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		<title>Media targeting public for a war with China, warns Declassified Australia</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2023/09/29/media-targeting-public-for-a-war-with-china-warns-declassified-australia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pacific Media Watch]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2023 18:49:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=93806</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Pacific Media Watch Barely a day passes without a story in the British or Australian media that ramps up fear about the rulers in Beijing, reports the investigative website Declassified Australia. According to an analysis by co-editors Antony Loewenstein and Peter Cronau, the Australian and British media are ramping up public fear, aiding a major ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/category/pacific-media-watch/">Pacific Media Watch</a><br />
</em></p>
<p>Barely a day passes without a story in the British or Australian media that ramps up fear about the rulers in Beijing, reports the investigative website <a href="https://declassifiedaus.org/"><em>Declassified Australia</em></a>.</p>
<p>According to an analysis by co-editors <a class="author url fn" title="Posts by Antony Loewenstein" href="https://declassifiedaus.org/author/antony/" rel="author">Antony Loewenstein</a> and <a class="author url fn" title="Posts by Peter Cronau" href="https://declassifiedaus.org/author/peter/" rel="author">Peter Cronau</a>, the Australian and British media are ramping up public fear, aiding a major military build-up &#8212; and perhaps conflict &#8212; by the United States and its allies.</p>
<p>The article is a warning to New Zealand and Pacific media too.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=China+Pacific"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> China and the Pacific</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Citing a recent article in the <a href="https://archive.is/42d4M"><em>Telegraph</em> newspaper</a> in Britain headlined, “A war-winning missile will knock China out of Taiwan – fast”, says the introduction.</p>
<p><em>&#8220;Written by <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/authors/d/da-de/david-axe/">David Axe</a>, who contributes regularly to the outlet, he detailed a war game last year that was organised by the US think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;It examined a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and concluded that the US Navy would be nearly entirely obliterated. However, Axe wrote, the US Air Force &#8216;could almost single-handedly destroy the Chinese invasion force&#8217;.</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;&#8216;How? With the use of a Lockheed Martin-made Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM).</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;&#8216;It’s a stealthy and highly accurate cruise missile that can range hundreds of miles from its launching warplane,&#8217; Axe explained.</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;&#8216;There are long-range versions of the JASSM and a specialised anti-ship version, too &#8212; and the USAF [US Air Force] and its sister services are buying thousands of the missiles for billions of dollars.&#8217;</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.caitlinjohnst.one/p/think-tanks-are-information-laundering?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=82124&amp;post_id=136773877&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=kghj&amp;utm_medium=email">&#8220;Missing from this analysis</a> was the fact that Lockheed Martin is a <a href="https://www.csis.org/about/financial-information/donors/corporations">major sponsor</a> of the CSIS. The editors of </em>The Telegraph<em> either didn’t know or care about this crucial detail.</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;One week after this story, Axe wrote another one for the paper, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/09/12/us-navy-robot-drone-armada-china-taiwan-battle/">titled</a>, &#8216;The US Navy should build a robot armada to fight the battle of Taiwan.&#8217;</em></p>
<p><em>&#8220;&#8216;The US Navy is shrinking,&#8217; the story begins. &#8216;The Chinese navy is growing. The implications, for a free and prosperous Pacific region, are enormous.'&#8221;</em></p>
<p>Branding the situation as &#8220;propaganda by think tank&#8221;, the authors argue that some sections of the news media are framing a massive military build-up by the US and its allies as necessary in the face of Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>&#8220;These repetitive media reports condition the public and so allow, or force, the political class to up the ante on China,&#8221; Loewenstein and Cronau write.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://declassifiedaus.org/2023/09/28/the-media-are-targeting-the-public-for-a-war-with-china/">The full report &#8211; &#8216;The media are targeting the public for a war with China&#8217;</a></li>
</ul>
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		<title>Samoa and China have no plans for military ties, says Fiamē</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/06/15/samoa-and-china-have-no-plans-for-military-ties-says-fiame/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2022 22:31:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=75240</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[RNZ Pacific Samoa and China do not have any plans for military ties, Samoa Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa says. Fiamē &#8212; who is on a three-day trip to Aotearoa &#8212; is making her first official bilateral trip abroad since becoming leader last year. Her visit marks 60 years of diplomatic relations between New Zealand ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/"><em>RNZ Pacific</em></a></p>
<p>Samoa and China do not have any plans for military ties, Samoa Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mataʻafa says.</p>
<p>Fiamē &#8212; who is on a three-day trip to Aotearoa &#8212; is making her first official bilateral trip abroad since becoming leader last year.</p>
<p>Her visit marks 60 years of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Samoa and the 60th anniversary <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/468262/samoa-celebrates-60-years-of-independence">of Samoa&#8217;s independence.</a></p>
<p>At a media briefing after talks with New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern yesterday, Fiamē said: &#8220;There are no discussions between Samoa and China on militarisation at all.&#8221;</p>
<p>She said the Pacific nations would discuss China&#8217;s security proposals at the Pacific Islands Forum due to take place from July 12.</p>
<p>&#8220;The issue needs to be considered in the broader context,&#8221; she said.</p>
<p>Ardern said there was capability in the region to deal with security issues and they could be addressed together, while stressing that Pacific nations still had the sovereign right to decide their own future.</p>
<p>&#8220;We have convergence on our regional priorities,&#8221; Fiamē said, adding that Samoa believed in the region taking a collective approach to issues.</p>
<p>She said the anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries would coincide with Samoa opening its borders fully on August 1.</p>
<p><b>Watch the media briefing </b></p>
<div class="embedded-media brightcove-video">
<div class="fluidvids"><iframe class="fluidvids-item" src="https://players.brightcove.net/6093072280001/default_default/index.html?videoId=6307707567112" width="480" height="270" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen" data-fluidvids="loaded" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><br />
