The President of the Federated States of Micronesia has made a series of disturbing claims against China, including alleging spying, threats to his personal safety and bribery.

President David Panuelo made the claims to his Congress, governors and the leadership of the country’s state legislatures in a letter which has been leaked to 1News.

Panuelo said the point of his letter was to warn of the threat of warfare.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific and China reports

The president, who has just two months left in office, has publicly attacked China in the past.

“We can play an essential role in preventing a war in our region; we can save the lives of our own Micronesian citizens; we can strengthen our sovereignty and independence,” he said in his latest letter.

President Panuelo said he believed that by informing the leaders of his views he was creating risks to his personal safety along with that of his family and staff.

Outlined in the letter are a series of startling allegations.

Chinese activity within EEZ
The president said there had been activity by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) within his country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

The “purpose includes communicating with other PRC assets so as to help ensure that, in the event a missile — or group of missiles — ever needed to land a strike on the US Territory of Guam that they would be successful in doing so”.

President Panuelo said he had stopped China research vessels in FSM waters after patrol boats were sent to check “but the PRC sent a warning for us to stay away”.

He also claimed that at the Pacific Islands Forum in Suva in July last year he was followed by two Chinese men, one of them an intelligence officer.

“To be clear: I have had direct threats against my personal safety from PRC officials acting in an official capacity,” he said.

In another claim, Panuelo said that after the first China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting, the joint communique was published with statements and references that had not been agreed to “which were false”.

He said he and other leaders such as Niue Premier Dalton Tagelagi and Fiji’s now former prime minister Voreqe Bainimarama had requested more time to review the joint communique before it went out but their requests were ignored.

Trying to strongarm officials
President Panuelo also claimed China had been trying to strongarm officials when it came to bilateral agreements such as a proposed memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the “Deepening Blue Economy” which had “serious red flags”.

One of those was that the FSM “would open the door to the PRC to begin acquiring control over the island nation’s fibre optic cables and ports”.

President Panuelo said in his latest letter that while he advised cabinet to reject the MOU in June last year, in December he learned that it was back in “just mere hours from its signing”.

He said that when Foreign Minister Khandhi Elieisar raised this with Chinese Ambassador Huang Zheng, he suggested “that he ought to sign the MOU anyway and that my knowing about it — in my capacity as Head of State and Head of Government — was not necessary”.

President Panuelo said he found out Ambassador Huang’s replacement, Wu Wei, had been given a mission to shift the FSM away from its allies the US, Japan and Australia. He therefore denied the Ambassador designate his position.

“I know that one element of my duty as President is to protect our country, and so knowing that: our ultimate aim is, if possible, to prevent war; and, if impossible, to mitigate its impacts on our own country and on our own people.”

There are also allegations of bribery. President Panuelo claimed that shortly after Vice-President Aren Palik took office in his former capacity as a Senator, he was asked by a Chinese official to accept an envelope filled with money.

‘Never offer bribe again’
“Vice-President Pakik refused, telling the [official] to never offer him a bribe again,” President Panuelo said.

In October last year, Panuelo said that when Palik visited the island of Kosrae he was received by a Chinese company, which has a private plane.

“Our friends told the Vice-President that they can provide him private and personal transportation to anywhere he likes at any time, even Hawai’i, for example; he need only ask,” President Panuelo claimed.

He said senior officials and elected officials across the whole of the national and state governments had received offers of gifts as a means to curry favour.

The President concluded the letter by saying he wanted to inform his fellow leaders, regardless of the risk to himself, because the nation’s sovereignty, prosperity and peace and stability were more important.

The Chinese embassy in the Federated States of Micronesia and in Wellington have been asked to comment on the allegations by 1News.

Republished with permission.

A commemoration has been held in French Polynesia to mark the 20th anniversary of the disappearance of a leading opposition politician in the Tuamotus.

Boris Léontieff, who headed the Fetia Api party, was among four politicians travelling in a small plane on a campaign trip when it disappeared without a trace.

The commemoration was held in Arue where Léontieff was the mayor.

