In 1904, a British geographer named Halford Mackinder stood before the Royal Geographical Society in London and delivered what would become the most prophetic warning in the history of geopolitics:

“Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the World.”

Mackinder’s insight was deceptively simple. The world’s greatest landmass — Eurasia and Africa combined, what he called the World Island — contained resources, populations and industrial potential that dwarfed anything that maritime powers could master.

• READ MORE: China built the railway Iran needed — America’s strategy is obsolete
• How the US naval blockade has bled Iran of nearly $6bn in oil revenues — but rail may change this
• Other war on Iran/ceasefire reports

The only thing preventing a land-based power from dominating was geography. The Heartland — that vast Central Asian interior was inaccessible to navies. No fleet could project power into the steppe.

But railways could unlock it.

Mackinder was watching Tsarist Russia’s railways push southward through Central Asia and issuing a warning to Britain: if any single power ever consolidated the Heartland by rail, British naval supremacy would become irrelevant.

The world’s oceans, which made Britain great, would become a moat around a fortress someone else owned.

Britain took the warning seriously.

Keeping Eurasia divided
America, inheriting Britain’s role as the guardian of the maritime order, built its entire grand strategy around preventing exactly this — keeping Eurasia divided — contested, and dependent on American-controlled sea lanes.

For 70 years, it worked.

Xian. The ancient capital of China. The city where the original Silk Road began 2000 years ago, where camel caravans loaded with silk, spices, and porcelain departed westward into the vast Central Asian steppe, threading through kingdoms and deserts toward Isfahan in Persia.

Today, freight trains depart from Xian’s modern logistics terminals heading in the same direction. Not on camels. Not in weeks. In 14 days — 10,400 km threading through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan before arriving in Tehran.

History doesn’t repeat. But it rhymes with astonishing precision.

Since the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran, something remarkable has happened on that Xian-Tehran rail corridor.

Train schedules have increased by 300 percent weekly.

Bypassing the US and its Strait if Hormuz blockade         Video: BeyondTheBuild

China is simply ‘going around’
Think about what that means. America’s naval assets — the most powerful maritime force in human history — are positioned around the Strait of Hormuz, squeezing Iran’s maritime trade. The blockade is real. The pressure is real.

And China is simply going around it.

Not through diplomatic protest. Not through UN resolutions. Through railways threading through the Heartland — through exactly the geography that Mackinder identified as impervious to naval power 120 years ago.

Every freight train that departs Xian is a Mackinderian argument made in steel and diesel. American carrier groups cannot follow it. American sanctions cannot easily interdict it.

American naval supremacy, the foundation of the post-war international order, is geographically irrelevant to a train crossing Kazakhstan.

This isn’t improvisation. China didn’t build this corridor in response to the current crisis. It built it years in advance — patiently, methodically, as part of the Belt and Road initiative — precisely because Chinese strategists understood that America’s ultimate weapon was control of sea lanes.

The answer to sea lane control is to not need the sea lanes.

Belt and Road strategy
The Xian-Tehran railway passes through four Central Asian republics — all former Soviet states that Russia once controlled, that America tried to court after 1991, and that China has now quietly bound into its infrastructure network through investment, loans and railway agreements.

The April 2024 four-party tariff agreement between China, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan established unified tariffs and guaranteed transit times. The corridor was operationalised before the crisis that would make it indispensable.

That is strategic foresight of a very high order.

What China has done with Belt and Road is achieve what Mackinder feared most — Heartland consolidation — not through military conquest but through commerce.

The Central Asian republics are now threaded into China’s logistics networks. Iran is bound to China through a 25 year comprehensive cooperation agreement.

Russia, weakened by Ukraine, watches Chinese influence expand into its former backyard with limited ability to resist. The Heartland — from Xian to Tehran, from the Caspian to the Pamirs, is quietly reorganising around Chinese economic gravity.

Shift in world power balance
Mackinder warned that this moment, if it ever came, would represent a fundamental shift in the balance of world power. He wasn’t wrong about much.

America’s blockade of Hormuz operates on a 20th century assumption — that controlling the maritime chokepoint controls the relationship. That assumption holds when there is no alternative. It weakens precisely as alternatives are built.

Iran’s trade with China — its economic lifeline — is increasingly flowing overland. The railway that cannot be blockaded is running at 300 percent of its pre-war schedule. China and Iran are simultaneously accelerating the electrification of Iranian rail infrastructure, deepening the corridor’s capacity further.

Russia completed its first freight run to Tehran through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in November 2025. The overland architecture is not just surviving the blockade — it is being reinforced by it.

This is what strategic infrastructure looks long when it was designed with exactly this contingency in mind.

Mackinder died in 1947, just as America was assuming Britain’s mantle as the world’s pre-eminent maritime power. He spent his final years anxious that the lesson of the Heartland had not been properly absorbed.

Standing in Xian today, watching freight trains loaded with Chinese goods depart for Tehran through four Central Asian republics, along a route that American naval power cannot touch — one suspects that he would feel a complicated mixture of vindication and dread.

The railway is 10,400 km long.

It is also in a very real sense, the distance between the world America built and the world that is coming.

Lim Tean is a Singaporean lawyer, politician and commentator. He is the founder of the political party People’s Voice and a co-founder of the political alliance People’s Alliance for Reform.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has reaffirmed the Trump administration’s defence commitments to America’s Pacific territories of Guam and Northern Mariana Islands and that any attack on them would be an attack on the mainland.

Hegseth touched down in Guam from Hawai’i on Thursday as part of an Indo-Pacific tour, his first as Defence Secretary, in which he is seeking to shore up traditional alliances to counter China.

Geostrategic competition between the US and China in the Pacific has seen Guam and neighboring CNMI become increasingly significant in supporting American naval and air operations, especially in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

• READ MORE: Other Micronesia defence reports

Both territories are also within range of Chinese and North Korean ballistic missiles and the US tested a defence system in Guam in December.

Any attack on Guam and the Commonwealth Northern Marianas Islands would be met with “appropriate response,” Hegseth said during his brief visit, emphasising both territories were central to the US defence posture focused on containing China.

“We’re defending our homeland,” Hegseth said. “Guam and CNMI are vital parts of America, and I want to be very clear — to everyone in this room, to the cameras — any attack against these islands is an attack against the US.”

“We’re going to continue to stay committed to our presence here,” Hegseth said. “It’s important to emphasise: we are not seeking war with Communist China. But it is our job to ensure that we are ready.”