<em>Ardern and Fiamē hold a joint media briefing. Video: RNZ News</em></div>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The talks with Ardern had covered a lot of ground, she said, and the two countries would work together on tourism, education and in other economic areas.</p>
<p>&#8220;Targeted assistance from New Zealand has enabled us to open our borders.&#8221;</p>
<p>From August 1 flights to Samoa would increase from the current weekly flight for passengers to daily flights by the end of the year.</p>
<p>Her message to Samoans living in New Zealand was that the anniversary celebrations will take place over 12 months so they had plenty of time to come home.</p>
<p>Asked what Samoa required of New Zealand, Fiamē said &#8220;she was not in a rush to come up with a shopping list&#8221;.</p>
<p>Instead it might be time just to reflect on reprioritising issues while saying climate change and education remained important as well as &#8220;building back stronger&#8221; after covid-19.</p>
<p><strong>Time for a rethink on RSE scheme<br />
</strong>On the subject of seasonal workers, which Samoa has &#8220;slowed down&#8221;, she said the New Zealand scheme was well run. But there were some concerns and Samoa was noticing the impact of the loss of workers in its own development sectors.</p>
<p>Originally it was intended to send unemployed workers to Australia and Aotearoa for the RSE programme, but now the civil service and the manufacturing sector in Samoa were being hit by experienced employees leaving.</p>
<p>&#8220;We need to have a bit more balance,&#8221; Fiamē said, adding that the new government wanted to hold new talks with both the Australia and New Zealand governments on the issue.</p>
<p>Referring to the Dawn Raids, Fiamē welcomed Ardern&#8217;s formal ceremonial apology last year.</p>
<p>&#8220;When we all live together it&#8217;s important to settle grievances and differences,&#8221; she said.</p>
<p>Ardern said the visit has come at a special time for the two countries, referring to the Treaty of Friendship and Samoa&#8217;s 60th anniversary.</p>
<p>She announced the launch of a special fellowship in Fiamē&#8217;s name and the New Zealand prime minister&#8217;s award plus the start of new sports leaders&#8217; awards with an emphasis on women and girls.</p>
<p>Discussions had covered their shared experiences on Covid-19 with Ardern praising the high vaccination rates among young Samoans.</p>
<p>Climate change had also been discussed and New Zealand will increase funding for Samoa&#8217;s plans to tackle it.</p>
<p><strong>Invitation to Ardern<br />
</strong>On her arrival at Parliament yesterday morning, Fiamē invited Ardern to Samoa to take part in the independence celebrations next month and she repeated the invitation at the media briefing.</p>
<p>Fiamē&#8217;s visit comes ahead of the Pacific Island Forum meeting.</p>
<p>After welcoming Fiamē, Ardern acknowledged the importance of that meeting which will discuss issues like climate change and the current &#8220;strategic&#8221; situation across the Pacific.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/468349/samoan-pm-raises-concerns-over-nations-sudden-interest-in-pacific">China&#8217;s growing presence in the Pacific</a> is among topics sure to be covered by the two leaders during their talks.</p>
<p><em>This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.</em></p>
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		<title>Amplifying narratives about the ‘China threat’ in the Pacific may help Beijing achieve its broader aims</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/05/27/amplifying-narratives-about-the-china-threat-in-the-pacific-may-help-beijing-achieve-its-broader-aims/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 May 2022 09:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=74716</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[ANALYSIS: By Joanne Wallis, University of Adelaide and Maima Koro, University of Adelaide Yet more proposed Chinese “security agreements” in the Pacific Islands have been leaked. The drafts have been described by critics as revealing “the ambitious scope of Beijing’s strategic intent in the Pacific” and its “coherent desire […] to seek to shape the ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ANALYSIS:</strong><em> By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joanne-wallis-1331684">Joanne Wallis</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-adelaide-1119">University of Adelaide</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/maima-koro-1349143">Maima Koro</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-adelaide-1119">University of Adelaide</a></em></p>
<p>Yet more proposed Chinese “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-china-seeks-pacific-islands-policing-security-cooperation-document-2022-05-25/">security agreements</a>” in the Pacific Islands have been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-25/china-seeks-pacific-islands-policing-security-cooperation/101099978">leaked</a>.</p>
<p>The drafts have been described by critics as revealing “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/26/five-things-we-learned-about-chinas-ambitions-for-the-pacific-from-the-leaked-deal">the ambitious scope of Beijing’s strategic intent in the Pacific</a>” and its “coherent desire […] to seek to shape the regional order”. There are concerns they will “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/26/deal-proposed-by-china-would-dramatically-expand-security-influence-in-pacific">dramatically expand [China’s] security influence in the Pacific</a>”.</p>
<p>But does this overstate their importance?</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/05/27/china-documents-threaten-pacific-sovereignty-warns-fsm-president/"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> China documents threaten Pacific sovereignty, warns FSM president</a></li>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=China+in+Pacific">Other reports on China in the Pacific</a></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>A pause for breath<br />
</strong>Australia and New Zealand should be concerned about China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific Islands. A coercive Chinese presence could <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/pacific-power-paperback-softback">substantially constrain Australia’s freedom of movement</a>, with both economic and defence implications.</p>
<p>And Pacific states and people have reason to be concerned. The <a href="https://twitter.com/DorothyWickham/status/1529297223535558656">restrictions on journalists</a> during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands demonstrate the potential consequences for transparency of dealing closely with China.</p>
<p>And there are questions about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saying-china-bought-a-military-base-in-the-solomons-is-simplistic-and-shows-how-little-australia-understands-power-in-the-pacific-180020">implications</a> of the Solomon Islands-China security agreement for democracy and accountability.</p>
<p>But before we work ourselves into a frenzy, it is worth pausing for breath.</p>
<p>The leaked drafts are just that: drafts.</p>
<p>They have not yet been signed by any Pacific state.</p>
<p>At least one Pacific leader, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo, has <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/05/27/china-documents-threaten-pacific-sovereignty-warns-fsm-president/">publicly rejected</a> them. Panuelo’s concerns are likely shared by several other Pacific leaders, suggesting they’re also unlikely to sign.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="en">Fiji is joining U.S. President Joe Biden&#8217;s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the White House said, making it the first Pacific Island country in the plan that is part of a U.S. effort to push back on China&#8217;s growing regional influence <a href="https://t.co/XByydU09IP">https://t.co/XByydU09IP</a> <a href="https://t.co/7xphYtRdv0">pic.twitter.com/7xphYtRdv0</a></p>