• READ MORE: Other reports on the Jean-Pascal Couraud mystery

The case was closed 11 years ago after investigations failed to conclude why their plane vanished, with theories suggesting the pilot lacked experience and might have encountered fuel problems.

There had been speculation there may have been foul play or that the aircraft may have been diverted.

The politicians’ wives had approached the French president to explore if the United States took satellite images of the Tuamotus at the time of the presumed crash.

Nine years ago, a court rejected a request for compensation to be paid to the widow of Boris Léontieff.

Her lawyer, James Lau, told a local newspaper that it was established that Leontieff was under surveillance by the secret service of then-president, Gaston Flosse.

Lau said the same spying effort was directed at Leontieff’s advisor and journalist, Jean-Pascal Couraud, who also disappeared without leaving a trace in 1997.

Researching the affairs of Flosse
Couraud was famous for researching the affairs of Flosse, who ruled a militia known as the GIP.

An investigation was first opened in 2004 after a former spy claimed that Couraud had been kidnapped and killed by the GIP, which dumped him in the sea between Mo’orea and Tahiti.

Murder charges against two members of the now disbanded militia, the GIP, were dismissed a decade later, after incriminating wiretaps were ruled inadmissible because they were obtained illegally.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Less than 24 hours after New Zealand investigative journalist Nicky Hager’s latest extraordinary story of how oil companies have been spying on children and it has disappeared without trace elsewhere.

School children from the group School Strike 4 Climate joined a peaceful protest against the oil-exploration company OMV in New Plymouth a year ago, only weeks after unprecedented numbers joined their 27 September school strike marches around New Zealand.

Public concern about climate change had never been so great. These were peaceful, democratic protests.

• READ MORE: School children targeted by private investigators Thompson and Clark

But a two-year investigation found that they and other climate change groups were targets of the private investigation firm Thompson and Clark, paid by clients from the oil and gas industry.

The investigation revealed that a major focus of Thompson and Clark in 2019 and 2020 – years of storms, floods, forest fires and marching school children – was monitoring and helping to counter citizen groups concerned about climate change.

Thompson and Clark’s clients included a range of large greenhouse gas emitting industries, including many of the oil and gas exploration and drilling companies in New Zealand and the industry lobby group, the Petroleum Exploration and Production Association of New Zealand (PEPANZ).

It has targeted climate change campaigners belonging to School Strike 4 Climate, Greenpeace, Extinction Rebellion and local Oil Free groups.

Company insiders
Information about Thompson and Clark’s clients and anti-environmental activities was provided confidentially by company insiders who say they disapprove of the private investigation company.

Operations against these groups were run by Thompson and Clark’s collection manager, a former long-term New Zealand Security Intelligence Service officer, as revealed by Radio New Zealand.

The officer, known only as Gerry, moved to Thompson and Clark 10 years ago, after 30 years with the NZSIS.

Investigative journalist Nicky Hager speaks to RNZ Morning Report about the probe findings. Video: RNZ

When oil companies are spying on school children protesting against global warming something has gone horribly, horribly wrong in society.

When just 100 companies are responsible for 71 percent of global emissions, and when oil corporations knew about and hid climate change as far back as the 1990s we must acknowledge that those who have created and fostered the economic model that has allowed for this damage must be the first to pay for the adaptation funding.

Oil companies must be sued for the damage they have caused the way tobacco companies were sued over cancer.

That money needs to help fund the adaption.

Watching the oil industry respond by hiring corporate spies who are using former SIS officers to spy on school children protesting against climate change is all the proof you ever needed to know how truly spiteful and evil these oil companies truly are, so if you are having some internal dialogue about their rights, don’t!

Martyn Bradbury is editor of The Daily Blog. This article is republished with permission.

Fiji has dropped three places in the latest Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index and been condemned for its treatment of “overly critical” journalists who are often subjected to intimidation or even imprisonment.

The Paris-based global media freedom watchdog has criticised many governments in the Asia-Pacific region for censorship and disinformation that has worsened since the start of the covid-19 coronavirus pandemic last year.

“On the one hand, governments use innovative practices often derived from marketing to impose their own narrative within the mainstream media, whose publishers are from the same elite as the politicians,” says RSF.