Key US strategic asset
Located closer to Beijing than Hawai’i, Guam serves as a key US strategic asset, known as the “tip of the spear,” with 10,000 military personnel, an air base for F-35 fighters and B-2 bombers, and home port for Virginia-class nuclear submarines.

The pledge from Hegseth comes as debate on Guam’s future as a US territory has intensified, with competing calls by some residents for full statehood and UN-mandated decolonisation, led by the Indigenous Chamorro people.

Defending Guam and CNMI, Hegseth said, aligns with President Donald Trump’s “goal to achieve peace through strength by putting America first”.

He delivered remarks at Andersen Air Force Base and took an aerial tour of the island before meeting with Lou Leon Guerrero and Arnold Palacios, governors of Guam and Northern Marianas, respectively.

Guerrero appealed to Hegseth about the “great impact” the US military buildup on Guam had had on the island’s residents.

“We welcome you, and we welcome the position and the posture that President Trump has,” Guerrero told Hegseth, during opening statements before their closed-door meeting.

“We are the centre of gravity here. We are the second island chain of defence,” she said. “We want to be a partner in the readiness effort but national security cannot happen without human health security.”

Funding for hospital
Guerrero sought funding for a new hospital, estimated to cost US$600 million.

“Our island needs a regional hospital capable of handling mass casualties — whether from conflict or natural disasters,” she told Hegseth.

“We are working very closely in partnership with the military, and one of our asks is to be a partner in the financing of that hospital.”

Afterwards Guerrero told reporters she did not have time to discuss the housing crisis caused by the US military buildup.

Earlier this month, Guerrero warned in her “state of the island” address of US neglect of Guam’s 160,000 residents, where one-in-five are estimated to live below the poverty line.

“Let us be clear about this: Guam cannot be the linchpin of American security in the Asian-Pacific if nearly 14,000 of our residents are without shelter, because housing aid to Guam is cut, or if 36,000 of our people lose access to Medicaid and Medicare coverage keeping them healthy, alive and out of poverty,” Guerrero said.

At the end of his visit to Guam, Hegseth announced in a statement he had also reached an “understanding” with President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia to begin planning and construction of US$400 million in military infrastructure projects in the State of Yap.

Territorial background
Simina’s office would not confirm to BenarNews he had met with Hegseth in Guam, saying only he was “off island.”

As a territory, Guam residents are American citizens but they cannot vote for the US president and their lone delegate to the Congress has no voting power.

The US acquired Guam in 1898 after winning the Spanish-American War, and CNMI from Japan in 1945 after its defeat in the Second World War. Both remain unincorporated territories to this day.

The Defence Department holds about 25 percent of Guam’s land and is preparing to spend billions to upgrade the island’s military infrastructure as another 5000 American marines relocate from Japan’s Okinawa islands.

On Tuesday, Hegseth was in Hawai’i meeting officials of the US Indo-Pacific Command. Speaking with the media in Honolulu, he said his Asia-Pacific visit was to show strength to allies and “reestablish deterrence.”

Hegseth’s week-long tour comes against a backdrop of growing Chinese assertiveness. Its coast guard vessels have recently encroached into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea and around the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

His visit will be closely watched in the Pacific for signs of the Trump administration’s commitment to traditional allies following a rift between Washington and Europe that has tested the transatlantic alliance.

The trip also threatens to be overshadowed by the fallout from revelations that he and other national security officials discussed attack plans against Yemen’s Houthis on the messaging app Signal with a journalist present.

Flagrant violation
Critics are calling it a flagrant violation of information security protocols.

During his first term, Trump revived Washington’s engagements in the Pacific island region after long years of neglect paved the way for China’s initiatives.

He hosted leaders of the US freely associated states of Palau, Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia at the White House in 2019.

The Biden administration followed through, doubling the engagement with an increased presence and complementing the military buildup with economic assistance that sought to outdo China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The new Trump administration, however, cut the cord, dismantling the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and along with it, the millions of dollars pledged to Pacific island nations.

The abolition of about 80 percent of USAID programmes sent mixed signals to the island nations and security experts have warned that China would fill the void it has created.

From Guam, Hegseth has travelled to Philippines and Japan, where he will participate in a ceremony commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima and will later meet with Japanese leaders and US military forces.

Republished from BenarNews with permission. Stefan Armbruster in Brisbane contributed to this story.

Cheaper loans will be a key agenda for Papua New Guinea officials when Prime Minister James Marape leads a delegation of government and business leaders to China for bilateral talks next week.

Treasurer Ian Ling-Stuckey, who is going to be part of the delegation, made the announcement earlier this week when giving an update on preparations for the visit.

The announcement is likely to worry China’s geopolitical rivals Australia and the US, whose interests on loans, according to Ling-Stuckey, are higher than that of China.

• READ MORE: Other China-US geopolitics reports

“My key goals during this visit [to China] are to work as part of the government team to strengthen our cooperative relations with such a key partner and friend, the government of China,” Ling-Stuckey said.

“The focus of my work is to secure additional, cheaper funding for PNG. Chinese interest rates are currently below those in the US and Australia, and even from many of our multilateral partners.

“I look forward to meetings with China’s Export Credit Bank along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.”

Two weeks ago, Marape led another delegation to Washington, along with other leaders of the Pacific, to meet with US President Joe Biden.

US aid for Pacific
In that summit, Biden announced that he is planned to work with Congress to request the release of nearly US$200 million (K718 million) for the Pacific island states, including PNG.

Ling-Stuckey said government officials were in hectic consultations with Chinese embassy officials in Port Moresby to ensure the visit to China went smoothly, compared to their recent visit to Washington.

Officials said the delegation would hold bilateral talks with senior Chinese officials, including President Xi Xinping, before engaging in the third Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum in Beijing.

It is expected that a big part of whatever financial assistance PNG secures from China will be centered around the BRI projects in PNG, which have been gaining momentum since Port Moresby signed up in 2018.

Chinese ambassador Zeng Fanhua a week earlier said China’s development experience and enhanced relations with PNG had laid the foundation for more cooperation and growth, and his government was looking forward to Marape and the PNG delegation’s visit to China.

“This year, we see new development in our bilateral relations. High-level exchanges have resurged,” Zeng said.

“More than a dozen PNG ministers, governors and Members of Parliament have visited China.