<p>— Reuters (@Reuters) <a href="https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1530035336235126789?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 27, 2022</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
<p>China wields powerful tools of statecraft &#8212; particularly economic &#8212; but Pacific states are sovereign. They will ultimately decide the extent of China’s role in the region.</p>
<p>And these drafts do not mention <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-could-have-solomon-islands-military-base-within-four-weeks-20220420-p5aevc.html">Chinese military bases</a> &#8212; nor did the China-Solomon Islands agreement.</p>
<p>Rumours in 2018 China was in talks to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/china-military-base-in-vanuatu-report-of-concern-turnbull-says/9635742">build a military base</a> in Vanuatu never eventuated.</p>
<p><strong>What if some Pacific states sign these documents?<br />
</strong>First, these documents contain proposals rather than binding obligations.</p>
<p>If they are signed, it’s not clear they will differ in impact from the many others agreed over the last decade. For example, China announced a “<a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014xiattendg20/2014-11/23/content_18961677.htm">strategic partnership</a>” with eight Pacific states in 2014, which had no substantive consequences for Australia.</p>
<p>So common &#8212; and often so ineffectual &#8212; are “strategic partnerships” and “memoranda of understanding” that there is a <a href="https://devpolicy.org/memorandum-of-understanding-conversations-about-international-development-our-new-podcast-20200115-1/">satirical podcast series</a> devoted to them.</p>
<p>Second, the drafts contain proposals that may benefit Pacific states.</p>
<p>For example, a China-Pacific Islands free trade area could open valuable opportunities, especially as China is a significant export destination.</p>
<p>Third, the drafts cover several activities in which China is already engaged. For example, China signed a <a href="https://fijisun.com.fj/2020/01/07/fiji-signs-mou-on-security-cooperation-with-china/">security agreement</a> with Fiji in 2011, and the two states have had a police cooperation <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2018/April/china-pacific-police">relationship</a> since.</p>
<p>It’s worth remembering Australia and New Zealand provide the bulk of policing assistance. The executive director of the <a href="https://picp.co.nz/who-we-are/secretariat/">Pacific Island Chiefs of Police</a> is even a Kiwi.</p>
<p>The drafts do contain concerning provisions. Cooperation on data networks and “smart” customs systems may raise cybersecurity issues. This is why Australia funded the <a href="https://coralseacablecompany.com/the-system">Coral Sea Cable</a> connecting Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea to Australia.</p>
<p>Provisions relating to satellite maritime surveillance may cause friction with existing activities supported by Australia and its partners.</p>
<p>Greater Chinese maritime domain awareness of the region &#8211; meaning understanding of anything associated with its oceans and waterways &#8211; would also raise strategic challenges for Australia, New Zealand, and the US.</p>
<p>But there is a risk of over-egging the implications based on our own anxieties.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="en">The omission of <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/PNG?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#PNG</a> from the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework set up by the US to contest China in the region is a huge mistake &amp; a missed opportunity, especially with China on the prowl in the Pacific Islands<a href="https://t.co/tRse7G3dvi">https://t.co/tRse7G3dvi</a></p>
<p>— Keith Jackson AM FRSA FAIM (@PNGAttitude) <a href="https://twitter.com/PNGAttitude/status/1530004696454557698?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 27, 2022</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
<p><strong>China’s interests<br />
</strong>Much of China’s diplomacy has been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/25/world/asia/china-pacific-island-countries.html">opportunistic</a> and not dissimilar to what Australia and other partners are doing.</p>
<p>Although the region is strategically important to Australia, the southern Pacific islands are marginal to China. And apart from Kiribati and Nauru, the northern Pacific islands are closely linked to the US.</p>
<p>China’s interest may primarily be about demonstrating strategic reach, rather than for specific military purposes.</p>
<p>So, amplifying narratives about China’s threatening presence may unintentionally help China achieve its broader aim of influencing Australia.</p>
<p>And <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/framing-china-in-the-pacific-islands/">framing China’s presence</a> almost exclusively as threatening may limit Australia’s manoeuvrability.</p>
<p>Given the accelerating frequency of natural disasters in the region due to climate change, it is only a matter of time before the Australian and Chinese militaries find themselves delivering <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tongan-disaster-highlights-lack-of-coordination-in-regional-response/">humanitarian relief</a> side-by-side. Being on sufficiently cordial terms to engage in even minimal coordination will be important.</p>
<p>Indeed, Australia should try to draw China into <a href="https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2021-06/mapping_security_cooperation_in_pacific_islands_dpa_research_report_2021_joanne_wallis_henrietta_mcneill_james_batley_anna_powles.pdf">cooperative arrangements</a> in the Pacific.</p>
<p>Reviving, updating, and seeking China’s signature of, the Pacific Islands Forum’s <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/Cairns-compact.pdf">Cairns Compact on Development Coordination</a>, would be a good start.</p>
<p>If China really has benign intentions, it should welcome this opportunity. The compact, a mechanism created by Pacific states, could help ensure China’s activities are well-coordinated and targeted alongside those of other partners.</p>
<p>Amplifying threat narratives also feeds into Australia’s perceived need to “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html">compete</a>” by playing <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/alarm-over-china-solomon-islands-deal-brushes-over-limits-of-our-influence-in-pacific-20220420-p5aeta.html">whack-a-mole</a> with China, rather than by formulating a coherent, overarching regional policy that responds to the priorities of Pacific states.</p>
<p>For example, Australia has funded <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-25/telstra-digicel-pacific-telecommunications-deal-finalised/100564976">Telstra’s purchase of Digicel</a>, following interest from Chinese telco Huawei, despite <a href="https://devpolicy.org/australia-buys-digicel-pacific-pngs-mobile-monopoly-20211026/">questions over the benefits</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What will Australia offer next?<br />
</strong>There is a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/risks-escalating-strategic-competition-pacific-islands">risk</a> some Pacific states may overestimate their ability to manage China. But for the time being it is understandable why at least some would entertain Chinese overtures.</p>