• READ MORE: RSF 2021 Index: Censorship and the disinformation virus hits Asia-Pacific

“On the other, politicians and activists wage a merciless war on several fronts against reporters and media outlets that don’t toe the official line.”

Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Philippines are among the regional countries condemned for draconian measures against freedom of information. China was given a special panel for condemnation in a summary report.

“Thanks to its massive use of new technology and an army of censors and trolls, Beijing manages to monitor and control the flow of information, spy on and censor citizens online, and spread its propaganda on social media,” says RSF.

Independent journalism was also being fiercely suppressed in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and and Nepal.

‘Less violent repression’
“A somewhat less violent increase in repression has also been seen in Papua New Guinea (down 1 at 47th), Fiji (down 3 at 55th) and Tonga (up 4 at 46th).” The Tongan “improvement” was due to the fall in other countries.

In the country report for Fiji, reference is made to the “draconian 2010 Media Industry Development Decree, which was turned into a law in 2018, and under the regulator it created, the Media Industry Development Authority”, which is under direct government oversight.

“Those who violate this law’s vaguely-worded provisions face up to two years in prison. The sedition laws, with penalties of up to seven years in prison, are also used to foster a climate of fear and self-censorship.

“Sedition charges poisoned the lives of three journalists with The Fiji Times, the leading daily, until they were finally acquitted in 2018. It was the price the newspaper paid for its independence, many observers thought.”

RSF also referred to the banning of Fiji Times distribution in several parts of the archipelago at the start of the covid-19 pandemic in March 2020.

A year ago, RSF condemned an op-ed by a pro-government Fiji military commander in Fiji defending curbs on freedom of expression and freedom of the press in order to enforce the lockdown imposed by the government to combat covid-19.

“In times of such national emergency such as this […] war against covid-19, our leaders have good reasons to stifle criticism of their policies by curtailing freedom of speech and freedom of the press,” Brigadier-General Jone Kalouniwai wrote in an op-ed in the pro-government Fiji Sun newspaper on 22 April 2020.

‘Enemy within’
General Kalouniwai, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces chief-of-staff and who is regarded as close to Prime Minister Bainimarama, went on to voice “deep concerns about this enemy within, which have been fuelled by irresponsible citizens selfishly […] questioning the rationale of our leader’s decision to impose such restrictions.”

“No authority, and certainly not a military officer, should be arguing in favour of placing any kind of curb on press freedom,” declared Daniel Bastard, the head of RSF’s Asia-Pacific desk at the time.

“These comments recall the worst time of the Fijian military dictatorship from 2006 to 2014. We urge the Fijian government to do what is necessary to guarantee the right of its citizens to inform and be informed, which is an essential ally in combating the spread of the virus.”

In late March, after the first coronavirus case was confirmed in the western city of Lautoka, police manning a roadblock outside the city prevented delivery of the Fiji Times, the country’s only independent daily.

Its pro-government rival, the Fiji Sun, was meanwhile distributed without any problem.

RSF noted “two other significant media actors that sustain press freedom” in the country – the Fiji Village news website and associated radio stations, and the Mai TV media group.

PNG journalists ‘disillusioned’
In Papua New Guinea, the ousting of Peter O’Neill by James Marape as prime minister in May 2019 was seen as an encouraging development for the prospects of greater media independence.

However, “journalists were disillusioned” in April 2020 when the police minister called for two reporters to be fired for their ‘misleading’ coverage of the covid-19 crisis.

“In addition to political pressure, journalists continue to be dependent on the concerns of those who own their media. This is particularly so at the two main dailies, the PNG Post -Courier, owned by US-Australian media tycoon Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp, which is above all focused on commercial and financial concerns, and The National, owned by the Malaysian logging multinational Rimbunan Hijau.”

In contrast to the Pacific drops in the index, Timor-Leste rose seven places to 78th.

“In 2020, journalists came under attack from the Catholic clergy, which is very powerful in Timor-Leste. A bishop [attacked] two media outlets that published an investigative article about a US priest accused of a sexual attack on a minor.

“The Press Council that was created in 2015 plays an active role in defusing any conflicts involving journalists, and works closely with university centres to provide aspiring journalists with sound ethical training.