New wave of growth
Business and trade cooperation has seen a new wave of growth.

In the first half of this year, PNG’s exports to China was nearly US$1.9 billion, up 6 percent year-on-year.”

“China highly appreciates PNG government’s firm commitment to the One-China principle and the decision to close its trade office in Taipei.

“This has laid a more solid political foundation for advancing China-PNG relations and cooperation in all areas.”

Lawrence Fong is a PNG Post-Courier reporter. Republished with permission.

The fate of Myanmar has major implications for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China, which is consolidating its economic and strategic influence in its smaller neighbour in pursuit of its two-ocean strategy.

Since the coup China has been — by far — the main source of foreign investment in Myanmar.

• READ MORE: Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to ‘the worst war ever’, what should Australia do?
• Conflict in the South China Sea threatens 90 percent of Australia’s fuel imports: study
• As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options

This includes US$2.5 billion in a gas-fired power plant to be built west of Myanmar’s capital, Yangon, that will be 81 percent owned and operated by Chinese companies.

Among the dozens of infrastructure projects China is funding are high-speed rail links and dams. But its most strategically important investment is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, encompassing oil and gas pipelines, roads and rail links costing many tens of billions of dollars.

The corridor’s “jewel in the crown” is a deep-sea port to be built at Kyaukphyu, on Myanmar’s west coast, at an estimated cost of US$7 billion.

This will finally give China its long-desired “back door” to the Indian Ocean.

Natural gas from Myanmar can help China reduce its dependence on imports from suppliers such as Australia. Access to the Indian Ocean will enable China to import gas and oil from the Middle East, Africa and Venezuela without ships having to pass through the contested waters of the South China Sea to Chinese ports.

About 80 percent of China’s oil imports now move through the South China Sea via the Malacca Strait, which is just 65 kilometres wide at its narrowest point between the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra.

Overcoming this strategic vulnerability arguably makes the Kyaukphyu port and pipelines the most important element of China’s Belt and Road initiative to reshape global trade routes and assert its influence over other nations.

Deepening relationship
Most of China’s infrastructure investment was planned before Myanmar’s coup. But whereas other governments and foreign investors have sought to distance themselves from the junta since it overthrew Myanmar’s elected government in February 2021, China has deepened its relationship.

China is the Myanmar regime’s most important international supporter. In April Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would support Myanmar “no matter how the situation changes”. In May it used its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to thwart a statement expressing concern about violence and the growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.

Work continues on projects associated with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. New ventures (such as the aforementioned power station) have been approved.
More projects are on the cards. In June, for example, China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the completion of a feasibility study to upgrade the Wan Pong port on the Lancang-Mekong River in Myanmar’s east.

Debt trap warnings
In 2020, before the coup, Myanmar’s auditor general Maw Than warned of growing indebtedness to China, with Chinese lenders charging higher interest payments than those from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank.

At that time about 40 percent of Myanmar’s foreign debt of US$10 billion was owed to China. It is likely to be greater now. It will only increase the longer a military dictatorship, with few other supporters or sources of foreign money, remains in power, dragging down Myanmar’s economy.

Efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar should therefore be seen as crucial to the long-term strategic interests of the region’s democracies, and to global peace and prosperity, given the increasing belligerence of China under Xi Jinping.

Xi, now president for life, this month told the People’s Liberation Army to prepare for war. A compliant and indebted Myanmar with a deep-sea port controlled by Chinese interests tips the scales towards that happening.

A democratic and independent Myanmar is a counter-strategy to this potential.

Calls for sanctions
Myanmar’s democracy movement wants the international community to impose tough sanctions on the junta. But few have responded.

The United States and United Kingdom have gone furthest, banning business dealings with Myanmar military officials and state-owned or private companies controlled by the military.

The European Union and Canada have imposed sanctions against a more limited range of individuals and economic entities.

South Korea has suspended financing new infrastructure projects. Japan has suspended aid and postponed the launch of Myanmar’s first satellite. New Zealand has suspended political and military contact.

Australia has suspended military cooperation (with some pre-existing restrictions on dealing with military leaders imposed following the human rights atrocities committed against the Rohingya in 2017.

But that’s about it.

Myanmar’s closest neighbours in the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations are still committed to a policy of dialogue and “non-interference” – though Malaysia and Indonesia are increasingly arguing for a tougher approach as the atrocities mount.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project says the only country now more violent than Myanmar is Ukraine.

Given its unique geo-strategic position, self-interest alone should be enough for the international community to take greater action.

Dr Htwe Htwe Thein, associate professor, Curtin University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

This week’s White House meeting between NZ Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and US President Joe Biden reflected a world undergoing rapid change. But of all the shared challenges discussed, there was one that kept appearing in the leaders’ joint statement — China in the Pacific.

Tucked within the statement, with all its promises of increased co-operation and partnership, was this not-so-subtle declaration:

In particular, the United States and New Zealand share a concern that the establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interests would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the region and pose national-security concerns to both our countries.

Unsurprisingly, this upset Chinese officials, with a foreign ministry spokesperson accusing Ardern and Biden of trying to “deliberately hype up” the issue.

• READ MORE: Amplifying narratives about the ‘China threat’ in the Pacific may help China achieve its broader aims
• New Zealand has just joined an overtly anti-China alliance – are the economic risks worth it?
• Saying China ‘bought’ a military base in the Solomons is simplistic and shows how little Australia understands power in the Pacific

But hopefully the statement will also prompt New Zealand to put its money where its mouth is when it comes to increasing assistance in the Pacific region. Expressing “concern” about China’s influence means little otherwise.

Aid and influence

While New Zealand and Australia are responsible for around 55 percent of all of the aid flowing into the region, that contribution needs to be seen in perspective.

There are two obvious shortcomings. First, more needs to be done to promote democracy in the Pacific, which means supporting anti-corruption initiatives and a free press. Second, both countries simply need to give more.

Neither spends anywhere near the 0.7 percent of gross national income on development assistance recommended by the United Nations (UN).

The high-tide mark for both was long ago: 0.52 percent for New Zealand in 1975 and 0.48 percent for Australia in 1967. Today, New Zealand spends 0.26 percent and Australia 0.21 percent of their incomes on overseas aid.

It is against this backdrop of under-spending that China has come to be seen as an attractive alternative to the traditional regional powers. It has no colonial baggage in the Pacific and is a developing country itself, having made impressive leaps in development and poverty reduction.