<p>New Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-25/penny-wong-fiji-visit-chinese-foreign-minister-pacific/101098382">rushed to Fiji</a> days into the job with sought-after offers of action on climate change and expanded migration opportunities. Pacific leaders might be wondering what Australia will offer next.<!-- Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --><img decoding="async" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important;" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183917/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" /><!-- End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines --></p>
<p><em>Dr <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joanne-wallis-1331684">Joanne Wallis</a> is professor of international security, <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-adelaide-1119">University of Adelaide</a></em> and Dr <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/maima-koro-1349143">Maima Koro</a> is a Pacific research fellow, <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-adelaide-1119">University of Adelaide</a></em>. This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons licence. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/amplifying-narratives-about-the-china-threat-in-the-pacific-may-help-china-achieve-its-broader-aims-183917">original article</a>.</em></p>
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		<title>Top level Chinese delegation headed to Kiribati &#8211; questions over Kanton</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/05/25/top-level-chinese-delegation-headed-to-kiribati-questions-over-kanton/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 09:48:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiji]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kiribati]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacific Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Papua New Guinea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Syndicate]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Chinese military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kanton Island]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phoenix Islands Protected Area]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taneti Maamau]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wang Yi]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=74592</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By Barbara Dreaver, TV1 News Pacific correspondent Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is to visit Kiribati on Friday for four hours as part of a Pacific tour to strengthen security ties in the region. It is the first top level bilateral meeting between the two countries since Kiribati switched allegiance to China from Taiwan in ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By <a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/reporter/barbara-dreaver/">Barbara Dreaver</a>, <a href="https://www.1news.co.nz/">TV1 News</a> Pacific correspondent</em></p>
<p>Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is to visit Kiribati on Friday for four hours as part of a Pacific tour to strengthen security ties in the region.</p>
<p>It is the first top level bilateral meeting between the two countries since Kiribati switched allegiance to China from Taiwan in 2019.</p>
<p>Concern is mounting over a potential security deal following the PRC’s recent controversial agreement with Solomon Islands which allows it to have military presence in the island nation if requested.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/05/24/chinas-high-level-milestone-visit-to-the-pacific-ahead-of-schedule/"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> China’s high-level ‘milestone’ visit to the Pacific ahead of schedule</a></li>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=China+and+Pacific">Other reports on China and the Pacific</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Speaking to 1News, Kiribati Opposition leader Tessie Eria Lambourne said she was “gravely concerned” about any potential security arrangement as she believed it would involve the militarisation of one of its atolls, Kanton Island, and Chinese control over the area.</p>
<p>“Our rich marine territory in the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) will be under China’s control for sure,” she said.</p>
<p>The area is valuable for its geo-strategic location, including proximity to United States military installations, along with its rich fisheries resources.</p>
<p>Last year, 1News revealed how the Kiribati government was ditching PIPA, a marine reserve and World Heritage site to open up to commercial fishing in a move believed to have been driven by Beijing.</p>
<p><strong>China funding feasibility study</strong><br />
China is also funding a feasibility study to upgrade the runway and causeway on Kanton Island which has raised alarm in the US and Australia.</p>
<p>Friday’s bilateral meeting which is expected to include discussions about the Kanton Island development was announced late on Tuesday.</p>
<p>A Facebook post from President Taneti Maamau’s office said the high-level state visit was “an important milestone for Kiribati-Chinese relations, as it will strengthen and promote partnership and cooperation between our two countries”.</p>
<p>An exemption is being made for the delegation as Kiribati borders remain closed as a covid-19 safety measure.</p>
<p>While the group will undergo PCR testing when they arrive at the airport, Lambourne said the visit demonstrated the influence the superpower had there.</p>
<p>“Since the lockdown there have been exemptions extended to Chinese nationals who have been coming in and going out of our country without restrictions while our seafarers and other nationals had to wait more than three years to be repatriated,” she said.</p>
<p>“Our democratic system, in fact our very sovereignty , is under attack and we need support to ensure our survival as a democratic nation.”</p>
<p><strong>Delegation arriving in Honiara tonight</strong><br />
The Chinese delegation is expected to arrive in Solomon Islands tonight and meet with the government on Thursday. The group will also be visiting Fiji on Sunday and Monday and Papua New Guinea next week.</p>
<p>Speaking to media from New York today, Jacinda Ardern said it was no surprise Yi was set to visit a number of Pacific countries.</p>
<p>Asked if it was a concern, Ardern said: &#8220;We’re very firm that yes of course we want collaboration in areas where we have shared concerns.</p>
<p>&#8220;Issues like climate mitigation and adaptation, we want quality investment and infrastructure in our region.</p>
<p>&#8220;We don&#8217;t want militarisation, we don’t want an escalation of tension, we want peace and stability so we will remain firm on those values.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Republished with permission.</em></p>
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		<title>Solomon Islands police complete combat drill with Chinese trainers</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/29/solomon-islands-police-complete-combat-drill-with-chinese-trainers/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Mar 2022 09:50:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacific Report]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RNZ Pacific]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Syndicate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China in Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China security pact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China-Taiwan rivalry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese training]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Combat skills]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manasseh Sogavare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Police training]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=72157</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By Robert Iroga in Honiara Fourteen officers of the Royal Solomon Island Police Force (RSIPF) have completed the first public order management (POM) training conducted by Chinese instructors. During the two week course, the Police Response Team (PRT) and Operational Safety Training (OST) officers were trained in unarmed combat skills, advanced use of long sticks, ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By Robert Iroga in Honiara</em></p>
