An Israeli cabinet minister has named the new Middle East on live radio —  and he named it in alarm.

What Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli called the “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis” is not a threat. It is the architecture of a new regional order.

And once you see its logic, you cannot unsee it. Here is what it means — and what it means for America.

• READ MORE: Lim Tean: Why standing on the wrong side of history cost Germany its UNSC seat
• Other Lim Tean articles

❝What we are witnessing is the rise of a new axis❞

Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli says Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis ‘is worrying’, linking three countries to recent US-Iran deal https://t.co/53i0KcwcAR pic.twitter.com/iOVMd6kEDI

— Anadolu English (@anadoluagency) June 17, 2026

The confession in the alarm
When Amichai Chikli went on Israel’s 103 FM radio this week to warn of the rise of a “Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan axis,” he wasn’t making a prediction. He was issuing a confession.

An adversary’s alarm is always the most reliable confirmation that a structural shift has occurred — and what Chikli named in anxiety, we must now examine with clarity.

The old Middle East is gone. What is rising in its place is an architecture that no Western foreign policy establishment has yet fully reckoned with — one in which American primacy has been displaced, Israeli military dominance has been exposed as insufficient, and the two great Indigenous powers of the region, Iran and Türkiye, are emerging as the twin poles of a new order.

The moment the Old Order broke
The proximate event was the US-Iran framework agreement — now signed and in force. Trump signing it at the Palace of Versailles during dinner with French President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday evening, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signing from Tehran.

But the manner of its emergence is as consequential as its content.

Washington and Tehran reached their temporary truce on April 8 through Pakistani mediation. The framework itself was shaped by Pakistan, Qatar, and Türkiye — playing, as one account noted, “different but complementary roles.”

Qatar hosted senior Iranian officials and maintained communication channels. Türkiye provided consistent diplomatic backing and called repeatedly for a negotiated resolution. Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was the crucial bridge, maintaining simultaneous contacts with both Washington and Tehran.

Notice who was absent from this architecture — Israel. Notice who else was absent — the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia. These are the three traditional American-anchored Gulf states that for three decades defined the regional order alongside Washington.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself admitted the scale of his marginalisation. At his first press conference in three months, he conceded he did not know what was actually written in the agreement.

The leader of the Middle East’s most powerful military, possessor of an undeclared nuclear arsenal, was reduced to a bystander while the region’s future was negotiated without him.

Trump, at the G7 summit in France, publicly described Netanyahu as “crazy” and said “without me, there would be no Israel.” Strip away the Trumpian grandiosity and a devastating strategic truth remains: Israel’s security has never rested on its own foundations, but on American patronage. And that patronage is being fundamentally recalibrated.

For American readers, this demands a moment of honest reflection. The United States spent trillions of dollars and decades of strategic energy constructing a Middle Eastern order anchored on Israeli military dominance and Gulf monarchy stability. That order has not been dismantled by an adversary’s military victory. It has been quietly superseded — by diplomacy conducted through channels America did not control, by actors America did not invite, producing an outcome America did not architect. That is a more profound kind of displacement than defeat in battle.

The dual-hegemon architecture
What is emerging is not a successor Pax — not Chinese, not Russian, not any external power’s regional order. It is something rarer and more durable: a regional order anchored by Indigenous great powers.

Iran and Turkey are the twin poles. Between them they possess the military depth, the demographic weight, the geographic centrality, and the independent foreign policy capacity that no other regional actor can match. Iran controls the eastern arc — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen — through its network of allied movements and state relationships.

Türkiye commands the northern tier, projects power into Syria, maintains NATO membership as a strategic hedge, and has emerged as the region’s most consequential diplomatic broker.

This is not a partnership moving in perfect harmony. Türkiye and Iran are rival civilisational powers with a long history of strategic friction. The more precise framework is managed bipolarity — two hegemons who converge sufficiently on the containment of Israeli expansionism to cooperate diplomatically, while competing for influence across the Arab world’s contested spaces.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made his country’s position unambiguous. Speaking to Parliament, he declared that Israeli aggression in Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where it threatened Türkiye directly, and called Israel the single biggest obstacle to regional peace.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking alongside Russia’s Sergey Lavrov in Moscow — a symbolically charged backdrop — welcomed the US-Iran agreement but crucially called for it to evolve into “a structural and lasting security architecture rather than a temporary period of calm”.

That phrase is the key to understanding Ankara’s ambition. Turkey is not interested in episodic crisis management. It is seeking to institutionalise a new regional order in which it is a permanent rule-setter — the Ottoman inheritance reframed for the 21st century.

Iran, militarily weakened by the six-week Israeli offensive but diplomatically rehabilitated by the agreement, emerges in a paradoxical position of strength. It has traded military confrontation for international legitimacy, secured the rehabilitation of its economy, and — crucially — retained its regional network intact. The agreement has not dismantled Iranian power projection. It has brought Iran back into the international system while leaving its strategic depth untouched.

Pakistan: The nuclear keystone
The actor most consistently underestimated in Western analysis is Pakistan — and yet Pakistan may be the keystone of the entire new architecture.

Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority nuclear power. Its Army Chief personally bridged Washington and Tehran to produce the April 8 truce. It sits at the heart of the Türkiye-Qatar-Pakistan diplomatic axis. And it has recently formalised a defence pact with Saudi Arabia.

That last point demands careful attention — and contains a particular irony for American readers.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic anxiety is acute. If American primacy in the region is receding, Riyadh needs an alternative security guarantee. It needs, specifically, nuclear cover. China has been proposed as one possible guarantor. But Pakistan is the more structurally coherent answer — and the answer whose historical roots run deepest.

Saudi money was instrumental in funding Pakistan’s nuclear programme during the 1970s and 1980s. This was never a secret in strategic circles. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s original conception of an “Islamic bomb” was always partly conceived with the broader Muslim world — and implicitly with Saudi Arabia — in mind. The recent Saudi-Pakistan defence pact is not a bilateral footnote. It is the formal institutionalisation of a security relationship whose nuclear dimension has always been implicit.

Here is the American irony: Washington funded, armed, and sustained Pakistan through decades of the Cold War and the War on Terror. American taxpayers financed the Pakistani military establishment that built the Islamic world’s first nuclear arsenal.

That arsenal may now serve as the instrument by which Saudi Arabia quietly exits the American security umbrella — replacing it with an Islamic solidarity framework that carries far greater domestic legitimacy in Riyadh than any guarantee from Washington ever did.

History has a sharp sense of irony. America built the tools of its own displacement.

Lebanon: The proving ground
Lebanon is not a footnote to this architectural shift. It is its most immediate and visible proving ground — the theatre where the transition from old order to new is being tested in real time.

Israel’s continued strikes on south Lebanon, even after the US-Iran framework was announced, reveal the central tension of this transitional moment. Netanyahu, sidelined from the deal and facing devastating domestic criticism, is using Lebanon as the one theatre where he can still project agency. But in doing so, he is accelerating precisely the dynamic that isolates Israel further from the emerging order.

Erdoğan’s response was explicit and historically significant: Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria had reached a point where they threatened Türkiye directly, with Ankara’s security now tied to its two neighbouring countries. That is an extraordinary statement from a NATO member — effectively drawing a Turkish strategic red line over Lebanese and Syrian territory.

Under the old American-anchored order, no such red line existed. Lebanon was perpetually sacrificed, a weak state with no regional protector capable of imposing real costs on Israeli operations. That calculus has now changed.

Hezbollah emerges weakened militarily but strategically sheltered. Iran’s diplomatic rehabilitation does not require Hezbollah’s disarmament — it requires Lebanon’s stabilisation as a buffer state within the New Order. The agreement creates pressure for a ceasefire, not for the dismantling of the network that gives Iran its Lebanese strategic depth.

For Israel, this is the core dilemma: military operations in Lebanon that once carried manageable costs now risk triggering a broader regional response that the new architecture makes structurally coherent for the first time.

The coming reckoning: Bahrain, UAE and the Abraham Accords
The states facing the most acute strategic exposure in the new architecture are Bahrain and the UAE — the two Arab signatories of the Abraham Accords most deeply integrated into the Israeli-American axis.

They signed those accords in 2020 premised on a specific geopolitical bet: that American military primacy was durable, that Israeli military dominance was unassailable, and that normalisation with Tel Aviv was the winning ticket to regional security and economic modernisation.

Every one of those premises has now been shaken to its foundation.

American primacy has visibly receded — demonstrated not by any declaration, but by the simple fact that the most consequential regional agreement in a generation was negotiated without Washington in the lead role, and with Washington explicitly sidelining Israel from the process. Israeli military might, while still formidable, has been shown to have strategic limits.

And normalisation with Israel now carries reputational and security costs that were never priced into the original Abraham Accords calculation.

Bahrain and the UAE possess sovereign wealth, infrastructure, and relationships that retain value in any regional configuration. But they are now exposed on multiple flanks simultaneously — caught between an American patron recalibrating its commitments, an Israeli partner increasingly isolated from the new regional consensus, and an emerging order being constructed around axes from which they were conspicuously absent.

Their most likely path is quiet hedging rather than dramatic realignment. Expect both states to begin softening their public identification with Israeli positions, to deepen economic ties with Türkiye and expand back-channel contacts with Tehran, and to use their sovereign wealth funds as instruments of strategic repositioning — investments that signal accommodation with the New Order without requiring a formal rupture with Washington.

Abu Dhabi in particular, will seek to be useful to all sides simultaneously. But the window for comfortable hedging is narrowing. The longer Bahrain and the UAE remain identified with a receding order, the less leverage they will carry when they eventually seek terms with the one that is rising.

Oman and Qatar occupy the opposite end of the spectrum. Oman’s historic role as a quiet back-channel to Iran — it was instrumental in facilitating the early Obama-era nuclear conversations that eventually produced the JCPOA — gives it standing and credibility in the New Order. Qatar’s role in the current mediation, hosting senior Iranian officials and explicitly supporting Pakistani-led diplomacy, has purchased it significant goodwill from Tehran. Both states will navigate the transition with relative comfort.

Saudi Arabia’s inevitable pivot
Saudi Arabia’s position is the most consequential and the most delicate of all.

MBS built his regional vision on three pillars: American security guarantees, economic modernisation through Vision 2030 anchored in Western and Israeli-adjacent investment, and a forthcoming normalisation with Israel that was to be the capstone of the Abraham Accords architecture. That capstone now looks not merely delayed but structurally implausible.

The pivot toward Iran and the new regional order is not a choice Riyadh makes from strength. It is a response to the collapse of the strategic alternative. The 2023 Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement was the first clear signal. The new architecture now accelerating around the Iran-Türkiye axis makes the logic of that pivot not merely rational but increasingly urgent.

Saudi Arabia cannot indefinitely maintain a posture of confrontation with Iran while its American patron visibly disengages, while the new regional order is being built by actors — Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar — with whom Riyadh has workable and historically deep relationships, and while its own population’s Islamic solidarity instincts run counter to alignment with an Israel conducting military campaigns across the Muslim world.

The Pakistani nuclear umbrella is what makes this pivot strategically viable without strategic nakedness. It allows Riyadh to reduce its dependence on American extended deterrence without being exposed — and to do so through an Islamic solidarity framework that carries profound domestic legitimacy in a way that a Chinese or Russian guarantee never could.

A Saudi Arabia sheltered by Pakistani nuclear deterrence, reconciled with Iran, and aligned with the Turkey-Qatar axis is a Saudi Arabia that has successfully navigated the transition without catastrophic rupture with anyone.

The pivot will not be announced with fanfare. It will happen gradually — through accumulating diplomatic signals, quiet investment reorientations, and careful distancing from Israeli positions on Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader regional conflict. By the time it is fully visible to Western analysts, it will already be irreversible.

Conclusion: Reading the tide
What Amichai Chikli named in alarm this week, we should name with analytical precision: the emergence of a new Middle Eastern order anchored by Indigenous power, shaped by Islamic solidarity and civilisational assertion, and no longer organised around American primacy or Israeli military dominance.

Iran and Turkey will not always agree. Their rivalry is ancient and will resurface across multiple theatres. But on the foundational question of this historical moment — that the old externally-imposed order must be replaced by one reflecting the region’s own balance of forces — they are aligned.

And that alignment, backstopped by Pakistan’s nuclear capability, lubricated by Qatar’s financial diplomacy, and increasingly accommodated by a pivoting Saudi Arabia, is sufficient to constitute a genuinely new architecture.

For America, the lesson is not that it has been defeated. It is that it has been superseded — which is a more permanent condition. The tools America built, the relationships America cultivated, the arsenals America funded across decades of Cold War and counter-terrorism strategy, have been repurposed by actors pursuing their own civilisational interests.

That is not a betrayal. It is simply how history works when the tide turns.

The states that bet on the Old Order — Bahrain, UAE, and above all Israel — now face a reckoning whose full dimensions are only beginning to become visible. The states that positioned themselves wisely — Türkiye, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, and soon Saudi Arabia — will shape what comes next.

History rewards those who read the tide correctly. The tide has turned. The only remaining question is who moves with it — and who insists on standing still as the water rises.

Lim Tean is a Singaporean lawyer, politician and commentator. He is the founder of the political party People’s Voice and a co-founder of the political alliance People’s Alliance for Reform.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: The United States and Iran have officially signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war in Iran. The signing came a day ahead of schedule. President Trump signed the agreement at a dinner at the Palace of Versailles hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the agreement in Tehran.

The 14-point agreement calls for an immediate end to fighting on all fronts, including Lebanon; the full resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz; the lifting of the US blockade; the easing of sanctions on Iran; the unfreezing of Iranian assets; and a $300 billion investment fund to rebuild Iran.

AMY GOODMAN: But the deal also leaves many major questions unresolved about Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s lead negotiator, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, said, “Everything we sought to achieve through military action, we obtained several times over through negotiation; it ​was not even comparable,” he said.

Just hours before signing the deal, President Trump spoke at the G7 summit and issued a new threat to Iran.

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: It’s a memorandum of understanding. And if I don’t like it, we’ll go back to shooting at them, dropping bombs on their head. If I don’t like it, if they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re joined now by Vali Nasr, an Iranian American professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs headlined “Iran’s New Grand Strategy: How a Remade Islamic Republic Will Reshape the Middle East.”

He is also author of the book Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History.

Professor Nasr, it’s great to have you back. If you can start off by responding to this memorandum of understanding that President Trump signed in Versailles, obviously meant to bring us back to the end of World War I? The Iranian President, of course, signed remotely.

But talk about the significance of what we have finally learned are the 14 points.

VALI NASR: Thank you very much for having me back.

I think, first of all, the most important part is that President Trump decided to sign this himself rather than have Vice-President JD Vance do it, which then now means that he basically owns this document. I think it’s important in the sense that it ends this war. It closes the parenthesis on a hundred days of both hot war and economic war that has devastated the global economy.

At face value, and the way in which the political commentary, particularly in the West and the United States, is interpreting it, is that this is a major strategic setback for the United States. The US started this war with the belief that it would destroy the Islamic Republic within days. President Trump demanded the utter surrender for Iran.

And now he has to settle for an agreement.

And the way this agreement reads, it looks like that the United States is more eager for this war to end than Iran is. The United States has given Iran a great deal of economic incentive in order to agree to sign this agreement, end the war, and then agree to negotiate over the larger issues which supposedly caused the war in the first place.

And also, it’s very clear that in Iran, they’re very triumphant. They think this is a big victory for them, not only that they survived the war, but that they forced the President to sign this agreement.

And more importantly, everything the President said yesterday was breaking taboos: Iran can have enrichment; Iran can have missiles; Israel cannot destroy buildings in Lebanon at will, or should not; and that Iran is entitled to have its own frozen assets taken back — given back to the country.

Trump’s war on Iran ends with a triumphant Tehran      Video: Democracy Now

NERMEEN SHAIKH: And if you could comment, Professor Nasr, on the fact that Lebanon figures in the very first point of this memorandum, and the fact you’ve called this agreement a success for Iran because it’s created, as you said, a fissure between the US and Israel? If you could elaborate on that, and what you see as the risks, given that Israel had — was not consulted on this agreement, and it’s very unclear that it will go along with it?

VALI NASR: Well, first of all, the war was a moment of triumph for Israel, because it convinced the United States to basically go to war to realise what is essentially, and at its core, Israel’s strategic aims, which was the destruction of the Islamic Republic through military means.

The war did not pan out the way that President Trump understood it would, and that already was a fissure. Now, the president trying to get out of this war the best he can has led him down a path that accepts the continued existence of the Islamic Republic, giving money to the Islamic Republic, talking to the Islamic Republic, all of which are basically strategic setbacks for Israel, and particularly for Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And Iran is actually asking for a price for accommodating President Trump, and the price that Iran is asking is deliberately trying to expand that fissure between the US and Israel. But Iran, by insisting that Israel needs to back away from its maximal position on Lebanon and settle for a ceasefire now, and perhaps, as Iran is demanding, even leave south Lebanon, essentially, first of all, asserts the fact that Iran is coming out of this war believing that it has more leverage than before it went into this war.

It also creates greater tension between Washington and Tel Aviv. And so, the Iranians are playing this in a very important way for them.

But also, we have to think that one outcome of this war is friction between Israel and the United States, period, because the Israeli strategy of deploying the US to destroy Iran has backfired, and ultimately there will be a reckoning in the US as to why did we go into this war, what were the premises of thinking that it would be successful, and who is responsible.

And even though it’s not said loudly, it’s very clear, in the undertone of what President Trump says, that he’s lost trust in what Prime Minister Netanyahu tells him, and that he’s somewhat angry because he’s receiving blowback for a war that was, essentially, an Israeli strategic agenda, and now he has to carry the political cost of it.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Professor Nasr, I want to ask about this piece that you co-wrote with Narges Bajoghli, “Iran’s New Grand Strategy,” in which you detail the changes that have taken place within Iran from last year, the first US-Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025, to now, when this invasion took place, February 26. You say the Iranian state underwent something of a transformation. You write, “More institutional change took place in those eight months than in the previous ten years combined.” If you could elaborate?

VALI NASR: Well, in Évian [France], President Trump kept saying multiple times that there has been regime change in Iran and a more pragmatic leadership has taken over. Setting aside the second part of his statement, that whether it’s pragmatic or not, there definitely has been regime change. I mean, Israel and the United States, between the June 2025 war and this recent war, have killed more than 130 Iranian leaders.

And by doing so, they’ve eliminated a whole class of the country’s leadership, which has been replaced by a new generation that has come up through the ranks, generation that has been born in Iran after the revolution, the generation that was born not as revolutionaries that were fighting against a state, but actually as children of that state and in a bureaucracy, in a system that took place.

They have a different attitude towards statecraft, towards how to manage the country, and particularly how to manage the war. I mean, one of the things that surprised the United States in this war is the aggressiveness of the new Iranian leadership. The President, as he referred yesterday multiple times, killed General Soleimani, put maximum-pressure sanctions on Iran, bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities in June.

And what he got from the previous leadership in Iran was a tepid, conservative, restrained answer. Now he’s facing a leadership that doesn’t answer the same way. It answers very, very aggressively, and, therefore, was able to turn the tables on the United States by closing the Strait of Hormuz, by attacking American bases.

In addition, one of the big surprises of this war is how quickly Iran reorganised itself between finding itself on the defensive in June, and then facing a massive social uprising in Iran in January, that it was compelled to suppress very bloodily and brutally, and led to the conclusion around the world that the Iranian regime was really, really weak.

How is it that this really, really weak regime, at war with its own people, and having just suffered massive bombardment in June, was able to reorganise itself to survive a very direct, massive attack by the world’s premier military superpower and the Middle East’s most powerful military. And not only survive it, but actually come out of the war with strategic wins, like the control of the Strait of Hormuz, like a chokehold on the global economy, and force the American President into retreat to settle for far less than what he had thought?

So, if we take stock of this, regardless of whether you like the Islamic Republic or not, or how heinous they’ve been with their own people, you have to account for the fact that Iran, Iran’s new leadership, achieved the feat of reorganising the state, reorganising their military, managing their economy in a way to be able to achieve what they did in the eight months between the two wars and then during the course of the hundred-day war.

AMY GOODMAN: You write that the view now from Tehran is that, “the United States’ decade-long containment of Iran has come to an end. The new regional order will be defined less by American primacy than by multipolarity, with China an increasingly central player and Iran an integral rather than a marginal actor.”

As we begin to wrap up, Professor Nasr, if you can explain that shifting geopolitics and how exactly what Trump has achieved, what is the difference between February 27, before Israel and the US attacked, and now?

VALI NASR: What Trump has achieved is to end Iran’s containment. First of all, Iran destroyed about 16 to 17 US bases, some of them completely. So, it ended, if you would, the military encirclement of Iran. It created doubt in the mind of the Gulf countries about the wisdom of partnering with the United States in containing Iran.

I think yesterday in Évian the President made clear that even the sanctions regime against Iran is going to come down. So, economic and military containment of Iran is gone.

During this war, both in the Middle East and globally, the United States’ standing has been diminished. It has lost strategic ground. This was very evident in the president’s visit to China. So, multipolarity is a big winner against the President, who asserted American domination around the world but tried to show it in a war with what he thought was a second-rate, third-rate military and a country on the verge of collapse, has come up short.

So, he has been cut at the knees, if you would. And what will come, obviously, is a greater assertion of power by various regions of the world, by China and Russia, and the United States that will find it more and more difficult to compel the rest of the world to basically follow the US lead.

The original content of this programme is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States Licence. Republished under Creative Commons.

So, the whole Iran war, like so much of life, has turned out to be exactly the opposite of what you thought: You initiate a regime change war against Iran. You kill its elderly cleric head of state. You blow up a girls’ school. You sink its ships. You decapitate its “Air Force,” whatever that was.

You unleash the full fury of the largest military in human history on this country and, in the end, almost inevitably, that country becomes stronger and the countries that attack it become weaker.

Again, only in real life do ironies like this exist, but they are everywhere. In fact, that is the story of life. The opposite happens.

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Who could have called this? Well, certainly almost no one in Washington saw this coming, because they’ve been talking about this war with Iran and the need to decapitate Iran and the need to do something about Iran: “America’s biggest problem is Iran, and their proxies, and the Houthis and Hezbollah and Hamas.”

Whenever they gather in Washington to talk about the world, Iran is at the top of the list of problems we must solve.

And in almost none of these gatherings has anyone piped up to say, “Well, wait a second, if we do that, the opposite will happen. Iran will become more powerful, and we will become less powerful.”

Almost nobody said that in Washington. Literally almost nobody. And if there is somebody, who is that person? There wasn’t one.

At least one realist
But there was at least one person outside of Washington who said this. His name is John Mearsheimer. He’s been a professor at the University of Chicago since 1982, for over 40 years.

And he studies international relations, the way that countries get along with each other, the balances of power regionally and globally. And he’s smart and he’s erudite, but above all, he is wise.

He draws obvious conclusions from longitudinal data sets. He looks at what happens over time and tries to understand what this tells us about the way nations behave and about the way people behave, about human nature, which is constant, it doesn’t change.

And because he is one of the very few people in the field of international relations who has this ability, married to personal bravery, he’s willing to say things that are unpopular, which is the rarest of all qualities in academia.

Because he has these two qualities, he has been maybe the only guy, or one of the very few guys, to call it right.

Back in 2007, he and a friend of his from Harvard called Stephen Walt wrote a book, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, on the so-called Jewish lobby, AIPAC, and the whole constellation of non-profits in Washington that seek to steer the US Congress and the executive of the White House to giving Israel more money and more military aid, to changing the inherent priorities of American foreign policy, which are to protect and enhance the United States and to do things that are good for the population of America, to change that priority to protect Israel, to do what Israel wants.

The two of them wrote this fairly famous book about it back in 2007 and were immediately attacked, can you guess, as Nazis and anti-Semites. Well, turns out neither of them was a Nazi or an anti-Semite, just the opposite.

Normal liberals
They’re kind of normal liberals, not racist in any sense.

The charge itself is ludicrous. You notice what AIPAC is doing, so you’re an anti-Semite? It doesn’t make any sense; it’s a slur.

It’s slander designed to make you be quiet. And in most cases it works, which is why they keep doing it.

But in this one specific case, it didn’t work. Professor John Mearsheimer, who had tenure at Chicago, did not lose his job. And not only did he keep speaking, he upped the volume of his speaking and kept telling the world, though most people didn’t listen, what he had personally seen and how he interpreted that.

Why does the United States military go to war?

Mearsheimer, through close observation, concluded, well, in the modern era, mostly it goes to war, big wars, on behalf of Israel.

Tucker Carlson is an American conservative political commentator who hosts The Tucker Carlson Show.

Professor John Mearsheimer on genocide in Gaza and the looming defeat in Iran — recorded just before the peace deal.        Video: The Tucker Carlson Show

The contest for influence in the Pacific is no longer confined to diplomacy, aid projects or infrastructure.

Increasingly, it is being waged through information, media and communications networks.

A recent report, Understanding China’s Footprint in the Pacific Island Media Landscape, paints a picture of a region where newsrooms are under financial pressure, audiences are migrating online and foreign powers are competing to shape narratives.

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The findings are drawn from a major study conducted by researchers from the Washington DC-based Centre for Naval Analyses (CNA), a United States non-profit organisation specialising in security, strategic and public policy issues.

The report examined media systems and China’s engagement across 15 Pacific Island countries and territories between 2024 and 2025 through fieldwork, interviews and consultations with media practitioners, academics and policymakers.

The report was launched during a virtual panel discussion on May 20, 2026, featuring presentations by CNA researchers Heidi Holz, Genevieve Collins, John Mahoney and Darlene Onuorah.

They were joined by regional academics Dr Shailendra Singh, associate professor and head of journalism at the University of the South Pacific, and Professor Stephen Noakes, head of politics and international relations at the University of Auckland.

Broader questions
While the report focuses on China’s growing media footprint, it also raises broader questions about the future of journalism, media independence and information sovereignty in Pacific Island countries.