Pacific Islanders snub China by rejecting security pact https://t.co/Mv217iuSx2

— FT China (@ftchina) May 30, 2022

Debt and distress
Many of the small developing island states in the Pacific share common challenges and vulnerabilities: negative migration patterns, risk from climate change and fragile economies.

Three states in the region (Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) are in the UN’s “least developed countries” category. Two others (Samoa and Vanuatu) are just above the threshold. Most are at high risk of debt distress, increasing the risk of poor policy decisions simply to pay bills.

The average debt-to-GDP ratio for Pacific states has risen from 32.9 percent in 2019 to 42.2 percent in 2021. Vanuatu, Palau and Fiji have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 70 percent.

China currently accounts for only about 6 percent of all aid in the region, but supplements this with grants and loans, some commercial and some interest-free. These overlap with grand infrastructure plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative aimed at connecting many regions of the world.

While it might not have secured its desired regional multilateral trade and security agreement with Pacific nations, China is clearly in the Pacific for the long haul.

Working with China
This presence need not be seen entirely negatively. In the right circumstances, Chinese assistance can have a positive impact on economic and social outcomes in recipient countries, according to the International Monetary Fund. (The same study also found a negative but negligible effect on governance.)

Overall, Chinese influence in the Pacific is not necessarily something that must be “countered”. For the good of the region, countries should seek ways to work together, especially given that aid to the Pacific is often fragmented, volatile, unpredictable and opaque.

Co-ordinated, efficient and effective partnerships between donors, recipients and regional institutions will be vital, and co-operation with China could be part of this.

New Zealand and Australia need to expand their work on the vast infrastructure and development needs of the Pacific. Transparency should be a priority with all projects and spending, and co-operation should be tied to shared benchmarks such as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

For its part, China should give more aid rather than loans (especially to the least developed countries) to avoid the risk of poor countries becoming beholden to lenders or even bankrupted.

Chinese Ambassador’s warning to NZ: Getting into ‘exclusive circles’ could lead to ‘unmitigated disasters’ https://t.co/tjK9a2jCg4

— Newshub Politics (@NewshubPolitics) June 1, 2022

Peace and security
Above all, peace and security between and within countries should be an agreed fundamental principle. The good news is that South Pacific nations have already taken steps towards this by agreeing to the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

This could be complemented by an agreement banning foreign military bases in the region to maintain its independence. If needed, peacekeeping or outside security assistance should be multilateral through the UN, not bilateral through secret arrangements.

Co-operation for the good of the Pacific should be the goal, but this is only possible if the region is not militarised.

Chinese influence and power in the Pacific is a reality that cannot be wished away or easily undermined. With the US similarly determined to assert itself, the stakes are rising.

All nations should work together to ensure no small, independent Pacific country becomes a pawn in what could be a very dangerous game.

Dr Alexander Gillespie, professor of law, University of Waikato. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

The draft security agreement between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.

In Australian debates, the term “influence” is often used to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.

There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).

• READ MORE: Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir
• As Australia deploys troops and police, what now for Solomon Islands?
• China’s push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?

On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.

Senior Australian government ministers have expressed concern about a draft security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands https://t.co/yFnyCKsJxE

— Bloomberg (@business) March 25, 2022

The role of domestic politics
First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics — not just geopolitics.

As explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.

These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.

Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.

Take, for example, the activism of Malaita provincial Governor Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the important role sub-national actors can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.

Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “passive dupes” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges — and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.

Australia’s current policy settings are not working
The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working — if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.

Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “Pacific Step-up” initiative.

Australia spent billions leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programMEs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.

Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s longstanding anxieties about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.

Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already commented in response to the leaked draft that:

This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands.

The rumours (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s attempt to lease Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties.

Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.

A closer look at the draft security agreement
The terms of the draft security agreement should make Australia anxious. It goes significantly beyond the bilateral security treaty between Solomon Islands and Australia.

Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.

Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that

relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.

It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.

Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.

The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states.

According to Article 5,

without the written consent of the other party, neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party.

This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.

The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.

Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and announced Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023.

It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support.

A draft security cooperation agreement could allow China to deploy police and military personnel in Solomon Islands.https://t.co/EkcrFaHEqV

— RNZ Pacific (@RNZPacific) March 25, 2022

Playing whack-a-mole
While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing whack-a-mole by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft.

Think of Telstra’s recent purchase of Digicel Pacific, headquartered in PNG — a move seen by some analysts as really an attempt to shut China out of the Pacific.

That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.

If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “compete” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy?

This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.

Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups.

And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.

We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.

The draft security agreement may come to nothing — but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.

Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination — as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.

Dr Joanne Wallis is professor of international security and Dr Czeslaw Tubilewicz is senior lecturer at the University of Adelaide. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

As China seeks greater influence in the South Pacific, its manipulation of local news outlets is having a serious impact on media independence.

Most Pacific media organisations are struggling financially, many journalists have lost their jobs and China is offering a way for them to survive — at the cost of media freedom.

It’s not just the “no strings attached” financial aid and “look and learn” tours of China for journalists; it’s about sharing an autocratic media model.

• READ MORE: An unprecedented RSF investigation: The Great Leap Backwards of Journalism in China
• China on the RSF World Press Freedom Index
• Other Chinese media in the Pacific reports

Prominent journalists and media executives say Pacific leaders are copying Chinese media tactics and stopping them from doing their jobs.

China is one of the worst countries in the world for media freedom. It ranks 177 on the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index.

Now it’s trying to influence media around the world, especially in countries which have signed up to its Belt and Road Initiative. That includes 10 Pacific island nations. Four remain with Taiwan.

China has spent an estimated US$6.6 billion over 13 years strengthening its global media presence. It took over Radio Australia’s shortwave transmitter frequencies in the Pacific when the ABC shut down its shortwave service in 2017.

Satellite service for Vanuatu
China’s national television service is about to start broadcasting by satellite into Vanuatu.

In a 2020 report, the International Federation of Journalists warned that foreign journalists were wooed by exchange programs, opportunities to study in China, tours and financial aid for their media outlets. Beijing also provides free content in foreign newspapers and ambassadors write opinion pieces for local media.

The federation’s report found that journalists frequently think their media is strong enough to withstand this influence, but a global survey suggests that’s not the reality and China is reshaping the media round the world.