“But the media law adopted in 2014, in defiance of the international community’s warnings, poses a permanent threat to journalists and encourages self-censorship.”

‘Press freedom models’
In other regional developments, RSF said that the “regional press freedom models – New Zealand (up 1 at 8th), Australia (up 1 at 25th), South Korea (42nd) and Taiwan (43rd) – have on the whole allowed journalists to do their job and to inform the public without any attempt by the authorities to impose their own narrative”.

In Australia, “it was Facebook that introduced the censorship virus.

“In response to proposed Australian legislation requiring tech companies to reimburse the media for content posted on their social media platforms, Facebook decided to ban Australian media from publishing or sharing journalistic content on their Facebook pages.”

While Samoa retained its 21st position, RSF’s index authors noted that the Pacific country was in danger of “losing its status as a regional press freedom model”.

Noting responses to repeated threats by the government, RSF cited the Samoa Alliance of Media Practitioners for Development (SAMPOD) for “urged the media to reaffirm the right of Samoans to pluralist, free and independent journalism as an essential condition for democracy”.

“In a sign of further decline in the situation in 2020, the prime minister threatened to ban Facebook and personally brought a defamation suit against a blogger whose comments he did not like.”

Pacific Media Watch collaborates with Reporters Without Borders.

• The 2021 RSF World Press Freedom Index rankings

A cyber security expert says attacks like the latest on the Reserve Bank could be due to the type of data systems they are using.

The Reserve Bank revealed yesterday a third party file sharing service it uses, which contains some sensitive information, had been hacked.

It is the latest after a string of cyber attacks in the past year targeting several major organisations in New Zealand, including the NZ Stock Exchange – which had its servers knocked out of public view for nearly a week in August.

• LISTEN TO RNZ MORNING REPORT: ‘They’re trying to assess the damage’ – Titanium Defence cyber security expert Tony Grasso (Duration 4′:49″)

Titanium Defence cyber security expert Tony Grasso, who was the cyber lead at the Department of Internal Affairs, told Morning Report file sharing systems could weaken security.

Grasso said there were still lots of questions about the breach to be answered.

“The question that will be on my mind, and I’m sure this will be what they’re looking at is, who got in, how did they get in, and more importantly, what information has been taken from this file share, but more interestingly than that, have they got from the file share onto the bank systems internally?”

However, he said it would be hard to say who could be behind the breach at this stage.

Foreign intelligence agency?
“You have to always keep in mind it may be a foreign intelligence national agency whenever something as big as the Reserve Bank … any government department within reason, you always have to have that at the back of your mind,” he said.

“It would be interesting to find out how they were caught. Our detection systems here are good, if it’s one of those systems that have come from another government agency, a more sensitive government agency, that may indicate it was a foreign actor, or these days criminal gangs are getting together and they’ve become an industry on their own and are really good at getting into organisations.

“Imagine the ransom you could put on the Reserve Bank if you encrypted all their data, for example.”

Grasso hoped for a more detailed report from the Reserve Bank on who it could be.

“The Americans are very good at saying ‘it was definitely a foreign government’ and they normally name them as well. It would be good to know if it was that, if it was a criminal organisation or if was it a just a lone wolf – we have loads of these in our industry.”

The Reserve Bank said sensitive information “may” have been breached.

The type of information exposed would depend on who the third party was, Grass said.

Third party may be IT provider
“A third party could be just an IT provider and they’re just sharing architecture documents, that would be bad of course. But it could be information around covid for example.

“If they were working with external agencies about the recovery of the company from covid … it could be papers around how we’re planning for our recovery, I mean who knows.

“I would hope that sensitive stuff like that isn’t held in a third party file server, I’m fairly sure it wouldn’t be.”

He said even if its own systems were very secure, having a third party who was insecure connecting to the systems could bring a threat.

Yesterday, Reserve Bank Governor Adrian Orr said they were investigating the breach with experts and authorities.

“The nature and extent of information that has been potentially accessed is still being determined, but it may include some commercially and personally sensitive information.

“It will take time to understand the full implications of this breach, and we are working with system users whose information may have been accessed. Our core functions remain sound and operational.”