For Fiji, the findings are particularly significant. As one of the region’s largest media markets and a diplomatic hub for the Pacific, Fiji has become a focal point for Chinese engagement through media partnerships, journalist exchanges and government-to-government cooperation.

The report also argues that media organisations across the Pacific are facing some of the most challenging operating conditions in decades.

Researchers found widespread concerns about declining newspaper circulation, shrinking advertising revenues and the growing dominance of social media platforms. One Pacific media practitioner described the situation as “the worst in history” for the region’s media industry, while another said many newsrooms had become a “revolving door” because journalists frequently leave for better-paying jobs.

The report warns that these financial pressures are creating vulnerabilities that external actors can exploit through media assistance, training programmes and content partnerships, making media sustainability not only an economic issue but increasingly a geopolitical one.

At the same time, researchers concluded that China’s overall influence remains limited compared with the longstanding reach and credibility of Australian and New Zealand media organisations.

The report has sparked wider discussion among Pacific media leaders about foreign aid, editorial independence and the long-term sustainability of journalism in the region.

Support for democracy
Dr Singh argues that aid to the media sector is often portrayed as support for democracy and media freedom, but is also shaped by geopolitics, donor interests and soft power.

“Even media aid comes with strings attached, regardless of who the donor is or what they claim,” he said.

According to Dr Singh, the Pacific’s media crisis is not new. The region continues to experience high levels of journalist attrition, while journalism schools that train future reporters receive little attention from major donor-funded media programmes.

He argues that much of the support provided to the media sector is driven by strategic interests rather than long-term capacity building.

Dr Singh’s assessment mirrors one of the CNA report’s central observations — that foreign interest in Pacific media is increasingly being shaped by strategic competition, particularly concerns over China’s growing influence in the region.

Fiji Media Association general secretary Stanley Simpson says the issue is less about who is offering support and more about whether that support responds to the needs of Pacific media organisations.

“Too much ‘let’s help ourselves and give more money to ourselves so we can help the Pacific’ and not enough ‘let’s work with Pacific media so they can help themselves and be our partner’,” he said.

Inconsistent support
Simpson was responding to an article by Australian journalism academic Professor Alexandra Wake of RMIT University, who argued that Australia risks weakening its soft-power influence through inconsistent support for international broadcasting and regional journalism initiatives.

Dr Wake contended that trusted news services remain critical to regional stability, particularly as misinformation spreads and other powers expand their influence.

However, Simpson says the issue is not simply the amount of funding available, but where it is directed.

“We are looking for real funding and support that makes a difference,” he said.

“Not one-sided funding which seems to help Australian organisations more than Fijians.”

He argues that Fiji media organisations have repeatedly sought practical assistance such as cameras, editing equipment, software and broadcast technology, but have often been offered training programmes instead.

His comments highlight a recurring theme in the debate over media aid in the Pacific. While Australia remains one of the region’s most trusted media partners through the ABC and programs such as PACMAS, there is continuing discussion over whether media assistance is sufficiently aligned with Pacific priorities.

Simply struggling
For all the discussion about foreign influence, many Pacific media organisations are simply struggling to survive.

The CNA report notes that declining revenues, digital disruption and staffing shortages have weakened media resilience throughout the region. These challenges were compounded by the covid-19 pandemic and continue to affect both commercial and public-interest journalism.

Dr Singh says this financial pressure helps explain why Pacific organisations increasingly engage with a range of development partners.

While Australia is understandably reluctant to create dependency, he argues that Pacific media systems operate in small markets where economies of scale do not exist and long-term support remains necessary.

To illustrate the situation, Dr Singh cited veteran Tongan publisher and Pacific Islands News Association president Kalafi Moala.

“When you are drowning, you will grab at any hand that is outstretched. You don’t care whether it is China, Australia or America.”

That sentiment may help explain why China’s media engagement efforts have attracted increasing attention.

Digital media
According to the CNA report, China has expanded media cooperation agreements, journalist exchanges, training programmes and diplomatic engagement throughout the Pacific. Fiji has featured prominently in these efforts, including agreements on digital media cooperation and journalist training.

At the same time, the report concludes that Chinese state media outlets still have relatively limited reach among Pacific audiences. Broadcasters such as Australia’s ABC and New Zealand’s RNZ remain among the most trusted international news providers in the region.

Trust, however, cannot be taken for granted.

Simpson argues that Pacific media organisations demonstrated resilience during Fiji’s years of political restrictions and economic hardship, often with limited international support.

“When we were being beaten, threatened and censored, and almost closing down due to political and economic pressure, where was Australian support for the Fiji media?” he asked.

The question challenges traditional development partners to consider whether support for Pacific media has always matched their stated commitment to democratic values and press freedom.

Broader geopolitical contest
As the CNA report makes clear, Pacific media organisations now find themselves at the centre of a broader geopolitical contest.

Foreign governments will continue to compete for influence and aid priorities will continue to be shaped by strategic interests. Yet for Pacific journalists confronting shrinking revenues, digital disruption and rising public expectations, the more pressing issue is sustainability.

The real challenge is not who provides support, but whether that support genuinely strengthens Pacific media organisations, protects editorial independence and helps ensure they remain accountable to the communities they serve.

Alifereti Sakiasi is a journalist with The Fiji Times. Based in Suva, he primarily contributes to The Sunday Times, where he covers a wide array of human interest, social, cultural, and sports events. This article is republished from The Fiji Times with permission.

A New Zealand policy research and advocacy group released a detailed blueprint today for a fresh “independent” Te Tiriti and Pacific-based approach to foreign policy, and called for greater transparency in election year.

The current coalition government has “radically shifted New Zealand’s longstanding foreign policy traditions” — including by moving the country away from a principled defence of its independent values to “unquestioning support” for the actions of the Trump administration, said Te Kuaka spokesperson Dr Marco de Jong.

“New Zealand’s slide under this government towards a tightly aligned, militaristic foreign policy is not inevitable,” he added.

• READ MORE: Other Aotearoa New Zealand foreign policy reports
• Other Te Kuaka reports

Te Kuaka — a group made up of academics such as Dr de Jong and Dr Arama Rata, and lawyers with expertise in international and constitutional law like Fuimaono Dylan Asafo and Gabriella Brayne — released a policy brief, “A Foreign Policy Alternative for the 2026 New Zealand Election”.

The group refers to the need to revitalise “an independent, Te Tiriti-based, Pacific-centred, internationalist foreign policy”.

Last year has witnessed “tumultuous developments in world affairs” such as Israel’s genocide in Gaza, US aggression in Venezuela, and US and Israel waging war on Iran.

Independent values
Te Kuaka’s policy brief says the current government “has radically shifted New Zealand’s longstanding foreign policy traditions”, including by moving NZ away from a principled defence of its independent values and interests towards total, unquestioning support for the actions of the Trump administration.

The brief calls for:

• greater transparency around trade agreements;
• a War Powers Act to ensure parliamentary authorisation for going to war,;
• shifts in New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific towards non-militarisation;
• NZ intervention in support of South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) genocide case against Israel; and
• other changes.

“How New Zealand acts in the world has always mattered,” said Dr de Jong. “And we need our political parties speaking more openly about their plans on how to maintain and strengthen our independent foreign policy.”

The policy brief also calls for New Zealand to take more strident steps in relation to Indigenous self-determination in Kanaky New Caledonia and to support a human rights visit to West Papua.

The coalition government did not have a mandate for this “dramatic repositioning” in support of the Trump administration, Dr de Jong said.

Call for ‘greater clarity’
“Before the coming election we are calling for greater clarity from political parties about what the public can expect to see from them in relation to New Zealand’s position in the world.”

The policy brief notes that Te Tiriti o Waitangi has not been sufficiently honoured in foreign policy, and also proposes formalising requirements for Māori representation alongside official New Zealand delegations to international forums.

“We are in a rupturing world,” said Dr de Jong. “We need to ensure we’re not unthinkingly caught in the riptide of major powers’ priorities, and that instead we chart our own course, appropriate to our histories and our location in the Pacific.”

• Te Kuaka has previously published reports on conflict prevention and peace mediation, New Zealand’s positioning on AUKUS, and civilian casualties and the NZ Defence Force.

The humiliating defeat of Israel and the United States in their war on Iran, along with the savagery of the ongoing genocide in Gaza, are ushering in a new world order.

This order is one where voices of reason and stability emanate not from the West — which spent tens of billions of dollars sustaining Israel’s genocide — but from the Global South, including China.

It is an order where alliances are being rapidly reconfigured to protect countries from a rogue American state that lashes out like a wounded beast, as it spirals toward terminal decline.

• READ MORE: Tehran, Trump yet to comment on plan for 60-day US, Iran truce extension
• Gaza’s Board of Peace ‘a fiction’ run by the Trump administration
• Other Gaza, Iran reports

The end of the US Empire, led by an impetuous and clueless President Donald Trump, is irreversible. The US has lost its sixth war in the Middle East in 25 years. Iran’s power has been enhanced not only because it — along with Oman — controls the Strait of Hormuz — where roughly 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and 20 percent of the world’s seaborne liquified natural gas pass through — but because it has delivered a stark message, with its drones and missiles, to US allies and bases in the region, while sending the global economy into a tailspin.

Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — who reportedly lured Trump into the war with Alice-in-Wonderland visions of easy regime change in Iran following the decapitation strikes against the country on February 28, 2026, which included the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other political and military figures, along with 168 school children and their teachers — may strike Iran again.

They are desperate. But a renewed bombing of Iran will not work. Iran’s mosaic defence strategy ensures all political and military commanders are easily replaced.

Iran can strangle the world economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz. It can accelerate the pain by getting its Yemeni allies — Ansar Allah — to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, just as they did to Israel-bound ships when defending Palestinians after October 7.

A complete blockade
This could result in a complete blockade. Saudi Arabia, with the Bab el-Mandeb Strait open, is able to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and export five million barrels a day through its pipeline to tankers in the Red Sea port of Yanbu.

If a ceasefire between the US and Iran is not reached soon, the global economy will crash, perhaps within weeks. The US and its allies, such as Japan, have released some of their extensive strategic oil reserves, however they will not be able to cushion markets indefinitely.

Stockpiles in America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve are near their lowest in more than 40 years. Once these reserves are depleted, the price of fuel will skyrocket. If a barrel of oil shoots up to $200, the price at the pump could climb as high as $10 per gallon. This, coupled with shortages of other petroleum-based products, along with nitrogen fertiliser, aluminum, and helium — an indispensable element in the production of MRI machines and semiconductors — are already shutting down vital industries and driving up prices on basic commodities.

The World Bank projects a 31 percent increase in the cost of nitrogen fertilisers alone — which are produced in the Persian Gulf and transit through the Strait of Hormuz — if the war continues. This will mean a steep rise in the price of food.

Trump is like a dog being pushed unwillingly into a crate. When it appears a deal with Iran is close, he snarls and barks, sabotaging the proposed 30-to-60-day ceasefire agreement.

Netanyahu’s apoplectic fits about any agreement that would halt Israeli attacks against Lebanon, along with the potential release of some of Iran’s estimated $100 billion in frozen assets, spurs Trump’s momentary defiance.

Clock is ticking
But the clock is ticking. There is little time left. And the longer Trump waits, the worse it will get. Neither Trump, nor Netanyahu, are the masters of this game. Iran holds the cards.

Israel’s dream of formalising its hegemony over the Middle East, codified in the Abraham Accords during Trump’s first term — which normalised relations between Israel and regional states — is dead. This war and the genocide in Gaza killed it.

Trump is attempting to revive them by inserting them into a deal to end the war on Iran. He has demanded states previously uninvolved with the Abraham Accords, such as Pakistan and eventually, Iran, sign up to normalise relations with Israel.

Pakistan — the only state to publicly respond — rejected the invitation due to what it called a clash with the country’s “fundamental ideologies”. Every other state Trump appealed to reacted with bewildered silence.

Iran demands the removal of sanctions and an end to the naval blockade — which the Central Intelligence Agency concluded Iran can endure for months before it experiences severe economic hardship — in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The proposed agreement makes no mention of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, which US military and intelligence officials believe remains at 70 percent pre-war levels, according to The New York Times.

Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Qatar — a lead negotiator with Hamas — are the new powerbrokers in the region.

Pakistan not only signed a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia in 2025, it deployed troops, jets and air defence systems to the Gulf dictatorship in April. It has also been hosting ceasefire talks between Trump’s Dumb and Dumber duo of lead negotiators — his feckless son-in-law Jared Kushner and fellow real estate developer and golfing partner, Steve Witkoff.

Prestige, power of China
The war has enhanced the prestige and power of China, which compared to Washington is seen globally as embodying rational, prudent and stable leadership. Iran, in a sign of the new global order, permits Chinese and Pakistani tankers, along with other ships not allied with Israel and the US, to travel through the Strait.

Israel, unable to convince the US to do its dirty work of bombing Iran into a failed state, will, I expect, strike out with renewed fury against Gaza, perhaps occupying the remaining 30 percent of what is left of the besieged territory.

It will continue its Gaza-like policy of turning every structure south of Lebanon’s Litani River into rubble, which it bombs daily despite Iran stating that attacks on Lebanon violate the current ceasefire agreement.

Trump’s savagery and bluster — he threatened to “blow up” Oman if it fails to “behave” after reports of Oman jointly charging tolls with Iran for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz — cannot mask the impotence of the US. The refusal by America’s allies to heed Trump’s call to help him reopen the Strait, along with the economic misery visited on nations struggling to cope with shortages and the rising costs of energy and fertiliser supplies, are stark evidence of Washington’s pariah status.

Empires, blinded by the myth of their own omnipotence and military superiority, blunder at the final stages into conflicts with little understanding of where they are headed. They alienate their allies. They stumble from one military fiasco to the next, as the US has done for over two decades in the Middle East.

The British Empire in 1956, already in precipitous decline, was humiliated when it conspired with France and Israel to seize the Suez Canal, which Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser had nationalised. The US forced all three countries to halt the invasion. Britain’s pound sterling gave way to the petrodollar. It signaled the last chapter of the British Empire.

The war on Iran is Washington’s Suez Crisis.

This may not be the end of the American Empire, but it is the beginning of the end.

Chris Hedges is a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist who was a foreign correspondent for 15 years for The New York Times, where he served as the Middle East bureau chief and Balkan bureau chief for the paper. He is the host of show “The Chris Hedges Report”. This commentary was first published on the Chris Hedges Substack page and is republished with permission.

• The Chris Hedges Report

A woman whose great-grandparents — all eight of them — were Girmitiya labourers has put their stories into her debut novel.

The result is Banjara, a novel partly based on what she found, which is told through the eyes of two women more than 100 years apart.

Author, Shana Chandra told RNZ Nine to Noon she knew her grandparents were Girmitiya, but nothing of their origin stories.

• READ MORE: Other Fiji literature reports

“I knew that they were part of this larger geopolitical movement under colonialism, but I didn’t have their personal stories,” she said.

“I didn’t know where they came from in India. I didn’t know what made them vulnerable to coercion. I didn’t even know their names. So really, writing the story was a way for me to write their origin story not only for me, but for them.”

Chandra said the former head of New Zealand’s Girmitiya Foundation told her that Indo-Fijians were prohibited from writing about indenture.

“It felt very important for me to write this origin story, because there was so much silence – I think, because there was so much shame over what happened.

‘Angry about the silence’
“And it was my way of saying to my ancestors, they no longer need to be silenced, and… thank you, in a way, because I used to be quite angry about the silence, but then I realized it was their gift to me, and their gift to all of us — they didn’t want us to be burdened with what they endured.”

Chandra said a lot of research went into the book, but historical records only tell so much.

“When I saw my great-grandmother’s immigration pass, she boarded the Hereford, which is actually the same boat that Avani, my character, boards in the book.

“She was only eight when she boarded, and she boarded the boat with her younger brother, her older sister and her father, and there was actually no record of her mother being on board. So because of the way indentureships were partitioned with men on one side and women and children on the other, I know that those women on board would have helped my great-grandmother and her siblings survive in a myriad of ways.

“One day, I just had this compulsion to wake up and say all of those women’s names because I knew that they would have helped them survive.”

There were shocking discoveries, too. One immigration pass was that of a 15-day-old baby who had died.

“And on the left-hand side, written in cursive writing by a colonial official, was that her mother had suffocated her. And though I know that could be true, there was something about that intuitively that just didn’t sit right in my body.”

Real oral histories
Chandra later came across a post from a site called Cutlass Magazine, featuring real oral histories.

“One about a woman who said that when her grandmother was indentured, the women on board had to hide the children because crew members would find them a nuisance and want to throw them overboard.

“And there was an actual story from an indentured man who kept on repeating the same story, how on his ship that had a particularly rough passage, the captain came, took a newborn baby and fed it to the sea as a sacrifice.

“Even just me writing the names of those women afterwards, just burst into tears… It was important to weave those other stories, those oral histories, into the book to show that other side of history.”

Chandra believes a lot of labourers were duped into signing the labour agreements, and many were promised a “paradisical island full of abundant opportunity”.

“But what they actually faced …was hard labour up to 14 hours a day or over six days a week. And a lot of them were subjected to brutal physical and sexual abuse.

“At one point, Fiji had the highest suicide rate in the world due to indenture.”

The ‘women’s gang’
Chandra said there was “amazing forms of resistance” from the women.

“There’s something known as the women’s gang.

“These women would form these gangs, and they would go to known abusers and use the only thing, only weapons they had, which was their bodies, and retaliate and beat their abusers. So my book really showcases that female solidarity.”

She said it was tough to navigate all the cultural practices and language of the time to be accurate. But what also became important was the “emotional truth”.

“That emotional honesty was almost just as important, because that’s what it’s really trying to capture, but I was lucky. When I was writing this novel, it did feel like something larger was guiding my hand. So I do partly dedicate this novel to my ancestors, who felt like they were conspiring with me from the heavens.

“I think what’s so amazing to me is that, and this is what I hoped the book would do — it would provide an emotional landscape for other Indo-Fijians to rebound off and to start talking about these stories.”

• Shana Chandra will be appearing as part of the Auckland Writers’ Festival next month.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

How insane is it that, a Theocracy is winning the propaganda war against a Democracy?

How badly has Trump screwed up when religious zealots are beating you in the marketing game?

It’s not just the social media meme burns where Iran is winning, they are actually winning the war strategically.

• READ MORE: ‘Vengeance for all’: How Iran’s Lego videos won narrative war against Trump

Trump’s inane decision to get conned into an illegal war against Iran by Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu has swiftly become the biggest geopolitical blunder since Vietnam.

By shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, Iran finally has a weapon that is forcing Trump to back down.

Here’s the future timeline:

• Late May – June 2026
  → noticeable fuel price increases globally
• July – September 2026
  → inflation spike, food costs rising
• Late 2026
  → real economic slowdown / recession risk

Causing global economic pain is the only way the Iranian regime can force Trump to stop the violence.

If this is still blocked come the midterms, Trump and the Republicans are finished and he’ll be swamped with impeachments attempts.

Iran’s information war at home and abroad  Video: Al Jazeera’s The Listening Post

There is NO WAY Iran are giving that leverage up now they have been forced to use it.

For the Theocracy, Trump’s insanity has opened an unexpected door to not only have all the damage rebuilt but the economic sanctions off as well.

Did you read that?

Trump has given the Theocracy the chance to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people they have repressed.

If the Iranians can force America and Israel to agree not to attack them again, pay for all the damage they caused and lift economic sanctions, they will gain legitimacy with the Iranian population they could never have dreamt of.

There’s no way they are handing over the Strait, so Trump either surrenders or nukes the entire Iranian coastline.

Martyn Bradbury is the editor and publisher of New Zealand’s The Daily Blog. Republished with permission.

The heads of Israel, Russia and the United States are leading the destruction of global human rights, says Amnesty International, describing them as “voracious predators” intent upon economic and political domination.

“A global environment where primitive ferocity could flourish has been long in the making,” Agnes Callamard, the head of the global rights group, wrote in an annual report on the state of the world’s human rights that was released yesterday.

In 2025, “sharp U-turns were taken away from the international order that had been imagined out of the ashes of the Holocaust and the utter destruction of world wars, and constructed slowly and painfully, albeit insufficiently, over these past 80 years,” she said.

• READ MORE: The State of the World’s Human Rights: April 2026
• Other US-Israel war on Iran reports

In a news conference in London, Callamard said that most governments tended to appease the “predators” rather than confront them.

“Some even thought to imitate the bullies and the looters,” she said.

Spain, however, which is an outlier in Europe for its criticism of Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and US-Israeli attacks on Iran, “is standing above the double standard that is destroying the international system”, Callamard said.

She argued that Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who in 2022 sent his forces into neighbouring Ukraine, have had an “absolutely dramatic” impact on the world.

Their conduct is “emboldening all of those that are tempted by similar behaviours,” said Callamard.

“It is allowing for the multiplication of copycats around the world, and therefore what we are confronting now is much more aggressive and ferocious than what we had to confront three or four years ago.”

Amnesty shocking report – Global rights collapse    Video: Al Jazeera

‘Authoritarian practices have intensified worldwide’
Amnesty’s review of the state of the world’s human rights makes for grim reading, documenting attacks on fundamental civil liberties in most nations.

“Authoritarian practices have intensified worldwide”, the report reads, before running through abuses alleged in countries from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe in 400 pages.

Israel’s genocide in Gaza, Russia’s “crimes against humanity” in Ukraine, and the US-Israeli war on Iran were noted as examples of conflict in which international laws have been ignored.

In a section on repression, the United Kingdom is blamed for cracking down on the Palestine solidarity movement and Palestine Action, the direct-action group that targets sites associated with the Israeli military and is currently fighting a legal battle against its UK proscription as a “terrorist” organisation.

Afghanistan’s Taliban was responsible for further gender-based discrimination in 2025, the report noted, citing measures excluding women from education and work, while Nepalese authorities were said to have failed to investigate instances of gender-based violence against Dalit women.

Amnesty’s report comes as multiple conflicts rage across the world.

US-Israeli assault on Iran
The US-Israeli assault on Iran has killed more than 3000 people, while Israeli attacks in Lebanon have killed nearly 2400.

In Gaza, the confirmed number of people killed in Israeli attacks since October 2023 has surpassed 72,500 as the decimated territory is continually threatened by Israeli bombardment.

In Ukraine, more than 15,000 have been killed since Russia’s full-scale invasion began more than four years ago.

Conflicts in the Middle East are a “product of the descent into lawlessness, made possible by a vision of the world in which war-making and the killings of civilians are normalised,” said Callamard.

“No effective steps have been taken against Israel for its repeated, constant violation of basic standards of humanity.”

However, there is some room for optimism, Amnesty said.

US President Donald Trump probably thinks he can starve a country that feeds itself.

Washington is selling the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a chokehold. However, it is worth asking whether the hand actually reaches the throat.

Iran shares land borders with seven countries — Türkiye, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Nearly 5900 kilometres of border, criss-crossed by road and rail.

• READ MORE: US ready to restart combat if Iran does not agree to deal: Hegseth
• Caitlin Johnstone: I hope the US loses and the empire collapses
• Other US-Israel war on Iran reports

No naval force on earth blockades a land route.

Petrochemicals, minerals, manufactured goods are moved overland. Machinery, spare parts, consumer goods, all come back the same way. The Strait of Hormuz does not sit across any of that.

Then there is the food issue, which is where blockades historically do their cruellest work.

It will not work here. Iran is approximately 96 percent self-sufficient in essential foodstuffs.

Iran doesn’t depend on imported food
Fertile western plains, mountain valleys, Caspian lowlands, including wheat, rice, fruit, livestock. The Gulf states that cheered this blockade loudest — the UAE and Qatar — depend almost entirely on food imports. Iran doesn’t.

You cannot starve a country that feeds itself.

What about the blockade?

Yes, that will hurt. Hard currency earnings from oil tanker traffic will fall. That is real and Washington knows it.

But “hurt” and “collapse” are different destinations, and the distance between them is precisely what the architects of this policy appear not to have calculated.

Central Asia and the Caucasus remain open. Regional markets will absorb what the sea lanes cannot carry.

The economic pressure is genuine. The total isolation that the blockade promises is not.

Iran has survived four decades of sanctions, assassinations, and sabotage. It did not survive them by accident. It survived them because its geography is not a weakness waiting to be exploited.

It is the strategy.

Prince Taofeek Ajibade is an educator and digital creator from Ibadan, Nigeria.

Without understanding the astonishing network of power exercised by the United Arab Emirates you would have no idea why the UAE was hit particularly hard by Iran in recent weeks.

Nor would you know what fuels chaos from Libya to Sudan to Somalia to Yemen.

If you understand the UAE’s business-geostrategic model and how it mobilises warlords, gold, oil, regional logistics and finance — you get much closer to seeing the pattern in the seeming madness.

• READ MORE: The war you’re not allowed to see: How the UAE rewrites the story of Iranian strikes
• Trump says war ‘very close to over’ — US claims all Iranian sea trade halted
• Iran slams YouTube ban on pro-Iranian group’s LEGO-style AI videos
• Other US-Israel war on Iran reports

Tiny UAE, 1.4 million citizens, wields so much power that Saudi Arabia sees it as a serious threat. In December, Saudi Arabia bombed UAE surrogates in Yemen and told the emirates to exit the country. They didn’t. If the US and Israel hadn’t attacked Iran, more fireworks were in the offing.

Israel is the UAE’s close ally. They collaborate not just on the War on Iran but in many of these various “civil wars” that are both money-making ventures and a series of heartless state-destruction campaigns that give them greater geopolitical weight in the region.

Israel is UAE’s close ally.            Image: Google Earth map

We first need to understand what UAE (United Arab Emirates) really is. Comprising seven emirates — Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Ras Al-Khaimah, and Fujairah — it is now the hub of an empire that both Iran and Saudi Arabia would like to knee-cap.

The powerhouse is actually Abu Dhabi, the oil giant which is the effective boss of the rest, including Dubai.

