NERMEEN SHAIKH: The United States and Iran have officially signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war in Iran. The signing came a day ahead of schedule. President Trump signed the agreement at a dinner at the Palace of Versailles hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the agreement in Tehran.

The 14-point agreement calls for an immediate end to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon; the full resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz; the lifting of the US blockade; the easing of sanctions on Iran; the unfreezing of Iranian assets; and a $300 billion investment fund to rebuild Iran.

AMY GOODMAN: But the deal also leaves many major questions unresolved about Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s lead negotiator, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, said, “Everything we sought to achieve through military action, we obtained several times over through negotiation; it ​was not even comparable,” he said.

Just hours before signing the deal, President Trump spoke at the G7 summit and issued a new threat to Iran.

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: It’s a memorandum of understanding. And if I don’t like it, we’ll go back to shooting at them, dropping bombs on their head. If I don’t like it, if they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re joined now by Vali Nasr, an Iranian American professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs headlined “Iran’s New Grand Strategy: How a Remade Islamic Republic Will Reshape the Middle East.”

He is also author of the book Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.

Professor Nasr, it’s great to have you back. If you can start off by responding to this memorandum of understanding that President Trump signed in Versailles, obviously meant to bring us back to the end of World War I? The Iranian President, of course, signed remotely.

But talk about the significance of what we have finally learned are the 14 points.

VALI NASR: Thank you very much for having me back.

I think, first of all, the most important part is that President Trump decided to sign this himself rather than have Vice-President JD Vance do it, which then now means that he basically owns this document. I think it’s important in the sense that it ends this war. It closes the parenthesis on a hundred days of both hot war and economic war that has devastated the global economy.

At face value, and the way in which the political commentary, particularly in the West and the United States, is interpreting it, is that this is a major strategic setback for the United States. The US started this war with the belief that it would destroy the Islamic Republic within days. President Trump demanded the utter surrender for Iran.

And now he has to settle for an agreement.

And the way this agreement reads, it looks like that the United States is more eager for this war to end than Iran is. The United States has given Iran a great deal of economic incentive in order to agree to sign this agreement, end the war, and then agree to negotiate over the larger issues which supposedly caused the war in the first place.

And also, it’s very clear that in Iran, they’re very triumphant. They think this is a big victory for them, not only that they survived the war, but that they forced the President to sign this agreement.

And more importantly, everything the President said yesterday was breaking taboos: Iran can have enrichment; Iran can have missiles; Israel cannot destroy buildings in Lebanon at will, or should not; and that Iran is entitled to have its own frozen assets taken back — given back to the country.

Trump’s war on Iran ends with a triumphant Tehran      Video: Democracy Now

NERMEEN SHAIKH: And if you could comment, Professor Nasr, on the fact that Lebanon figures in the very first point of this memorandum, and the fact you’ve called this agreement a success for Iran because it’s created, as you said, a fissure between the US and Israel? If you could elaborate on that, and what you see as the risks, given that Israel had — was not consulted on this agreement, and it’s very unclear that it will go along with it?

VALI NASR: Well, first of all, the war was a moment of triumph for Israel, because it convinced the United States to basically go to war to realise what is essentially, and at its core, Israel’s strategic aims, which was the destruction of the Islamic Republic through military means.

The war did not pan out the way that President Trump understood it would, and that already was a fissure. Now, the president trying to get out of this war the best he can has led him down a path that accepts the continued existence of the Islamic Republic, giving money to the Islamic Republic, talking to the Islamic Republic, all of which are basically strategic setbacks for Israel, and particularly for Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And Iran is actually asking for a price for accommodating President Trump, and the price that Iran is asking is deliberately trying to expand that fissure between the US and Israel. But Iran, by insisting that Israel needs to back away from its maximal position on Lebanon and settle for a ceasefire now, and perhaps, as Iran is demanding, even leave south Lebanon, essentially, first of all, asserts the fact that Iran is coming out of this war believing that it has more leverage than before it went into this war.

It also creates greater tension between Washington and Tel Aviv. And so, the Iranians are playing this in a very important way for them.

But also, we have to think that one outcome of this war is friction between Israel and the United States, period, because the Israeli strategy of deploying the US to destroy Iran has backfired, and ultimately there will be a reckoning in the US as to why did we go into this war, what were the premises of thinking that it would be successful, and who is responsible.

