Forum reports

“I have to say there is widespread support for the membership of Guam and American Samoa, and so that is the recommendation in principle coming from foreign ministers that will be tabled with leaders,” he said.

However, Griffith Asia Institute’s Pacific Hub project lead Dr Tess Newton Cain said the move had a geopolitical aspect.

“When it comes to the Pacific Islands Forum, the US has struggled with the fact that it sits at the same table as China — they are both dialogue partners,” she said.

“It is like when you invite people to a wedding — the US does not like the table it is on.

US seeking ‘better table’
“It wants to be on a better table and being able to have two of its territories, American Samoa and Guam, get that associate membership — if that happens — does seem to indicate this is how they get a little bit of an edge on China.”

She expects the application to be accepted at the Leaders’ Meeting in Tonga at the end of the month.

Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna are currently the associate members of the Forum. American Samoa and Guam are currently forum observers; being upgraded to associate members will give them better participation in the regional institution.

Guam’s Governor Lou Leon Guerrero told RNZ Pacific last week the territory would ultimately want to be full voting members.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had previously said the territories’ political status meant they could not be full members but he supported the application for associate membership.

French territories New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full members in 2016.

Newton Cain believes full membership for the two US territories would be a push.

French territories ‘justified’
But she said for the French territories it was “kind of justified” — New Caledonia was on the path to independence, while French Polynesia was re-inscribed to the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories (C-24 list).

“If Guam and American Samoa are not interested, or there is no kind of indication that they are moving towards being sovereign or even in a compact, like Marshall Islands and Palau and FSM, then that would be a big ask.”

Newton Cain thinks full membership would mean some member states would have concerns because it means Washington is getting closer to the decision making.

“There is also regional concern surrounding Guam’s military build-up. If the territory wanted to progress to full membership it may not be able to comply with the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Treaty,” Newton Cain said.

Architecture reform
Brown said the Forum was undergoing a review of its architecture, including criteria for associate member status and observer status, which would likely see changes to associate membership applications.

“So, while [Guam and American Samoa] applications will be considered by leaders, and in this case, it looks favourably to be elevated to associate membership — the review of the regional architecture, as it pertains to associate membership, may see some changes,” he said.

Newton Cain said it was not clear what Brown meant.

“It would be a very bad look diplomatically if they were to allow them to become associate members and then in a couple of years say, ‘oh we have changed the rules now and you no longer qualify’.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

The thing I hate about Western electoral politics in general and US presidential races in particular is that they take the focus off the depravity of the US-centralised Empire itself, and run cover for its criminality.

In the coming months you’re going to be hearing a lot of talk about the two leading presidential candidates and how very very different they are from each other, and how one is clearly much much worse than the other.

But in reality the very worst things about both of them will not be their differences — the worst things about them will be be the countless ways in which they are both indistinguishably in lockstep with one another.

Australia and New Zealand’s populations must now wake up to the fact that our countries have been drawn into what ForeignPolicy.com called the knitting together of “the United States’ patchwork of different regional security systems into a global security architecture of networked alliances and partnerships”.

Hit pause right there.

Very few people have tuned into the fact that what is happening isn’t “NATO” moving into our region – it’s actually far bigger than that.  America is creating a super-bloc, a super-alliance of client states that includes both the EU and NATO, the AP4 (its key Asia Pacific partners Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan) and other partners like the Philippines (now the Marcos dynasty is back at the helm).

• READ MORE: Other NZ-China and Luxon reports

It explains why, in the midst of committing genocide in Palestine, Israel still managed to send defence personnel to participate in RIMPAC 2024 naval exercises: they’re part of our team.  It is taking the Military Industrial Complex to a global level. Where do you think it will lead us to?

New Zealand is about to sacrifice what it cannot afford to lose for something it doesn’t need: gambling we can keep the strength and security of our trading relationship with China while leaping into the US anti-China military alliance.

The Chinese have noticed. Writing in the South China Morning Post last week, Alex Lo gave an unvarnished Chinese perspective on this. In a piece titled “NATO barbarians are expanding and gathering at the gates of Asia,” he says: “Most regional countries want none of it, but four Trojan horses – South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – are ready to let them in”.

“Has it crossed Blinken’s mind that most of Asia, including the Indian subcontinent, don’t want NATO militarism to infect their parts of the world like the plague?”

