Look around this morning.

America and Israel, nuclear-armed states have attacked Iran.

Israel, which has never declared its nuclear stockpiles nor its borders, has spent 2.5 years committing genocide against Gaza, a trapped community with no significant defensive weapons.

• READ MORE: Israel, Trump claim Iran’s Khamenei killed, Iran denies, attacks continue
• Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: The leader who shaped Iran’s defiance
• NZ rally slams Five Eyes intelligence ties hours before US-Israel attack on Iran
• We warned you,’ says Iran’s national security chief after Israel-US attacks
• Israel strikes two schools in Iran, killing more than 50 students

Israel has bombed six countries which are not at war with it. America funded it and elected Donald Trump to lead the violence from the front.

America and Israel pontificate about other states’ fitness to hold nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-armed Russia has invaded and battered Ukraine for four long years. Nuclear-armed Pakistan has begun to bomb the cities of Afghanistan, a state which lacks even an air force with which to defend its people (not that the Taliban care for the lives of their people).

We awake in the world that wise, caring people worked to avert for over a century; a world of impunity and gleeful slaughter by the already-overarmed.

People tried to minimise the risk and the harm of war with a few basic agreements. They dared to intervene for the protection and survival of civilians, doctors, journalists. They wrote laws to criminalise aggression and genocide.

All this is going up in smoke, and not one of the aggressors/provocateurs/genocidaires has a viable claim of self-defence.

How many people wake up in terror this morning (if they slept at all last night) in this new world?

Marilyn Garson writes about Palestinian and Jewish dissent. Republished from her Facebook page with permission.

If Israel and the US attack Iran, the cosy worlds of Europe, Australia and New Zealand could be swept up in an economic catastrophe.

Should the Iranians survive a terrifying onslaught, they have vowed to strike back in a way that could crash the global economy.  How they could quite possibly do this is the topic of this article.

The leaders of the Islamic Republic — love them or hate them — know that they face an existential threat; that the continued existence of a unified state called Iran is imperilled.

• READ MORE: Iran will not bow down to US pressure in nuclear talks, Pezeshkian says
• Other Iran reports

They also know that the collective West will not stand up for international law and the proscription on launching wars of aggression. Under these circumstances a state will sacrifice anything to survive, including hitherto unthinkable acts like sinking the USS Abraham Lincoln, the glory of the American war machine.

All the signs are pointing to a new Shock and Awe campaign by the United States.

The goal, as it was in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, is a fast knock-out. Mission Accomplished in a few weeks.

War, however, seldom goes entirely to plan — the Americans never expected they would spend 20 years in Afghanistan and waste trillions of dollars to move from the Taliban regime to . . .  the Taliban regime.

Here is a selection of options open to the Iranians if they survive the initial onslaught.

Shut down all civilian flights for the duration of the conflict
Without firing a single missile, Iran can likely bring all flights into and out of the entire Gulf region to a shuddering halt. That’s 500,000 passengers per day.

More than 180 million passengers pass through Doha, Abu Dhabi and Dubai every year.

Simply issuing a warning that the entire Gulf region is an air combat zone will put the brakes on all major airlines, effectively severing the primary link between Europe, Asia and Australasia for as long as Iran hangs on.

Insurance companies would issue a cancel note on all policies (for airlines, passengers, airports, provisioners) for the entire region.

No airline will defy this interdiction. Would Qantas, for example, fly one of its A380s loaded with mums, dads and kids into a potential kill zone?  The Iranians could underscore the seriousness by firing a couple of missiles onto runways or using EW (electronic warfare tools) to spoof or harass planes.