The Reserve Bank declined a request for an interview with Morning Report.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Breathless police and media commentary about a cocktail of napalm bombs, terrorist cells, guns, ammunition, Māori extremists, guerrilla warfare, assassination threats against politicians, greeted the public on the 15 October 2007.

You name it – the police claimed it and the media hyped it.

From the 17 arrests and the dozens searched and detained – illegally as it turned out – just four people were charged with illegal possession of firearms – two were jailed and two given home detention.

The progressive left was quick to hit back against the hysterical police narrative and bring some semblance of sanity and common sense to the public debate.

This was highly successful and within 24 hours some elements of the media and much of the public were expressing scepticism concerning the police claims.

We worked with Tuhoe activists to organise marches and public demonstrations highlighting the appalling police behaviour and calling for a reigning in of the surveillance state.

Police overreacted
Subsequent developments showed we were right – the police had overreacted and dramatically overreached. They should have taken concerns about military style camps in the Urewera seriously and sent in a Māori liaison officer to find out what was happening and why.

Instead, the police deliberately sidelined their community officers in favour of a dramatic $8 million surveillance operation which they hoped would bring public justification for the massive increase in police (and SIS) powers and resources in the wake of the US September 11 attacks.

New Zealand had become a surveillance state and these raids would show that while we didn’t have Islamic extremists, we had our own home-grown “terrorists”.

A lot of that initial response from the left was instinctive. We knew most of the people the police were claiming as terrorists and knew this was at least a gross over-reaction to whatever had been going on.

The most important lesson from the Urewera raids is to always be sceptical of state agencies who often have their own non-public interest justifications for what they do.

On the other side I don’t think it’s too cynical to say the main lesson the police will have learnt is NOT that they got it wrong and couldn’t tell the difference between a bullshit conversation in a car and a credible terrorist threat, but that it was a failure of PR to prepare carefully enough.

Tuhoe have their own lessons which they have been speaking about in the past few days.

It’s worth remembering too the long list of legislation passed by successive Labour and National governments to extend the surveillance state on the pretext of keeping us safe.

Instead, it has turned this country into a surveillance state where civil liberties and the right to privacy take second place to the powers of Big Brother to intrude into our lives.

This article was first published on The Daily Blog and has been republished with permission.

• Summary of NZ laws threatening civil liberties post September 11, 2001

Phillip Knightley, the investigative reporter who has died aged 87, was a wonderful storyteller. Once he told my students at City University (where I was a journalism lecturer from 1984 to 2003) how, when he was a rookie reporter in the late 1940s on a suburban Australian rag, the news appeared to have dried up for the next edition so his editor asked him to invent a story.

Phillip promptly wrote a “report” about a man (he dubbed him “the hook man”) who terrorised women on the local buses by lifting up their skirts with a clothes peg. So the front page splash headline: “‘Hook man’ terrorises women on the buses” duly appeared on the Friday.

Not surprisingly, Phillip worried about the response of the local cops to his invented “exclusive”. Monday passed without any call from the cops.

Then on Tuesday, he received a call from the local police station. “Is that Knightley?” the cop asked abruptly. “Yes,” he responded nervously. “Well,” the cop continued, “you know that ‘hook man’ – we’ve caught him!”

In every respect, that was a typical Phillip story: extremely funny – but was it true or false: fact or fiction? In reality, the story as well as being extremely entertaining was a device to encourage his audience to be sceptical.

Indeed, Knightley was for me the supreme journo: always sceptical, fiercely intelligent, courageous, witty, highly sociable, politically astute – as well as being a brilliant writer and storyteller.

Vast achievements
His achievements in journalism and publishing were vast: major roles in The Sunday Times’s investigations into the thalidomide scandal and Kim Philby, the British intelligence chief exposed as a Soviet spy; twice awarded the Journalist of the Year award; closely involved in the work of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists – and so on.

But his contribution to the development of journalism education in this country was substantial too. His major texts (The First Casualty, his seminal history of war reporting; The Second Oldest Profession, on spying, and his autobiography, A Hack’s Progress) are essential reading for all journalism students.