Family business with six sons
Abu Dhabi is a family business, run by The Bani Fatima, the sons of Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi who is the most influential of the wives of the late Sheikh. Today, ultimate power resides with MBZ (Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan) the eldest of her six sons.

MBZ was a long-time buddy of MBS (Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman) but those days are well behind us. In the words of a senior Saudi figure, Ahmed Altuwaijri, Abu Dhabi is Israel’s Trojan horse in the region.

Along with Bahrain, UAE is a signatory to the Abraham Accords which is a US vehicle to bring Israel in from the cold. The other Gulf States oppose this “Israel First” policy and are clear that a resolution of the rights of the Palestinians must come first, although they do little about it.

The Bani Fatimid system works like this: identify a country that is experiencing instability, pick a side (preferably anti-political Islam) and offer not only to finance that militia or warlord of choice but provide the immense logistical support the UAE has, including air freighting weapons, supplies and soldiers, and the complex systems needed to convert, for example, stolen gold into arms or other assets.

Time and again this has resulted in the creation of shadow economies that end up controlling significant resources (gold, oil, agriculture, ports) and creating parallel states. Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen have all been played in this way. It is textbook divide and rule: weakening a state from within to then exert ongoing influence and resource extraction.

Dr Andreas Krieg of the School of Security Studies at King’s College London told The Thinking Muslim channel recently that UAE is far more advanced than Saudi Arabia in establishing powerful, agile networks across a wide zone of influence.

“It’s not about size. Size doesn’t matter in the networked global order that we’re operating in today. It’s about connectivity and who you can mobilise on your behalf — whether it’s in the information environment or armed non-state actors, such as the STC (in Yemen).

“But it’s also the commodity traders, the financiers, the banks, the insurance companies, the other trading corporations, that you can mobilise to generate what strategy is all about: influence and power,” Krieg says.

Libya’s terrible 15-year civil war has been immensely worsened by outside states, including UAE which turned general Khalifa Belqasim Haftar from a YouTube revolutionary into the head of the massively resourced LNA militia that now controls about a third of the country.

With UAE commanding the centre of a hub-and-spoke system, it can move fighters around the region at will, for example from Libya to Yemen where it sent thousands of LNA fighters to support local client militias. By backing the Southern Transition Council (STC) in Yemen, UAE got control over the vital Port of Aden. Similarly, by partnering with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, tons of stolen gold flows into Dubai. You get the picture.

Gold is the prime currency of the Bani Fatima empire (MBZ and his brothers). Dubai is known in the region as The City of Gold, the place where the bulk of Africa’s yellow metal, much of it smuggled, finds its way.

Imagine this: at the very time tens of millions of Sudanese are suffering famine or near-famine conditions, the UAE is facilitating the export to Dubai of tons of gold to fuel the war. This represents billions of dollars that should be held for the benefit of the people but instead is being used for empire building.

In Somalia the UAE has switched sides when economic or strategic advantage could be made. Along with Israel, UAE is backing militias who have declared a break-away state “Somaliland” that borders the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The UAE has military bases in “Somaliland” and has poured millions of dollars into the port of Berbera. With hundreds of kilometres of coastline adjacent to vital Red Sea shipping lanes, UAE and Israel will be important players in a contest with Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other powers.

In December last year Israel became the first to recognise Somaliland as a state. UAE is understood to be working on the Trump administration to do the same – further trashing the idea of territorial integrity for the sake of advantage. As an aside: Israel hopes to ethnically cleanse Palestinians to Somaliland one day.

All this dovetails with Israel’s strategy of smashing states to control them. For them, an alternative to regime change in Iran is Balkanisation to create several weak statelets thereby enhancing Israeli security and influence.

For those reasons and more, I hope the sovereign state of Iran survives the onslaught. I hope UAE and Israel’s genuinely evil business of fragmenting state after state is defeated. I hope the Western countries look at themselves in the mirror and ask themselves: what kind of moral monsters would be allies of Israel and the UAE?

Eugene Doyle is a writer based in Wellington, New Zealand. He has written extensively on the Middle East, as well as peace and security issues in the Asia Pacific region.

Eugene Doyle is a writer based in Wellington, New Zealand. He has written extensively on the Middle East, as well as peace and security issues in the Asia Pacific region, and contributes to Asia Pacific Report. He hosts solidarity.co.nz

As an Iranian living in New Zealand, I wake up every morning to the quiet green hills and the calm sea, but my mind is always thousands of kilometres away in Iran.

The news from home hits differently when you are far away. You feel helpless, but you sometimes also see things more clearly.

For years, I have watched the same old story from Washington and Tel Aviv: they want to change the regime in Iran. Not because they care about Iranian freedom, but because they want more power in the Middle East, control the oil routes, control the region, control everything.

• READ MORE: Diplomatic efforts to revive US-Iran talks intensify amid Hormuz blockade
• Iran a hugely ‘friendly’ country behind the sabre-rattling
• Other Eugene Doyle Solidarity articles

They tried it openly in the 12-Day War last year. They bombed, they threatened, they hoped the whole system would collapse. It didn’t. And now they are trying again, waiting for the Iranian people to rise up and do their job for them.

But it is not happening, and it will not happen.

From my small house here in New Zealand, I talk to family back home almost every day. They are tired, yes. Life is hard with sanctions, constant threats and bombings.

But Iran isn’t run by stupid people. The authorities in Iran have planned for this for a long time. If top figures are targeted, there is a chain ready to continue. It is not a secret. They have built it step by step.

Americans, Israelis don’t understand
The Americans and Israelis don’t seem to understand this because they do not know the religious and cultural soul of Iran. Without that knowledge any plan is blind. You cannot bomb a country and expect surrender when the children in every school learn about resistance from the first grade.

Take Imam Hussein, for example. Most people in New Zealand and other countries have probably never heard the name, so let me explain it simply. Imam Hussein was the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad.

In the year 680, in what is now Iraq, he and just 72 of his loyal companions including women and children stood in the desert of Karbala against an army of tens of thousands sent by a tyrannical ruler. They were cut off from water for days. They knew they would be killed.

Yet Imam Hussein refused to swear loyalty to a corrupt leader. He chose death with dignity over a life of submission. Every year during the month of Muharram, Iranians mourn this event not as a defeat but as the ultimate symbol of resistance.

We cry, we march, we tell the story to our children: standing for justice is worth any price.

That lesson is not ancient history. It is taught in schools today as a living example of how a small group can defy an empire. How do you expect a nation raised on that story to give up when missiles fall?

We have many such examples from the revolution to the war with Iraq to every pressure since. According to many political analysts, this is exactly why the West keeps making the same mistake.

They don’t see the culture
They look at Iran through their own eyes. They see maps and weapons and money. They do not see the culture that turns every attack into fuel for survival.

The diaspora is another story. When I first came to New Zealand years ago, the Iranians overseas were split into two main groups. One part supported the Islamic Republic, the other part, mostly louder in the West, wanted the return of the monarchy and backed the king in exile. They argued online, but at least the lines were clear.

Now everything is different. The attacks on Iran have created real splits and even anger among those who used to be against the regime. Some of them trusted Trump and Netanyahu. They said on social media and in interviews that the bombs would bring freedom.

Instead, the bombs are bringing destruction, dead civilians, ruined houses, fear in the streets.

Now you see fights breaking out in the comments, in the Persian TV channels, even in family online group chats. The ones who still wave the old flag blame the Islamic Republic for every death.

But many others who once hated the government are saying, “This isn’t freedom. This is an attack on our country.” They feel betrayed. They realise the “liberators” they cheered for only wanted a weaker Iran they could control.

And the war does not look like it will end soon. I speculate it will drag on in this strange way that gets tighter then loosens a bit, then tightens again. Iran will keep using its asymmetric tools: missiles that reach far, drones that are cheap, friends in the region who act when needed.

The system will not fall
The economy will suffer, people will suffer more, but the system will not fall. The Iranian people have closed ranks around the idea of independence. Those in the diaspora who hoped for quick regime change will stay disappointed. The ones who begged for American and Israeli action are now watching their own relatives bury the dead and should be asking themselves what “freedom” really means when it comes with foreign bombs.

Living here in New Zealand, I sometimes feel guilty for the safety I have. I go to work without air-raid sirens. But every time I see the news, I remember why Iran will not break.

It isn’t because the government is perfect. Far from it. It is because the alternative they are being offered is not freedom. Instead, it is humiliation and loss of dignity.

The Americans and Israelis think they are playing chess. They do not realise they are fighting a nation that has turned resistance into a religion, a culture, a memory passed from mother to child for centuries.

I do not know how long this round will last. Maybe months, maybe years of shadow war. But one thing is clear from my quiet corner in New Zealand: regime change from outside will not come.

The Iranian people have decided, consciously or not, that they will decide their own future, even if it is painful. The planners in Washington and Tel Aviv should study Karbala again. They might understand then why their plans keep failing.

Kaveh is an Iranian who has been living in New Zealand for many years. Having travelled across many different countries, he takes great pride in contributing to various communities through his professional work and community activities in New Zealand. Republished with permission from Eugene Doyle’s Solidarity website.

COMMENTARY: By Andrew Brown

Two men are mainly responsible for the war on Iran. And then there are those — such as Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese — who wilfully acquiesce to their murderous whims.

It’s the men. Not their press releases. Not their carefully managed public personas. Not the language their communications teams have stress tested for maximum palatability.

It’s the men themselves.

• READ MORE: Tehran says response to ceasefire proposals formulated, no direct talks
• NZ’s Peters called on to stress Palestine ‘open wound’ with Rubio
• Other US-Israel war on Iran reports

Their records. Their legal jeopardy. And the extraordinary, historically unprecedented fact that the two primary architects of a war now costing ordinary Australians their livelihoods are both, in their own ways, running from accountability while simultaneously running the world.

Benjamin Netanyahu
Netanyahu is not merely a controversial leader prosecuting a controversial war. He is a criminal defendant. An accused man.

A person who, under the laws of his own country, not the laws of his enemies, not the laws of international tribunals, he can dismiss as biased, stands charged with fraud, breach of trust, and bribery.

His trial has been grinding through Israel’s courts since 2020. It has not concluded. And critics, serious critics, within Israel’s own legal and political establishment, have made the case, with mounting evidence, that the prolongation of this war serves Netanyahu’s personal legal interests at least as much as it serves Israel’s security ones.

Think about what that means.

A man facing prison. A man whose political survival depends on remaining in power. A man for whom a ceasefire, a negotiated peace, a return to normalcy could mean the resumption of court proceedings that his wartime emergency has conveniently disrupted. A man whose far-right coalition partners have made clear they will collapse the government the moment the guns fall silent.

This man, this specific man, in this specific legal and political predicament, has been handed a blank cheque by Washington. Unlimited weapons. Diplomatic cover.

A US veto at the Security Council every time the international community tries to intervene.

And Anthony Albanese calls the objectives of his war appropriate.

ICC arrest warrant
The International Criminal Court did not call them appropriate. It issued an arrest warrant.

A warrant that sits unrequited and unenforced as Western governments, including Australia’s, conduct business as usual with a man the court has found reasonable grounds to prosecute for war crimes. This is not a technicality. This is not a diplomatic inconvenience. It is the most fundamental possible test of whether the rules-based international order that Australia constantly invokes as a guiding principle means anything whatsoever.

And Australia is failing that test, quietly, daily,

with a smile and a press release about shared values.

This is the casus belli we are never allowed to examine. Not the security rationale. Not the stated military objectives. The actual human being in whose name and for whose benefit this catastrophe is being prosecuted. And what that human being is running from.

Donald Trump
Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 carrying more legal and personal baggage than any president in American history.

A convicted felon. Civil judgments in the hundreds of millions of dollars. And something else, something the mainstream press, particularly in America and Australia, has handled with a caution so extraordinary it constitutes institutional cowardice — the Epstein files.

Jeffrey Epstein was not a lone predator. He was the centre of a network. A procurement and blackmail operation, almost certainly intelligence connected, that ran for decades across the highest levels of American, British, and Israeli power.

The files released in dribs and drabs, fought over in courts, partially suppressed and heavily redacted, point toward a system of leverage that compromised some of the most powerful men on earth.

Trump’s name appears in those files thousands of times. His association with Epstein was long, documented, and by his own prior admission, enthusiastic. In a 2002 interview, he described Epstein as terrific fun, noting approvingly that he liked beautiful women, many of them on the younger side.

That statement was made publicly. It has not been retracted.

It has simply been absorbed into the general noise of a political culture that has lost the capacity for appropriate disgust.

But the Epstein connection is not merely a personal scandal. It is a geopolitical one.

Epstein’s operation did not exist in a vacuum. Ghislaine Maxwell, his co-conspirator, convicted and imprisoned, was the daughter of Robert Maxwell, the media baron confirmed after his death to have been a Mossad asset.

The intelligence dimensions of the Epstein network have been reported by journalists of unimpeachable seriousness across multiple continents. The suggestion that a blackmail operation of this scale, running through the power centres of American political and financial life for decades, had no connection to the intelligence services that specialise precisely in this kind of leverage is not a serious position.

It is wilful blindness.

The Mossad connection
Mossad is Israel’s foreign intelligence service and one of the most operationally aggressive intelligence agencies on the planet. It has assassinated scientists in foreign countries. It has conducted sabotage operations across the Middle East. It has run networks of influence, surveillance, and covert pressure in Western capitals for decades.

This is not conspiracy. This is its known, partially acknowledged, historically documented record.

What the Epstein network, the Mossad connection, the Maxwell lineage, and the drip feed of suppressed files collectively describe, if you follow the thread honestly and without flinching, is a Western political order in which deference to Israeli policy is not entirely or even primarily explained by shared democratic values and strategic alignment.

Some of it is explained by fear.

Some of it is explained by leverage.

Some of it is explained by the quiet, unspoken, never to be uttered in polite company reality that powerful men in Washington, London, and Canberra have made themselves vulnerable. To networks of kompromat, to relationships they cannot fully disclose, to the specific kind of coercive power that intelligence operations specialising in the exploitation of human weakness have deployed for as long as intelligence operations have existed.

This is why the charge of antisemitism is deployed so rapidly against anyone who raises these questions.

Not because the questions are antisemitic.

They manifestly are not, being questions about the conduct of specific governments, specific intelligence agencies, and specific individuals, not about Jewish people as a whole.

But because the charge works. It silences. It ends careers. It redirects the conversation. And the people with the most to lose from honest answers have every incentive to ensure the conversation never reaches those answers.

The International Criminal Court has issued its warrant. The Epstein files are dripping into the public domain. The Maxwell Mossad connection is confirmed historical record.

The leverage that may explain a generation of Western politicians who cannot bring themselves to say a single word of meaningful criticism of Israeli state conduct is no longer the province of conspiracy forums. It is the subject of serious investigative journalism on three continents.

And Australia’s answer, apparently, is to look away.

Anthony Albanese will not be the one to look squarely at any of this. He has already told us where he stands. On national television, he endorsed the war. He called it constructive. He offered the American justification back to an Australian audience as though it were Australia’s own sovereign conclusion.

It was not. It was obedience dressed as policy. And the men who benefit most from that obedience, a defendant in Tel Aviv and a felon in Washington, are laughing all the way to the next airstrike while ordinary Australians pay the bill, while journalists are prosecuted.

• Tomorrow: How the Murdoch press is running cover for a war and pointing your anger at the wrong man entirely.

New Zealand protesters have again spotlighted the country’s stake in US space militarisation today and speakers branded Rocket Lab as an alleged key link in the “IDF kill chain” as part of the Gaza genocide.

“Rocket Lab is a celebrated New Zealand success story, with a stated mission to open access to space and improve life on Earth,” said Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa  (PSNA) advocate Brendan Corbett.

“Yet many of its key contracts are with the US military and their suppliers.

• READ MORE: Government increases New Zealand space launch limit to 1000
• Other Rocket Lab reports

“It is driven by share price increases and creating value for shareholders.”

Corbett said the global space militarisation market size was valued at US$61 billion (about NZ$100 billion) in 2025 and was projected to grow from US$66 billion this year to US$116 billion by 2034.

North America dominated space militarisation last year with a market share of more than 40 percent.

‘World war threat’
“The overwhelming majority of our human family are totally appalled at this march to militarisation of space and the threat of world war,” Corbett told the crowd in Te Komititanga Square as they marked the 123rd week of protest over the Gaza genocide.

“But not the war mongering investor class. They make more money.

“Guess what people? Increasing geopolitical rivalry and security threats propels market growth.”

A so-called “ceasefire” came into effect in Gaza on October 10, but since then Israeli violations almost daily have killed 591 Palestinians and wounded 1578 – and children dying at a rate of about two a day — with the besieged enclave facing a severe humanitarian crisis.

Overall, the death toll in the Gaza Strip has topped 72,049 with 171,691 wounded – mostly women and children — since the start of the war, according to Palestinian health authorities.

The government has raised the total number of launches allowed for Rocket Lab at its Mahia launch pad tenfold to 1000, as the cap set at 100 in 2017 is close to being breached.

However, a physics professor at Auckland University, Dr Richard Easther, told RNZ News this week that he did not trust the New Zealand Space Agency to make good decisions while the agency said it had assessed all space activities against clear legislative criteria.

Geopolitical tension
Corbett stressed the increasing geopolitical tension, rivalries and escalating security threats across the globe.

This situation was expected to encourage countries to strengthen space-based defence capabilities.

Military forces of various nations required satellites and space systems to maintain secure communications, surveillance, and navigation under hostile conditions.

“This is the Rocket Lab, Black Sky, Palantir, IDF kill chain,” said Corbett, referring to the Israeli Defence Forces, although critics prefer to characterise IDF as the IOF – “Israeli Offence Forces” in view of Tel Aviv having attacked five countries in the region last year.

“This demand drives procurement of hardened, redundant, and cyber-secure space infrastructure — ”these are the factors contributing to space militarisation market growth”.

Corbett quoted Palantir chief executive officer Alex Karp telling investors in a call last month: “Palantir is here to disrupt and make the institutions we partner with the best in the world, and when it’s necessary to scare our enemies and, on occasion, kill them.”

“Military tech companies no longer pretend they are ethical and humane,” Corbett said.

Space technologies
He explained how space militarisation included deployment and use of space technologies for military applications such as reconnaissance, communications, navigation and so on.

It involved satellites, ground systems and related technologies for defence.

“This is the market niche that fuels Rocket Lab’s business plan,” he said.

Some countries used space and counter-space capabilities and integrated them into regular military exercises.

With space militarisation, countries integrated space assets such as satellites, ground stations, and launch systems into defence operations.

“These factors are driving the overall market growth,” Corbett said. “These are the activities that are driving us to war.”

RIMPAC 2026 exercises
He cited some of the major companies involved, including Lockheed Martin Corporation, Raytheon Technologies — both investors in Rocket Lab — Northrop Gumman Corporation, Airbus Defence and Space, and others.

Other speakers included Kia Ora Gaza activist Patrick O’Dea – who reminded the crowd of nuclear-free protest success in blocking visits by US warships in the 1980s – PSNA’s Neil Scott, and Maire Leadbeater of West Papua Action Tāmaki.

O’Dea challenged the crowd top campaign against New Zealand taking part in the RIMPAC 2026 military exercises in Hawai’i during June to August and “collaborating with the IDF”.

Protesters marched with banners declaring “Break the Rocket Lab kill chain” and “Rocket Lab – death for money” to Queens Wharf where a visiting Norwegian cruise ship Viking Orion (1000 passengers) was moored.

Israel’s President, Isaac Herzog, is due to arrive in Australia next Sunday. Why is a foreign Head of State asked to help heal an Australian community after an Australian tragedy?

Australia is being asked to accept something extraordinary as if it were normal.

Who invited Isaac Herzog in the first place, and why did Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese say yes? Presented to us not as diplomacy, not as geopolitics, not as a strategic signal, but as “healing”.

• READ MORE: Aly speaks after refusing to welcome Israeli president’s visit as nationwide protests planned
• Protests planned over Israeli President Herzog’s visit amid genocide accusations
• Other Bondi attack reports

Before we swallow that story, one question needs to be put on the table and left there until someone answers it.

Where does this community’s allegiance align? Australia or Israel?

The visit is being sold as reassurance for Jewish Australians after the Bondi attack last December 14. And yet the reassurance on offer does not come from Australia at all.

It does not come from Australian civic leaders. It does not come from Australian law or Australian institutions. It does not come from Jewish Australian faith figures, nor even from Israeli rabbinical leaders rooted in this country and this community.

It comes instead from a foreign head of state, and that single choice does more than any speech. It quietly rewrites the relationship between citizenship, faith, and state power in Australia.

So ask the obvious questions. Who requested this visit? Who lobbied for it? Who thought it was wise to import a foreign political figure into the emotional aftermath of Bondi? And why did the Prime Minister say yes?

Why did Albanese say yes?
If the purpose is truly pastoral, then the choice makes no sense. The visitor is not a rabbi. Not a spiritual leader. Not an interfaith presence. Not a community counsellor.

He is an Israeli president. A political figure. The constitutional face of a foreign state. Politics, not pastoral care. Power, not solace.

That is the first truth we are being asked not to notice, but the second truth is even more uncomfortable.

For years, Australians have been hammered with a single instruction, delivered with the confidence of a moral rule. Judaism is a religion. Israel is a state. Zionism is a political ideology. Keep them separate. Do not conflate.

If you blur those lines, you will be accused of prejudice, sometimes fairly, sometimes strategically, but always loudly.

That instruction has been enforced through the culture. In media commentary. In parliamentary speeches. In complaints processes. In campaigns to delegitimise critics who would not repeat the approved formula with sufficient reverence.

Fine. If separation is the principle, then separation must hold when it matters most. Especially when grief is raw, and symbols do their sharpest work.

Separation is abandoned
But at the precise moment symbolism matters most, the separation is abandoned. Not by critics. Not by social media hotheads. By the state itself.

At a moment of Australian grief, it is not faith that is summoned. It is the Israeli state.

Its president is elevated as the symbolic consoler. Its presence is framed as essential to the healing of Jewish Australians.

This visit does not merely blur the line between Judaism and Israel. It erases it. Publicly. Institutionally. With government endorsement of inviting a man who, according to Labor Friends of Palestine, doesn’t pass the character test for a visa application:

1. “A person does not pass the character test if … the Minister reasonably suspects that the person has been or is involved in conduct constituting . . .  the crime of genocide, a crime against humanity, a war crime, a crime involving torture or slavery or a crime that is otherwise of serious international concern; whether or not the person, or another person, has been convicted of an offence constituted by the conduct . . . ”
   
2. “A person does not pass the character test if . . .  in the event the person were allowed to enter or to remain in Australia, there is a risk that the person would . . . incite discord in the Australian community or in a segment of that community . . . ’ 

— Migration Act 1958, Section 501

Judaism vs Israel
You cannot spend decades demanding that Australians keep Judaism and Israel separate, then place an Israeli head of state at the centre of an Australian tragedy and expect the public to maintain the fiction.

You cannot demand absolute separation when critics speak, then collapse that separation when power needs a stage.

That is not an oversight. It is a choice, and it leads to the real debate Australia has been pushed to avoid.

If Jewish Australians are Australians of Jewish faith, then their safety, grief, and belonging are matters for Australia to address. Australian law. Australian civic leadership. Australian institutions.

Or, if faith is the organising principle, rabbis and religious leaders who actually carry pastoral authority. They are not matters for a foreign head of state. Not for an overseas government inserting itself into an Australian tragedy.

The moment a foreign political leader is presented as necessary to healing, the issue stops being faith and becomes allegiance.

And allegiance is not some abstract thing in Australia. It is demanded constantly. Migrant communities are told, again and again, that Australia comes first. That loyalty must be singular. That old countries are left behind. That this nation, its laws, its institutions, and its flag are the sole point of civic attachment.

Except here, the rules bend. Here, the separation we are warned never to breach is breached from above. Here, the state quietly endorses the idea that

Jewish identity in Australia is incomplete without Israeli political authority standing behind it.

Divisive double standard
That is why this visit is divisive. Not because Australians lack compassion. Not because antisemitism is not real. It is real, and it should be crushed without hesitation.

The division comes from the double standard. The division comes from importing a foreign political symbol into Australian grief, then scolding Australians for noticing what that symbol implies.

And once Israel is positioned as the emotional guarantor of Jewish life in Australia, the logic runs further, whether anyone likes it or not.

Why does responsibility stop at speeches? Why does it end in symbolism?

Why is the Australian taxpayer funding security, policing, protective infrastructure, and now a full diplomatic visit, while the implication being advanced is that Jewish safety here is inseparable from the Israeli state?

If Israel is to be treated as the natural guardian, then why is Australia carrying the entire material cost?

The Prime Minister has not merely allowed a diplomatic courtesy. He has endorsed a narrative. One that collapses the very separation it claims to defend.

One that institutionalises the question of allegiance while pretending the question is offensive to ask.

It is not offensive. It is civic. It is democratic. It is necessary. So ask it clearly, without malice and without fear.

Who asked for this visit? Why did the government agree? And what exactly are Australians being told, in symbols rather than words, about where allegiance is supposed to lie?

Because if the answer is Australia, this visit makes no sense.

And if the answer is Israel, Australians deserve honesty about what has just been done in their name.

With all the setbacks of recent years, Vanuatu’s citizenship sale schemes should be dead in the water — instead they are thriving, and geopolitical chaos is playing a part.

The citizenship-by-investment sector is the biggest single revenue earner for Vanuatu’s government, but lingering issues of integrity cast a shadow over it.

In 2024, when Vanuatu became the first country to lose its European Union visa-free access over concerns about its golden passport scheme, there were fears it would be a huge blow to the sector.

• READ MORE: Other Vanuatu passport sale reports

But designated agents for Vanuatu’s citizenship programmes have told RNZ Pacific this has not necessarily hurt them much, as their product has other benefits and passport holders can still apply to access Europe.