While in Washington for the recent NATO summit, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon told The Financial Times that he viewed China as a strategic competitor in the Indo-Pacific.  In the next breath he said he wanted New Zealand to continue to develop trade with China and double the country’s overall exports over the next 10 years.

Good luck with that if we join a hostile alliance. And since when has New Zealand declared that China was a strategic competitor?  That’s an American position, surely not ours?

New Zealand could “add value” to its security relationships and be a “force multiplier for Australia and the US and other partners”, Luxon said while being hosted in Washington.  New Zealand was also “very open” to participating in the second pillar of AUKUS.

Firmly placing New Zealand in the anti-China camp in this way was immediately lambasted by former PM Helen Clark and ex National Party leader Don Brash. What has been abandoned, they argue, without any public consultation, is our relatively independent foreign policy.   They sounded a warning about where real danger lies:

Given the intensifying situation, journalists, academics and experts joined to state the need for the Pacific, including its media, to re-assert itself and chart its own path, rooted in its unique cultural, economic and environmental context.

The tone for the discussions was set by Papua New Guinea’s Minister for Information and Communications Technology Timothy Masiu, chief guest at the official dinner of the Suva conference.

The conference heard that the Pacific media sector is small and under-resourced, so its abilities to carry out its public interest role is limited, even in a free media environment.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific International Media Conference reports

Masiu asked how Pacific media was being developed and used as a tool to protect and preserve Pacific identities in the light of “outside influences on our media in the region”. He said the Pacific was “increasingly being used as the backyard” for geopolitics, with regional media “targeted by the more developed nations as a tool to drive their geopolitical agenda”.

Masiu is the latest to draw attention to the widespread impacts of the global contest on the Pacific, with his focus on the media sector, and potential implications for editorial independence.

In some ways, Pacific media have benefitted from the geopolitical contest with the increased injection of foreign funds into the sector, prompting some at the Suva conference to ponder whether “too much of a good thing could turn out to be bad”.

Experts echoed Masiu’s concerns about island nations’ increased wariness of being mere pawns in a larger game.

Fiji a compelling example
Fiji offers a compelling example of a nation navigating this complex landscape with a balanced approach. Fiji has sought to diversify its diplomatic relations, strengthening ties with China and India, without a wholesale pivot away from traditional partners Australia and New Zealand.

Some Pacific Island leaders espouse the “friends to all, enemies to none” doctrine in the face of concerns about getting caught in the crossfire of any military conflict.

This is manifest in Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s incessant calls for a “zone of peace” during both the Melanesian Spearhead Group Leaders’ meeting in Port Vila in August, and the United Nations General Assembly debate in New York in September.

Rabuka expressed fears about growing geopolitical rivalry contributing to escalating tensions, stating that “we must consider the Pacific a zone of peace”.

Papua New Guinea, rich in natural resources, has similarly navigated its relationships with major powers. While Chinese investments in infrastructure and mining have surged, PNG has also actively engaged with Australia, its closest neighbour and long-time partner.

“Don’t get me wrong – we welcome and appreciate the support of our development partners – but we must be free to navigate our own destiny,” Masiu told the Suva conference.

Masiu’s proposed media policy for PNG was also discussed at the Suva conference, with former PNG newspaper editor Alex Rheeney stating that the media fraternity saw it as a threat, although the minister spoke positively about it in his address.

Criticism and praise
In 2019, Solomon Islands shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, a move that was met with both criticism and praise. While this opened the door to increased Chinese investment in infrastructure, it also highlighted an effort to balance existing ties to Australia and other Western partners.

Samoa and Tonga too have taken significant strides in using environmental diplomacy as a cornerstone of their international engagement.

As small island nations, they are on the frontlines of climate change, a reality that shapes their global interactions. In the world’s least visited country, Tuvalu (population 12,000), “climate change is not some distant hypothetical but a reality of daily life”.

One of the outcomes of the debates at the Suva conference was that media freedom in the Pacific is a critical factor in shaping an independent and pragmatic global outlook.

Fiji has seen fluctuations in media freedom following political upheavals, with periods of restrictive press laws. However, with the repeal of the draconian media act last year, there is a growing recognition that a free and vibrant media landscape is essential for transparent governance and informed decision-making.

But the conference also heard that the Pacific media sector is small and under-resourced, so its ability to carry out its public interest role is limited, even in a free media environment.