These attempts at ‘sharp power’ go beyond simply telling China’s story, according to Sarah Cook, research director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at Freedom House. Their sharper edge often undermines democratic norms, erodes national sovereignty, weakens the financial sustainability of independent media, and violates local laws.

Journalists say this is an ideological and political struggle, with China determined to combat what it sees as decades of unchallenged Western media imperialism.

There’s mounting evidence from the Pacific of the impact of Beijing’s worldwide campaign, particularly in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

The situation for journalists in Solomon Islands has rapidly changed since the country swapped diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing in 2019. Media freedom has deteriorated and journalists say leaders are now taking their cues from China.

Vulnerable media outlets
Media outlets are vulnerable to offers of financial help. Many journalists have lost jobs and others haven’t been paid for months. It’s estimated there are just 16 full-time journalists left in Honiara.

There’s been little advertising since the November 2021 riots, a situation exacerbated by the covid pandemic. The only income for one privately owned media outlet is from the small street sales of its newspapers.

Earlier this month, the Solomon Islands government held its first news conference for 2022 after months of pressure to talk to journalists. The government denied there were restrictions on media freedom.

As the media struggles to survive, China’s ambassador is offering support, such as more trips to China (after the pandemic) and donations including two vehicles to the Solomon Star and maintenance of the newspaper’s printing presses. In the experience of other media, these offers are often followed with pressure to adhere to editorial positions congruent with those of the Chinese embassy.

While some journalists are resisting the pressure and holding a strong line, others are being targeted by China with rewards for “friends”.

Chinese embassies throughout the South Pacific are active on social media. In Solomon Islands, the embassy’s Facebook site includes posts about its aid assistance for covid-19, joint press releases with the Solomons government and stories from official Chinese news outlets.

There are numerous examples of the growing impact on media freedom.

Harassment over investigation
A freelance journalist has relocated to Australia after her investigations into the relationship between Solomons Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and a Chinese businessman resulted in harassment from police. She said police told her an order for her arrest came directly from the prime minister.

She was advised by Australia’s high commissioner to move to Australia for her safety.

Veteran journalist Dorothy Wickham was among a group of Solomon Islands journalists who accepted an invitation for a “look and learn” tour of China soon after the Sogavare government swapped allegiance to China in 2019.

She said the trip left her concerned about how Solomon Islands would deal with its new diplomatic partner.

“By the time our tour concluded in Shanghai, I was personally convinced that our political leaders are not ready or able to deal effectively with China. Solomon Islands’ regulatory and accountability mechanisms are too weak,” she says.

“We have already shown some spirit with our attorney-general rejecting a hasty deal to lease the island of Tulagi, the capital of one of our provinces, to a Chinese company, but I fear how fragile and weak my country is against any large developed nation let alone China,’ she wrote in an article for The Guardian.

One senior media executive that said if his own government, Australia, and New Zealand didn’t assist, he would look to China.

“There is too much talk about the role of media in democracy,” he said. He thought the Chinese ambassador understood that his organisation had its own editorial policy.

Soon after that, though, he was asked to publish a press release word for word.

No expense spared
Another media executive said he only had to ring the Chinese embassy and help arrived. He said China was rapidly moving into his country’s media space with no expense spared.

High-profile Vanuatu journalist Dan McGarry says he has no doubt that some Pacific governments are following China’s lead and adopting its contempt for critical speech and dissent.

In 2019, McGarry left Vanuatu to attend a forum in Australia, but his visa was revoked and he was banned from re-entering Vanuatu. He told the ABC’s Media Watch programme at the time that he had no doubt it was because of a story he wrote about the secret deportation of six Chinese from Vanuatu.

The six were arrested and detained without charge on the premises of a Chinese company with numerous large government contracts before being escorted out of Vanuatu by Chinese and Vanuatu police. McGarry said he was summoned by the prime minister, who told him he was disappointed with his negative reporting.

McGarry said he had no evidence that China tried to influence the Vanuatu government over his residence, but he’d seen a tendency in Pacific leaders to emulate behaviour they saw elsewhere.

Now back in Vanuatu, he said the decision to refuse his work permit was still under judicial review and he’s seeking financial compensation.

In 2018, Papua New Guinea journalist Scott Waide was suspended by EMTV under pressure from Prime Minister Peter O’Neill for a story he wrote about a diplomatic Chinese tantrum and a scandal over the purchase of Maserati cars for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Port Moresby.

Waide told the ABC that Pacific governments were taking lessons from China in dealing with their critics using media clampdowns and intimidation. That didn’t necessarily involve direct instructions from Beijing, “but people watch, people learn”.

Head of news sacked
A dispute over media freedom has escalated with the sacking of the head of news and 24 journalists at EMTV in PNG. They were initially suspended but later terminated for supporting their editor over interference from a government minister about a story involving an Australian man charged with drug trafficking.

On March 9, the EMTV news manager was sacked for insubordination. The network has since hired a new team of recent graduates with little experience — just months before the scheduled elections in June.

These examples give a sharper edge to concerns about China’s growing influence in the South Pacific and the lack of an Australian media voice there. The ABC’s presence has been described as a whisper.

There’s only one Australian journalist based in the region, the ABC’s Natalie Whiting in PNG. Meanwhile, Xinhua has a correspondent based in Fiji and China has recently been recruiting Pacific journalists for its global TV network.

The situation worries Australia’s national broadcaster. ABC managing director David Anderson told a Senate hearing in February 2022 of growing Chinese influence in the Pacific.

“The single biggest piece of information that comes back to us from the public broadcasters is concern over the pressure the Chinese government put on them to carry content,” he said.

In November 2019, the Melanesian Media Freedom Forum at Griffith University expressed concern about growing threats to media freedom. It called on Pacific governments to fund public broadcasters properly to ensure they have sufficient equipment and staff to enable their services to reach all citizens and to adequately play their watchdog role.

Australian journalist, media development consultant and trainer Jemima Garrett says media executives are at risk of being captured by China.

She has no doubt that China’s growing influence is a major story, but with so few Australian journalists based in the region, even significant developments in the China story are going unreported.

Sue Ahearn is the creator and co-editor of The Pacific Newsroom and co-convenor of the Australia Asia Pacific Media Initiative. She was a senior executive at ABC Radio Australia and is currently studying Pacific development at the Australian National University. Image: Media Association of Solomon Islands/Facebook. This article was first published by The Strategist and is republished with the author’s permission.