They capture the best elements of journalism: original, clear writing, the synthesis of a vast amount of often complex information, a political awareness, an immediacy; a sense of history and a fascination with the complexities of human nature.

As he wrote at the end of A Hack’s Progress: “So my advice for the new generation of journalists is to ignore the accountants, the proprietors and the conventional editors and get on with it. And your assignment is the same as mine has been – the world and the millions of fascinating people who inhabit it.’

Moreover, Phillip clearly enjoyed the contact with students and his appearances at City University and more recently at the University of Lincoln (after I became a professor there in 2003 and where Phillip was appointed a Visiting Professor) always drew big, appreciative crowds.

He was also inspirational in smaller, workshop settings, forever keen to share his knowledge of investigative techniques and his spin on various tricky ethical/political dilemmas. For instance, intriguingly, he never had a bad word to say about cheque-book journalism.

Phillip spent a lot of his career writing on the intelligence services – but he was never seduced by the lure of the secret world and very critical of the hacks who got too close to the spooks. As he wrote: “…although journalism is riddled with people working for intelligence services, I would stay clear of the game.”

In his autobiography, he concluded wryly: “The main threat to an intelligence agent comes not from the security service in the country against which he is operating but from his own centre, his own people.”

Highly managed operation
And he bravely revealed that the Philby scoop was, in fact, a highly managed operation. The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) “knew beforehand what we were about to publish each week. The editor-in-chief of The Sunday Times, Denis Hamilton, had come to an agreement with the service.” So much for intrepid investigative reporting!

Phillip was also an activist journalist. For instance, in 1999, I organised a meeting at the Freedom Forum in London protesting at Fleet Street’s coverage of the Nato attacks on Serbia and Phillip immediately agreed to speak on a panel.

At international forums and in media articles (in both the prestigious press and alternative, progressive journals), he constantly criticised government and military moves to censor and sanitise the reporting of war – and journalists’ failure to confront the secret state effectively.

As he reflected: “I know now that the influence journalists can exercise is limited and that what we achieve is not always what we intended. It is the fight that counts.”

Richard Lance Keeble is joint editor of Ethical Space: The International Journal of Communication Ethics. This obituary was first published on the Ethical Space blog. Knightley’s journalism career began in Fiji.

• Journalist behind some of The Sunday Times‘ greatest investigations – The Guardian
• Pacific Journalism Review of A Hack’s Progress about Knightley’s Fiji connection

The Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) are being handed more powers by the New Zealand government, and given legal backing for spying on New Zealanders — in spite of yet another example of their wrongdoings being exposed this week.

It has been revealed by The Intercept and Television New Zealand that in 2012 the two agencies harassed and persecuted a New Zealander, Tony Fullman, whose only activity had been expressing negative opinions about the post-2006 coup military backed Fiji government.

This new episode is just another example of a long line of repressive actions against New Zealand citizens who pose absolutely no threat to this country whatsoever – the cases of David Small, Aziz Choudry, Ahmed Zaoui and Kim Dotcom are good examples of citizens or residents who suffered from mistaken and/or illegal surveillance by the spies.

And the total number of “terrorists” uncovered and brought to justice numbers exactly zero.

New government legislation is based on the Cullen-Reddy Report which recommended extending the powers of the spies and instituting a more rigorous warrant system.

However, past experience shows “oversight” always fails; in 2014 the GCSB could not properly give account of the number of warrants it was operating, and Sir Michael Cullen himself, when he was a senior minister in the 1999-2008 Labour government, lied to the country about spying on New Zealanders when he presided over a warrant system that failed.

In the unlikely event that warrants are properly constituted the evidence above suggests they are likely to be used to make innocent people suffer.

The GCSB and the SIS have demonstrated incompetence and victimisation over many years.

It is not the time to give them greater powers but is the time to close them down completely.

Close down the GCSB and its Waihopai spy base and pull out of the Five Eyes system.

Close down the SIS and transfer its functions to the Police who (theoretically at least) have to justify their actions in a court of law.

Murray Horton is organiser of the Anti-Bases Campaign in Christchurch, New Zealand.