However, Vanuatu’s continued inclusion on an EU anti-money laundering blacklist hurts more, Francesca Grillon of approved agent Yawha & Associates said.

Currency hassles
Grillon said the decision to stop visa-free entry was not a major downfall for the citizenship programme.

“I think the main issue we are having is the blacklisting from Europe, because that that is an obstacle for receiving funds in foreign currency,” she said.

This issue came to a head last September when the Commonwealth Bank of Australia — which served as the correspondent bank for the National Bank of Vanuatu — advised it would no longer facilitate transfers for certified agents in the citizenship programmes

Melten Menauke of Smart Citizenship Vanuatu explained that this left the government in a bind over how it collects the donations and fees that foreign applicants pay.

“The National Bank is still looking for a correspondent bank to accept US dollars. I don’t know what is happening with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.

“US currency was the first one they blocked, and now they are no longer accepting [Australian dollars]. They’re only accepting Japanese yen,” he said, adding that this created costly hurdles for agents and applicants alike.

But integrity issues are not just creating pressure on Vanuatu’s citizenship sector internationally.

‘Nobody trusts anyone’
A Commission of Inquiry into the citizenship programmes was initiated by Vanuatu’s government in 2024 following concerns about corrupt practices involving the sale of citizenship and misuse of the programmes for personal and political gain.

But the inquiry report has still not been made public, eight months after it was officially handed to the government. As calls for its release continue, Jenny Ligo, the chairperson of Women Against Crime and Corruption in Vanuatu, said citizenship schemes had been misled by political interests.

“That programme needs to be taken out totally. Because most of the projects under programmes in Vanuatu, it always ties in with pollitics and politicians,” Ligo said.

“This is all wrong. We need neutral people to run these programmes. But at the moment nobody trusts anyone.”

Vanuatu’s government has had a lot to contend with in the last few years, including responding to major disasters — earthquakes and cyclones — and the challenge of creating much-needed political reform. However, addressing the integrity problems of the citizenship-by-investment schemes is high on its priotiy list

Grillon said the government had been taking the right steps to improve compliance with regulations and rules, including strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit which screens applicants.

“There’s a lot of effort, both from the high level government and directorship and public servants, in trying to really follow the international advice, and the newly introduced laws and doing everything properly.”

In demand
Overall, the sector is doing well. According to the Vanuatu Daily Post, citizenship sale receipts made up the bulk of the US$31 million in revenue in the past year — 24.3 percent more than what was forecast, with around 2000 foreigners granted citizenship last year.

Interest remains strong in several foreign markets, Norman Joseph of JG Marketing, Consulting and Recruitment Agency said.

“We have Chinese, we have Indonesians, we have Russians. Most of them are from different countries but they also have passports from different countries,” Joseph said.

“So they come in, for example, some might be Chinese but they also have a Mexican passport, so they apply from a Mexican passport.”

Ros Stanford of designated agent Stanford Knight said the Vanuatu passport was attractive for a variety of reasons.

“So, either for visa free travel — so global mobility is one option; for those that actually physically want to reside for tax benefits; and then we have a lot of clients currently who just want a safe like a Plan B, a safe alternative residence, in case things turn to custard globally.”

On the latter reason, Stanford said they had seen an uptick in the last couple of years, a reflection of ongoing ruptures in the global geopolitical order.

Even without visa-free access to Europe, and despite the concerns of ni-Vanuatu about its commodification, Vanuatu Citizenship is in demand — and agents tout it as one of the fastest citizenships to get any where in the world.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Two years ago, Israel suffered what was perhaps the most jarring day in its modern history. The events of October 7, 2023, weren’t just a military failure or an intelligence lapse — they were a national humiliation. Police stations were stormed and overrun. Military posts were taken. Soldiers and officers, including from elite units, were killed or captured. The Gaza Division of the Israeli army, a symbol of Israel’s long-standing dominance over the Strip, fell into chaos.

Israel invoked the Hannibal Doctrine — a policy that allows military forces to prevent the capture of soldiers even at the cost of their lives, by opening fire on both Hamas and the kidnapped Israelis. That day, it wasn’t theory — it was execution.

In the fog of panic, Israeli fire turned on its own, and the thin line between protecting society and sacrificing civilians for strategic ends evaporated.

• READ MORE: Gaza in a thousand faces – Al Jazeera looks back at two years of Israel’s war
• Two years after October 7: Israel’s reckoning

But October 7 was just the opening act. What followed was a war unlike anything Israel had fought in fifty years — brutal, relentless, and devastating in scale and ambition. Gaza was not merely targeted; it was systematically dismantled. What began as retaliation became something else entirely: an erasure.

The illusion of military supremacy
Two years into the war, one fact is undeniable: Israel, backed by some of the most powerful military alliances in the world, has failed to conquer a territory smaller than half of New York City. 365 square kilometers — that’s all Gaza is. Yet despite overwhelming force, technological advantage, and political cover, the Israeli army has been unable to fully occupy it.

This failure is especially glaring given the scale of destruction. Over 200,000 tons of explosives have been dropped on Gaza — the equivalent of 20 nuclear bombs without radiation. That’s not metaphor. That’s the measure of how far Israel was willing to go and is not willing to stop yet: flattening entire towns, turning hospitals, schools, mosques, residential towers, universities, even cemeteries into rubble.

Gaza has endured more concentrated bombing than any territory since the Second World War.

Indeed, what Gaza has endured over the past two years dwarfs even some of the most infamous wartime bombardments of the twentieth century. In February 1945, Allied forces dropped roughly 3,900 tons of explosives on Dresden in a three-day firestorm that killed an estimated 25,000 to 35,000 people and obliterated much of the city. Where Dresden became a symbol of wartime excess, Gaza is witnessing destruction on a scale so vast it makes Dresden look like a prelude.

And unlike Dresden, Gaza’s devastation has been broadcast live, in real time, to a world that cannot claim it did not know.

But Israel was never alone and had every advantage and complicity: real-time intelligence from the United States and Britain, precision munitions from Germany, satellite targeting, drone supremacy, complete air dominance. And still, two years on, it cannot claim control over this tiny strip of land.

The problem was never firepower. It was urban warfare — a terrain where bombs are blunt tools and conquest requires something far more difficult: boots on the ground, close-quarters control, and the ability to hold territory without hemorrhaging soldiers or sparking endless insurgency.

The Israeli army, trained for dominance but not for urban occupation, found itself caught in a repetitive, grinding cycle: enter, level, retreat, repeat.

Neighborhoods were captured and declared “secured,” only to be abandoned and recontested days later. Troops rotated in and out of ruined zones, unable to maintain sustained presence. For every area leveled, resistance either moved underground or regrouped elsewhere. The war turned into a grim spectacle of destruction without achievement.

This revealed a contradiction at the heart of Israel’s military doctrine: it can destroy almost anything, but it cannot hold what it destroys. Air supremacy means nothing when the battlefield is a bombed-out maze. Gaza’s density, devastation, and defiance turned every advantage into a liability.

So while the Strip lies in ruins, it is not conquered. And that truth — buried under declarations of “strategic success” — is the defeat Israel cannot admit.

The real objective: Not security—territory
Israel’s war was not, as officially claimed, about eliminating Hamas or rescuing hostages. That narrative collapsed quickly under the weight of Israel’s own actions. From the beginning, hostage negotiations were treated as peripheral. Every time progress was made on potential ceasefires, it was Netanyahu’s office that pulled the plug — because every hostage released made the war harder to justify. Every ceasefire threatened to slow the campaign just enough for the world to ask uncomfortable questions.

This was never about hostages. It was about Gaza. More specifically: it was about removing Gaza as an obstacle to territorial ambition.

Netanyahu, cornered by political instability, corruption trials, and a fragile coalition held together by the far-right, saw in October 7 a chance to do what had always been unspoken: clear Gaza. Not of Hamas, but of Palestinians. Permanently. Not by announcement, but by attrition — bombing, starvation, siege, trauma.

Gaza’s civilian population wasn’t collateral damage. It was the target.

Destroying Gaza wasn’t a means to defeat an enemy. It was a means to reshape a demographic reality. This wasn’t defense. It was a conquest dressed up as security.

When the mask falls
In war, the first casualty is truth. But in this war, truth didn’t die quietly — it was dragged into the open, exposed by the very actors trying to hide it. Israeli soldiers live streamed brutality. Government officials made genocidal statements on public platforms. Civilian infrastructure was not accidentally struck — it was deliberately annihilated.

At first, the world made excuses. Israel had been attacked and was “entitled to defend itself”. But over time, the scale, duration, and clarity of its actions stripped away any remaining ambiguity. When every hospital (38 in total) becomes a target, when entire neighborhoods are turned to rubble, when starvation is used as a weapon — it becomes impossible to speak of “defence” without insulting reason.

And so the global tide turned. Governments hesitated, but people didn’t. From Berlin to Boston, from Sydney to Cape Town, millions marched — not for Hamas, but for the principle that no state, however victimised, has the right to massacre an entire population in response.

Israel didn’t just lose global support. It lost the moral framing that had shielded, or it had hid behind, it for decades.

It had positioned itself as a democracy surrounded by enemies. But democracies don’t bomb refugee camps, don’t livestream the deaths of children, don’t cut off water to two million people and don’t hold hostages’ lives hostage to political calculus.

Israel’s loss over the last two years hasn’t been military — it’s been existential. The myth of invincibility is broken. The image of moral exceptionalism, cultivated so carefully for decades, has shattered. Netanyahu, once a master manipulator of global opinion, now finds himself isolated, distrusted, even among allies.

What October 7 exposed was the weakness of Israel in the one arena it believed itself untouchable: control. It wasn’t just a border breach. It was a rupture of the entire apparatus that had kept Gaza contained for years. Fences, drones, AI, intelligence, surveillance — all of it failed.

And when the mask of control slipped, the response wasn’t strategic — it was criminally vengeful. It was rage mixed with blood thirst. But rage isn’t a strategy, rage destroys. And over two years, rage has destroyed Gaza — and with it, Israel’s future.

Netanyahu’s calculus: Eternal war
The war served Netanyahu well—at least at first. It silenced his critics. It unified a fractured public. It postponed trials. It gave him relevance again. But the deeper logic was more disturbing: war is the only environment where his political survival is guaranteed.

Peace, by contrast, is a threat. Peace requires compromise. Peace requires vision. Netanyahu offers neither.

Each time a ceasefire neared, his government collapsed it. Each time hostages were close to freedom, the process was torpedoed. To free the hostages would be to end the war. To end the war would be to lose power. This is the twisted loop that has defined Israel’s leadership for two years. Hostages weren’t bargaining chips — they were leverage. They were the excuse for ongoing brutality.

And the world saw it. Every broken deal, every last-minute sabotage, made it harder to pretend this was about security. By the end of the second year, no serious government believed Netanyahu was acting in good faith. Even allies began to distance themselves, not out of principle — but out of shame. What’s remarkable isn’t that Israel committed war crimes — it’s that it did so while assuming the world would look away.

For decades, that assumption held. But this time was different.

Technology turned every phone into a witness. Every child pulled from rubble was broadcast in real time. Every lie was challenged within seconds. The world saw the crimes as they happened — and watched as Israel confirmed them with its own footage.

No state can withstand that level of exposure and retain legitimacy.

Even in the US, the last bastion of unconditional support, the consensus cracked. Young people rejected the old narratives. Jewish voices joined Palestinian ones. The streets filled with dissent, not just from the fringe but from the center. Israel’s status as a protected partner is no longer guaranteed.

In Europe, traditional guilt-driven loyalty gave way to disgust. Governments clung to old alliances, but the public broke ranks. Supporting Israel was no longer an expression of Western solidarity — it became a political liability.

Ceasefire, but not peace
Now, with pressure mounting, ceasefire talks are back — this time in Egypt, under the bizarre influence of Donald Trump, whose re-entry into international politics has added a surreal dimension to an already surreal conflict. But few believe the talks will produce anything lasting. Netanyahu has built his power on conflict. He has no incentive to end it.

Even if a deal is signed, it’s unlikely to hold. The machinery of occupation, the logic of dispossession, the appetite for dominance — it remains intact. This war may pause. But the ideology that fueled it still governs Israel.

And that’s the real crisis: not the bombs, not the destruction, not even the deaths — but the belief that this can go on forever.

Israel may declare victory over Hamas. It may claim strategic success in degrading enemy capabilities. But that’s not what the world sees.

What the world sees is a nation that responded to horror with horror. A nation that lost its soul in pursuit of a war it could never truly win. A nation that allowed vengeance to become policy, and policy to become annihilation.

Two years later, Gaza lies in ruins. But so does Israel’s credibility. So does the illusion of a “moral army.” So does the narrative of self-defence that once made its case persuasive to the world.

Hamas lit the match. But Israel poured the fuel, struck the steel, and claimed the fire was purification.

In the end, what remains isn’t security. It’s ash.

Elijah J Magnier is a veteran war zone correspondent and political analyst with over 35 years of experience covering the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). He specialises in real-time reporting of politics, strategic and military planning, terrorism and counter-terrorism; his strong analytical skills complement his reporting. His in-depth experience, extensive contacts and thorough political knowledge of complex political situations in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Syria provide his writings with insights balancing the routine misreporting and propaganda in the Western press. He also comments on Al Jazeera.

The signing of the Papua New Guinea-Australia Mutual Defence Treaty — officially known as the Pukpuk Treaty — marks a defining moment in the modern Pacific order.

Framed as a “historic milestone”, the pact re-casts security cooperation between Port Moresby and Canberra while stirring deeper debates about sovereignty, dependency, and the shifting balance of power in the region.

At a joint press conference in Canberra, PNG Prime Minister James Marape called the treaty “a product of geography, not geopolitics”, emphasising the shared neighbourhood and history binding both nations.

• READ MORE: Papua New Guinea may sit out potential conflict between Australia and China despite Pukpuk defence treaty

“This Treaty was not conceived out of geopolitics or any other reason, but out of geography, history, and the enduring reality of our shared neighbourhood,” Marape said.

Described as “two houses with one fence,” the Pukpuk Treaty cements Australia as PNG’s “security partner of choice.” It encompasses training, intelligence, disaster relief, and maritime cooperation while pledging full respect for sovereignty.

“Papua New Guinea made a strategic and conscious choice – Australia is our security partner of choice. This choice was made not out of pressure or convenience, but from the heart and soul of our coexistence as neighbours,” Marape said.

For Canberra, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese cast the accord as an extension of “family ties” – a reaffirmation that Australia “will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with PNG to ensure a peaceful and secure Pacific family.”

Intensifying competition
It comes amid intensifying competition for influence across the Pacific, where security and sport now intersect in Canberra’s broader regional strategy.

The Treaty promises to bolster the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) through joint training, infrastructure upgrades, and enhanced maritime surveillance. Marape conceded that the country’s forces have long struggled with under-resourcing.

“The reality is that our Defence Force needs enhanced capacity to defend our sovereign territorial integrity. This Treaty will help us build that capacity – through shared resources, intelligence, technology, and training,” he said.

Yet, retired Major-General Jerry Singirok, former PNGDF commander, has urged caution.

“Signing a Defence Pact with Australia for the purposes of strengthening our military capacity and capabilities is most welcomed, but an Act of Parliament must give legal effect to whatever military activities a foreign country intends,” Singirok said in a statement.

He warned that Sections 202 and 206 of PNG’s Constitution already define the Defence Force’s role and foreign cooperation limits, stressing that any new arrangement must pass parliamentary scrutiny to avoid infringing sovereignty.

The sovereignty debate
Singirok’s warning reflects a broader unease in Port Moresby — that the Pukpuk Treaty could re-entrench post-colonial dependency. He described the PNGDF as “retarded and stagnated”, spending just 0.38 percent of GDP on defence, with limited capacity to patrol its vast land and maritime borders.

“In essence, PNG is in the process of offloading its sovereign responsibilities to protect its national interest and sovereign protection to Australia to fill the gaps and carry,” he wrote.

“This move, while from face value appeals, has serious consequences from dependency to strategic synergy and blatant disregard to sovereignty at the expense of Australia.”

Former leaders, including Sir Warren Dutton, have been even more blunt: “If our Defence Force is trained, funded, and deployed under Australian priorities, then whose sovereignty are we defending? Ours — or theirs?”

Canberra views the NRL deal not simply as a sporting venture but as “soft power in action” — embedding Australian culture and visibility across the Pacific through a sport already seen as a regional passion.

Marape called it “another platform of shared identity” between PNG and Australia, aligning with the spirit of the Pukpuk Treaty: partnership through shared interests.

However, critics argue the twin announcements — a defence pact and an NRL team — reveal a coordinated Australian effort to strengthen influence at multiple levels: security, economy, and society.

The US factor and overall strategy
The Pukpuk Treaty follows last year’s Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed between Papua New Guinea and the United States, which grants US forces access to key PNG military facilities, including Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.

That deal drew domestic protests over transparency and the perception of external control.

The Marape government insisted the arrangement respected PNG’s sovereignty, but combined with the new Australian treaty, it positions the country at the centre of a US-led security network stretching from Hawai’i to Canberra.

Analysts say the two pacts complement each other — with the US providing strategic hardware and global deterrence, and Australia delivering regional training and operational partnership.

Together, they represent a deepening of what one defence analyst called “the Pacific’s most consequential alignment since independence”.

PNG’s deepening security ties with the United States also appear to have shaped its diplomatic posture in the Middle East.

As part of its broader alignment with Washington, PNG in September 2023 opened an embassy in Jerusalem — becoming one of only a handful of states to do so, and signalling strong support for Israel.

In recent UN votes on Gaza, PNG has repeatedly voted against ceasefire resolutions, siding with Israel and the US. Some analysts link this to evangelical Christian influence in PNG’s politics and to the strategic expectation of favour with major powers.

China has been one of PNG’s longest and most consistent diplomatic partners since formal relations began in 1976.

China’s role in Papua New Guinea is not limited to diplomatic signalling — it remains a major provider of loans, grants and infrastructure projects across the country, even as the strategic winds shift. Chinese state-owned enterprises and development funds have backed highways, power plants, courts, telecoms and port facilities in PNG.

In recent years, PNG has signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and observers count at least 40 Chinese SOEs currently operating in Papua New Guinea, many tied to mining, construction, and trade projects.

While Marape has repeatedly said PNG “welcomes all partners,” the growing web of Western defence agreements has clearly shifted regional dynamics. China views the Pukpuk Treaty as another signal of Canberra and Washington’s determination to counter its influence in the Pacific — even as Port Moresby maintains that its foreign policy is one of “friends to all, enemies to none”.

A balancing act
For Marape, the Treaty is not about choosing sides but strengthening capacity through trust.

“Our cooperation is built on mutual respect, not dominance; on trust, not imposition. Australia never imposed this on us – this was our proposal, and we thank them for walking with us as equal partners,” he said.

He stressed that parliamentary ratification under Section 117 of the Constitution will ensure accountability.

“This is a fireplace conversation between neighbours – Papua New Guinea and Australia. We share this part of the earth forever, and together we will safeguard it for the generations to come,” he added.

The road ahead
Named after the Tok Pisin word for crocodile — pukpuk, a symbol of endurance and guardianship — the Treaty embodies both trust and caution. Its success will depend on transparency, parliamentary oversight, and a shared understanding of what “mutual defence” means in practice.

As PNG moves to ratify the agreement, it stands at a delicate crossroads — between empowerment and dependency, regional cooperation and strategic competition.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Leaders of the three Pacific nations with diplomatic ties to Taiwan are united in a message to the Pacific Islands Forum that the premier regional body must not allow non-member countries to dictate Forum policies — a reference to the China-Taiwan geopolitical debate.

Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine, in remarks to the opening of Parliament in Majuro yesterday, joined leaders from Tuvalu and Palau in strongly worded comments putting the region on notice that the future unity and stability of the Forum hangs in the balance of decisions that are made for next month’s Forum leaders’ meeting in the Solomon Islands.

This is just three years since the organisation pulled back from the brink of splintering.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific Islands Forum unity articles

Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu are among the 12 countries globally that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

At issue is next month’s annual meeting of leaders being hosted by Solomon Islands, which is closely allied to China, and the concern that the Solomon Islands will choose to limit or prevent Taiwan’s engagement in the Forum, despite it being a major donor partner to the three island nations as well as a donor to the Forum Secretariat.

China worked to marginalise Taiwan and its international relationships including getting the Forum to eliminate a reference to Taiwan in last year’s Forum leaders’ communique after leaders had agreed on the text.

“I believe firmly that the Forum belongs to its members, not countries that are non-members,” said President Heine yesterday in Parliament’s opening ceremony. “And non-members should not be allowed to dictate how our premier regional organisation conducts its business.”

Heine continued: “We witnessed at the Forum in Tonga how China, a world superpower, interfered to change the language of the Forum Communique, the communiqué of our Pacific Leaders . . . If the practice of interference in the affairs of the Forum becomes the norm, then I question our nation’s membership in the organisation.”

She cited the position of the three Taiwan allies in the Pacific in support of Taiwan participation at next month’s Forum.

“There should not be any debate on the issue since Taiwan has been a Forum development partner since 1993,” Heine said.

Heine also mentioned that there was an “ongoing review of the regional architecture of the Forum” and its many agencies “to ensure that their deliverables are on target, and inter-agency conflicts are minimised.”

The President said during this review of the Forum and its agencies, “it is critical that the question of Taiwan’s participation in Forum meetings is settled once and for all to safeguard equity and sovereignty of member governments.”

The Big Picture Podcast host, New Zealand-Egyptian journalist and author Mohamed Hassan, interviews Middle East Eye editor-in-chief David Hearst about the rapidly unfolding war between Israel and Iran, why the West supports it, and what it threatens to unleash on the global order.

What does Israel really want to achieve, what options does Iran have to deescalate, and will the United States stop the war, or join it as is being hinted?

Hearst says the war is “more dangerous than we imagine” and notes that while most Western leadership still backs Israel, there has been a strong shift in world public opinion against Tel Aviv.

• READ MORE: Israel-Iran attacks continue; Trump demands unconditional surrender
• Iran war: from the Middle East to America, history shows you cannot assassinate your way to peace
• Attack on Iran’s state media – Israel bombs IRIB building in new war crime
• Why Israel’s ‘humane’ propaganda is such a sinister facade
• Other Israeli war on Iran reports

He says Israel has lost most of the world’s support, most of the Global South, most African states, Brazil, South Africa, China and Russia.

Hearst says the world is witnessing the “cynical tailend of the colonial era” among Western states.

The era of peace is over.             Video: Middle East Eye

Iran ‘unlikely to surrender’
Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, says Iran is unlikely to “surrender to American terms” and that there is a risk the war on Iran could “bring the entire region down”.

Vaez told Al Jazeera in an interview that US President Donald Trump “provided the green light for Israel to attack Iran” just two days before the president’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, was due to meet with the Iranians in the Oman capital of Muscat.

Imagine viewing, from the Iranian perspective, Trump giving the go-ahead for the attack while at the same time saying that diplomacy with Tehran was still ongoing, Vaez said.

Now Trump “is asking for Iranian surrender” on his Truth Social platform, he said.

“I think the only thing that is more dangerous than suffering from Israeli and American bombs is actually surrendering to American terms,” Vaez said.

“Because if Iran surrenders on the nuclear issue and on the demands of President Trump, there is no end to the slippery slope, which would eventually result in regime collapse and capitulation anyway.”

pic.twitter.com/QcySkOWWGN

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) June 17, 2025

Most Americans oppose US involvement
Meanwhile, a new survey has reported that most Americans oppose US military involvement in the conflict.

The survey by YouGov showed that some 60 percent of Americans surveyed thought the US military should not get involved in the ongoing hostilities between Israel and Iran.

Only 16 percent favoured US involvement, while 24 percent said they were not sure.

Among the Democrats, those who opposed US intervention were at 65 percent, and among the Republicans, it was 53 percent. Some 61 percent of independents opposed the move.

The survey also showed that half of Americans viewed Iran as an enemy of the US, while 25 percent said it was “unfriendly”.

The recent series of high-level agreements between Papua New Guinea and France marks a significant development in PNG’s geopolitical relationships, driven by what appears to be a convergence of national interests.

The “deepening relationship” is less about a single personality and more about a calculated alignment of economic, security, and diplomatic priorities with PNG, taking full advantage of its position as the biggest, most strategically placed island player in the Pacific.

An examination of the key outcomes reveals a partnership of mutual benefit, reflecting both PNG’s strategic diversification and France’s own long-term ambitions as a Pacific power.

• READ MORE: Other France in the Pacific reports

A primary driver is the shared economic rationale. From Port Moresby’s perspective, the partnership offers a clear path to economic diversification and resilience.

But many in PNG have been watching with keen interest and asking: how badly does PNG want this?

While Prime Minister James Marape offered France a Special Economic Zone in Port Moresby (SEZ) for French businesses, he also named the lookout at Port Moresby’s Variarata National Park after President Emmanuel Macron drawing the ire of many in the country.

The proposal to establish a SEZ specifically for French industries is a notable attempt to attract capital from beyond PNG’s traditional partners.

Strategically coupled
This is strategically coupled with securing the future of the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project.

Macron’s personal undertaking to work with TotalEnergies to keep the project on schedule provides crucial stability for one of PNG’s most significant economic ventures.

For France, these arrangements secure a major energy investment for its national corporate champion and establish a stronger economic foothold in a strategically vital region between Asia and the Pacific.

In the area of security, the relationship addresses tangible needs for both nations.

PNG is faced with the immense challenge of monitoring a 2.4 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, making it vulnerable to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The finalisation of a Shiprider Agreement with France provides a practical force-multiplier, leveraging French naval assets to enhance PNG’s maritime surveillance capabilities. This move, along with planned defence talks on air and maritime cooperation, allows PNG to diversify its security architecture.

For France, a resident power with Pacific territories like New Caledonia and French Polynesia, participating in regional security operations reinforces its role and commitment to stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Elevating diplomatic influence
The partnership is also a vehicle for elevating diplomatic influence.