<p>Fourteen officers of the Royal Solomon Island Police Force (RSIPF) have completed the first public order management (POM) training conducted by Chinese instructors.</p>
<p>During the two week course, the Police Response Team (PRT) and Operational Safety Training (OST) officers were trained in unarmed combat skills, advanced use of long sticks, round shields, tactical batons, T-shaped batons, handcuffs, basic rifle tactics and crowd control.</p>
<p>They were trained by the Chinese Police Liaison Team (CPLT) at Rove Police Headquarters.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/464199/beijing-honiara-pact-leaked-by-lunatics-and-agents-of-foreign-regimes-says-sogavare"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> Beijing-Honiara pact leaked by &#8216;lunatics and agents of foreign regimes&#8217; says Sogavare</a></li>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=Chinese+security+pact">Other China security pact reports</a></li>
</ul>
<p>All the training was &#8220;relevant and practical&#8221; aimed at increasing the capability of RSIPF officers to respond to different kinds of emergencies, a statement said amid controversy over a <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=Chinese+security+pact">leak of a security pact</a> between China and Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>At the end of the training last Friday, the instructors from CPLT and RSIPF assessed all 14 officers.</p>
<p>A second POM training course will be conducted for Central Response Unit (CRU) and Provincial Response Unit (PRU) officers from May 2-15.</p>
<p>Deputy Commissioner (National Security and Operation Support) Ian Vaevaso said he was &#8220;extremely happy&#8221; that the RSIPF was receiving such policing capacity development training.</p>
<p>This would help boost the capability of police officers to handle various situations during public disorder, he said.</p>
<p>Deputy Commissioner Vaevaso thanked the Chinese instructors for the commitment and dedication in making making the first training a success.</p>
<p><em>Robert Iroga is publisher and editor of <a href="https://sbm.sb/">SBM Online</a>. Republished with permission.</em></p>
<p><strong>China pact leaked by &#8216;lunatics&#8217; and &#8216;agents of foreign regimes&#8217;<br />
</strong><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/464199/beijing-honiara-pact-leaked-by-lunatics-and-agents-of-foreign-regimes-says-sogavare">RNZ Pacific reports</a> that Solomon Islands Prime Minister Mannasseh Sogavare says the leak of a draft security pact between Beijing and Honiara was done by &#8220;lunatics and agents of foreign regimes&#8221; with &#8220;no regard for secrecy&#8221;.</p>
<p>The Pacific country has drawn criticism from <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/463957/china-solomon-islands-security-agreement-leaked-on-social-media">Australia and New Zealand</a> after a draft copy of the security agreement being brokered with China was leaked.</p>
<p>In a parliamentary statement today, Sogavare brushed off accusations that a new China-Solomon Islands security treaty would diminish the role of its traditional security partners in the region.</p>
<p>Sogavare said his country&#8217;s relationship with allies in Australia and New Zealand will &#8220;always remain important&#8221;.</p>
<p><i><em>This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.</em></i></p>
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		<title>Sogavare denies &#8216;insulting&#8217; claim on Chinese military base for Solomons</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/29/sogavare-denies-insulting-claim-on-chinese-military-base-for-solomons/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2022 23:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacific Report]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Solomon Islands]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syndicate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Chinese aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manasseh Sogavare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military bases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[new zealand]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacific security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=72129</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By Robert Iroga in Honiara Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has denied allowing the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to establish a military base in the Solomon Islands in a security treaty that he confirmed today as having already been finalised. “We denied it totally. We don’t know where it came from,” Sogavare said when responding ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By Robert Iroga in Honiara</em></p>
<p>Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has denied allowing the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to establish a military base in the Solomon Islands in a <a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=China+security+pact">security treaty</a> that he confirmed today as having already been finalised.</p>
<p>“We denied it totally. We don’t know where it came from,” Sogavare said when responding to a question in Parliament today.</p>
<p>Sogavare took about 30 minutes to defend the security treaty with China which was leaked on social media and has caused waves of concern, especially in Australia and New Zealand.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/28/pm-says-honiaras-growing-china-relationship-is-gravely-concerning/"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> NZ PM says Honiara’s growing China relationship is ‘gravely concerning’</a></li>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/?s=China+security+pact">Other China security pact reports</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Among the concern is a claim that the treaty allows China to establish a military base in Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>Sogavare said the Australian media had focused on Solomon Islands being pressured by China to build a military base in Solomon Islands, which was only 2000km away from the northern coast of Australia.</p>
<p>“Where does the nonsense come from?” he asked.</p>
<p>Sogavare said the security treaty was pursued at the request of Solomon Islands and “we are not pressured. We are not pressured in any way by our new friends&#8221;.</p>
<p>Sogavare said: “There is no intention whatsoever to ask China to build a military base in Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>&#8220;We are insulted by such an unfounded stories and comments.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, he said the treaty has already been finalised and approved by cabinet.</p>
<p><em>Robert Iroga is publisher and editor of <a href="https://sbm.sb/">SBM Online</a>. Republished with permission.</em></p>
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		<title>PM says Honiara&#8217;s growing China relationship is &#8216;gravely concerning&#8217;</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/28/pm-says-honiaras-growing-china-relationship-is-gravely-concerning/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2022 04:53:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://asiapacificreport.nz/?p=72084</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[RNZ News New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern says there is &#8220;very little&#8221; reason for China to station military forces on Solomon Islands, describing developments as &#8220;gravely concerning&#8221;. A draft agreement &#8212; leaked online &#8212; indicated Solomon Islands would allow Beijing to send military forces there and make regular ship visits. The New Zealand and ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/"><em>RNZ News</em></a></p>