In an interview with @CBSNews , Iran’s FM Seyed Abbas Araghchi said uranium enrichment is Iran’s legal right under the NPT, reaffirming peaceful nuclear policy and commitment to diplomacy
More: https://t.co/XqHaDqxOfl https://t.co/3tGlg9SJKL

— Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (@Iran_GOV) February 22, 2026

Shut down all oil and LNG shipments
Iran will likely mine the Strait of Hormuz 33 km (21 miles) wide, making it instantly uninsurable for any oil or LNG tanker to move into or out of the Gulf.  Huge numbers of smart mines (that can recognise the acoustic signature of a tanker) will be deployed as well as hundreds of semi-submersible drone boats.

Spread out across the Gulf are thousands of short-range anti-ship missiles that will be virtually impossible to suppress.

Is this the IDF in Gaza or the West Bank, or the US military in Afghanistan or Iraq, or ICE in Minneapolis?

The answer is that this is ICE in Minneapolis.

But the fact that it’s hard to tell whether it’s the IDF or the US Army or ICE is the whole story.

• READ MORE: ‘Finger on the trigger’: Iran warns of quick retaliation after US threats
• Other Middle East reports

Both the United States and Israel are imperialist and settler colonial projects which support each other.

The United States spends trillions to be a hegemonic power and tests its weapons in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. It also sends billions of dollars in aid and military equipment to Israel to suppress Palestinians and to be an outpost of Western empire in Southwest Asia.

Israel develops cutting edge surveillance technology and repressive tactics used against Palestinians that are then exported back to the United States and to many other countries.

The tactics of occupation and the blurring of lines between the military and the police in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine are all reflected in the appearance, weapons, and tactics of ICE.

And let’s not forget: Israel is still engaged in kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing, detaining, killing, and expelling Palestinians during the so-called Gaza ceasefire.

At least 477 Palestinians have been killed by Israel since the ceasefire was declared on October 10, and the total death toll since the war on Gaza began in October 2023 is more than 71,000, mostly women and children.

Both US President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — wanted on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for crimes against humanity — and their far right supporters are intent on ethnic cleansing and terrorising whoever remains.

The reported plea bargain between WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and the United States government brings to a close one of the darkest periods in the history of media freedom, says the union for Australian journalists.

While the details of the deal are still to be confirmed, MEAA welcomed the release of Assange, a Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance member, after five years of relentless campaigning by journalists, unions, and press freedom advocates around the world.

MEAA remains concerned what the deal will mean for media freedom around the world.

• READ MORE: The Free Julian Assange RSF campaign file

The work of WikiLeaks at the centre of this case — which exposed war crimes and other wrongdoing by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan — was strong, public interest journalism.

MEAA fears the deal will embolden the US and other governments around the world to continue to pursue and prosecute journalists who disclose to the public information they would rather keep suppressed.

MEAA media federal president Karen Percy welcomed the news that Julian Assange has already been released from Belmarsh Prison, where he has been held as his case has wound its way through UK courts.

“We wish Julian all the best as he is reunited with his wife, young sons and other relatives who have fought tirelessly for his freedom,” she said.

‘Relentless battle against this injustice’
“We commend Julian for his courage over this long period, and his legal team and supporters for their relentless battle against this injustice.

“We’ve been extremely concerned about the impact on his physical and mental wellbeing during Julian’s long period of imprisonment and respect the decision to bring an end to the ordeal for all involved.

Julian Assange boards flight at London Stansted Airport at 5PM (BST) Monday June 24th. This is for everyone who worked for his freedom: thank you.#FreedJulianAssange pic.twitter.com/Pqp5pBAhSQ

— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) June 25, 2024

“The deal reported today does not in any way mean that the struggle for media freedom has been futile; quite the opposite, it places governments on notice that a global movement will be mobilised whenever they blatantly threaten journalism in a similar way.

Percy said the espionage charges laid against Assange were a “grotesque overreach by the US government” and an attack on journalism and media freedom.

“The pursuit of Julian Assange has set a dangerous precedent that will have a potential chilling effect on investigative journalism,” she said.

“The stories published by WikiLeaks and other outlets more than a decade ago were clearly in the public interest. The charges by the US sought to curtail free speech, criminalise journalism and send a clear message to future whistleblowers and publishers that they too will be punished.”