Port Moresby has noted the significance of engaging with a partner that holds permanent membership on the UN Security Council and seats at the G7 and G20.

This alignment provides PNG with a powerful channel to global decision-making forums. The reciprocal move to establish a PNG embassy in Paris further cements the relationship on a mature footing.

The diplomatic synergy is perhaps best illustrated by France’s full endorsement of PNG’s bid to host a future UN Ocean Conference. This support provides PNG with a major opportunity to lead on the world stage, while allowing France to demonstrate its credentials as a key partner to the Pacific Islands.

This deepening PNG-France partnership does not exist in a vacuum.

It is unfolding within a broader context of heightened geopolitical competition across the Pacific.

The West’s view of China’s rapid emergence as a dominant economic and military force in the region has reshaped the strategic landscape, prompting traditional powers to re-engage with renewed urgency.

increased diplomatic footprint
The United States has responded by significantly increasing its diplomatic and security footprint, a move marked by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Port Moresby to sign the Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Similarly, Australia, PNG’s traditional security partner, is working to reinforce its long-standing influence through initiatives like the multi-million-dollar deal to establish a PNG team in its National Rugby League (NRL), a soft-power exercise reportedly linked to security outcomes.

This competitive environment has, in turn, created greater agency for Pacific nations, allowing them to diversify their partnerships beyond old allies and providing a fertile ground for European powers like France to assert their own strategic interests.

A strong foundation for the relationship is a shared public stance on environmental stewardship. The agreement on the need for rigorous scientific studies before any deep-sea mining occurs aligns PNG’s national policy with a position of environmental caution.

This common ground extends to broader climate action, where France’s commitment to conservation in the Pacific resonates with PNG’s status as a frontline nation vulnerable to climate change.

This alignment on values provides a durable and politically important basis for cooperation, allowing both nations to jointly advocate for climate justice and ocean protection.

For the Papua New Guinea economy, this deepening partnership with France is critically important as it provides high-level stability for the multi-billion-dollar Papua LNG project and creates a direct pathway for new investment through a proposed SEZ for French businesses.

Vital economic resource
Furthermore, by moving to finalise a Shiprider Agreement to combat illegal fishing, the government is actively protecting a vital economic resource.

For Marape’s credibility in local politics, these outcomes are tangible successes he can present to the nation as he battles a massive credibility dip in recent years.

Securing a personal undertaking from the leader of a G7 nation, gaining support for PNG to host a future UN Ocean Conference, and enhancing national security demonstrates effective leadership on the world stage.

This allows him to build a narrative of a competent statesman who, through “warm, personal relationships”, can deliver on promises of economic opportunity and national security while strengthening his political standing at home.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

How global power struggles are impacting in local communities, culture and sovereignty in Kanaky, New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands and Samoa.

In episode one, The Battlefield, broadcast today, tensions between the United States and China over the Pacific escalate, affecting the lives of Pacific Islanders.

Key figures like former Malaita Premier Daniel Suidani and tour guide Maria Loweyo reveal how global power struggles impact on local communities, culture and sovereignty in the Solomon Islands and Samoa.

• WATCH: The first episode of this new series

The episode intertwines these personal stories with the broader geopolitical dynamics, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of the Pacific’s role in global diplomacy.

Fight for the Pacific, a four-part series by Tuki Laumea and Cleo Fraser, showcases the Pacific’s critical transformation into a battleground of global power.

This series captures the high-stakes rivalry between the US and China as they vie for dominance in a region pivotal to global stability.

The series frames the Pacific not just as a battleground for superpowers but also as a region with its own unique challenges and aspirations.

Republished from Al Jazeera.

The Trump administration might let hundreds of millions of dollars in aid pledged to Pacific island nations during former President Joe Biden’s time in office stand, says New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters.

The Biden administration pledged about $1 billion in aid to the Pacific to help counter China’s influence in the strategic region.

However, Trump last month froze all disbursements of aid by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), for 90 days pending a “review” of all aid spending under his “America First” policy.

• READ MORE: Political analyst hopes NZ, Australia will ‘step up’ over USAID cuts gap
• Other USAID reports

Peters told reporters on Monday after meetings with Trump’s USAID acting head, Peter Marocco, and his national security adviser, Mike Waltz, “more confident” about the prospects of the aid being left alone than he was before.

Peters said he had a “very frank and open discussion” with American officials about how important the aid was for the Pacific, and insisted that they “get our point of view in terms of how essential it is”.

“In our business, it’s wise to find out the results before you open your mouth, but we are looking ahead with more confidence than when we arrived,” Peters said, pushing back against claims that the Trump administration would be “pulling back” from the Pacific region.

“We don’t know that yet. Let’s find out in April, when that full review is done on USAID,” he said. “But we came away more confident than some of the alarmists might have been before we arrived.”

Frenzied diplomatic battle
The Biden administration sought to rapidly expand US engagement with the small island nations of the Pacific after the Solomon Islands signed a controversial security pact with China three years ago.

The deal by the Solomon Islands sparked a frenzied diplomatic battle between Washington and Beijing for influence in the strategic region.

Biden subsequently hosted Pacific island leaders at back-to-back summits in Washington in September 2022 and 2023, the first two of their kind. He pledged hundreds of millions of dollars at both meets, appearing to tilt the region back toward Washington.

The first summit included announcements of some $800 billion in aid for the Pacific, while the second added about $200 billion.

But the region has since been rocked by the Trump administration’s decision to freeze all aid pending its ongoing review. The concerns have not been helped by a claim from Elon Musk, who Trump tasked with cutting government waste, that USAID would be shut down.

“You’ve got to basically get rid of the whole thing. It’s beyond repair. We’re shutting it down,” Musk said in a February 3 livestreamed video.

However, the New Zealand foreign minister, who also met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, said he held out hope that Washington would not turn back on its fight for influence in the Pacific.

“The first Trump administration turned more powerfully towards the Pacific . . .  than any previous administration,” he said, “and now they’ve got Trump back again, and we hope for the same into the future.”

Radio Free Asia is an online news service affiliated with BenarNews. Republished from BenarNews with permission.

Ongoing wars and conflict around the world expose how international law and norms can be co-opted. With the US pulling out again from the Paris Climate Agreement, and other international commitments, this volatility is magnified.

And with the intensifying US-China rivalry in the Pacific posing the real risk of a new “arms race”, the picture becomes unmistakable: the international global order is rapidly shifting and eroding, and the stability of the multilateral system is increasingly at risk.

In this turbulent landscape, the Pacific must move beyond mere narratives such as the “Blue Pacific” and take bold steps toward establishing a set of rules that govern and protect the Blue Pacific Continent against outside forces.

• WATCH: The authors discuss this issue at an ANU Department of Pacific Affairs seminar on 5 March 2025
• Other Pacific geopolitics reports

If not, the region risks being submerged by rising geopolitical tides, the existential threat of climate change and external power projections.

For years, the US and its allies have framed the Pacific within the “Indo-Pacific” strategic construct — primarily aimed at maintaining US primacy and containing a rising and more ambitious China. This frame shapes how nations in alignment with the US have chosen to interpret and apply the rules-based order.

On the other side, while China has touted its support for a “rules-based international order”, it has sought to reshape that system to reflect its own interests and its aspirations for a multipolar world, as seen in recent years through international organisations and institutions.

In addition, the Taiwan issue has framed how China sets its rules of engagement with Pacific nations — a diplomatic redline that has created tension among Pacific nations, contradicting their long-held “friends to all, enemies to none” foreign policy preference, as evidenced by recent diplomatic controversies at regional meetings.

Confusing and divisive
For Pacific nations these framings are confusing and divisive — they all sound the same but underneath the surface are contradictory values and foreign policy positions.

For centuries, external powers have framed the Pacific in ways that advance their strategic interests. Today, the Pacific faces similar challenges, as superpowers compete for influence — securitising and militarising the region according to their ambitions through a host of bilateral agreements. This frame does not always prioritise Pacific concerns.

Rather it portrays the Pacific as a theatre for the “great game” — a theatre which subsequently determines how the Pacific is ordered, through particular value-sets, processes, institutions and agreements that are put in place by the key actors in this so-called game.

But the Pacific has its own story to tell, rooted in its “lived realities” and its historical, cultural and oceanic identity. This is reflected in the Blue Pacific narrative — a vision that unites Pacific nations through shared values and long-term goals, encapsulated in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

The Pacific has a proud history of crafting rules to protect its interests — whether through the Rarotonga Treaty for a nuclear-free zone, leading the charge for the Paris Climate Agreement or advocating for SDG 14 on oceans. Today, the Pacific continues to pursue “rules-based” climate initiatives (such as the Pacific Resilience Facility), maritime boundaries delimitation, support for the 2021 and 2023 Forum Leaders’ Declarations on the Permanency of Maritime Boundaries and the Continuation of Statehood in the face of sea level rise, climate litigation through the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and a host of other rules-based regional environmental, economic and social initiatives.

However, these efforts often exist in isolation, lacking a cohesive framework to bring them all together, and to maximise their strategic impact and leverage. Now must be the time to build on these successes and create an integrated, long-term, visionary, Pacific-centric “rules-based order”.

This could start by looking to consolidate existing Pacific rules: exploring opportunities to take forward the rules through concepts like the Ocean of Peace currently being developed by the Pacific Islands Forum, and expanding subsequently to include something like a “code of conduct” for how Pacific nations should interact with one another and with outside powers.

Responding as united bloc
This would enable them to respond more effectively and operate as a united bloc, in contrast to the bilateral approach preferred by many partners.

Over time this rules-based approach could be expanded to include other areas — such as the ongoing protection and preservation of the ocean, inclusive of deep-sea mining; the maintenance of regional peace and security, including in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflict and demilitarisation; and movement towards greater economic, labour and trade integration.

Such an order would not only provide stability within the Pacific but also contribute to shaping global norms. It would serve as a counterbalance to external strategic frames that look to define the rules that ought to be applied in the Pacific, while asserting the position of the Pacific nations in global conversations.

This is not about diminishing Pacific sovereignty but about enhancing it — ensuring that the region’s interests are safeguarded amid the geopolitical manoeuvring of external powers, and the growing wariness in and of US foreign policy.

The Pacific’s geopolitical challenges are mounting, driven by climate change, shifting global power dynamics and rising tensions between superpowers. But a collective, rules-based approach offers a pathway forward.

Cohesive set of standards
By building on existing frameworks and creating a cohesive set of standards, the Pacific can assert its autonomy, protect its environment and ensure a stable future in an increasingly uncertain world.

The time to act is now, as Pacific nations are increasingly being courted, and before it is too late. This implies though that Pacific nations have honest discussions with each other, and with Australia and New Zealand, about their differences and about the existing challenges to Pacific regionalism and how it can be strengthened.

By integrating regional arrangements and agreements into a more comprehensive framework, Pacific nations can strengthen their collective bargaining power on the global stage — while in the long-term putting in place rules that would over time become a critical part of customary international law.

Importantly, this rules-based approach must be guided by Pacific values, ensuring that the region’s unique cultural, environmental and strategic interests are preserved for future generations.

Sione Tekiteki is a senior lecturer at the Auckland University of Technology. He previously served at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat in three positions over nine years, most recently as director, governance and engagement. Joel Nilon is currently senior Pacific fellow at the Pacific Security College at the Australian National University. He previously served at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat for nine years as policy adviser.  The article was written in close consultation with Professor Transform Aqorau, vice-chancellor of Solomon Islands National University. Republished from DevBlog with permission.

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown says New Zealand is asking for too much oversight over its deal with China, which is expected to be penned in Beijing next week.

Brown told RNZ Pacific the Cook Islands-New Zealand relationship was reciprocal.

“They certainly did not consult with us when they signed their comprehensive partnership agreement [with China] and we would not expect them to consult with us,” he said.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific and China reports

“There is no need for New Zealand to sit in the room with us while we are going through our comprehensive agreement with China.

“We have advised them on the matter, but as far as being consulted and to the level of detail that they were requiring, I think that’s not a requirement.”

Brown is going to China from February 10-14 to sign the “Joint Action Plan for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”.

The Cook Islands operates in free association with New Zealand. It means the island nation conducts its own affairs, but Aotearoa needs to assist when it comes to foreign affairs, disasters, and defence.

NZ seeks more consultation
New Zealand is asking for more consultation over what is in the China deal.

Foreign Minister Winston Peters said neither New Zealand nor the Cook Island people knew what was in the agreement.

“The reality is we’ve been not told [sic] what the nature of the arrangements that they seek in Beijing might be,” he told RNZ Morning Report on Friday.

In 2023, China and Solomon Islands signed a deal on police cooperation as part of an upgrade of their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”.

Brown said he had assured New Zealand “over and over” that there would be no impact on the countries’ relationship and “no surprises”, especially on security aspects.

“But the contents of this agreement is something that our team are working on with our Chinese counterparts, and it is something that we will announce and provide once it is signed off.”

He said it was similar to an agreement New Zealand had signed with China in 2014.

Deep sea mining research
Brown said the agreement was looking for areas of cooperation, with deep sea mining research being one area.

However, he said the immediate area that the Cook Islands wanted help with was a new interisland vessel to replace the existing ageing ship.

Brown has backed down from his controversial passport proposal after facing pressure from New Zealand.

He said the country “would essentially punish any Cook Islander that would seek a Cook Islands passport” by passing new legislation that would not allow them to also hold a New Zealand passport.

“To me that is a something that we cannot engage in for the security of our Cook Islands people.

“Whether that is seen as overstepping or not, that is a position that New Zealand has taken.”

A spokesperson for Peters said the two nations did “not see eye to eye” on a number of issues.

Relationship ‘very good’
However, Brown said he always felt the relationship was very good.

“We can agree to disagree in certain areas and as mature nation states do, they do have points of disagreement, but it doesn’t mean that the relationship has in any way broken down.”

On Christmas Day, a Cook Islands-flagged vessel carrying Russian oil was seized by Finnish authorities. It is suspected to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet and cutting underwater power cables in the Baltic Sea near Finland.

Peters’ spokesperson said the Cook Islands shipping registry was an area of disagreement between the two countries.

Brown said the government was working with Maritime Cook Islands and were committed with aligning with international sanctions against Russia.

When asked how he could be aligned with sanctions when the Cook Islands flagged the tanker Eagle S, Brown said it was still under investigation.

“We will wait for the outcomes of that investigation, and if it means the amendments and changes, which I expect it will, to how the ship’s registry operates then we will certainly look to make those amendments and those changes.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

It didn’t come as a surprise to see President Donald Trump sign executive orders to again pull out of the Paris Agreement, or from the World Health Organisation, but the immediate suspension of US international aid has compounded the impact beyond what was imagined possible.

The slew of executive orders signed within hours of Trump re-entering the White House and others since have caused consternation for Pacific leaders and communities and alarm for those operating in the region.

Since Trump was last in power, US engagement in the Pacific has increased dramatically. We have seen new embassies opened, the return of Peace Corps volunteers, high-level summits in Washington and more.

• READ MORE: Trump 2.0 chaos and destruction — what it means Down Under
• Other Donald Trump reports

All the officials who have been in the region and met with Pacific leaders and thinkers will know that climate change impacts are the name of the game when it comes to security.

It is encapsulated in the Boe Declaration signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018 as their number one existential threat and has been restated many times since.

Now it is hard to see how US diplomats and administration representatives can expect to have meaningful conversations with their Pacific counterparts, if they have nothing to offer when it comes to the region’s primary security threat.

The “on again, off again” approach to cutting carbon emissions and providing climate finance does not lend itself to convincing sceptical Pacific leaders that the US is a trusted friend here for the long haul.

Pacific response muted
Trump’s climate scepticism is well-known and the withdrawal from Paris had been flagged during the campaign. The response from leaders within the Pacific islands region has been somewhat muted, with a couple of exceptions.

Vanuatu Attorney-General Kiel Loughman called it out as “bad behaviour”. Meanwhile, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape has sharply criticised Trump, “urging” him to reconsider his decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement, and plans to rally Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders to stand with him.

It is hard to see how this will have much effect.

The withdrawal from the World Health Organisation – to which the US provides US$500 million or about 15 percent of its annual budget – creates a deep funding gap.

In 2022, the Lowy Pacific aid map recorded that the WHO disbursed US$9.1 million in the Pacific islands across 320 projects. It contributes to important programmes that support health systems in the region.

In addition, the 90-day pause on disbursement of aid funding while investments are reviewed to ensure that they align with the president’s foreign policy is causing confusion and distress in the region.

Perhaps now the time has come to adopt a more transactional approach. While this may not come easily to Pacific diplomats, the reality is that this is how everyone else is acting and it appears to be the geopolitical language of the moment.

Meaningful commitment opportunities
So where the US seeks a security agreement or guarantee, there may be an opportunity to tie it to climate change or other meaningful commitments.

When it comes to the PIF, the intergovernmental body representing 18 states and territories, Trump’s stance may pose a particular problem.

The PIF secretariat is currently undertaking a Review of Regional Architecture. As part of that, dialogue partners including the US are making cases for whether they should be ranked as “Strategic Partners” [Tier 1] or “Sector Development Partners [Tier 2].

It is hard to see how the US can qualify for “strategic partner” status given Trump’s rhetoric and actions in the last week. But if the US does not join that club, it is likely to cede space to China which is also no doubt lobbying to be at the “best friends” table.

With the change in president comes the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He was previously known for having called for the US to cut all its aid to Solomon Islands when then Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare announced this country’s switch in diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.

It is to be hoped that since then Rubio has learned that this type of megaphone diplomacy is not welcome in this part of the world.

Since taking office, he has made little mention of the Pacific islands region. In a call with New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters they “discussed efforts to enhance security cooperation, address regional challenges, and support for the Pacific Islands.”

It is still early days, a week is a long time in politics and there remain many “unknown unknowns”. What we do know is that what happens in Washington during the next four years will have global impacts, including in the Pacific. The need now for strong Pacific leadership and assertive diplomacy has never been greater.

Dr Tess Newton Cain is a principal consultant at Sustineo P/L and adjunct associate professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. She is a former lecturer at the University of the South Pacific and has more than 25 years of experience working in the Pacific islands region. This article was first published by BenarNews and is republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

Donald Trump is an unusual United States President in that he may be the first to strike greater anxiety in allies than in adversaries.

Take the responses to his pre-inauguration comments about buying Greenland, for instance, which placed US ally Denmark at the centre of the global foreign policy radar screen and caused the Danish government — which retains control of the territory’s foreign and security policies — to declare Greenland isn’t for sale.

Canada is also in Trump’s sights with trade tariff threats and claims it should be the 51st US state. Its government has vociferously opposed Trump’s comments, begun back-channel lobbying in Washington, and prepared for trade retaliation.

• READ MORE: Pacific delegates ‘look forward’ to working with Trump
• World on edge as Trump takes office with major moves
• Other Donald Trump reports

Both cases highlight the coming challenges for management of the global US alliance network in an era of increased great power rivalry — not least for NATO, of which Denmark and Canada are member states.

Members of that network saw off the Soviet Union’s formidable Cold War challenge and are now crucial to addressing China’s complex challenge to contemporary international order. They might be excused for asking themselves the question: with allies like this, who needs adversaries?

Oversimplifying complex relationships
Trump’s longstanding critique is that allies have taken advantage of the US by under-spending on defence and “free-riding” on the security provided by Washington’s global network.

In an intuitive sense, it is hard to deny this. To varying degrees, all states in the international system — including US allies, partners and even adversaries — are free-riding on the benefits of the global international order the US constructed after the Cold War.

But is Trump therefore justified in seeking a greater return on past US investment?

Since alliance commitments involve a complex mix of interests, perception, domestic politics and bargaining, Trump wouldn’t be the deal-maker he says he is if he didn’t seek a redistribution of the alliance burden.

The general problem with his recent foreign policy rhetoric, however, is that a grain of truth is not a stable basis for a sweeping change in US foreign policy.

Specifically, Trump’s “free-riding” claims are an oversimplification of a complex reality. And there are potentially substantial political and strategic costs associated with the US using coercive diplomacy against what Trump calls “delinquent” alliance partners.

Free riding or burden sharing?
The inconvenient truth for Trump is that “free-riding” by allies is hard to differentiate from standard alliance “burden sharing” where the US is in a quid pro quo relationship: it subsidises its allies’ security in exchange for benefits they provide the US.

And whatever concept we use to characterise US alliance policy, it was developed in a deliberate and methodical manner over decades.

US subsidisation of its allies’ security is a longstanding choice underpinned by a strategic logic: it gives Washington power projection against adversaries, and leverage in relations with its allies.

To the degree there may have been free-riding aspects in the foreign policies of US allies, this pales next to their overall contribution to US foreign policy.

Allies were an essential part in the US victory in its Cold War competition with the Soviet-led communist bloc, and are integral in the current era of strategic competition with China.

Overblown claims of free-riding overlook the fact that when US interests differ from its allies, it has either vetoed their actions or acted decisively itself, with the expectation reluctant allies will eventually follow.

During the Cold War, the US maintained a de facto veto over which allies could acquire nuclear weapons (the UK and France) and which ones could not (Germany, Taiwan, South Korea).

In 1972, the US established a close relationship with China to contain the Soviet Union – despite protestations from Taiwan, and the security concerns of Japan and South Korea.

In the 1980s, Washington proceeded with the deployment of US missiles on the soil of some very reluctant NATO states and their even more reluctant populations. The same pattern has occurred in the post-Cold War era, with key allies backing the US in its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The problems with coercion
Trump’s recent comments on Greenland and Canada suggest he will take an even more assertive approach toward allies than during his first term. But the line between a reasonable US policy response and a coercive one is hard to draw.

It is not just that US policymakers have the challenging task of determining that line. In pursuing such a policy, the US also risks eroding the hard-earned credit it earned from decades of investment in its alliance network.

There is also the obvious point that is takes two to tango in an alliance relationship. US allies are not mere pawns in Trump’s strategic chessboard. Allies have agency.

They will have been strategising how to deal with Trump since before the presidential campaign in 2024. Their options range from withholding cooperation to various forms of defection from an alliance relationship.

Are the benefits associated with a disruption of established alliances worth the cost? It is hard to see how they might be. In which case, it is an experiment the Trump administration might be well advised to avoid.

Dr Nicholas Khoo is associate professor of international politics and principal research fellow, Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs (Christchurch), University of Otago. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Indonesia officially joined the BRICS — Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — consortium last week marking a significant milestone in its foreign relations.

In a statement released a day later on January 7, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that this membership reflected Indonesia’s dedication to strengthening multilateral cooperation and its growing influence in global politics.

The ministry highlighted that joining BRICS aligned with Indonesia’s independent and proactive foreign policy, which seeks to maintain balanced relations with major powers while prioritising national interests.

• READ MORE: Indonesia joins BRICS group of emerging economies
• Other West Papua independence reports

This pivotal move showcases Jakarta’s efforts to enhance its international presence as an emerging power within a select group of global influencers.

Traditionally, Indonesia has embraced a non-aligned stance while bolstering its military and economic strength through collaborations with both Western and Eastern nations, including the United States, China, and Russia.

By joining BRICS, Indonesia clearly signals a shift from its non-aligned status, aligning itself with a coalition of emerging powers poised to challenge and redefine the existing global geopolitical landscape dominated by a Western neoliberal order led by the United States.

Indonesia joining boosts BRICS membership to 10 countres — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — but there are also partnerships.

Supporters of a multipolar world, championed by China, Russia, and their allies, may view Indonesia’s entry into BRICS as a significant victory.

In contrast, advocates of the US-led unipolar world, often referred to as the “rules-based international order” are likely to see Indonesia’s decision as a regrettable shift that could trigger retaliatory actions from the United States.

The future will determine how Indonesia balances its relations with these two superpowers. However, there is considerable concern about the potential fallout for Indonesia from its long-standing US allies.

The smaller Pacific Island nations, which Indonesia has been endeavouring to win over in a bid to thwart support for West Papuan independence, may also become entangled in the crosshairs of geostrategic rivalries, and their response to Indonesia’s membership in the BRICS alliance will prove critical for the fate of West Papua.

Critical questions
The crucial questions facing the Pacific Islanders are perhaps related to their loyalties: are they aligning themselves with Beijing or Washington, and in what ways could their decisions influence the delicate balance of power in the ongoing competition between great powers, ultimately altering the Melanesian destiny of the Papuan people?

For the Papuans, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS or any other global or regional forums is irrelevant as long as the illegal occupation of their land continues driving them toward “extinction”.

The pressing question for Papuans is which force will ultimately dismantle Indonesia’s unlawful hold on their sovereignty.

Will Indonesia’s BRICS alliance open new paths for Papuan liberation fighters to re-engage with the West in ways not seen since the Cold War? Or does this membership indicate a deeper entrenchment of Papuans’ fate within China’s influence — making it almost impossible for any dream of Papuans’ independence?

While forecasting future with certainty is difficult on these questions, these critical critical questions need to be considered in this new complex geopolitical landscape, as the ultimate fate of West Papua is what is truly at stake here.

Strengthening Indonesia’s claims over West Papuan sovereignty
Indonesia’s membership in BRICS may signify a great victory for those advocating for a multipolar world, challenging the hegemony of Western powers led by the United States.

This membership could augment Indonesia’s capacity to frame the West Papuan issue as an internal matter among BRICS members within the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

Such backing could provide Jakarta with a cushion of diplomatic protection against international censure, particularly from Western nations regarding its policies in West Papua.

However, it is also crucial to note that for more than six decades, despite the Western world priding itself on being a champion of freedom and human rights, no nation has been permitted to voice concern or hold Indonesia accountable for the atrocities committed against Indigenous Papuans.

The pressing question to consider is what or who silences the 193 member states of the UN from intervening to save the Papuans from potential eradication at the hands of Indonesia.

Is it the United States and its allies, or is it China, Russia, and their allies — or the United Nations itself?