<p>New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern says there is &#8220;very little&#8221; reason for China to station military forces on Solomon Islands, describing developments as &#8220;gravely concerning&#8221;.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/463957/china-solomon-islands-security-agreement-leaked-on-social-media">draft agreement</a> &#8212; leaked online &#8212; indicated Solomon Islands would allow Beijing to send military forces there and make regular ship visits.</p>
<p>The New Zealand and Australian governments have both <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/463997/china-solomons-security-deal-very-concerning-if-true-mahuta">expressed concern</a> at the development.</p>
<div class="c-play-controller c-play-controller--full-width u-blocklink" data-uuid="74f7a4bd-d551-4e7d-a721-848dc86fe3ae">
<ul>
<li><a href="https://podcast.radionz.co.nz/mnr/mnr-20220328-0709-pm_on_china-solomons_security_deal-128.mp3"> <span class="c-play-controller__title"><strong>LISTEN TO RNZ:</strong> &#8216;So we do see this as gravely concerning&#8217; &#8211; PM Jacinda Ardern</span></a></li>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/28/tread-carefully-opposition-warns-solomons-pm-over-geopolitical-rivalries/">‘Tread carefully’, opposition warns Solomons PM over geopolitical rivalries</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>&#8220;We see such acts as the potential militarisation of the region and also see very little reason in terms of the Pacific security for such a need and such a presence,&#8221; Ardern said.</p>
<p>Ardern said during the recent unrest experienced in Solomon Islands both Australia and New Zealand had personnel, vessels and a presence there to support the country&#8217;s stability.</p>
<p>She said that demonstrated there was no need to reach beyond this region for such support.</p>
<p>&#8220;So we do see this as gravely concerning.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Relationship building</strong><br />
Ardern said the Solomon Islands relationship with China had been building.</p>
<p>She said there were leadership level talks between New Zealand and Solomon Islands at the end of last year and at that time there was talk to China&#8217;s presence as the Solomons looked to regain stability after recent disruptions in the country.</p>
<p>&#8220;We expressed some concern over the direction of travel that Solomons was taking in terms of their security arrangements with China,&#8221; at that time, Ardern said.</p>
<p>But Ardern said it is vital to recognise these were sovereign nations which were entitled to form their own security arrangements.</p>
<p>&#8220;But actually, as a region, and I say as a region, the Pacific island nations in particular actually coming together and asking the question, &#8216;well what gaps are there, what needs are there and how can we support one another to fill those so that we&#8217;re not having to look beyond our own Pacific family?'&#8221;</p>
<p>Ardern rejected comments from former foreign minister <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/464099/china-solomons-deal-winston-peters-says-nz-must-try-much-harder-in-pacific">Winston Peters</a> that his successor should have visited Pacific neighbouring countries sooner and more frequently.</p>
<p>Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta is set to travel to Fiji today &#8212; her first trip as minister in the region, aside from Australia.</p>
<p><strong>Borders closed</strong><br />
Ardern said New Zealand has not visited the Pacific recently because their borders were closed due to covid-19.</p>
<p>&#8220;Now that we have the opportunity to travel into the Pacific safely and be welcomed, we are doing so.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ardern said Peters seemed to be implying that the relationship between Solomon Islands and China is new, but that was not the case.</p>
<p>She said Solomon Islands switched its relationship to China from a previous relationship they had had with Taiwan in 2019 when Peters was foreign minister and even then the development had been building for some time.</p>
<p>Ardern said New Zealand would not be able to outspend other countries on military defence, but its relationships in the Pacific were longstanding.</p>
<p>&#8220;We have to make sure that we are respecting the sovereignty of our neighbours while working closely alongside them to make sure our region&#8217;s needs are met.&#8221;</p>
<p>There was no need for new military arrangements to ensure that needs are met, Ardern said.</p>
<p><strong>Needed the support</strong><br />
An international politics expert said the reason why Solomon Islands wanted a security deal with China was because it needed the support.</p>
<p>Victoria University of Wellington professor of Political Science and International Relations Jon Fraenkel said it was still too early to see how things would pan out.</p>
<p>The draft agreement talks about Chinese security assistance in a way that was similar to agreements Australia and New Zealand had reached with Solomon Islands about the deployment of military and policing personnel, Fraenkel said.</p>
<p>He said Australia and New Zealand both built up the local police force between 2003 and 2017, but Solomon Islands still needed a boost.</p>
<p>&#8220;The reason why the Solomon Islands is accepting this kind of agreement is because of the extreme riots that were experienced last year in late 2019, not for the first time &#8212; Solomon Islands has a lot of experience of urban rioting,&#8221; he said.</p>
<p>&#8220;Chinese vessels already move around the Pacific and dock at various ports and indeed dock at both New Zealand and Australia ports.</p>
<p>&#8220;China&#8217;s been wary about putting straight military vessels into the Pacific &#8230; and of course the draft agreement, if that&#8217;s what gets agreed, says any such deployment would have to be on a mutual agreement of the two countries.&#8221;</p>
<p><i><em>This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.</em></i></p>
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		<title>Saying China ‘bought’ a military base in the Solomons is simplistic and shows how little Australia understands power in the Pacific</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/25/saying-china-bought-a-military-base-in-the-solomons-is-simplistic-and-shows-how-little-australia-understands-power-in-the-pacific/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[APR editor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Mar 2022 10:05:43 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[ANALYSIS: By Joanne Wallis and Czeslaw Tubilewicz of the University of Adelaide The draft security agreement between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands. In Australian debates, the term “influence” is often used to characterise ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ANALYSIS:</strong> <em>By <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joanne-wallis-1331684">Joanne Wallis</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/czeslaw-tubilewicz-1331685">Czeslaw Tubilewicz</a> of the University of Adelaide</em></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632?s=03">draft security agreement</a> between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.</p>
<p>In Australian debates, the term “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-defence-strategic-update">influence</a>” is <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7227988/australia-losing-influence-in-south-pacific-to-china-report/">often</a> <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-influence-pacific-islands">used</a> to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.</p>