• Author’s note: Some of the Pacific journalists in this story have asked not to be named or identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Professor of International Relations at Oxford University Rosemary Foot kicked off the QS Summit debate, arguing that while a power transition between the US and China is obviously underway, China’s new vision for the region is being held back by its own policy decisions.

“It’s a question of China’s use of its new power as dominance, or power as authority, using ideas of consent, or coercion ..which is it?” she asked.

“You need to look at how wisely China is conducting state-to state relations in the region … is it attracting followers or not?”

READ MORE: The QS Summit on power relationships

She says China has held itself back with a perception of heavy-handedness on issues like the South China Sea, where new military installations have been constructed on a number of small, uninhabited islands an rocky outcrops.

She says any new order has to be attentive to the norms that have kept the region stable in recent times, and China’s rise now means it has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a stable regional order, focused on something more than just military dominance.

“The signals that China sends are mixed – the South China Sea has been militarised – that is seen as a defensive strategy by China, but as an aggressive move by its neighbours to take control of marine resources – it implies use of force, or at least a willingness to use force, and that creates distrust”

China though, regards the US as fundamentally disruptive to region order, dividing it into friends and enemies

Belt and Road ambitions
Beijing has spent a lot of time emphasising its own willingness and commitment to public goods, like the hugely ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). But the challenge, according to Professor Foot, is whether China can bring stability and development, and replace the US security order with something more firmly rooted in Asian economic power.

So, is China’s vision resonating anywhere?

The disruption caused by Donald Trump’s administration and its unilateral approach to international relations surely gives China a chance to corral some support.

”But China’s policies put China first and many in the region find it hard to see China ‘doing the right thing’,” says Professor Foot.

“China’s claim to be the main stabiliser in the region is put under question by its current attitude to the US and Japan, and its behaviour in places like the South China Sea.”

“Why is it that China is finding it so hard to move into the role of benign hegemon in Asia …I’m not sure, but I think there is a sense of entitlement and a sense of victimhood that is drawn on frequently … Xi Jinping has argued that China is in a “unique space”, not the post-colonial situation its neighbours occupy.”

Potential flashpoint warning
Professor Yuen Foong Khong joined the debate with a warning that political tensions in East Asia are a potential flashpoint for conflict.

“Asia is moving fast from uni-polarity to bi-polarity .. and the competition between the US and China could be reminiscent of the Cold War, but perhaps even more severe and dangerous than that period.”

“There are a number of flashpoints in Asia – the South China Sea, North Korea, Taiwan – and these flashpoints do not involve proxies. If they flare up then China and the US will find themselves directly involved very quickly”

But Professor Khong doubts a war will erupt, given the amount of economic integration between the two, and the fact neither would want any kind of nuclear exchange.

“China sees the current order as constraining on a number of fronts… China wants equality with the US in the region … but the US is very unlikely to cede to that, as it has more economic power, and stronger alliances in the region.

“Also China’s one-party political system is s serious stumbling block to it being accepted as a credible equal in the region at present.

His view was that the Asia-Pacific’s increasing instability could in fact result in a more pluralist future scenario, with no one power taking precedence over another.

“The bipolar scenario with China and the US may not eventuate. East Asia’s future may we be more diffusive and de-centralised than you might think.”

Graeme Acton, the new Asia New Zealand Foundation’s Asia Media Centre manager, is former foreign news editor of RNZ.

• Who is militarising the South China Sea?

A Solomon Islands province has agreed to lease a large island to a Chinese developer to develop into a special economic zone, weeks after the country opened diplomatic ties with China.

But already cracks abound; there has been no official announcement and the provincial premier says the deal is on ice.

Experts say the arrangement in Central Province would give the developer and other Chinese firms a strategic inlet into Solomon Islands, which until last month was one of Taiwan’s dwindling allies in the Pacific.

READ MORE: PNG and Solomons governments call for changes to forestry

The government traded Taiwan for China in a move that it said would promise more development for the nation.

The Central Province agreement, signed 22 September, would give Beijing-based Sam Group an exclusive five-year development lease for Tulagi island and its surrounding islands, according to a copy which was shared on Facebook on Friday by a Solomon Islands youth group which is pro-Taiwan.

RNZ Pacific has verified the leaked copy’s authenticity with two sources who are familiar with the agreement’s contents.

Central Province premier, Stanley Manetiva, confirmed he had signed the “strategic cooperation agreement” in Honiara with representatives of Sam Group, but said it was not legally binding and the company would have to comply with local laws and respect landowner rights on Tulagi.

“To be honest here, leasing Tulagi will not be possible,” he said in an interview. “Nothing will eventuate on the agreement.”

A phone number for Sam Group’s office in Beijing listed on its website was disconnected on Friday. Another company listed as a party to the lease agreement, Xiamen International Trade Group, could not be reached for comment.

According to a statement posted to Sam Group’s website, a Solomon Islands delegation visited its headquarters in August.

The two parties “hoped to carry out comprehensive cooperation in energy, chemical industry, investment, trade and other fields in addition to existing cooperation,” the statement said. It was unclear whether the visiting delegation was from Central Province.

“We want the investors to come to our province,” said Manetiva, adding the diplomatic switch had opened investment opportunities for Solomon Islands. “But we must be mindful, mindful in a sense that we must see that the people are our priority.”

Not everyone’s convinced the deal with Sam Group is as non-binding as Manetiva claims.

Solomon Islands’ deputy opposition leader, Peter Kenilorea Junior, was worried the lease would still go ahead.

“It raises a lot of concern for me, I didn’t see any protection, or at least any obligation in the agreement that I saw that also safeguards the interests of Central islands province peoples and the resources.”

As part of the Tulagi lease, Sam Group would be able to survey the island for oil and gas developments, despite what Kenilorea Junior described as a sizeable anti-mining movement on the island.

Central province, which hosted the former capital under British-ruled Solomon Islands, has a relatively small population of around 26,000 people, but covers a vast area of more than 600km2 of mostly-ocean. The province is also located close to the Guadalcanal, where the current capital Honiara is.

Kenilorea Junior said the province’s strategically central location might have made it a target for a Chinese developer like Sam Group.

“This may be a means to sort of piggybacking other companies into the Solomons,” said Anna Powles, a senior lecturer in security studies at Massey University in New Zealand.

She questioned whether one of Sam Group’s subsidiaries, China Jing An, was privately-owned because it was previously part of China’s Public Security Ministry.

“My sense from other research and other companies similarly, is that there are still very strong ties there.”