Vulnerability worsened
The Pacific media sector’s vulnerability had worsened due to the financial damage from the digital disruption and the covid-19 pandemic. It underscored the need to address the financial side of the equation if media organisations are to remain viable.

For the Pacific, the path forward lies in pragmatism and self-reliance, as argued in the book of collected essays Waves of Change: Media, Peace, and Development in the Pacific, edited by Shailendra Bahadur Singh, Fiji Deputy Prime Minister Professor Biman Prasad and Amit Sarwal, launched at the Suva conference by Masiu.

No doubt, as was commonly expressed at the Suva media conference, the world is watching as the Pacific charts its own course.

As the renowned Pacific writer Epeli Hau’ofa once envisioned, the Pacific Islands are not small and isolated, but a “sea of islands” with deep connections and vast potential to contribute in the global order.

As they continue to engage with the world, the Pacific nations will need to carve out a path that reflects their unique traditional wisdom, values and aspirations.

Dr Shailendra Bahadur Singh is head of journalism at The University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva, Fiji, and chair of the recent Pacific International Media Conference. Dr Amit Sarwal is an Indian-origin academic, translator, and journalist based in Melbourne, Australia. He is formerly a senior lecturer and deputy head of school (research) at the USP. This article was first published by The Interpreter and is republished with permission.

Wansolwara News

Here is the speech by Papua New Guinea’s Minister for Communication and Information Technology, Timothy Masiu, at the 2024 Pacific International Media Conference dinner at the Holiday Inn, Suva, on July 4:

I thank the School of Journalism of the University of the South Pacific (USP) for the invitation to address this august gathering.

Commendations also to the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) and the Asia Pacific Media Network (APMN) for jointly hosting this conference – the first of its kind in our region in two decades!

It is also worth noting that this conference has attracted an Emmy Award-winning television news producer from the United States, an award-winning journalism academic and author based in Hong Kong, a member of the New Zealand Order of Merit, a finalist in the 2017 Pulitzer Prize, and a renowned investigative journalist from New Zealand.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific Media Conference reports

Mix this with our own blend of regional journalists, scholars and like-minded professionals, this is truly an international event.

Commendation to our local organisers and the regional and international stakeholders for putting together what promises to be three days of robust and exciting interactions and discussions on the status of media in our region.

This will also go a long way in proposing practical and tangible improvements for the industry.

My good friend and the Deputy Prime Minister of Fiji, the Honourable Manoa Kamikamica, has already set the tone for our conference with his powerful speech at this morning’s opening ceremony. (In fact, we can claim the DPM to also be Papua New Guinean as he spent time there before entering politics!).

We support and are happy with this government of Fiji for repealing the media laws that went against media freedom in Fiji in the recent past.

In PNG, given our very diverse society with over 1000 tribes and over 800 languages and huge geography, correct and factful information is also very, very critical.

Our theme “Navigating Challenges and Shaping Futures in Pacific Media Research and Practice” couldn’t be more appropriate at this time.

If anything, it reminds us all of the critical role that the media continues to play in shaping public discourse and catalysing action on issues affecting our Pacific.

We are also reminded of the power of the media to inform, educate, and mobilize community participation in our development agenda.

IT is in the context that I pause to ask this pertinent question: How is the media being developed and used as a tool to protect and preserve our Pacific Identity?

I ask this question because of outside influences on our media in the region.

I should know, as I have somewhat traversed this journey already – from being a broadcaster and journalist myself – to being a member of the board of the largest public broadcaster in the region (National Broadcasting Corporation) – to being the Minister for ICT for PNG.

From where I sit right now, I am observing our Pacific region increasingly being used as the backyard for geopolitical reasons.

It is quite disturbing for me to see our regional media being targeted by the more developed nations as a tool to drive their geopolitical agenda.

As a result, I see a steady influence on our culture, our way of life, and ultimately the gradual erosion of our Pacific values and systems.

In the media industry, some of these geopolitical influences are being redesigned and re-cultured through elaborate and attractive funding themes like improving “transparency” and “accountability”.

This is not the way forward for a truly independent and authentic Pacific media.

The way we as a Pacific develop our media industry must reflect our original and authentic value systems.

Just like our forefathers navigated the unchartered seas – relying mostly on hard-gained knowledge and skills – we too must chart our own course in our media development.