Indonesia’s double standard and hypocrisy
Indonesia’s support for Palestine bolsters its image as a defender of international law and human rights in global platforms like the UN and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

This commitment was notably highlighted at the BRICS Summit in October 2024, where Indonesia reaffirmed its dedication to Palestinian self-determination and called for global action to address the ongoing conflict in line with international law and UN resolutions, reflecting its constitutional duty to oppose colonialism.

Nonetheless, Indonesia’s self-image as a “saviour for the Palestinians” presents a rather ignoble facade being promoted in the international diplomatic arena, as the Indonesian government engages in precisely the same behaviours it condemns Israel over in Palestine.

Military engagement and regional diplomacy
Moreover, Indonesia’s interaction with Pacific nations serves to perpetuate a façade of double standards — on one hand, it endeavours to portray itself as a burgeoning power and a champion of moral causes concerning security issues, human rights, climate change, and development; while on the other, it distracts the communities and nations of Oceania — particularly Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, which have long supported the West Papua independence movement — from holding Indonesia accountable for its transgressions against their fellow Pacific Islanders in West Papua.

On October 10, 2024, Brigadier-General Mohamad Nafis of the Indonesian Defence Ministry unveiled a strategic initiative intended to assert sovereignty claims over West Papua. This plan aims to foster stability across the Pacific through enhanced defence cooperation and safeguarding of territorial integrity.

The efforts to expand influence are characterised by joint military exercises, defence partnerships, and assistance programmes, all crafted to address common challenges such as terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters.

However, most critically, Indonesia’s engagement with Pacific Island nations aims to undermine the regional solidarity surrounding West Papua’s right to self-determination.

This involvement encapsulates infrastructure initiatives, defence training, and financial diplomacy, nurturing goodwill while aligning the interests of Pacific nations with Indonesia’s geopolitical aspirations.

Indonesia has formally joined the BRICS group, a bloc of emerging economies featuring Russia, China and others that is viewed as a counterweight to the West https://t.co/WArU5O2PfT pic.twitter.com/IQKmPOJqlS

— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) January 7, 2025

Military occupation in West Papua
As Indonesia strives to galvanise international support for its territorial integrity, the military presence in West Papua has intensified significantly, instilling widespread fear among local Papuan communities due to heightened deployments, surveillance, and restrictions.

Indonesian forces have been mobilised to secure economically strategic regions, including the Grasberg mine, which holds some of the world’s largest gold and copper reserves.

These operations have resulted in the displacement of Indigenous communities and substantial environmental degradation.

As of December 2024, approximately 83,295 individuals had been internally displaced in West Papua due to armed conflicts between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua Liberation Army (TPNPB).

Recent reports detail new instances of displacement in the Tambrauw and Pegunungan Bintang regencies following clashes between the TPNPB and security forces. Villagers have evacuated their homes in fear of further military incursions and confrontations, leaving many in psychological distress.

The significant increase in Indonesia’s military presence in West Papua has coincided with demographic shifts that jeopardise the survival of Indigenous Papuans.

Government transmigration policies and large-scale agricultural initiatives, such as the food estate project in Merauke, have marginalised Indigenous communities.

These programmes, aimed at ensuring national food security, result in land expropriation and cultural erosion, threatening traditional Papuan lifestyles and identities.

For more than 63 years, Indonesia has occupied West Papua, subjecting Indigenous communities to systemic marginalisation and brink of extinction. Traditional languages, oral histories, and cultural values face obliteration under Indonesia’s colonial occupation.

A glimmer of hope for West Papua
Despite these formidable challenges, solidarity movements within the Pacific and global communities persist in their advocacy for West Papua’s self-determination.

These groups, united by a shared sense of humanity and justice, work tirelessly to maintain hope for West Papua’s liberation. Even so, Indonesia’s diplomatic engagement with Pacific nations, characterised by eloquent rhetoric and military alliances, represents a calculated endeavour to extinguish this fragile hope for Papuan liberation.

Indonesia’s membership in BRICS will either amplify this tiny hope of salvation within the grand vision of a new world re-engineered by Beijing’s BRICS and its allies or will it conceal West Papua’s independence dream on a path that is even harder and more impossible to achieve than the one they have been on for 60 years under the US-led unipolar world system.

Most significantly, it might present a new opportunity for Papuan liberation fighters to reengage with the new re-ordering global superpowers– a chance that has eluded them for more than 60 years.

From the 1920s to the 1960s, the tumult of the First and Second World Wars, coupled with the ensuing cries for decolonisation from nations subjugated by Western powers and Cold War tensions, forged the very existence of the nation known as “Indonesia.”

It seems that this turbulent world of uncertainty is upon us, reshaping a new global landscape replete with new alliances and adversaries, harbouring conflicting visions of a new world. Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS in 2025 is a clear testament to this.

The pressing question remains whether this membership will ultimately precipitate Indonesia’s disintegration as the US-led unipolar world intervenes in its domestic affairs or catalyse its growth and strength.

Regardless of the consequences, the fundamental existential question for the Papuans is whether they, along with their global solidarity networks, can reinvent themselves while nurturing the fragile hope of restoring West Papua’s sovereignty in a world rife with change and uncertainty?

Ali Mirin is a West Papuan academic and writer from the Kimyal tribe of the highlands bordering the Star mountain region of Papua New Guinea. He lives in Australia and contributes articles to Asia Pacific Report.

COMMENTARY: By Tess Newton Cain

Vanuatu’s devastating earthquake and dramatic political developments in Tonga and New Caledonia at the end of 2024 set the tone for the coming year in the Pacific.

The incoming Trump administration adds another level of uncertainty, ranging from the geostrategic competition with China and the region’s resulting militarisation through to the U.S. response to climate change.

And decolonisation for a number of territories in the Pacific will remain in focus as the region’s largest country celebrates its 50th anniversary of independence.

The deadly 7.3 earthquake that struck Port Vila on December 17 has left Vanuatu reeling. As the country moves from response to recovery, the full impacts of the damage will come to light.

The economic hit will be significant, with some businesses announcing that they will not open until well into the New Year or later.

Amid the physical carnage there’s Vanuatu’s political turmoil, with a snap general election triggered in November before the disaster struck to go ahead on January 16.

On Christmas Eve a new prime minister was elected in Tonga. ‘Aisake Valu Eke is a veteran politician, who has previously served as Minister of Finance. He succeeded Siaosi Sovaleni who resigned suddenly after a prolonged period of tension between his office and the Tongan royal family.

Eke takes the reins as Tonga heads towards national elections, due before the end of November. He will likely want to keep things stable and low key between now and then.

Fall of New Caledonia government
In Kanaky New Caledonia, the resignation of the Calédonie Ensemble party — also on Christmas Eve — led to the fall of the French territory’s government.

After last year’s violence and civil disorder – that crippled the economy but stopped a controversial electoral reform — the political turmoil jeopardises about US$77 million (75 million euro) of a US$237 million recovery funding package from France.

In addition, and given the fall of the Barnier government in Paris, attempts to reach a workable political settlement in New Caledonia are likely to be severely hampered, including any further movement to secure independence.

In France’s other Pacific territory, the government of French Polynesia is expected to step up its campaign for decolonisation from the European power.

Possibly the biggest party in the Pacific in 2025 will be the 50th anniversary of Papua New Guinea’s independence from Australia, accompanied hopefully by some reflection and action about the country’s future.

Eagerly awaited also will be the data from the country’s flawed census last year, due for release on the same day — September 16. But the celebrations will also serve as a reminder of unfinished self-determination business, with its Autonomous Region of Bougainville preparing for their independence declaration in the next two years.

The shadow of geopolitics looms large in the Pacific islands region. There is no reason to think that will change this year.

Trump administration unkowns
A significant unknown is how the incoming Trump administration will alter policy and funding settings, if at all. The current (re)engagement by the US in the region started with Trump during his first incumbency. His 2019 meeting with the then leaders of the compact states — Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands — at the White House was a pivotal moment.

Under Biden, billions of dollars have been committed to “securitise” the region in response to China. This year, we expect to see US marines start to transfer in numbers from Okinawa to Guam.

However, given Trump’s history and rhetoric when it comes to climate change, there is some concern about how reliable an ally the US will be when it comes to this vital security challenge for the region.

The last time Trump entered the White House, he withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement and he is widely expected to do the same again this time around.

In addition to polls in Tonga and Vanuatu, elections will be held in the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia and for the Autonomous Bougainville Government.

There will also be a federal election in Australia, the biggest aid donor in the Pacific, and a change in government will almost certainly have impacts in the region.

Given the sway that the national security community has on both sides of Australian politics, the centrality of Pacific engagement to foreign policy, particularly in response to China, is unlikely to change.

Likely climate policy change
How that manifests could look quite different under a conservative Liberal/National party government. The most likely change is in climate policy, including an avowed commitment to invest in nuclear power.

A refusal to shift away from fossil fuels or commit to enhanced finance for adaptation by a new administration could reignite tensions within the Pacific Islands Forum that have, to some extent, been quietened under Labor’s Albanese government.

Who is in government could also impact on the bid to host COP31 in 2026, with a decision between candidates Turkey and Australia not due until June, after the poll.

Pacific leaders and advocates face a systemic challenge regarding climate change. With the rise in conflict and geopolitical competition, the global focus on the climate crisis has weakened. The prevailing sense of disappointment over COP29 last year is likely to continue as partners’ engagement becomes increasingly securitised.

A major global event for this year is the Oceans Summit which will be held in Nice, France, in June. This is a critical forum for Pacific countries to take their climate diplomacy to a new level and attack the problem at its core.

In 2023, the G20 countries were responsible for 76 percent of global emissions. By capitalising on the geopolitical moment, the Pacific could nudge the key players to greater ambition.

Several G20 countries are seeking to expand and deepen their influence in the region alongside the five largest emitters — China, US, India, Russia, and Japan — all of which have strategic interests in the Pacific.

Given the increasingly transactional nature of Pacific engagement, 2025 should present an opportunity for Pacific governments to leverage their geostrategic capital in ways that will address human security for their peoples.

Dr Tess Newton Cain is a principal consultant at Sustineo P/L and adjunct associate professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. She is a former lecturer at the University of the South Pacific and has over 25 years of experience working in the Pacific islands region. The views expressed here are hers, not those of BenarNews/RFA. Republished from BenarNews with permission.

The A$140 million aid agreement between Australia and Nauru signed last week is a prime example of the geopolitical tightrope vulnerable Pacific nations are walking in the 21st century.

The deal provides Nauru with direct budgetary support, stable banking services, and policing and security resources. In return, Australia will have the right to veto any pact Nauru might make with other countries — namely China.

The veto terms are similar to the “Falepili Union” between Australia and Tuvalu signed late last year, which granted Tuvaluans access to Australian residency and climate mitigation support, in exchange for security guarantees.

• READ MORE: Pacific police chiefs open Australian base for regional rapid deployment force

And just last week, more details emerged about a defence deal between the United States and Papua New Guinea, now revealed to be worth US$864 million.

In exchange for investment in military infrastructure development, training and equipment, the US gains unrestricted access to six ports and airports.

Also last week, PNG signed a 10-year, A$600 million deal to fund its own team in Australia’s NRL competition. In return, “PNG will not sign a security deal that could allow Chinese police or military forces to be based in the Pacific nation”.

These arrangements are all emblematic of the geopolitical tussle playing out in the Pacific between China and the US and its allies.

This strategic competition is often framed in mainstream media and political commentary as an extension of “the great game” played by rival powers. From a traditional security perspective, Pacific nations can be depicted as seeking advantage to leverage their own development priorities.

But this assumption that Pacific governments are “diplomatic price setters”, able to play China and the US off against each other, overlooks the very real power imbalances involved.

The risk, as the authors of one recent study argued, is that the “China threat” narrative becomes the justification for “greater Western militarisation and economic dominance”. In other words, Pacific nations become diplomatic price takers.

Defence diplomacy
Pacific nations are vulnerable on several fronts: most have a low economic base and many are facing a debt crisis. At the same time, they are on the front line of climate change and rising sea levels.

The costs of recovering from more frequent extreme weather events create a vicious cycle of more debt and greater vulnerability. As was reported at this year’s United Nations COP29 summit, climate financing in the Pacific is mostly in the form of concessional loans.

The Pacific is already one of the world’s most aid-reliant regions. But considerable doubt has been expressed about the effectiveness of that aid when recipient countries still struggle to meet development goals.

At the country level, government systems often lack the capacity to manage increasing aid packages, and struggle with the diplomatic engagement and other obligations demanded by the new geopolitical conditions.

In August, Kiribati even closed its borders to diplomats until 2025 to allow the new government “breathing space” to attend to domestic affairs.

In the past, Australia championed governance and institutional support as part of its financial aid. But a lot of development assistance is now skewed towards policing and defence.

Australia recently committed A$400 million to the Pacific Policing Initiative, on top of a host of other security-related initiatives. This is all part of an overall rise in so-called “defence diplomacy”, leading some observers to criticise the politicisation of aid at the expense of the Pacific’s most vulnerable people.

Lack of good faith
At the same time, many political parties in Pacific nations operate quite informally and lack comprehensive policy manifestos. Most governments lack a parliamentary subcommittee that scrutinises foreign policy.

The upshot is that foreign policy and security arrangements can be driven by personalities rather than policy priorities, with little scrutiny. Pacific nations are also susceptible to corruption, as highlighted in Transparency International’s 2024 Annual Corruption Report.

Writing about the consequences of the geopolitical rivalry in the Solomon Islands, Transparency Solomon Islands executive director Ruth Liloqula wrote:

Since 2019, my country has become a hotbed for diplomatic tensions and foreign interference, and undue influence.

Similarly, Pacific affairs expert Distinguished Professor Steven Ratuva has argued the Australia–Tuvalu agreement was one-sided and showed a “lack of good faith”.

Behind these developments, of course, lies the evolving AUKUS security pact between Australia, the US and United Kingdom, a response to growing Chinese presence and influence in the “Indo-Pacific” region.

The response from Pacific nations has been diplomatic, perhaps from a sense they cannot “rock the submarine” too much, given their ties to the big powers involved. But former Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Meg Taylor has warned:

Pacific leaders were being sidelined in major geopolitical decisions affecting their region and they need to start raising their voices for the sake of their citizens.

While there are obvious advantages that come with strategic alliances, the tangible impacts for Pacific nations remain negligible. As the UN’s Asia and the Pacific progress report on sustainable development goals states, not a single goal is on track to be achieved by 2030.

Unless these partnerships are grounded in good faith and genuine sustainable development, the grassroots consequences of geopolitics-as-usual will not change.

Dr Sione Tekiteki, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Auckland University of Technology. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

Northern Marianas Governor Arnold Palacios and Senator Celina Babauta have travelled to Guam to attend a luncheon with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te.

Taiwan is officially known as the Republic of China (Taiwan). China claims Taiwan as its own territory, with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan strongly disputes.

Palacios welcomed the opportunity to meet Lai and said this could pave the way for improved relations with the East Asian country.

• READ MORE: Other Taiwan and the Pacific reports

“This meeting is an opportunity for the CNMI to foster relations with allies in the region.”

When asked if meeting the President would upset the People’s Republic of China, which considers Taiwan a rogue state and part of its territory, Palacios said: “As far as being in the crosshairs of China, we already are in many ways.”

Worldwide, a dozen countries maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taipei.

In January, Nauru cut ties with Taiwan and shifted its diplomatic allegiance to Beijing.

Pacific foreign ministers have given their nod of approval for United States territories Guam and American Samoa to be associate members of main regional decision-making body, but a political analyst says it is geopolitics at play.

The news was delivered by Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) chair and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown at the PIF Foreign Ministers Meeting on Friday.

Brown said both territories meet the current qualifying criteria for associate membership.

• LISTEN TO RNZ MORNING REPORT: Guam and American Samoa to become associate members of Pacific Islands Forum
• Other Pacific Islands Forum reports

“I have to say there is widespread support for the membership of Guam and American Samoa, and so that is the recommendation in principle coming from foreign ministers that will be tabled with leaders,” he said.

However, Griffith Asia Institute’s Pacific Hub project lead Dr Tess Newton Cain said the move had a geopolitical aspect.

“When it comes to the Pacific Islands Forum, the US has struggled with the fact that it sits at the same table as China — they are both dialogue partners,” she said.

“It is like when you invite people to a wedding — the US does not like the table it is on.

US seeking ‘better table’
“It wants to be on a better table and being able to have two of its territories, American Samoa and Guam, get that associate membership — if that happens — does seem to indicate this is how they get a little bit of an edge on China.”

She expects the application to be accepted at the Leaders’ Meeting in Tonga at the end of the month.

Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna are currently the associate members of the Forum. American Samoa and Guam are currently forum observers; being upgraded to associate members will give them better participation in the regional institution.

Guam’s Governor Lou Leon Guerrero told RNZ Pacific last week the territory would ultimately want to be full voting members.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had previously said the territories’ political status meant they could not be full members but he supported the application for associate membership.

French territories New Caledonia and French Polynesia became full members in 2016.

Newton Cain believes full membership for the two US territories would be a push.

French territories ‘justified’
But she said for the French territories it was “kind of justified” — New Caledonia was on the path to independence, while French Polynesia was re-inscribed to the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories (C-24 list).

“If Guam and American Samoa are not interested, or there is no kind of indication that they are moving towards being sovereign or even in a compact, like Marshall Islands and Palau and FSM, then that would be a big ask.”

Newton Cain thinks full membership would mean some member states would have concerns because it means Washington is getting closer to the decision making.

“There is also regional concern surrounding Guam’s military build-up. If the territory wanted to progress to full membership it may not be able to comply with the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Treaty,” Newton Cain said.

Architecture reform
Brown said the Forum was undergoing a review of its architecture, including criteria for associate member status and observer status, which would likely see changes to associate membership applications.

“So, while [Guam and American Samoa] applications will be considered by leaders, and in this case, it looks favourably to be elevated to associate membership — the review of the regional architecture, as it pertains to associate membership, may see some changes,” he said.

Newton Cain said it was not clear what Brown meant.

“It would be a very bad look diplomatically if they were to allow them to become associate members and then in a couple of years say, ‘oh we have changed the rules now and you no longer qualify’.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

The thing I hate about Western electoral politics in general and US presidential races in particular is that they take the focus off the depravity of the US-centralised Empire itself, and run cover for its criminality.

In the coming months you’re going to be hearing a lot of talk about the two leading presidential candidates and how very very different they are from each other, and how one is clearly much much worse than the other.

But in reality the very worst things about both of them will not be their differences — the worst things about them will be be the countless ways in which they are both indistinguishably in lockstep with one another.

Australia and New Zealand’s populations must now wake up to the fact that our countries have been drawn into what ForeignPolicy.com called the knitting together of “the United States’ patchwork of different regional security systems into a global security architecture of networked alliances and partnerships”.

Hit pause right there.

Very few people have tuned into the fact that what is happening isn’t “NATO” moving into our region – it’s actually far bigger than that.  America is creating a super-bloc, a super-alliance of client states that includes both the EU and NATO, the AP4 (its key Asia Pacific partners Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan) and other partners like the Philippines (now the Marcos dynasty is back at the helm).

• READ MORE: Other NZ-China and Luxon reports

It explains why, in the midst of committing genocide in Palestine, Israel still managed to send defence personnel to participate in RIMPAC 2024 naval exercises: they’re part of our team.  It is taking the Military Industrial Complex to a global level. Where do you think it will lead us to?

New Zealand is about to sacrifice what it cannot afford to lose for something it doesn’t need: gambling we can keep the strength and security of our trading relationship with China while leaping into the US anti-China military alliance.

The Chinese have noticed. Writing in the South China Morning Post last week, Alex Lo gave an unvarnished Chinese perspective on this. In a piece titled “NATO barbarians are expanding and gathering at the gates of Asia,” he says: “Most regional countries want none of it, but four Trojan horses – South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – are ready to let them in”.

“Has it crossed Blinken’s mind that most of Asia, including the Indian subcontinent, don’t want NATO militarism to infect their parts of the world like the plague?”

While in Washington for the recent NATO summit, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon told The Financial Times that he viewed China as a strategic competitor in the Indo-Pacific.  In the next breath he said he wanted New Zealand to continue to develop trade with China and double the country’s overall exports over the next 10 years.

Good luck with that if we join a hostile alliance. And since when has New Zealand declared that China was a strategic competitor?  That’s an American position, surely not ours?

New Zealand could “add value” to its security relationships and be a “force multiplier for Australia and the US and other partners”, Luxon said while being hosted in Washington.  New Zealand was also “very open” to participating in the second pillar of AUKUS.

Firmly placing New Zealand in the anti-China camp in this way was immediately lambasted by former PM Helen Clark and ex National Party leader Don Brash. What has been abandoned, they argue, without any public consultation, is our relatively independent foreign policy.   They sounded a warning about where real danger lies:

Given the intensifying situation, journalists, academics and experts joined to state the need for the Pacific, including its media, to re-assert itself and chart its own path, rooted in its unique cultural, economic and environmental context.

The tone for the discussions was set by Papua New Guinea’s Minister for Information and Communications Technology Timothy Masiu, chief guest at the official dinner of the Suva conference.

The conference heard that the Pacific media sector is small and under-resourced, so its abilities to carry out its public interest role is limited, even in a free media environment.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific International Media Conference reports

Masiu asked how Pacific media was being developed and used as a tool to protect and preserve Pacific identities in the light of “outside influences on our media in the region”. He said the Pacific was “increasingly being used as the backyard” for geopolitics, with regional media “targeted by the more developed nations as a tool to drive their geopolitical agenda”.

Masiu is the latest to draw attention to the widespread impacts of the global contest on the Pacific, with his focus on the media sector, and potential implications for editorial independence.

In some ways, Pacific media have benefitted from the geopolitical contest with the increased injection of foreign funds into the sector, prompting some at the Suva conference to ponder whether “too much of a good thing could turn out to be bad”.

Experts echoed Masiu’s concerns about island nations’ increased wariness of being mere pawns in a larger game.

Fiji a compelling example
Fiji offers a compelling example of a nation navigating this complex landscape with a balanced approach. Fiji has sought to diversify its diplomatic relations, strengthening ties with China and India, without a wholesale pivot away from traditional partners Australia and New Zealand.

Some Pacific Island leaders espouse the “friends to all, enemies to none” doctrine in the face of concerns about getting caught in the crossfire of any military conflict.

This is manifest in Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s incessant calls for a “zone of peace” during both the Melanesian Spearhead Group Leaders’ meeting in Port Vila in August, and the United Nations General Assembly debate in New York in September.

Rabuka expressed fears about growing geopolitical rivalry contributing to escalating tensions, stating that “we must consider the Pacific a zone of peace”.

Papua New Guinea, rich in natural resources, has similarly navigated its relationships with major powers. While Chinese investments in infrastructure and mining have surged, PNG has also actively engaged with Australia, its closest neighbour and long-time partner.

“Don’t get me wrong – we welcome and appreciate the support of our development partners – but we must be free to navigate our own destiny,” Masiu told the Suva conference.

Masiu’s proposed media policy for PNG was also discussed at the Suva conference, with former PNG newspaper editor Alex Rheeney stating that the media fraternity saw it as a threat, although the minister spoke positively about it in his address.

Criticism and praise
In 2019, Solomon Islands shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, a move that was met with both criticism and praise. While this opened the door to increased Chinese investment in infrastructure, it also highlighted an effort to balance existing ties to Australia and other Western partners.

Samoa and Tonga too have taken significant strides in using environmental diplomacy as a cornerstone of their international engagement.

As small island nations, they are on the frontlines of climate change, a reality that shapes their global interactions. In the world’s least visited country, Tuvalu (population 12,000), “climate change is not some distant hypothetical but a reality of daily life”.

One of the outcomes of the debates at the Suva conference was that media freedom in the Pacific is a critical factor in shaping an independent and pragmatic global outlook.

Fiji has seen fluctuations in media freedom following political upheavals, with periods of restrictive press laws. However, with the repeal of the draconian media act last year, there is a growing recognition that a free and vibrant media landscape is essential for transparent governance and informed decision-making.

But the conference also heard that the Pacific media sector is small and under-resourced, so its ability to carry out its public interest role is limited, even in a free media environment.

Vulnerability worsened
The Pacific media sector’s vulnerability had worsened due to the financial damage from the digital disruption and the covid-19 pandemic. It underscored the need to address the financial side of the equation if media organisations are to remain viable.

For the Pacific, the path forward lies in pragmatism and self-reliance, as argued in the book of collected essays Waves of Change: Media, Peace, and Development in the Pacific, edited by Shailendra Bahadur Singh, Fiji Deputy Prime Minister Professor Biman Prasad and Amit Sarwal, launched at the Suva conference by Masiu.

No doubt, as was commonly expressed at the Suva media conference, the world is watching as the Pacific charts its own course.

As the renowned Pacific writer Epeli Hau’ofa once envisioned, the Pacific Islands are not small and isolated, but a “sea of islands” with deep connections and vast potential to contribute in the global order.

As they continue to engage with the world, the Pacific nations will need to carve out a path that reflects their unique traditional wisdom, values and aspirations.

Dr Shailendra Bahadur Singh is head of journalism at The University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva, Fiji, and chair of the recent Pacific International Media Conference. Dr Amit Sarwal is an Indian-origin academic, translator, and journalist based in Melbourne, Australia. He is formerly a senior lecturer and deputy head of school (research) at the USP. This article was first published by The Interpreter and is republished with permission.

Wansolwara News

Here is the speech by Papua New Guinea’s Minister for Communication and Information Technology, Timothy Masiu, at the 2024 Pacific International Media Conference dinner at the Holiday Inn, Suva, on July 4:

I thank the School of Journalism of the University of the South Pacific (USP) for the invitation to address this august gathering.

Commendations also to the Pacific Islands News Association (PINA) and the Asia Pacific Media Network (APMN) for jointly hosting this conference – the first of its kind in our region in two decades!