<p>There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/25/leaked-draft-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-causes-pacific-stir/"><strong>READ MORE: </strong>Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir</a></li>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-deploys-troops-and-police-what-now-for-solomon-islands-172678">As Australia deploys troops and police, what now for Solomon Islands?</a></li>
<li><a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-push-into-png-has-been-surprisingly-slow-and-ineffective-why-has-beijing-found-the-going-so-tough-140073">China&#8217;s push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?</a></li>
</ul>
<p>On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="en">Senior Australian government ministers have expressed concern about a draft security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands <a href="https://t.co/yFnyCKsJxE">https://t.co/yFnyCKsJxE</a></p>
<p>— Bloomberg (@business) <a href="https://twitter.com/business/status/1507176221469249536?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">March 25, 2022</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
<p><strong>The role of domestic politics<br />
</strong>First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics &#8212; not just geopolitics.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio-australia/programs/pacificbeat/analyst-absolutely-certain-australia-not-interfering-solomons/13656652">explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka</a> after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.</p>
<p>These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.</p>
<p>Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/behind-the-scenes-in-the-solomons-local-leader-has-leveraged-china-issue-to-his-advantage-20211126-p59cks.html">activism of Malaita provincial Governor</a> Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-United-States-Subnational-Relations-with-Divided-China-A-Constructivist/Tubilewicz-Omond/p/book/9780367763190">important role sub-national actors</a> can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.</p>
<p>Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-whispers-and-pacific-agency">passive dupes</a>” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges &#8212; and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.</p>
<p><strong>Australia’s current policy settings are not working<br />
</strong>The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working &#8212; if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.</p>
<p>Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific">Pacific Step-up</a>” initiative.</p>
<p>Australia spent <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australias-costly-investment-solomon-islands-lessons-ramsi">billions</a> leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programMEs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.</p>
<p>Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/pacific-power-paperback-softback">longstanding anxieties</a> about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.</p>
<p>Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632">commented</a> in response to the leaked draft that:</p>
<blockquote><p>This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands.</p></blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/china-military-base-in-vanuatu-report-of-concern-turnbull-says/9635742">rumours</a> (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/solomons-government-vetoes-chinese-attempt-to-lease-an-island">attempt to lease</a> Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties.</p>
<p>Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.</p>
<p><strong>A closer look at the draft security agreement<br />
</strong>The <a href="https://twitter.com/AnnaPowles/status/1506845794728837120">terms of the draft</a> security agreement should make Australia anxious. It goes significantly beyond the bilateral security <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2018/14.html">treaty between Solomon Islands and Australia</a>.</p>
<p>Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.</p>
<p>Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that</p>
<blockquote><p>relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.</p></blockquote>
<p>It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.</p>
<p>Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.</p>
<p>The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states.</p>
<p>According to Article 5,</p>
<blockquote><p>without the written consent of the other party, neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party.</p></blockquote>
<p>This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.</p>
<p>The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.</p>
<p>Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-defence-minister-says-china-base-solomons-would-be-concerning-2022-03-25/">announced</a> Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023.</p>
<p>It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="en">A draft security cooperation agreement could allow China to deploy police and military personnel in Solomon Islands.<a href="https://t.co/EkcrFaHEqV">https://t.co/EkcrFaHEqV</a></p>
<p>— RNZ Pacific (@RNZPacific) <a href="https://twitter.com/RNZPacific/status/1507172261404774401?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">March 25, 2022</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script><br />
<strong>Playing whack-a-mole<br />
</strong>While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing <a href="https://www.9dashline.com/article/pushing-the-limits-of-australias-strategic-imagination-in-the-pacific-islands">whack-a-mole</a> by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft.</p>
<p>Think of <a href="https://exchange.telstra.com.au/expanding-the-telstra-family-with-digicel-pacific/">Telstra’s recent purchase of Digicel Pacific, headquartered in PNG</a> &#8212; a move <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australias-telstra-digicel-deal-about-shutting-china-out-of-pacific-analysts-say/7pbq85euv">seen by some analysts</a> as really an attempt to shut China out of the Pacific.</p>
<p>That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.</p>
<p>If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html">compete</a>” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy?</p>
<p>This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.</p>
<p>Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups.</p>
<p>And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.</p>
<p>We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.</p>
<p>The draft security agreement may come to nothing &#8212; but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.</p>
<p>Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination &#8212; as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.<!-- Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --><img decoding="async" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;" src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180020/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" /><!-- End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines --></p>
<p><em>Dr <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joanne-wallis-1331684">Joanne Wallis </a>is professor of international security and Dr <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/czeslaw-tubilewicz-1331685">Czeslaw Tubilewicz</a> is senior lecturer at the University of Adelaide. This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons licence. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/saying-china-bought-a-military-base-in-the-solomons-is-simplistic-and-shows-how-little-australia-understands-power-in-the-pacific-180020">original article</a>.</em></p>