• Special investigation: Inside one of the SIS’s biggest anti-terrorism operations – Television NZ
• The raid: The bungled spy operation – The Intercept
• The Tony Fullman NSA files

One of the “Thumbs up for democracy” in Fiji videos, 3 June 2011. Video: Truth for Fiji

The New Zealand government is considering the recommendations of a former deputy prime minister and lawyer as it embarks on designing a new wave of controversial spy-law reform. And again, it looks certain to drive a wedge into contemporary New Zealand.

On one side are those who support and trust the government to get the balance right between security intelligence and civil liberties, and on the other… those who don’t. Previous polls on such matters suggest the split is about 50/50.

The report was delivered to the government on February 29 and had been kept under wraps until yesterday (Wednesday, March 9). It is titled: Intelligence and Security in a Free Society and was written by former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister in the Clark Labour Government, Sir Michael Cullen, and, Dame Patsy Reddy, a lawyer with corporate experience.

Sir Michael and Dame Patsy write: “The need to maintain both security and the rights and liberties of New Zealanders has been at the forefront of our minds. Given the intrusive nature of the agencies’ activities, New Zealanders are understandably concerned about whether those activities are justifiable. This concern is not helped by the fact that the agencies’ activities have been kept largely in the shadows.”

Fair comment

But I would add to that the fact the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) was found only four years ago to have been operating illegally under the current Prime Minister’s governance. That is, until he changed the law in 2013 to accommodate the spy agency’s illegal operations.

And after much public outrage on the matter, the Prime Minister also read into the new legislation a retrospective element, making past illegalities legal. In some suburbs of Auckland, slick manoeuvres such as this are called a “hustle”.

However, in this report, there is some progressive thinking in evidence. For example Sir Michael and Dame Pasty recommend New Zealand’s spy laws be redrafted and brought under one single intelligence and security act, so as to make it clear what the spy agencies “can and cannot do”.

In a comprehensive report such as this, there is much detail, and within it much that when brought out for discussion will attract considerable and enduring controversy.

Let’s look at the recommendations regarding proposed authorisation procedures.

Targeted survaillance
This set of recommendations frame how authorisation is applied for, and given, when spy agencies seek to surveil New Zealand citizens and permanent residents. The recommendations include changes to:

* how targeted surveillance is authorised against New Zealanders and permanent residents be designated as Tier 1 authorisation and require sign off from the Attorney-General and a judicial commissioner. This changes from the Prime Minister (or minister responsible for the intelligence agency) and commissioner.

* how covert spying and intelligence gathering activities be designated as Tier 2 authorisation and would require the sign off of just the Attorney-General

* how open source intelligence gathering is authorised, defining it based on how it is collected (which includes the surveillance of organisations, people, and individuals while in a public place) – such activities would be designated as Tier 3 authorisation and would only require a broad policy statement to be issued by the Attorney-General.

If the spy operations intend to target a foreign dignitary, or embark on an operation likely to have implications for New Zealand’s foreign policy or international relations, then the Attorney-General “should be required” to refer authorisation applications to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for comment.

Is this an erosion of the status quo, of the current requirement that security intelligence operations involving the surveillance of New Zealand citizens and permanent residents require a warrant signed off by the commissioner and Prime Minister or minister responsible?

Or is it improving on the current regime by tagging the responsibility to the Attorney-General, a minister in the Executive Government’s cabinet whose justifications can be more readily challenged, even reprimanded, than can a prime minister?

‘Two hops’
The report fails however to address the fact that when our security intelligence agencies target an individual placing him or her under surveillance, breach a network, a computer, smartphone or communications device, they initiate an operative methodology referred to as up to “two hops” – which means hundreds or even thousands of others fall into the scope of surveillance simply because they may have been in direct communication with the individual under surveillance or (in the case of two hops) been in communication with an individual who may have been in communication with the individual upon whom an authorisation surveillance warrant has been granted and actioned.

It is believed that this is how Keith Locke’s SIS file included references to surveillance while he was a member of Parliament representing the Green Party. Helen Clark, who was the prime minister at the time, suggested no warrant had been authorised permitting the SIS to place Locke under surveillance. However, it is believed, that a person of Sri Lankan Tamil origin, whom Locke was in communication with, was the subject of an authorised and warranted surveillance operation. If correct, then Locke’s privacy and rightful right to political liberty was breached without authorisation.