It is also worth noting that this conference has attracted an Emmy Award-winning television news producer from the United States, an award-winning journalism academic and author based in Hong Kong, a member of the New Zealand Order of Merit, a finalist in the 2017 Pulitzer Prize, and a renowned investigative journalist from New Zealand.

• READ MORE: Other Pacific Media Conference reports

Mix this with our own blend of regional journalists, scholars and like-minded professionals, this is truly an international event.

Commendation to our local organisers and the regional and international stakeholders for putting together what promises to be three days of robust and exciting interactions and discussions on the status of media in our region.

This will also go a long way in proposing practical and tangible improvements for the industry.

My good friend and the Deputy Prime Minister of Fiji, the Honourable Manoa Kamikamica, has already set the tone for our conference with his powerful speech at this morning’s opening ceremony. (In fact, we can claim the DPM to also be Papua New Guinean as he spent time there before entering politics!).

We support and are happy with this government of Fiji for repealing the media laws that went against media freedom in Fiji in the recent past.

In PNG, given our very diverse society with over 1000 tribes and over 800 languages and huge geography, correct and factful information is also very, very critical.

Our theme “Navigating Challenges and Shaping Futures in Pacific Media Research and Practice” couldn’t be more appropriate at this time.

If anything, it reminds us all of the critical role that the media continues to play in shaping public discourse and catalysing action on issues affecting our Pacific.

We are also reminded of the power of the media to inform, educate, and mobilize community participation in our development agenda.

IT is in the context that I pause to ask this pertinent question: How is the media being developed and used as a tool to protect and preserve our Pacific Identity?

I ask this question because of outside influences on our media in the region.

I should know, as I have somewhat traversed this journey already – from being a broadcaster and journalist myself – to being a member of the board of the largest public broadcaster in the region (National Broadcasting Corporation) – to being the Minister for ICT for PNG.

From where I sit right now, I am observing our Pacific region increasingly being used as the backyard for geopolitical reasons.

It is quite disturbing for me to see our regional media being targeted by the more developed nations as a tool to drive their geopolitical agenda.

As a result, I see a steady influence on our culture, our way of life, and ultimately the gradual erosion of our Pacific values and systems.

In the media industry, some of these geopolitical influences are being redesigned and re-cultured through elaborate and attractive funding themes like improving “transparency” and “accountability”.

This is not the way forward for a truly independent and authentic Pacific media.

The way we as a Pacific develop our media industry must reflect our original and authentic value systems.

Just like our forefathers navigated the unchartered seas – relying mostly on hard-gained knowledge and skills – we too must chart our own course in our media development.

Our media objectives and practices should reflect all levels of our unique Pacific Way of life, focusing on issues like climate change, environmental preservation, the protection and preservation of our fast-fading languages and traditions, and our political landscape.

We must not let our authentic ways be lost or overshadowed by outside influences or agendas. We must control WHAT we write, HOW we write it, and WHY we write.

Don’t get me wrong – we welcome and appreciate the support of our development partners – but we must be free to navigate our own destiny.

If anything, I compel you to give your media funding to build our regional capabilities and capacities to address climate change issues, early warning systems, and support us to fight misinformation, disinformation, and fake news on social media.

I don’t know how the other Pacific Island countries are faring but my Department of ICT has built a social media management desk to monitor these ever-increasing menaces on Facebook, Tik Tok, Instagram and other online platforms.

This is another area of concern for me, especially for my future generations.

Draft National Media Development Policy of PNG
Please allow me to make a few remarks on the Draft National Media Development Policy of PNG that my ministry has initiated.

As its name entails, it is a homegrown policy that aims to properly address many glaring media issues in our country.

In its current fifth draft version, the draft policy aims to promote media self-regulation; improve government media capacity; roll-out media infrastructure for all; and diversify content and quota usage for national interest.

These policy objectives were derived from an extensive nationwide consultation process of online surveys, workshops and one-on-one interviews with government agencies and media industry stakeholders and the public.

To elevate media professionalism in PNG, the policy calls for the development of media self-regulation in the country without direct government intervention.

The draft policy also intend to strike a balance between the media’s ongoing role on transparency and accountability on the one hand, and the dissemination of developmental information, on the other hand.

It is not in any way an attempt by the Marape/Rosso government to restrict the media in PNG. Nothing can be further from the truth.

In fact, the media in PNG presently enjoys unprecedented freedom and ability to report as they deem appropriate.

Our leaders are constantly being put on the spotlight, and while we don’t necessarily agree with many of their daily reports, we will not suddenly move to restrict the media in PNG in any form.

Rather, we are more interested in having information on health, education, agriculture, law and order, and other societal and economic information, reaching more of our local and remote communities across the country.

It is in this context that specific provision within the draft policy calls for the mobilisation – particularly the government media – to disseminate more developmental information that is targeted towards our population at the rural and district levels.

I have brought a bigger team to Suva to also listen and gauge the views of our Pacific colleagues on this draft policy.

The fifth version is publicly available on our Department of ICT website and we will certainly welcome any critique or feedback from you all.

Before I conclude, let me also briefly highlight another intervention I made late last year as part of my Ministry’s overall “Smart Pacific; One Voice” initiative.

After an absence for several years, I invited our Pacific ICT Ministers to a meeting in Port Moresby in late 2023.

At the end of this defining summit, we signed the Pacific ICT Ministers’ Lagatoi Declaration.

For a first-time regional ICT Ministers’ meeting, it was well-attended. Deputy Prime Minister Manoa also graced us with his presence with other Pacific Ministers, including Australia and New Zealand.

This declaration is a call-to-arms for our regional ministers to meet regularly to discuss the challenges and opportunities posed by the all-important ICT sector.

Our next meeting is in New Caledonia in 2025.

In much the same vein, I was appointed the special envoy to the Pacific by the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD) in Mauritius in 2023.

Since then, I have continuously advocated for the Pacific to be more coordinated and unified, so we can be better heard.

I have been quite bemused by the fact that the Pacific does not have its own regional offices for such well-meaning agencies like AIBD to promote our own unique media issues.

More often than not, we are either thrown into the “Asia-Pacific’ or “Oceania” groupings and as result, our media and wider ICT interests and aspirations get drowned by our more influential friends and donors.

We must dictate what our broadcasting (and wider media) development agenda should be. We live in our Region and better understand the “Our Pacific Way” of doing things.

Let me conclude by reiterating my firm belief that the Pacific needs a hard reset of our media strategies.

This means re-discovering our original values to guide our methods and practices within the media industry.

We must be unified in our efforts navigate the challenges ahead, and to reshape the future of media in the Pacific.

We must ensure it reflects our authentic ways and serves the needs of our Pacific people.

Best wishes for the remainder of the conference.

God Bless you all.

Republished from Wansolwara in partnership.

When former prime minister Helen Clark spoke out against New Zealand potentially compromising its independent foreign policy by joining pillar two of the AUKUS security pact, Foreign Minister Winston Peters responded bluntly:

On what could she have possibly based that statement? […] And I’m saying to people, including Helen Clark, please don’t mislead New Zealanders with your suspicions without any facts – let us find out what we’re talking about.

Pillar one of AUKUS involves the delivery of nuclear submarines to Australia, making New Zealand membership impossible under its nuclear-free policy.

• READ MORE: Joining AUKUS could boost NZ’s poor research and technology spending – but at what cost?
• Is Japan joining AUKUS? Not formally – its cooperation will remain limited for now
• New Zealand is reviving the ANZAC alliance – joining AUKUS is a logical next step

But pillar two envisages the development of advanced military technology in areas such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles and cyber warfare. By some reckonings, New Zealand could benefit from joining at that level.

Peters denies the National-led coalition government has committed to joining pillar two. He says exploratory talks with AUKUS members are “to find out all the facts, all the aspects of what we’re talking about and then as a country to make a decision.”

But while the previous Labour government expressed a willingness to explore pillar two membership, the current government appears to view it as integral to its broader foreign policy objective of aligning New Zealand more closely with “traditional partners”.

Official enthusiasm
During his visit to Washington earlier this month, Peters said New Zealand and the Biden administration had pledged “to work ever more closely together in support of shared values and interests” in a strategic environment “considerably more challenging now than even a decade ago”.

In particular, he and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken agreed there were “powerful reasons” for New Zealand to engage practically with arrangements like AUKUS “as and when all parties deem it appropriate”.

Former New Zealand prime minister Helen Clark warns a “profoundly undemocratic” shift in New Zealand’s foreign policy is taking place — warning the coalition Government off a geopolitical shift which Kiwis didn’t vote for. https://t.co/2E2aKOpf2w

— 1News (@1NewsNZ) April 9, 2024

Declassified documents reveal the official enthusiasm behind such statements and the tightly-curated public messaging it has produced.

A series of joint-agency briefings provided to the New Zealand government characterise AUKUS pillar two as a “non-nuclear” technology-sharing partnership that would elevate New Zealand’s longstanding cooperation with traditional partners and bring opportunities for the aerospace and tech sectors.

But any assessment of New Zealand’s strategic interests must be clear-eyed and not clouded by partial truths or wishful thinking.

Beyond great power rivalry
First, the current government inherited strong bilateral relations with traditional security partners Australia, the US and UK, as well as a consistent and cooperative relationship with China.

Second, while the contemporary global security environment poses threats to New Zealand’s interests, these challenges extend beyond great power rivalry between the US and China.

The multilateral system, on which New Zealand relies, is paralysed by the weakening of institutions such as the UN Security Council, Russian expansionism in Ukraine and a growing array of problems which do not respect borders.

Those include climate change, pandemics and wealth inequality — problems that cannot be fixed unilaterally by great powers.

Third, it is evident New Zealand sometimes disagrees with its traditional partners over respect for international law.

In 2003, for example, New Zealand broke ranks with the US (and the UK and Australia) over the invasion of Iraq. More recently, it was the only member of the Five Eyes network to vote in the UN General Assembly for an immediate humanitarian truce in Gaza.

China’s man in Wellington has a warning for the NZ Govt that joining Pillar II of AUKUS won’t make the region safer, in an exclusive commentary for Newsroom. https://t.co/xgXNwbWRSv

— Newsroom (@NewsroomNZ) April 13, 2024

Role of the US
In a robust speech to the UN General Assembly on April 7, Peters said the world must halt the “utter catastrophe” in Gaza.

He said the use of the veto — which New Zealand had always opposed — prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its primary function of maintaining global peace and security.

However, the government has been unwilling to publicly admit a crucial point: it was a traditional ally — the US — whose Security Council veto and unconditional support of Israel have led to systematic and plausibly genocidal violations of international law in Gaza, and a strategic windfall for rival states China, Russia and Iran.

Rather than being a consistent voice for justice and de-escalation, the New Zealand government has joined the US in countering Houthi rebels, which have been targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

A done deal?
The world has become a more complex and conflicted place for New Zealand. But it would be naive to believe the US has played no part in this and that salvation lies in aligning with AUKUS, which lacks a coherent strategy for addressing multifaceted challenges.

There are alternatives to pillar two of AUKUS more consistent with a principled, independent foreign policy, centred in the Pacific, and which deserve to be seriously considered.

On balance, New Zealand involvement in pillar two of AUKUS would represent a seismic shift in the country’s geopolitical stance. The current government seems bullish about this prospect, which has fuelled concerns membership may be almost a done deal.

If true, it would be the government facing questions about transparency.

Marco de Jong, lecturer, Law School, Auckland University of Technology and Robert G. Patman, professor of international relations, University of Otago. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

After a relatively well organised and peaceful day of voting in Solomon Islands yesterday, the electoral commission is working with donor partners to safely transport ballot boxes from polling stations all over the country to centrally located counting venues.

It is a massive exercise with more than 200 New Zealand Defence Force personnel providing logistical support across the 29,000 sq km sprawling island chain to ensure that those who want to vote have an opportunity to do so.

Chief Electoral Officer Jasper Anisi said there were some preliminary processes to be completed once all ballot boxes were accounted for but he expected counting to begin today.

• READ MORE: Other Solomon Islands elections reports

“Mostly it will be verification of ballot boxes and ballot papers from the polling stations. But once verification is done then counting will automatically start,” Anisi said.

The big issues
So what were the big election issues for Solomon Islanders at the polls yesterday?

A lack of government services, poor infrastructure development and the establishment of diplomatic ties with China are some of the things voters in the capital Honiara told RNZ Pacific they cared about.

Timothy Vai said he was unhappy with the former government’s decision to cut ties with Taiwan in 2019 so it could establish ties with China.

“I want to see a change. My aim in voting now is for a new government. Because we are a democratic country but we shifted [diplomatic ties] to a communist country,” Vai said.

Another voter, Minnie Kasi, wanted leaders to do more for herself and her community.

“My voting experience was good. I came to vote for the right person,” she said.

“Over the past four years I did not see anything delivered by the person I voted for last time which is why I am voting for the person I voted for today.”

Lack of government services
While Ethel Manera felt there was a lack of development and basic government services in her constitutency.

“Some infrastructure and sanitation [projects] they have not developed and they are still yet to develop and that is what I see should be developed in our country,” Manera said.

This is the first time the country has conducted simultaneous voting for national and provincial election candidates.

Anisi has said they would start by tallying the provincial results.

“The provincial results we count in wards,” he said.

“So wards have smaller numbers compared to the constituencies so you need to count all the wards in order to get the constituency number.”

Some visiting political experts and local commentators in Honiara think delaying the announcement of the national election results might pose a security risk if it takes too long and voters grow impatient.

But others say it is a good strategy because historically supporters of national candidates who win hold noisy public celebrations and if this is done first it could disrupt the counting of provincial results.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Papua New Guinea’s Defence Minister Dr Billy Joseph attended the second Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue (JPIDD) in Tokyo, Japan, this week on his first overseas engagement.

The JPIDD is one of the pillars of the regional security architecture initiated by Japan and contributes to regional peace and security by fostering trust and sustained practical cooperation among its members and dialogue partners.

During the meeting, Dr Joseph and his counterparts and dialogue partners exchanged views on the regional security environment, issues and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

• READ MORE: Other PNG Indo-Pacific reports

He stressed the importance of the Pacific Island countries and their security partners in the region to cooperate and collaborate to uphold and enforce the “rules-based international order” to maintain peace and stability in the region.

“As a Pacific family, we must stand united in response to the current and emerging security challenges posed by the intensification of geo-strategic competition, climate change, maritime security, non-traditional security challenges such as illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, transnational crime as well as space and cyber security threats,” Dr Joseph said.

“It is our common resolve to realise our shared vision for a Blue Pacific Continent, a resilient Pacific region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, that ensures everybody live a free, healthy and productive life.”

He acknowledged the important roles played by Japan and “our traditional friends and dialogue partners Australia, New Zealand and the United States” in the JPIDD process and urged them to elevate their support for Pacific Island countries to collaborate and promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific for peace and economic prosperity for all”.

Regional training focus
“We call for our partners to genuinely assist the individual Pacific Island countries with a regional focus on capacity building in the areas of training, equipment support and infrastructure development with the principle of ‘helping us to help ourselves’,” Dr Joseph said.

“In doing so, we envisage our region to be a region that is capable of looking after itself, a region that is led by Pacific Islands, and a region that promotes collective regional response in addressing its regional security challenges.”

Fiji and Papua New Guinea have sent their defence ministers to the talks, with the crown prince of Tonga representing his country.

From the other 11 participating nations that have no military forces, senior officials have joined the meeting, either in person or online.

Defence ministers and the representatives of Australia, Canada, Cook Islands, France, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Japan, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, and Vanuatu have been attending.

Jeffrey Elapa is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

Papua New Guinea and Indonesia have formally ratified a defence agreement a decade after its initial signing.

PNG’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko and the Indonesian ambassador to the Pacific nation, Andriana Supandy, convened a press briefing in Port Moresby on February 29 to declare the ratification.

The agreement enables an enhancement of military operations between the two countries, with a specific focus on strengthening patrols along the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.

• READ MORE: Other West Papua reports

According to Tkatchenko as reported by RNZ Pacific citing Benar News, “The Joint border patrols and different types of defence cooperation between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea of course will be part of the ever-growing security mechanism.”

“It would be wonderful to witness the collaboration between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, both now and in the future, as they work together side by side. Indonesia is a rising Southeast Asian power that reaches into the South Pacific region and dwarfs Papua New Guinea in population, economic size and military might,” added the minister.

In recent years, Indonesia has been asserting its own regional hegemony in the Pacific amid the rivalries of two superpowers — the United States and China.

Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi reiterated Indonesia’s commitment to bolster collaboration with Pacific nations amid heightened geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region during the recent 2024 annual press statement held by the minister for foreign affairs at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung.

Diverse Indigenous states
The Pacific Islands are home to diverse sovereign Indigenous states and islands, and also home to two influential regional powers, Australia and New Zealand. This vast diverse region is increasingly becoming a pivotal strategic and political battleground for foreign powers — aiming to win the hearts and minds of the populations and governments in the region.

Numerous visible and hidden agreements, treaties, talks, and partnerships are being established among local, regional, and global stakeholders in the affairs of this vast region.

The Pacific region carries great importance for powerful military and economic entities such as China, the United States and its coalition, and Indonesia. For them, it serves as a crucial area for strategic bases, resource acquisition, food, and commercial routes.

For Indigenous islanders, states, and tribal communities, the primary concern is around the loss of their territories, islands, and other vital cultural aspects, such as languages and traditional wisdom.

The crumbling of Oceania, reminiscent of its past colonisation by various European powers, is now occurring. However, this time it is being orchestrated by foreign entities appointing their own influential local pawns.

With these local pawns in place, foreign monarchs, nobility, warlords, and miscreants are advancing to reshape the region’s fate.

The rejection by the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to acknowledge the representation of West Papua by the United Liberation for West Papua (ULMWP) as a full member of the regional body in August 2023 highlights the diminishing influence of MSG leaders in decision-making processes concerning issues that are deemed crucial by the Papuan community as part of the “Melanesian family affairs”.

Suspicion over ‘external forces’
This raises suspicion of external forces at play within the Melanesian nations, manipulating their destinies. The question arises, who is orchestrating the fate of the Melanesian nations?

Is it Jakarta, Beijing, Washington, or Canberra?

In a world characterised by instability, safety and security emerges as a crucial prerequisite for fostering a peaceful coexistence, nurturing friendships, and enabling development.

The critical question at hand pertains to the nature of the threats that warrant such protective measures, the identities of both the endangered and the aggressors, and the underlying rationale and mechanisms involved. Whose safety hangs in the balance in this discourse?

And between whom does the spectre of threat loom?

If you are a realist in a world of policymaking, it is perhaps wise not to antagonise the big guy with the big weapon in the room. The Minister of Papua New Guinea may be attempting to underscore the importance of Indonesia in the Pacific region, as indicated by his statements.

If you are West Papuan, it makes little difference whether one leans towards realism or idealism. What truly matters is the survival of West Papuans, in the midst of the significant settler colonial presence of Asian Indonesians in their ancestral homeland.

West Papuan refugee camp
Two years ago, PNG’s minister stated the profound existential sentiments experienced by the West Papuans in 2022 while visiting a West Papuan refugee community in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

During the visit, the minister addressed the West Papuan refugees with the following words:

“The line on the map in middle of the island (New Guinea) is the product of colonial impact. These West Papuans are part of our family, part of our members and part of Papua New Guinea. They are not strangers.

“We are separated only by imaginary lines, which is why I am here. I did not come here to fight, to yell, to scream, to dictate, but to reach a common understanding — to respect the law of Papua New Guinea and the sovereignty of Indonesia.”

These types of ambiguous and opaque messages and rhetoric not only instil fake hope among the West Papuans, but also produce despair among displaced Papuans on their own soil.

The seemingly paradoxical language coupled with the significant recent security agreement with the entity — Indonesia — that has been oppressing the West Papuans under the pretext of sovereignty, signifies one ominous prospect:

Is PNG endorsing a “death decree” for the Indonesian security apparatus to hunt Papuans along the border and mountainous region of West Papua and Papua New Guinea?

Security for West Papua
Currently, the situation in West Papua is deteriorating steadily. Thousands of Indonesian military personnel have been deployed to various regions in West Papua, especially in the areas afflicted by conflict, such as Nduga, Yahukimo, Maybrat, Intan Jaya, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, Star Mountain, and along the border separating Papua New Guinea from West Papua.

On the 27 February 2024, Indonesian military personnel captured two teenage students and fatally shot a Papuan civilian in the Yahukimo district. They alleged that the deceased individual was affiliated with the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNB), although this assertion has yet to be verified by the TPNPB.

Such incidents are tragically a common occurrence throughout West Papua, as the Indonesian military continue to target and wrongfully accuse innocent West Papuans in conflict-ridden regions of being associated with the TPNPB.

These deplorable acts transpired just prior to the ratification of a border operation agreement between the governments of the Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.

As the security agreement was being finalised, the Indonesian government announced a new military campaign in the highlands of West Papua. This operation, is named as “Habema” — meaning “must succeed to the maximum” — and was initiated in Jakarta on the 29 February 2024.

Agus Subiyanto, the Indonesian military command and police command stated during the announcement:

“My approach for Papua involves smart power, a blend of soft power, hard power, and military diplomacy. Establishing the Habema operational command is a key step in ensuring maximum success.”

The looming military operation in West Papua and its border regions, employing advanced smart weapon technology poised a profound danger for Papuans.

A looming humanitarian crisis in West Papua, PNG, broader Melanesia and the Pacific region is inevitable, as unmanned aerial drones discern targets indiscriminately, wreak havoc in homes, and villages of the Papuan communities.

The Indonesian security forces have increasingly employed such sophisticated technology in conflict zones since 2019, including regions like Intan Jaya, Yahukimo, Maybrat, Pegunungan Bintang, and other volatile regions in West Papua.

Consequently, villages have been razed to the ground, compelling inhabitants to flee to the jungle in search of sanctuary — an exodus that continues unabated as they remain displaced from their homes indefinitely.

On 5 April 2018, the Indonesian government announced a military operation known as Damai Cartenz, which remains active in conflict-ridden regions, such as Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang, Nduga, and Intan Jaya.

The Habema security initiative will further threaten Papuans residing in the conflict zones, particularly in the vicinity of the border shared by Papua New Guinea and West Papua.

There are already hundreds of people from the Star Mountains who have fled across to Tumolbil, in the Yapsie sub-district of the PNG province of West Sepik, situated on the border. They fled to PNG because of Indonesia’s military operation (RNZ 2021).

According to RNZ News, individuals fleeing military actions conducted by the Indonesian government, including helicopter raids that caused significant harm to approximately 14 villages, have left behind foot tracks.

The speaker explained that Papua New Guineans occasionally cross over to the Indonesian side, typically seeking improved access to basic services.

The PNG government has been placing refugees from West Papua in border camps, the biggest one being at East Awin in the Western Province for many decades, with assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

How should PNG, UN respond?
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007, article 36, states that “Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation with their own members as well as other peoples across borders”.

Over the past six years, regional and international organisations, such as the Melanesian Spearheads groups (MSG), Pacific islands Forum (PIF), Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP), the UN’s human rights commissioner as well as dozens of countries and individual parliaments, lawyers, academics, and politicians have been asking the Indonesian government to allow the UN’s human rights commissioner to visit West Papua.

However, to date, no response has been received from the Indonesian government.

What does this security deal mean for West Papuans?
This is not just a simple security arrangement between Jakarta and Port Moresby to address border conflicts, but rather an issue of utmost importance for the people of Papua.

It concerns the sovereignty of a nation — West Papua — that has been unjustly seized by Indonesia, while the international community watched in silence, witnessing the unfurling and unparalleled destruction of human lives and the ecological system.

There is one noble thing the foreign minister of PNG and his government can do: ask why Jakarta is not responding to the request for a UN visit made by the international community, rather than endorsing an ‘illegal security pact’ with the illegal Indonesia colonial occupier over his supposed “family members separated only by imaginary lines”.

Ali Mirin is a West Papuan from the Kimyal tribe of the highlands that share a border with the Star Mountain region of Papua New Guinea. He graduated last year with a Master of Arts in International Relations from Flinders University in Adelaide, South Australia.

Keeping the Pacific nuclear-free, in line with the Rarotonga Treaty, was a recurring theme from the leaders of Tonga, Cook Islands and Samoa to New Zealand last week.

The New Zealand government’s Pacific mission wrapped up on Saturday with the final leg in Samoa.

Over the course of the trip, defence and security in the region was discussed with the leaders of the three Polynesian nations.

In Apia, Samoan Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa addressed regional concerns about AUKUS.

New Zealand is considering joining pillar two of the agreement, a non-nuclear option, but critics have said this could be seen as Aotearoa rubber stamping Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines.

“We would hope that both administrations will ensure that the provisions under the maritime treaty are taken into consideration with these new arrangements,” Fiamē said.

New Zealand’s previous Labour government was more cautious in its approach to joining AUKUS because it said pillar two had not been clearly defined, but the coalition government is looking to take action.

Nuclear weapons opposed
Prime Minister Fiamē said she did not want the Pacific to become a region affected by more nuclear weapons.

She said the impact of nuclear weapons in the Pacific was still ongoing, especially in the North Pacific with the Marshall Islands, and a semblance of it still in the south with Tahiti.

She said it was crucial to “present that voice in these international arrangements”.

“We don’t want the Pacific to be seen as an area that people will take licence of nuclear arrangements.”

The Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits signatories — which include Australia and New Zealand — from placing nuclear weapons within the South Pacific.

Cook Island’s Prime Minister Mark Brown said Pacific leaders were in agreement over security.

“I think our stance mirrors that of all the Pacific Island countries. We want to keep the Pacific region nuclear weapons free, nuclear free and that hasn’t changed.”

Timely move
Reflecting on discussions during the Pacific Islands Forum in 2023, he said: “A review and revisit of the Rarotonga Treaty should take place with our partners such as New Zealand, Australia and others on these matters.”