Our media objectives and practices should reflect all levels of our unique Pacific Way of life, focusing on issues like climate change, environmental preservation, the protection and preservation of our fast-fading languages and traditions, and our political landscape.

We must not let our authentic ways be lost or overshadowed by outside influences or agendas. We must control WHAT we write, HOW we write it, and WHY we write.

Don’t get me wrong – we welcome and appreciate the support of our development partners – but we must be free to navigate our own destiny.

If anything, I compel you to give your media funding to build our regional capabilities and capacities to address climate change issues, early warning systems, and support us to fight misinformation, disinformation, and fake news on social media.

I don’t know how the other Pacific Island countries are faring but my Department of ICT has built a social media management desk to monitor these ever-increasing menaces on Facebook, Tik Tok, Instagram and other online platforms.

This is another area of concern for me, especially for my future generations.

Draft National Media Development Policy of PNG
Please allow me to make a few remarks on the Draft National Media Development Policy of PNG that my ministry has initiated.

As its name entails, it is a homegrown policy that aims to properly address many glaring media issues in our country.

In its current fifth draft version, the draft policy aims to promote media self-regulation; improve government media capacity; roll-out media infrastructure for all; and diversify content and quota usage for national interest.

These policy objectives were derived from an extensive nationwide consultation process of online surveys, workshops and one-on-one interviews with government agencies and media industry stakeholders and the public.

To elevate media professionalism in PNG, the policy calls for the development of media self-regulation in the country without direct government intervention.

The draft policy also intend to strike a balance between the media’s ongoing role on transparency and accountability on the one hand, and the dissemination of developmental information, on the other hand.

It is not in any way an attempt by the Marape/Rosso government to restrict the media in PNG. Nothing can be further from the truth.

In fact, the media in PNG presently enjoys unprecedented freedom and ability to report as they deem appropriate.

Our leaders are constantly being put on the spotlight, and while we don’t necessarily agree with many of their daily reports, we will not suddenly move to restrict the media in PNG in any form.

Rather, we are more interested in having information on health, education, agriculture, law and order, and other societal and economic information, reaching more of our local and remote communities across the country.

It is in this context that specific provision within the draft policy calls for the mobilisation – particularly the government media – to disseminate more developmental information that is targeted towards our population at the rural and district levels.

I have brought a bigger team to Suva to also listen and gauge the views of our Pacific colleagues on this draft policy.

The fifth version is publicly available on our Department of ICT website and we will certainly welcome any critique or feedback from you all.

Before I conclude, let me also briefly highlight another intervention I made late last year as part of my Ministry’s overall “Smart Pacific; One Voice” initiative.

After an absence for several years, I invited our Pacific ICT Ministers to a meeting in Port Moresby in late 2023.

At the end of this defining summit, we signed the Pacific ICT Ministers’ Lagatoi Declaration.

For a first-time regional ICT Ministers’ meeting, it was well-attended. Deputy Prime Minister Manoa also graced us with his presence with other Pacific Ministers, including Australia and New Zealand.

This declaration is a call-to-arms for our regional ministers to meet regularly to discuss the challenges and opportunities posed by the all-important ICT sector.

Our next meeting is in New Caledonia in 2025.

In much the same vein, I was appointed the special envoy to the Pacific by the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD) in Mauritius in 2023.

Since then, I have continuously advocated for the Pacific to be more coordinated and unified, so we can be better heard.

I have been quite bemused by the fact that the Pacific does not have its own regional offices for such well-meaning agencies like AIBD to promote our own unique media issues.

More often than not, we are either thrown into the “Asia-Pacific’ or “Oceania” groupings and as result, our media and wider ICT interests and aspirations get drowned by our more influential friends and donors.

We must dictate what our broadcasting (and wider media) development agenda should be. We live in our Region and better understand the “Our Pacific Way” of doing things.

Let me conclude by reiterating my firm belief that the Pacific needs a hard reset of our media strategies.

This means re-discovering our original values to guide our methods and practices within the media industry.

We must be unified in our efforts navigate the challenges ahead, and to reshape the future of media in the Pacific.

We must ensure it reflects our authentic ways and serves the needs of our Pacific people.

Best wishes for the remainder of the conference.

God Bless you all.

Republished from Wansolwara in partnership.