And even though it’s not said loudly, it’s very clear, in the undertone of what President Trump says, that he’s lost trust in what Prime Minister Netanyahu tells him, and that he’s somewhat angry because he’s receiving blowback for a war that was, essentially, an Israeli strategic agenda, and now he has to carry the political cost of it.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Professor Nasr, I want to ask about this piece that you co-wrote with Narges Bajoghli, “Iran’s New Grand Strategy,” in which you detail the changes that have taken place within Iran from last year, the first US-Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025, to now, when this invasion took place, February 26. You say the Iranian state underwent something of a transformation. You write, “More institutional change took place in those eight months than in the previous ten years combined.” If you could elaborate?

VALI NASR: Well, in Évian [France], President Trump kept saying multiple times that there has been regime change in Iran and a more pragmatic leadership has taken over. Setting aside the second part of his statement, that whether it’s pragmatic or not, there definitely has been regime change. I mean, Israel and the United States, between the June 2025 war and this recent war, have killed more than 130 Iranian leaders.

And by doing so, they’ve eliminated a whole class of the country’s leadership, which has been replaced by a new generation that has come up through the ranks, generation that has been born in Iran after the revolution, the generation that was born not as revolutionaries that were fighting against a state, but actually as children of that state and in a bureaucracy, in a system that took place.

They have a different attitude towards statecraft, towards how to manage the country, and particularly how to manage the war. I mean, one of the things that surprised the United States in this war is the aggressiveness of the new Iranian leadership. The President, as he referred yesterday multiple times, killed General Soleimani, put maximum-pressure sanctions on Iran, bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities in June.

And what he got from the previous leadership in Iran was a tepid, conservative, restrained answer. Now he’s facing a leadership that doesn’t answer the same way. It answers very, very aggressively, and, therefore, was able to turn the tables on the United States by closing the Strait of Hormuz, by attacking American bases.

In addition, one of the big surprises of this war is how quickly Iran reorganised itself between finding itself on the defensive in June, and then facing a massive social uprising in Iran in January, that it was compelled to suppress very bloodily and brutally, and led to the conclusion around the world that the Iranian regime was really, really weak.

How is it that this really, really weak regime, at war with its own people, and having just suffered massive bombardment in June, was able to reorganise itself to survive a very direct, massive attack by the world’s premier military superpower and the Middle East’s most powerful military. And not only survive it, but actually come out of the war with strategic wins, like the control of the Strait of Hormuz, like a chokehold on the global economy, and force the American President into retreat to settle for far less than what he had thought?

So, if we take stock of this, regardless of whether you like the Islamic Republic or not, or how heinous they’ve been with their own people, you have to account for the fact that Iran, Iran’s new leadership, achieved the feat of reorganising the state, reorganising their military, managing their economy in a way to be able to achieve what they did in the eight months between the two wars and then during the course of the hundred-day war.

AMY GOODMAN: You write that the view now from Tehran is that, “the United States’ decade-long containment of Iran has come to an end. The new regional order will be defined less by American primacy than by multipolarity, with China an increasingly central player and Iran an integral rather than a marginal actor.”

As we begin to wrap up, Professor Nasr, if you can explain that shifting geopolitics and how exactly what Trump has achieved, what is the difference between February 27, before Israel and the US attacked, and now?

VALI NASR: What Trump has achieved is to end Iran’s containment. First of all, Iran destroyed about 16 to 17 US bases, some of them completely. So, it ended, if you would, the military encirclement of Iran. It created doubt in the mind of the Gulf countries about the wisdom of partnering with the United States in containing Iran.

I think yesterday in Évian the President made clear that even the sanctions regime against Iran is going to come down. So, economic and military containment of Iran is gone.

During this war, both in the Middle East and globally, the United States’ standing has been diminished. It has lost strategic ground. This was very evident in the president’s visit to China. So, multipolarity is a big winner against the President, who asserted American domination around the world but tried to show it in a war with what he thought was a second-rate, third-rate military and a country on the verge of collapse, has come up short.

So, he has been cut at the knees, if you would. And what will come, obviously, is a greater assertion of power by various regions of the world, by China and Russia, and the United States that will find it more and more difficult to compel the rest of the world to basically follow the US lead.

The original content of this programme is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States Licence. Republished under Creative Commons.