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		<title>Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir</title>
		<link>https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/25/leaked-draft-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-causes-pacific-stir/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Mar 2022 22:15:49 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[By Moera Tuilaepa-Taylor, RNZ Pacific manager A draft security cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands has been leaked on social media. The unverified document includes seven articles, which discuss the scope of cooperation between both nations. Massey University&#8217;s Centre for Defence and Security senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles has seen the agreement on social ]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>By <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/authors/moera-tuilaepa-taylor-1">Moera Tuilaepa-Taylor</a>, <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/">RNZ Pacific</a> manager</em></p>
<p>A draft security cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands has been <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/137895163463995">leaked on social media</a>.</p>
<p>The unverified document includes seven articles, which discuss the scope of cooperation between both nations.</p>
<p>Massey University&#8217;s Centre for Defence and Security senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles has seen the agreement on social media.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/463957/china-solomon-islands-security-agreement-leaked-on-social-media"><strong>READ MORE:</strong> China-Solomon Islands security agreement leaked on social media</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-confirms-policing-deal-with-solomons-20220325-p5a7ut">China confirms &#8216;policing&#8217; deal with Solomon Islands</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/137895163463995">Solomon Is &amp; China security agreement?</a> &#8211; <em>The Pacific Newsroom</em></li>
</ul>
<p>She told RNZ Pacific that the document is presented as a draft: &#8220;It doesn&#8217;t have any dates, nor is it signed.</p>
<p>&#8220;There are still questions around its authenticity but if it is authentic, it raises some serious questions and if it&#8217;s not authentic then it also provides some interesting insights into the way in which the geopolitical dynamic is playing out domestically in the Solomon Islands,&#8221; she said.</p>
<p>Dr Powles said that the draft document includes a request between the Solomon Islands government and China to send armed police personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to the Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>&#8220;Now that raises a lot of questions obviously, what is the distinction between police and armed police, and who are the other law enforcement and armed forces that are referred to in the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>&#8216;Maintaining social order&#8217;</strong><br />
&#8220;It also talks about what kind of tasks that a Chinese contingent would be involved in such as maintaining social order, it&#8217;s not clear what that means, it also talks about providing assistance on other tasks and it&#8217;s also unclear what those other tasks would be.&#8221;</p>
<div class="photo-captioned photo-captioned-full photo-cntr eight_col "><figure style="width: 720px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.rnz.co.nz/assets/news_crops/129200/eight_col_anna1a.jpg?1630186763" alt="A senior lecturer at Massey University's Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Dr Anna Powles" width="720" height="450" /><figcaption class="wp-caption-text">Massey University&#8217;s Dr Anna Powles &#8230; &#8220;There are still questions around [the draft agreement] authenticity but if it is authentic, it raises some serious questions.&#8221; Image: RNZ</figcaption></figure></div>
<p>Dr Powles points out that the agreement refers to protecting lives and property, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.</p>
<p>In February, a team of Chinese police officers began working in Solomon Islands. This was two months after the Solomons government accepted Beijing&#8217;s offer to help restore law and order <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/456654/solomon-islands-riots-night-time-curfew-imposed">following anti-government riots in November</a> 2021.</p>
<p>Dr Powles believes that if the draft agreement is authentic, then the deployment was a natural extension of the document.</p>
<p>The document also contains some concerning provisions which allow China to send ships to the Solomon&#8217;s &#8220;according to its needs&#8221;.</p>
<p>&#8220;The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.&#8221;</p>
<p>She said that such provisions would need to be clarified as it was unclear what &#8220;China&#8217;s own needs&#8221; refer to.</p>
<p><strong>Concerns over &#8216;strategic interests&#8217;</strong><br />
Are those strategic interests for instance? If so, that would raise a number of concerns. Particularly as to what would happen if China&#8217;s interests cut across the interests of the Solomon Islands or of its key regional partners such as Australia or Papua New Guinea.</p>
<div class="photo-captioned photo-captioned-full photo-cntr eight_col ">
<figure style="width: 720px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.rnz.co.nz/assets/news_crops/134822/eight_col_260309891_2925448374371116_7696375151415963797_n.jpg?1638275840" alt="The Adkonect printing complex in Ranadi was among dozens of businesses destroyed in the riots." width="720" height="450" /><figcaption class="wp-caption-text">The Adkonect printing complex in Ranadi was among dozens of businesses destroyed in the riots last November. Image: Namoi Kaluae/RNZ</figcaption></figure>
</div>
<p>&#8220;And it also suggests that logistical support would be provided for ship visits in the Solomon Islands and suggests that perhaps China could seek to establish a logistical supply base in Solomon Islands to support those ship visits.</p>
<p>The document does not specify what types of ships, but Dr Powles said &#8220;we could safely assume that they are referring to the People&#8217;s Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) ships.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;In the Pacific, we have seen PLAN ship visits to the region. China has a strong interest in maritime issues and in the Pacific maritime domain. And so that probably is not surprising and there have been long-standing concerns and very public long-standing concerns about the potential for increased ship visits for China increasing its engagement in the Pacific maritime domain and potential implications that may have for a potential base to support those ship visits.&#8221;</p>
<p>Dr Powles also drew attention to one particular provision of the agreement, which raised alarm bells with respect to the control of information around security cooperation.</p>
<p>That provision stated that information between the Solomon Islands and China could only be released on mutual agreement by both parties.</p>
<p>&#8220;And that suggests that there would be the intent to control public information, to control media briefings, to control what access media has to information about security arrangements between the two countries.</p>
<p>&#8220;We can be legitimately concerned about lack of transparency about a degree around this agreement,&#8221; she said.</p>
<p>Solomon Islands switched allegiances <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/399293/once-a-stronghold-taiwan-s-presence-in-the-pacific-wanes">from Taiwan to China in</a> 2019.</p>
<p><i><em>This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.</em></i></p>
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