Still, local businesses on Tulagi have welcomed what they say is sorely-needed development on the island.

“We don’t have any banks and services here is quite low, and having investors to come and improve the place would be really great,” said Teika Dennis, the owner of the Vanita Motel and Restaurant.

• This article is published under the Pacific Media Centre’s content partnership with Radio New Zealand

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen has said she “regrets and strongly condemns” the Solomon Islands’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with China.

The Solomons cabinet made the decision yesterday after which Taiwan terminated its 36-year relationship with the Pacific country.

Tsai said China’s promises of financial assistance often come up “empty” and that “Taiwan’s contributions to Solomon Islands, particularly in medicine, agriculture, education, and culture, could not be measured in dollars.”

READ MORE: Solomons academic calls for caution over Taiwan/China decision

“Taiwan’s attitude towards its diplomatic allies has been one of sincere friendship. We spare no effort and treat our allies with sincerity. However, in the face of China’s interference and suppression, we will not stand to be threatened, nor will we be subjected to ceaseless demands,” Tsai said.

Taiwan will close its embassy in Solomon Islands today and recall all technical and medical personnel stationed there, she said.

“I want to thank them for fighting bravely to the last for our diplomatic relationship. It is indeed regrettable that their unfinished cooperative projects must come to an end, and it is a loss for Solomon Islands people,” Tsai said.

“However, this is the choice that Solomon Islands’ government has made, leaving us with no other option but to respond in this way.

“Although we have terminated diplomatic ties, I want to extend my gratitude to the people of Solomon Islands for their support for Taiwan, and to our allies in the international community who sought to help mediate this issue.

“Changes in the diplomatic arena are indeed challenging, but Taiwan still has many friends around the world willing to stand with us, and we are not alone.”

• This article is published under the Pacific Media Centre’s content partnership with Radio New Zealand. 

China launched an “international green development coalition” last week, in the face of growing concern about its coal investments.

The Environment Ministry hosted an event on the “green belt and road” as part of a leaders’ summit in Beijing to promote Chinese investment in partner countries.

According to the official progress report on President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy: “The Belt and Road Initiative pursues the vision of green development and a way of life and work that is green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable.

READ MORE: Climate Weekly: Activists hold London landmarks

“The initiative is committed to strengthening cooperation on environmental protection and defusing environmental risks.”

However, China’s energy investments abroad – it is a major investment and aid donor in the Pacific – continue to favour coal, threatening to blow the global carbon budget.

More than 30 heads of state were due at the summit, including from countries with shared coal, oil and gas interests such as Russia, Indonesia and Pakistan.

In a press conference before travelling to join them, UN chief Antonio Guterres said greening the initiative was important to meeting international climate goals.

“We need a lot of investments in sustainable development, in renewable energy, and a lot of investments in infrastructure that respect the future,” he said, as reported by Xinhua.

Test for China
The test is whether China will require its belt and road projects to meet international standards, in line with the Paris Agreement on climate change, said Greenpeace China climate analyst Li Shuo.

“China is certainly becoming more conscious about the criticisms around president Xi’s diplomatic initiative, particularly the environmental impacts of some of the Chinese projects,” said Li.

“Now comes the hard part – will any substantive progress be made at the policy level?”

China is financing 102 gigawatts of coal power capacity outside the country, 26 percent of the total under development, according to green think tank the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.

It has become the “lender of last resort” for projects Western banks deem too risky.

Investment in renewables grew in 2018, US-based campaign group NDRC noted, but was still dwarfed by support for fossil fuels.

“There is a huge potential for renewable energy in these partner countries, but then they don’t have great policy set-ups for renewables,” NRDC energy policy expert Han Chen said.

Indonesian coal plants
In a commentary for the Jakarta Globe, campaigner Pius Ginting criticised the Indonesian government for seeking investment in four coal power plants instead of cleaner hydroelectric projects.

An opinion poll of six key emerging economies commissioned by UK-based thinktank E3G found a strong preference for renewables over fossil fuels. In Pakistan, 61 percent of respondents said renewable energy was a better investment for development in the long term, rising to 89 percent in Vietnam.

In these and Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa and the Philippines, solar power was seen as top priority. Coal had some positive associations, most strongly in Pakistan, where 41 percent said it created jobs, but in the rest of the countries polled these were outweighed by pollution concerns.

Republished under a Creative Commons licence.

• China’s Xi promises green ‘belt and road’ investment strategy
• Belt and road countries could emit triple China’s carbon, warns official

Traditional chiefs are trying to expel a US journalist from the Federated States of Micronesia island of Yap.

Last week the Pacific Island Times reported that the chiefs, member of the council of Pilung, had written a letter to the Yap Legislature requesting that Joyce McClure be made a “persona non grata”.

Signed by nine chiefs, the letter described McClure’s journalistic activates as “disruptive to the state environment and/or to the safety and security of the state” and labelled the news magazine and website she writes for, Pacific Islands Times, a “fake news agency”.

READ MORE: Yap’s traditional chiefs seek to expel probing US journalist

It also said McClure’s articles contained “biased strong opinions against Asian ethnicity”.

RNZ Pacific reported that the efforts to have her expelled were linked to her scrutiny of Chinese investment on the island.

“They have been what I call cautionary tales about what the Chinese government is doing in terms of their Belt and Road initiative,” she told RNZ in an interview.

Such stories have investigated pollution from a Chinese resort development and the operation of Chinese fisheries in local waters.

Mystery stories

However, McClure said she did know which story the chiefs had taken issue with.

“It’s a mystery what they are referring to,” she said.

“I do wish they would come forward with examples of what they’re talking about.”

Pacific Island Times publisher and editor-in-chief chief Mar-Vic Cagurangan told Pacific Media Watch the campaign against McClure was consistent with a publishing climate where “community connections influence what gets published.”

“It is not easy to be a journalist in a small community, where everyone knows everyone – everyone is related,” she said.

Based in nearby Guam, Cagurangan said that although the island benefits from the US First Amendment of the right to free speech, local media organisations may face “economic sanctions” for some content.

“Guam is a small market, where some elected officials are business owners or have a family that owns a business that deals with government.

Questionable contracts
“When I was the editor of the now-defunct Marianas Variety, I had encountered many occasions when a certain business owned by the family of the governor pulled out their ads following the publication of a series of stories about questionable contracts entered into by the administration.”

She said that despite the threats, the paper would continue to run important stories.