Two days ago, I wrote an article and posted on FaceBook describing the US-Iran ceasefire as a surrender document. That article has since been viewed more than 4.5 million times, liked 56,000 times, and shared more than 11,000 times.

The response confirmed what many already sensed but could not yet prove: that something was deeply wrong with the terms America had accepted.

Now, with the full text of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding obtained by Al Arabiya English, we no longer have to speculate. The document speaks for itself — and it confirms everything I said.

• READ MORE: Trump, Pezeshkian sign US-Iran MoU to end war, both sides confirm
• Other War on Iran reports

As a lawyer, I have spent a 35 year career parsing legal language with precision. Reading this MOU, my conclusion is unequivocal: this is not a peace agreement between equals.

This is a surrender document. The Americans did not want the world to see this text, and reading it, it is not difficult to understand why.

I will now explain in detail why that is so. Let me set out all 14 clauses in full, and then explain what they mean.

The 14 clauses of the Iran MOU:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, together with their allies in the current war, declare upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and undertake that from now on they will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other. The final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article and the remaining Articles.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
3. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States undertake to negotiate and reach a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual h a final agreement within a maximum period of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent.
4. Immediately upon the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States will lift the naval blockade and prevent any interference or obstruction against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and restore traffic within a maximum of 30 days to its full capacity; the traffic of ships shall be proportional to the pre-war volume of traffic on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States also undertakes to withdraw its forces from the surrounding areas within 30 days after the final agreement.
5. Upon signing this Memorandum of Understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take steps to ensure that the movement of merchant ships from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa is resumed within 30 days to the pre-war volume, taking into account the need for the removal of technical obstacles and the neutralisation of mines by Iran.
6. The United States undertakes, together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while ensuring financing of at least $300 billion. The implementation mechanism of this plan, as part of the final agreement, will be formulated within 60 days.
7. The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran, including resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and all unilateral US sanctions, both primary and secondary.
8. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have agreed that the fate of enriched material and the fate of all other mutually agreed nuclear-related issues, including Iran’s nuclear needs, will be adequately addressed in a final agreement; the final agreement will confirm the provisions of this Article.
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that, pending a final agreement, they will maintain the status quo: Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear programme, and the United States will not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.
10. The United States undertakes that immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and until the date of the lifting of sanctions, the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.
11. The United States undertakes that, in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement, frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available. These funds, whether held in the master account or transferred, will be used for any final beneficiary payment determined by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will be fully available for use. The United States undertakes to issue all necessary permits and licenses on this basis.
12. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States agree that an implementation mechanism will be established to oversee the successful implementation of and future commitment to the Final Agreement.
13. Following the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding, and upon receipt of assurances regarding the commencement of implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this Memorandum of Understanding, and the continued implementation of these steps, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States will enter into negotiations for a Final Agreement solely with respect to the remaining Articles.
14. The final agreement will be approved through a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

Why this is a surrender document — and worse than Obama’s JCPOA:
Reading this MOU as a lawyer, the conclusion is clear beyond peradventure. Let me explain why, point by devastating point:

First: The $300 billion.
Clause 6 commits the United States and its regional partners to finance Iran’s rehabilitation and economic development to the tune of at least $300 billion. Let us call this what it is — reparations. The victor does not pay the defeated party $300 billion. The party that initiated a war, prosecuted it, and lost pays the winner. The Obama JCPOA involved releasing approximately $100–150 billion in frozen Iranian assets — money that was already Iran’s. This MOU commits the United States to generating $300 billion in fresh financing for Iranian development. Trump went to war and came back owing Iran more than twice what Obama ever conceded.

Second: The Strait of Hormuz remains in Iranian hands.
Clause 5 requires Iran to clear its own mines and restore shipping — a technical concession that actually confirms something extraordinary: Iran controls the waterway. The MOU contains not a single provision preventing Iran from later imposing transit fees, “environmental levies,” or “navigational service charges” on vessels passing through. It is tolls under a different name. The Strait of Hormuz, the jugular vein of global energy supply, remains firmly within Iran’s sovereign grip. The United States went to war and lost the Strait, which had been open to the world before then.