The report fails to address this nor make a recommendation on how such a practice should be addressed.

Scope of the spy agencies
There is considerable attention given to how the security agencies should come under the State Services Act and be under one umbrella; that accessible information databases be defined and information and intelligence sharing and cooperation among public agencies (including the Police and Inland Revenue) be permitted.

It suggests a legislative catch-up be initiated to detail in law how the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) work with the Police on operations, share skill-sets, and prevent duplication of the same within other agencies.

The National Assessments Bureau (NAB) is also given some attention, suggesting it be brought into the fold as a significant specialist analysis body that works with executive government and politicians to understand and accurately assess the intelligence product. The NAB has been doing this in part since it was brought in from the cold, its title changed from the under-utilised External Assessments Bureau and brought within the respectable influence of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The report did not observe nor comment on how professional, efficient, or otherwise the spy agencies are. However, moves to locate elements of the intelligence community within the scope of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet suggest deep-seated concerns by those of the Public Service’s highest office. And the fact that senior members of the DPMC have in recent years been seconded to the SIS and GCSB also suggest a tipping point was breached once realisation was publicly noted of ill-defined and illegal surveillance activity.

The report also fails to address the question of in whose interests (foreign or otherwise) the GCSB and SIS serve. The Edward Snowden revelations, and the FBI’s involvement in the raids on Kim Dot Com and his associates (of which the GCSB was found to have been illegally involved) underscore why the public rightfully has concerns that external foreign powers use the GCSB as an instrument that serves their own national security interests.

Human rights
The report does mention how human rights should be a consideration for investigations conducted by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, which could offer a counter-balance to the previously heavy-weighted national security intelligence considerations applied to trade implications.

This recommendation may provide a reference, or at least a point of discussion, should the SIS embark on another disastrous, costly, wobbly, and legally flawed security risk certificate exercise – as was initiated when former Algerian politician and academic Ahmed Zaoui was imprisoned unjustly after seeking asylum and refugee status in New Zealand. In that case, the SIS cited likely negative trade implications with Algeria as justification for imprisonment without a trial while the Government considered Zaoui’s fate and possible deportation. Of course in the end, after years of legal battles and millions of dollars spent, the SIS retracted its security risk determination and deemed Zaoui not to be a risk to New Zealand’s national security at all.

Oversight
With the forever intensification of state security intelligence powers, there has been much discussion about the need for more robust oversight. It is interesting, if not disappointing, that Sir Michael and Dame Patsy only recommend a slight tweaking of the status quo.

For example, it is recommended the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security’s investigative powers be expanded in scope to include investigations into ‘sensitive’ operations. And, the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee be increased to a minimum of five and a maximum of seven politicians. There is nothing in the report’s recommendations that addresses Sir Michael and Dame Patsy’s observation that politicians on the intelligence committee are at times unable to fathom the detail or underlying consequences of information communicated during intelligence briefings – presumably due to the use of jargon, intel-speak, and vague references in the communications.

One would have expected, at the very least, this report would have recommended a robust oversight committee be established with a mix of sworn in and appointed experts including political, judicial, constitutional, and formerly operational members.

In Summary
There is much detail in the report, and overall Sir Michael and Dame Patsy have provided a robust analysis of today’s security intelligence environment, its demands, complexities, and referenced realities of security threats (whether they be cyber-security, human, infrastructure, or reputational in nature).

The Cullen-Reddy report does not make recommendations nor observations as to whether New Zealand has the balance right between the state’s search and surveillance powers and those of the citizenry’s right to expressions of freedom and liberty without undue corruption of those ideals.

And as far as public discussion, discourse and debate is concerned, it would have been helpful had the report included an observation of where New Zealand currently sits on the search and surveil Vs civil liberties axis when compared to the other Five Eyes intelligence partner states – I would suggest the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 and other states’ counterpart legislation could be used as a benchmark.

The full Cullen/Reddy report 

Dr Paul Buchanan’s comprehensive analysis