“Although we rely on advertising revenue to keep going, we refuse to compromise our journalistic integrity and independence.”

However, she said in other jurisdictions of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the risks of reporting were much greater. There has been at least one case of a journalist being expelled.

In 1997, the FSM government declared Canadian citizen Sherry O’Sullivan persona non grata in response to information about government corruption published in her publication, The FSM News, as reported by Pacific Journalism Review.

The Pacific Daily News took up her case, saying in an editorial that “actions to censor her are misdirected and, instead, end up posing a serious threat to the right of free speech and a free press in the Federated States of Micronesia”.

The following year, the US Department of State released a report criticising the FSM government for stifling investigation into its activities and figures.

Threat ‘unsurprising’
Associate professor of journalism at the University of Guam, Francis Dalisay, said it was not normal for media in the FSM to challenge local elites and power structures. He said it was not surprising that the chiefs in Yap viewed Joyce McClure as a threat.

“The local media in Yap may have a greater tendency to report on issues and matters that are meant to maintain the status quo and tradition.”

Dalisay has published research on the relationship between the mainstream media in Guam and the US military establishment. He found that the local papers often focused on the benefits while neglecting the risks of increased US activity.

Manny Cruz, an indigenous journalist from Guam who is also a doctoral research scholar attached to AUT’s Pacific Media Centre, said that such risks included the confiscation of indigenous land for military use.

He said that because of the islands’ strategic significance for US military operations, it should be at the forefront of global news.

“They’re currently going through a process of military build-up.

“They want to actually bring in more US marines, and they’re building up more federal facilities on indigenous, sacred land.

“This is something that really the entire world should be looking at.”

• World Press Freedom Day is celebrated next Friday – May 3.

Michael Andrew is contributing editor of the Pacific Media Centre’s Pacific Media Watch freedom project.

Manny Cruz talking to Michael Andrew on a recent PMC Southern Cross radio programme.

• ‘Censorship by exile’ in Micronesia
• RSF World Press Freedom Index

Pacific Media Centre Newsdesk

Already surrounded by mounting controversies, the 2018 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit has been another disappointment for its members as it comes to an end.

This is the first time in its history that the summit has ended without any formal leaders’ joint statement – due to disagreements over the US-China trade war, reports EMTV News.

Referring to the US and China – “the two giants in the room” – they were unable to agree due to their division over trade, said host Prime Minister Peter O’Neill of Papua New Guinea.

But O’Neill reassured the press that the chairperson of the APEC summit would release the statement “this afternoon” – yesterday.

READ MORE Chinese president bound for PNG as controversy mounts over APEC 2018

Allegation of theft
The Chinese President Xi Jinping said that the countries that embraced “protectionism were doomed to failure,” implying the US “America First” policy. 

US Vice-President Mike Pence later said that the US had great respect for President Xi and China.

“But in the [US] President’s words, China has taken advantage of the US for many many years, and those days are over,” Pence said.

Vice-President Pence also accused China for theft of intellectual property on an “unprecedented scale”.

“China has tremendous barriers, they have tremendous tariffs and as we all know their country engages in quotas, forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies on an unprecedented scale,” said Vice-President Pence.

But in his speech, President Xi said that his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was an open platform for cooperation.

“It is guided by the principle of consultation and collaboration for shared benefits, it is not designed to serve any hidden geopolitical agenda, it is not targeted against anyone and it does not exclude anyone,” said President Xi.

“It is not an exclusive club that is closed to non-members, nor is it a trap as some people has labelled it, rather the BRI is a major and transparent initiative with which China shares opportunities and pursues common development with the rest of the world,” he said.

US-China fight for influence
Although China has already been funnelling millions of dollars into the Pacific to gain its influence in the region, US also bought its 500 marines and Navy servicemen to Papua New Guinea to bolster its massive security operation just before the summit.

Yet Vice-President Pence clearly warned in his speech not to accept the foreign debt as this could compromise the sovereignty of the country.

“Let me say with great respect to all the nations across this wider region, and the world, do not accept foreign debt that could compromise your sovereignty. Protect your interests preserve your independence and just like America always put your country first,” said Vice-President Pence.

He also reaffirmed US President Donald Trump’s words, “we want to strengthen the relationship between our two countries and improve the lives of our citizens,” he said.

The next time when the two world leaders will come together will be in Argentina for the G20 summit due on November 30.

The Pacific Media Centre republishes EMTV News items with permission.

• More on APEC stories

Pacific Media Centre Newsdesk

Chinese President Xi Jinping has met Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in Beijing, pledging to work with the country to push the bilateral relations to a new level.

Xi said Papua New Guinea is a country with significant influence in the Pacific island region, reports CCTV+ News.

Since the two countries established diplomatic ties 42 years ago, the bilateral relations have achieved historic development, Xi said.

READ MORE: Chinese Pacific presence improves Australian aid

The development of bilateral relations had entered a fast track, and political mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation had both reached a new level in history since the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two countries in 2014, he said.

China appreciated Papua New Guinea’s resolute adherence to the one-China policy, Xi said.

China was willing to work with Papua New Guinea to strengthen communication and deepen cooperation, expand exchanges and push bilateral relations to a new level.

O’Neill also met with the Premier Li Keqiang when they discussed issues of mutual interest between the two countries, including shared development interests, infrastructure delivery and the hosting of Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) 2018 due in Port Moresby in November.

‘Strong friendship’
“There is a strong friendship between our governments, both through our officials and high-level interaction,” O’Neill said, reports EMTV News.

“We intend to keep taking this friendship to an even higher level, and there are many outcomes we look to achieve on this visit.

“My last state visit to China was in 2016, and this resulted in seven major agreements in development projects, investment and trade.

“A number of other infrastructure projects have been identified since then are in the process of being delivered.

“These include the rehabilitation of the Poreporena Freeway, the construction of the Boulevard to Parliament, and the upgrade of the International Convention Centre.

“Each of these projects is a gift of the people of China, and are demonstrations of warm relationship between our countries.

“The International Convention Centre has already hosted many APEC meetings, and now it has been upgraded for the APEC Leaders’ Week.

Buses for APEC
China is also providing a number of vehicles, including buses, that will be used in APEC motorcades.

APEC is based on enhancing partnerships, and the partnership we have with China in the delivery of APEC is most appreciated.”

The Pacific Media Centre has a content sharing arrangement with EMTV News.

• More PNG stories