Third: The nuclear question is left wide open — and Trump’s bombast about Iran’s enriched uranium is flatly contradicted by the text.
This is perhaps the most legally significant point of all. Clause 8 states that Iran “reiterates” it will never produce nuclear weapons. The word “reiterates” is not accidental — it is a diplomatic term of art meaning Iran is simply repeating a prior position, not making a fresh, legally binding, verifiable commitment. There is no dismantlement of centrifuges. No reduction in enrichment levels. No breakout timeline. No snap inspections. The fate of enriched material is merely deferred to the final agreement. Compare this to the JCPOA, which at least imposed specific caps on enrichment, reduced Iran’s stockpile by 98 percent, limited centrifuges, and established a 15-year timeline with IAEA verification. This MOU gives America nothing comparable.

Trump has boasted publicly that under this deal, America will be able to seize and destroy Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. This is pure fantasy. Read Clause 8 again: the fate of enriched material is to be “adequately addressed in a final agreement”. That is all. There is no mechanism for seizure, no timeline for removal, no verification procedure, and no enforcement clause. The enriched uranium remains in Iran’s possession, on Iranian soil, under Iranian control — today, tomorrow, and until such time as a final agreement is reached, if one ever is. Indeed, Clause 8 explicitly acknowledges “Iran’s nuclear needs,” a formulation that implicitly recognises Iran’s right to continue developing its nuclear programme as it sees fit. Far from constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, this MOU hands Iran enormous residual power over the direction and pace of its own nuclear development. The deal does not strip Iran of its nuclear leverage — it leaves that leverage entirely intact while America pays the bills.

I make no judgment on whether Iran should or should not possess nuclear weapons — my longstanding view has always been that if Iran is not to have them, Israel, which possesses an undeclared arsenal, should not have them either.

But the point is this: it is pure hyperbole for Trump to claim that under this deal Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons. The MOU does not prevent it. And given that the Iranian President Pezeskian, in a recent call with the Pakistani Prime Minister, reportedly threatened to detonate a nuclear device if America remained intransigent — and given that Pakistan has given assurances to Turkey of nuclear cover in the event of an Israeli threat — who is to say a similar assurance will not be extended to Iran by Pakistan, China, Russia, or North Korea? The MOU provides no answer.

Fourth: The sequencing reveals everything.
Clause 13 is perhaps the most telling of all. It provides that Iran and the United States will enter final agreement negotiations only after America has commenced implementation of Articles 4, 5, 10, and 11 — meaning the naval blockade is lifted, frozen assets are released, oil export waivers are issued, and shipping is restored — all before a final deal is concluded. America gives first. Iran negotiates later. This is the logic not of a victor extracting concessions, but of a supplicant purchasing the right to sit at the table.

The bottom line
Donald Trump launched military strikes on Iran, deployed carrier battle groups, imposed a naval blockade, and subjected Iranian infrastructure to sustained bombardment. He did so with maximalist rhetoric about preventing Iran from ever obtaining nuclear weapons and forcing Iran’s unconditional surrender. The MOU he has now signed delivers: a $300 billion development commitment, no structural nuclear dismantlement, Iranian retention of effective control over the Strait of Hormuz, immediate American concessions before final negotiations even begin, and a nuclear clause so weak that the word “reiterates” does all the work of what should have been a cast-iron prohibition.

Obama’s JCPOA, whatever its imperfections, at least contained specific, measurable nuclear rollbacks, independent verification mechanisms, and phased sanction relief tied to verified Iranian compliance. This MOU contains none of that structural architecture.

Trump tore up the JCPOA calling it the worst deal in history. He then went to war. And he came home with something worse.

And here is a modest suggestion for the occasion. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles — a document that imposed such punishing reparations and national humiliation on Germany that it gave rise to Adolf Hitler and delivered the world into the catastrophe of the Second World War.

President Macron is now set to dine President Trump in that same Hall of Mirrors during the G7 summit. How fitting it would be — how perfectly, poetically fitting — if Trump were to stay on and sign the final MOU with Iran on June 19 in that very same Hall. After all, a room that once witnessed one great power reduce another to humiliating reparations is precisely the right setting for a document in which the self-proclaimed world’s greatest dealmaker has somehow managed to be the one paying them.

The mirrors — 357 in total, at least, would reflect the moment with perfect clarity.

Lim Tean is a Singaporean lawyer, politician and commentator. He is the founder of the political party People’s Voice and a co-founder of the political alliance People’s Alliance for Reform.