“It’s timely that we have them now moving forward,” he said.

Last year, Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka proposed a Pacific peace zone which was discussed during the Forum leaders’ meeting in Rarotonga.

This year, Tonga will be hosting the forum and matters of security and defence involving AUKUS are expected to be a key part of the agenda.

Tongan Acting Prime Minister Samiu Vaipulu acknowledged New Zealand’s sovereignty and said dialogue was the way forward.

“We do not interfere with what other countries do as it is their sovereignty. A talanoa process is best,” Vaipulu said.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Health and Pacific People Minister Dr Shane Reti reiterated that they cared and had listened to the needs outlined by the Pacific leaders.

They said New Zealand would deliver on funding promises to support improvements in the areas of health, education and security of the region.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Marshall Islands officials quickly moved this week to reaffirm this nation’s ties with Taipei in the wake of Nauru shifting diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China.

“The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) values the strong relationship with Republic of China (Taiwan) as an indispensable partner in promotion of democratic principles,” said Foreign Minister Kalani Kaneko.

“The RMI pledges its diplomatic allegiance with Taiwan and will continue to stand in solidarity with the government and people of Taiwan.”

• READ MORE: China has ‘whittled down’ key Taiwan support with Nauru move, says scholar
• Other China in the Pacific articles

President Hilda Heine quickly congratulated President-elect Lai Ching-te after his win in Taiwan’s presidential election last Saturday, adding that the Marshall Islands “looks forward to working closely with the Republic of China (Taiwan) to further strengthen the close and friendly ties between the two nations”.

Just two days after Lai’s election victory, Nauru announced its change to China — the latest development in the tit-for-tat between Taipei and Beijing, which views Taiwan as a renegade province that needs to be reunited with the mainland.

The mayors of the two largest local governments, in the capital Majuro and at Kwajalein, which hosts the US Army’s Reagan Test Site, took out full-page advertisements in the weekly Marshall Islands Journal supporting Taiwan.

Both local governments have benefited significantly from partnerships with Taiwan that have funded the building of numerous community sports facilities, installation of solar lighting, and purchase of equipment for maintenance of facilities.

Friendship ‘remains strong’
The “Marshall Islands-Republic of China (Taiwan) friendship remains strong and will continue to withstand the test of time,” Kaneko said.

“In parallel, we wholeheartedly respect the sovereignty of all countries and will continue to foster open and friendly dialogue with other nations for the sake of peace and stability for all.”

Kaneko said he wanted to reassure the dozens of Marshall Islands students currently attending universities in Taiwan “that the Nauru-ROC relationship change will not affect their current immigration status while in Taiwan.”

While Taiwan voters sent Beijing a message last Saturday by giving the ruling Democratic Progressive Party an unprecedented third four-year term by electing Lai, whose party and candidacy China had opposed, on Monday, China struck back, with the announcement by Nauru that it was dropping diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognising China instead.

This development leaves only the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu as Taiwan allies in the Pacific, and reduces the total globally to 12 that recognise Taiwan.

Recently elected Nauru President David Adeang’s government issued a statement on Monday saying that Nauru was “moving to the One-China Principle…which recognises the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”

“This is a big win for China,” wrote Cleo Paskal, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies who regularly writes on US-China issues in the Pacific, on X (formerly Twitter) on Tuesday.

She commented that one of the implications of Nauru’s switch is that now the incoming secretary-general of the Pacific Islands Forum will be from a China-aligned nation, not Taiwan.

‘A real problem for Beijing’
“Apart from the myriad other implications, the announced next Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum was to be former Nauru President Baron Waqa, who has stood up to China in the past and, at the time of his selection, was from a country that recognised Taiwan — two things that were a real problem for Beijing,” Paskal said on X.

“This change means that, at least, the next Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General will be from a country that recognises China rather than Taiwan. Now let’s see if it stays Baron Waqa.”

American Samoa Congresswoman Amata Radewagen congratulated the new Taiwan president and said in a statement issued by her office Wednesday.

“I’m confident that by far most leadership throughout the Pacific Islands fully supports a strong US commitment in the region and appreciates Taiwan’s role in our many economic and security partnerships that provide enduring regional stability, peace and prosperity.”

She also pointed out that people in the islands “value and support the right to self-determination and democratic elections, for themselves and their neighbours” — an unsubtle dig at China, a dictatorship run by the Chinese Communist Party without national elections.

“The Pacific Islands have a widespread desire to stand with the US and our key allies, which includes our friendship to the people of Taiwan.

I am certain that the decision by Nauru did not take our professional diplomats by surprise and will be an exception in the Pacific Islands,” she added.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

A security studies professor says China has been applying pressure to countries to switch diplomatic ties over from Taiwan, but Beijing says its “ready to work” with the Pacific island nation “to open new chapters” in the relations between the two countries.

The Nauru government said that “in the best interests” of the country and its people, it was seeking full resumption of diplomatic relations with China.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan strongly disputes.

• READ MORE: Pacific nation Nauru cuts ties with Taiwan, switches to China
• Other Nauru-Taiwan reports
• LISTEN TO RNZ: Nauru severs diplomatic ties with Taiwan

Dr Anna Powles, an associate professor at the Massey University Centre for Defence and Security Studies, told RNZ this was not Nauru’s “first rodeo” — this was the third time they had “jumped ship”.

“China, certainly, has been on the offensive to effectively dismantle Taiwan’s diplomatic allies across the Pacific,” Dr Powles said.

“There has been increased Chinese pressure — that was certainly one of the reasons why Australia pursued their Falepili union agreement with Tuvalu last year with great speed,” she said.

Taiwan now has three Pacific allies left — Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands.

Significant drop
Dr Powles said that was a significant drop from 2019 when Solomon Islands and Kiribati had switched allegiance.

But she said the switch should not come as a major surprise. Most countries, including New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, recognised China and adhere to the one-China policy.

“Nauru is like most other Pacific Island countries, recognising China over Taiwan,” Dr Powles said.

“The challenge here though for Taiwan is for a very long period of time, the Pacific was the bulkhead of its allies, and as I mentioned, China has effectively and very successfully managed to whittle that down and dismantle that network.

“For many of those countries in the Pacific which have switched back and forth between the two, this actually hasn’t contributed in positive ways to sustainable, consistent growth and development.”

Unanswered questions
Dr Powles said there were still questions to be answered.

Nauru set up its intergenerational fund in 2015 with Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan as contributors.

“So the question here is, will China now be a contributor to the trust fund?”

Lai Ching-te from Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, won the presidential election on Saturday as expected and will take office on May 20.

“With deep regret we announce the termination of diplomatic relations with Nauru,” Taiwan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry said on social media platform X, formerly Twitter.

“This timing is not only China’s retaliation against our democratic elections but also a direct challenge to the international order. Taiwan stands unbowed and will continue as a force for good,” it added.

China ‘ready to work’
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said that Beijing “China appreciates and welcomes the decision of the government of the Nauru”.

“There is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”

She said this was affirmed in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 “and is the prevailing consensus among the international community”.

“China has established diplomatic relations with 182 countries on the basis of the one-China principle.

“The Nauru government’s decision of re-establishing diplomatic ties with China once again shows that the One-China principle is where global opinion trends and where the arc of history bends.

“China stands ready to work with Nauru to open new chapters of our bilateral relations on the basis of the one-China principle.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Major media organisations all over the world are copping criticism for the way they’re reporting what’s happening in Gaza and Israel. Mediawatch has asked BBC news boss Jonathan Munro how they’re handling it — even when it’s coming from the UK’s own government.

“Palestinian health officials in Gaza say hundreds of people have been killed in an explosion at a hospital in Gaza. They’re blaming an Israeli strike on the hospital.

“But the Israel DefenCe Forces said an initial investigation shows the explosion was caused by a failed Hamas rocket launch.”

That was how RNZ’s news at 8am last Tuesday reported the single deadliest incident of this conflict so far — and likely to be the deadliest one in all of the five times Israel and Hamas have fought over Gaza so far.

The Israeli Defence Force also singled out Islamic Jihad for the atrocity — but the absence of hard evidence put the media reporting it in a difficult position.

“It’s still absolutely unclear. There are varying bits of information that are coming out for now. I don’t think anybody can quite say . . . it’s most likely to have been Israel,” the BBC Middle East editor Sebastian Usher told RNZ on Wednseday night.

“They said it seems like it might be a misfired rocket,”

Huge anger on streets
“We can’t say for now, but I don’t think  — in terms of the mood in the Arab world and the Middle East — that that really matters. People out on the streets are showing huge anger and they will reject any investigation, any Israeli claim, to say that Israel is not responsible,” he said.

Reporting those claims and counterclaims creates confusion among the audience. It’s also stoked the anger of those objecting to reporters’ choice of words.

CNN’s Clarissa Ward, for example, was criticised heavily on social media for mentioning the Israeli Defense Force claims — and then expressing doubt about them at the same time.

A video showing a pro-Palestinian protester calling Clarissa Ward “a puppet” has gone viral on social media. So did another falsely accusing her of faking a rocket strike.

The longer version of the video of Egyptian podcaster Rahma Zein confronting CNN reporter Clarissa Ward at the Rafah crossing. It’s raw, sincere, and powerful. Much respect for Rahma, she expressed our collective pain at the Western media’s dehumanization of the Palestinians. pic.twitter.com/yfB7zFYPwe

— Amro Ali (@_amroali) October 20, 2023

Her CNN colleague Anderson Cooper was also criticised online for referring to a huge civilian loss of life during the live report from Tel Aviv in Israel and repeating himself, but then without the word “civilian”.

Among those who, alongside expert investigators, tried to sift the available evidence and cut through the information war was Alex Thompson, correspondent for UK broadcaster Channel Four

“Israel and Hamas can tweet what they like. The truth of what happened here requires independent expert investigation — not happening,” was Alex Thompson’s bleak conclusion.

‘A fierce information war’
“Any doubt is due to a fierce information war that in truth matters little to the victims of the Gaza hospital tragedy,” another British correspondent — ITV Jonathan Irvine — said on Newshub at 6 last Tuesday.

At times, broadcasters have used the wrong words and given audiences the wrong idea.

Last week the BBC’s main evening news bulletin made a rapid apology for describing pro-Palestine protests in the UK as “pro-Hamas”.

“We accept that this was poorly-phrased and was a misleading description,” the presenter told viewers just before the end of the bulletin.

And earlier this month, people protested outside the BBC News headquarters in London about the BBC’s long-standing policy of not labeling any group as “terrorists”.

“You don’t seem to be particularly interested. If the BBC seems to refuse to call terrorists even though the British Parliament has legislated them terrorists — that is a question I haven’t heard the BBC answer yet,” UK government Defence Secretary Grant Shapps told the BBC radio flagship news show Today.

“Have you not seen any of the coverage on the BBC of the atrocities, the dead, the injured, the survivors?” the startled presenter asked him.

“How can you say that we’re not interested?” she replied, when Shapps said he had.

An obligation to audiences
The BBC’s deputy chief executive of news Jonathan Munro was at Sydney’s South by Southwest festival this week to talk about how the BBC delivers news from and about conflict zones.

“We’ve already seen journalists lose their lives in this country, working for organisations who are also facing the same dilemmas as we are,” said Munro, who is also the BBC’s director of journalism.

“We’ve got an obligation to audiences to explain what’s going on and that involves lots of people on the ground as witnesses to events, but also the analysis that comes with expert knowledge,” he told Mediawatch.

“Expertise is just invaluable. People like Jeremy Bowen (former Middle East editor and current international editor of BBC News) and our chief international correspondent Lyse Doucet and correspondents who are based in that region,” he said.

“But the main story here is the catastrophic loss of life and the appalling conditions that people are living in and that the hostages are being held in — the humanity of that,” he said.

A lot of reporting people will see, hear and read will come from Israel. Reporting from Gaza itself is difficult and dangerous — and access to Gaza at the border is restricted by Israel.

“We have a correspondent in Gaza, but he’s moved from Gaza City to Khan Yunis in the south of the strip, a safer option. But he can’t report 24 hours a day, and he is looking after his family which is paramount.

Need for transparency
“So we do have to add to that [with] reporting from Israel and from London by people who know Gaza very well,” he said.

“We have to be transparent about that and tell the audience and then the audience knows that wherever it’s coming from, and you still hold editorial integrity.”

A lot of what people will be seeing from Gaza is amateur footage and social media content that’s very difficult to verify.

The BBC recently launched BBC Verify, dedicated to checking out this kind of material and vetting its use.

“There’s a huge amount of video out there on social media we can all find at the touch of a button. The brand of BBC Verify is a signpost that the material . . . has been checked by us using methods like geolocation and looking at the metadata,” he said.

Even when verified, there are still ethical dilemmas.

For example, BBC Verify used facial recognition software to analyse images of an individual in the Hamas surprise attacks on October 8. It identified one gunman as a policeman from Gaza.

Independently verifying claims
“It’s case-by-case — but something shouldn’t go out on the BBC without us knowing it’s true. There are occasions we would broadcast something and we would tell the audience that we’ve not been able to independently verify a claim . . . and we need to caveat our coverage of the reaction to it with the fact that we do not have our own verification of source material,” he said.

Major media outfits all over the world are copping criticism for the way they’re reporting what’s happening in Gaza and Israel. Mediawatch asks BBC news boss Jonathan Munro how they’re handling it – even when it’s coming from the UK’s own government https://t.co/gm8Fyv4ar1

— Mediawatch (@MediawatchNZ) October 21, 2023

Even before the Al Ahli hospital catastrophe amplified emotions, intense scrutiny of reporters’ work was adding to the stress of those reporting from the region.

“Every word you say is being scrutinised so closely and is likely to be contested by one side or the other more or both — and that definitely adds to the pressure,” Channel Four correspondent Secunder Kermani told the BBC’s Media Show last week from Gaza.

“In the Israel Gaza situation it is critical. Every word can be checked and rechecked and double checked for any implication which is either inferred or implied by accident.

“Because our job is to be impartial, tell the reality of the story, and most importantly, share the witnessing of that story by our correspondents,” Jonathan Munro told Mediawatch.

“That’s why we’ve got a significant number of correspondents in Israel and back in the newsroom in London are adding explanations and leaning into that scrutiny on language,” he said.

Adjectives ‘can be dangerous’
“We’re using expertise, our knowledge as an organisation and we’re making sure that at every stage of that every sentence, every paragraph is reflective of what we know to be true.

“But adjectives can be dangerous, because they may imply something which is more emotive than we mean. We have to be quite clean in our language in these circumstances,” he said.

“Of course, people can come on the BBC and express their views in language of their choice. All of those things help to keep our coverage straight and honest and ensure that correspondents on the ground aren’t in danger by slips or mistakes that are made in good faith elsewhere in the BBC output.”

Last week at its annual conference, senior members of the Conservative Party — which is in power in the UK — heavily criticised the BBC for alleged bias and elitism. Some — including home secretary Suella Braverman and former prime minister Liz Truss made a point of praising GB News — the new right-wing TV channel backed by billionaire Brexiteers — for disrupting the news.

“The criticism of the BBC from politicians is as old as the BBC itself. Just because they’re habitual critics doesn’t mean they’re wrong, but we’ve got a well developed set of editorial guidelines which have stood the test of time over many, many difficult stories,” Munro told Mediawatch. 

“The editorial guidelines are robust and public. You can go online and look at them. All of our journalism abides by those guidelines and if you have guidelines that you believe in as an organisation, that’s a significant defence to some of the less well-founded attacks that we sometimes find ourselves on the end of,” he said.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

The political superpowers of the world have been gently reminded this week of Fiji’s intention to turn the Pacific islands region into a zone of peace and not be pawns in geopolitics.

In his address at a Lowy Institute event in Canberra on Tuesday afternoon, Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka emphasised the Pacific’s peace stand in a world that has become riddled with volatile conflicts.

Referring to the US-China rivalry as “very evident” in the Blue Pacific, Rabuka said Fiji did not want to be caught in the middle.

• READ MORE: Fiji PM Sitiveni Rabuka calls for ‘Zone of Peace’ in the Pacific in Canberra speech

“Fiji’s position is very clear. We’re friendly with China now. And with the US — always. And we do not want to be caught in the struggle between the superpowers,” he said.

The Pacific region has become known as a contested region, with interest from the two conflicting superpowers increasing in recent times.

University of the South Pacific academic Professor Sandra Tarte said in an earlier interview with this newspaper that Fiji and other Pacific countries could turn the increased engagement from these countries into economic opportunities to benefit them.

“I think certainly countries want to retain their independence to do what they want and who they deal with,” she said.

‘We don’t want to provoke’
“I think while you can applaud that, there is also the question: how can our countries actually work more collectively on this sort of thing? And we don’t want to provoke any anything.

“We don’t want to create more tension. We are a region of peace or zone of peace, as our prime minister said, so how can we as a Pacific Island region actually work together to make that happen?”

Rabuka said this would be discussed at the next Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leader’s meeting in Cook Islands next month.

“I envisage the basic foundation built on refraining from actions that may jeorpadise regional order and stability. And maintaining respects for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he said.

“There will be continued emphasis on the Pacific way of dialogue, diplomacy and consensus. We will continue to promote our concept of the vuvale cooperation and our vuvale way of resolving our differences,” Rabuka said.

After bilateral talks in Canberra on Wednesday, Rabuka and Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a “renewed and elevated Vuvale Partnership, with a pledge of A$68 million (F$98 million) in budgetary support to Fiji.

Dionisia Tabureguci is a Fiji Times reporter. Republished with permission.

Cheaper loans will be a key agenda for Papua New Guinea officials when Prime Minister James Marape leads a delegation of government and business leaders to China for bilateral talks next week.

Treasurer Ian Ling-Stuckey, who is going to be part of the delegation, made the announcement earlier this week when giving an update on preparations for the visit.

The announcement is likely to worry China’s geopolitical rivals Australia and the US, whose interests on loans, according to Ling-Stuckey, are higher than that of China.

• READ MORE: Other China-US geopolitics reports

“My key goals during this visit [to China] are to work as part of the government team to strengthen our cooperative relations with such a key partner and friend, the government of China,” Ling-Stuckey said.

“The focus of my work is to secure additional, cheaper funding for PNG. Chinese interest rates are currently below those in the US and Australia, and even from many of our multilateral partners.

“I look forward to meetings with China’s Export Credit Bank along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

Two weeks ago, Marape led another delegation to Washington, along with other leaders of the Pacific, to meet with US President Joe Biden.

US aid for Pacific
In that summit, Biden announced that he is planned to work with Congress to request the release of nearly US$200 million (K718 million) for the Pacific island states, including PNG.

Ling-Stuckey said government officials were in hectic consultations with Chinese embassy officials in Port Moresby to ensure the visit to China went smoothly, compared to their recent visit to Washington.

Officials said the delegation would hold bilateral talks with senior Chinese officials, including President Xi Xinping, before engaging in the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum in Beijing.

It is expected that a big part of whatever financial assistance PNG secures from China will be centered around the BRI projects in PNG, which have been gaining momentum since Port Moresby signed up in 2018.

Chinese ambassador Zeng Fanhua a week earlier said China’s development experience and enhanced relations with PNG had laid the foundation for more cooperation and growth, and his government was looking forward to Marape and the PNG delegation’s visit to China.

“This year, we see new development in our bilateral relations. High-level exchanges have resurged,” Zeng said.

“More than a dozen PNG ministers, governors and Members of Parliament have visited China.

New wave of growth
Business and trade cooperation has seen a new wave of growth.

In the first half of this year, PNG’s exports to China was nearly US$1.9 billion, up 6 percent year-on-year.”

“China highly appreciates PNG government’s firm commitment to the One-China principle and the decision to close its trade office in Taipei.

“This has laid a more solid political foundation for advancing China-PNG relations and cooperation in all areas.”

Lawrence Fong is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

The New Zealand government has given its full blessing to Cook Islands and Niue establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.

At the US-Pacific summit on Monday (Washington time), President Joe Biden said he recognised the two island nations as sovereign and independent states, an announcement which the US Embassy in Aotearoa has labelled as “historic”.

Both countries are self-governing in ‘free association’ with New Zealand.  

Prime Minister Chris Hipkins acknowledged that and responded to questions around what the US’s move means for both countries’ relationship with Aotearoa.

“That’s the way that the American system works,” Hipkins said.

“So in order to recognise those specific countries, the wording that they use is they recognise their sovereignty but actually they also recognise, through diplomatic channels, the unique constitutional relationship that those countries have with New Zealand as well.”

The establishment of diplomatic relations does not change the constitutional relationship Aotearoa New Zealand has with either the Cook Islands or Niue, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesperson said.

“Aotearoa New Zealand welcomes the establishment of diplomatic relations between US, Cook Islands and Niue,” the MFAT spokesperson said.

Diplomatic relations
“The Cook Islands has diplomatic relations with 61 countries, and Niue has diplomatic relations with 21 countries.

“[The NZ government] expects that the establishment of diplomatic relations[with the US] will better enable close engagement.”

In his speech, Biden said building a better world started with stronger partnerships.

“And that’s why the United States is formally establishing relations with the Cook Island’s . . .  and Niue,” Biden said.

Pacific Islands Forum chair and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has hailed the move as a milestone that marks an “era of change”.

He said Niue and the Cook Islands were “celebrating”.

“These milestones celebrate era’s of change and demonstrate that with unshakable resolve and leadership, remarkable achievements are possible,” Brown said.

Brown thanked the US President for his elevated level of engagement with the Pacific over the last year.

Development funding
Massey University’s defence and security analyst Dr Anna Powles said formalising diplomatic ties was “very much about ensuring that Cook Islands and Niue are able to receive development assistance funding”.

“There’s obviously also a strategic benefit from the United States perspective to have diplomatic presence, or at least diplomatic reach, into both of those countries.”

On top of the diplomatic ties talk, Biden also announced climate assistance at the summit.

He told Pacific leaders more than US$20 million is being injected into climate assistance.

The announcement for climate support and affirming the US’s commitment to climate action comes just days days after he was slammed by Pacific youth climate activist Suluafi Brianna Freuan following the UN Climate Ambition Summit.

Suluafi said not all nations were being ambitious enough when it came to climate ambition.

“What are the commitments that they will make to financing those most vulnerable to climate change, including those in their, their very ocean, their neighbours in the Pacific,” Suluafi said.

“[Countries] really need to talk about how they will phase out fossil fuels.”

But President Biden wanted to be clear that the Pacific’s stance on the climate crisis was the US’s position too.

‘I hear you’ – Biden on climate crisis
“I want you to know I hear you, the people in the United States and around the world hear you,” Biden said.

“We hear your warnings of a rising sea that they pose an existential threat to your nations. We hear your calls for reassurance that you never, never, never will lose your statehood, or membership of the UN as a result of the climate crisis.”

The President also announced the doubling of US-Pacific exchange student spots.

He committed to a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region.

Biden also plans on investing US$5 million into co-funding a fisheries and ocean science vessel.

It is expected to be used to manage the region’s tuna resources and for ocean science research.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s opposition – and poll leader — National Party’s three biggest donors have a combined net worth of $15 billion.

The bottom 50 percent of NZ has $23 billion.

The top 5 percent of New Zealanders own roughly 50 percent of New Zealand’s wealth, while the bottom 50 percent of New Zealanders own a miserable 5 percent.

• READ MORE: Other NZ election 2023 reports

IRD proved NZ capitalism is rigged for the rich and business columnist Bernard Hickey calculates that if we had had a basic capital gains tax in place over the last decade, we would have earned $200 billion in tax revenue.

$200 billion would have ensured our public infrastructure wouldn’t be in such an underfunded ruin right now.

There are 14 billionaires in NZ plus 3118 ultra-high net worth individuals with more than $50 million each. Why not start start with them, then move onto the banks, then the property speculators, the climate change polluters and big industry to pay their fair share before making workers pay more tax.

Culture War fights make all the noise, but poor people aren’t sitting around the kitchen table cancelling people for misusing pronouns, they are trying to work out how to pay the bills.

‘Bread and butter’ pressures
“Bread and butter” cost of living pressures are what the New Zealand electorate wants answers to, and that’s where the Left need to step up and push universal policy that lifts that cost from the people.

The Commerce Commission is clear that the supermarket duopoly should be broken up and the state should step in and provide that competition.

We need year long maternity leave.

We need a nationalised Early Education sector that provides free childcare for children under 5.

We need free public transport.

We need free breakfast and lunches in schools.

We need free dental care.

We need 50,000 new state houses.

We need more hospitals, more schools and a teacher’s aid in every class room.

We need climate change adaptation and a resilient rebuilt infrastructure.

Funded by taxing the rich
We need all these things and we need to fund them by taxing the rich who the IRD clearly showed were rigging the system.

That requires political courage but there is none.

No one is willing to fight for tomorrow, they merely want to pacify the present!

Just promise me one thing.

Don’t. You. Dare. Vote. Early. In. 2023!

I can not urge this enough from you all comrades.

Don’t vote early in the 2023 election.

Secrecy of the ballot box
I’m not going to tell you who to vote for because this is a liberal progressive democracy and your right to chose who you want in the secrecy of that ballot box is a sacred privilege and is your right as a citizen.

But what I will beg of you, is to not vote early in 2023.

Comrades, on our horizon is inflation in double figures, geopolitical shockwave after geopolitical shockwave and a global economic depression exacerbated by catastrophic climate change.

As a nation we will face some of the toughest choices and decision making outside of war time and that means you must press those bloody MPs to respond to real policy solutions and make them promise to change things and you can’t do that if you hand your vote over before the election.

Keep demanding concessions and promises for your vote right up until midnight before election day AND THEN cast your vote!

We only get 1 chance every 3 years to hold these politicians’ feet to the fire and they only care before the election, so force real concessions out of them before you elect them.

This election is going to be too important to just let politicians waltz into Parliament without being blistered by our scrutiny.

Demand real concessions from them and THEN vote on Election Day, October 14.

If the Left votes — the Left wins!

Republished with permission from The Daily Blog.