Percy said was clearly in the public interest and it had “always been an outrage” that the US government sought to prosecute him for espionage for reporting that was published in collaboration with some of the world’s leading media organisations.

Julian Assange has been an MEAA member since 2007 and in 2011 WikiLeaks won the Outstanding Contribution to Journalism Walkley award, one of Australia’s most coveted journalism awards.

The New Zealand government is being urged to create a special humanitarian visa for Palestinians in Gaza with ties to this country.

More than 30 organisations — including World Vision, Save the Children and Greenpeace — have sent an open letter to ministers, calling on them to step up support.

They also want the government to help evacuate Palestinians with ties to New Zealand from Gaza, and provide them with resettlement assistance.

• LISTEN TO RNZ MORNING REPORT: ‘Everyone is susceptible to death’ — Palestinian New Zealander Muhammad Dahlen
• ‘This is one way we could help’ — World Vision spokesperson Rebekah Armstrong
• Israel’s war on Gaza live: More than 100 killed in al-Aqsa Hospital attack

Their appeal is backed by Palestinian New Zealander Muhammad Dahlen, whose family is living in fear in Rafah after being forced to move there from northern Gaza.

His ex-wife and two children (who have had visitor visas since December) were now living in a garage with his mother, sisters and nieces who do not have visas.

“There is no food, there is no power . . .  it is a really hard situation to be living in,” he told RNZ Morning Report.

If his family could receive visas to come to New Zealand “it literally can be the difference between life and death”.

‘Everyone susceptible to death’
With Israel making it clear it still intended to send ground forces into Rafah “everyone is susceptible to death and at least we would be saving some lives”.

Dahlen said New Zealand had a tradition of accepting refugees from areas of conflict, including Sudan, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Syria.

“So why is this not the same?”

He appealed to Immigration Minister Erica Stanford and Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters to intervene and approach the Egyptian government.

“We need these people out,” he said.

“Please give them visas; this is a first step. This is something super super difficult and huge and requires ministerial intervention.”

Border permission needed
At the Gaza-Egypt border potential refugees needed to gain the permission of officials from both Israel and Egypt.

Egypt had concerns about taking in too many refugees from Gaza so the New Zealand government would need to provide assurances flights had been organised.

If the government offered a charter flight to bring refugees to this country, “that would be amazing”.

World Vision spokesperson Rebekah Armstrong said the government had responded with immigration support in other humanitarian emergencies.

“We provided humanitarian visas for Ukrainians when their lives were torn apart by war, and we assisted Afghans to leave and resettle in this country when the Taliban returned to power. The situation for vulnerable Palestinians is no different.

“Palestinians are living in a perilous environment, with hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes; children and families starving with literally nothing to eat; and healthcare and medical treatment nearly impossible to access,” Armstrong said.

This is not a detainment camp in World War II, nor a prison in the Holocaust, this is Gaza in 2024. A chilling reminder that history repeats.

A holocaust is happening right before our eyes and the world is silent. pic.twitter.com/Y4SgE1yjji

— Mohamad Safa (@mhdksafa) March 10, 2024

Several hundred
The organisations did not know exactly how many people would qualify for such a visa, but estimated it could be several hundred.

“We know there’s around 288 Palestinian New Zealanders in New Zealand, and they have estimated that there would be around 300-400 people that are their family members that they’d like to bring here,” Armstrong said.

“That’s a very small number and as we’ve seen, in the case of Ukraine . . . the actual number of people that have probably come here would be significantly less than that, it’s not like they’re asking for the world. I think it’s quite a conservative number myself.”

She told Morning Report similar visas for Ukrainians and Afghans had been organised within days or weeks.

“It would be New Zealand’s response to this catastrophic situation that is unfolding. We want to be on the right side of history and this is one way we could help.”

She said embassies in the region would need to assist with the logistics of people leaving Gaza.

NZ government ‘monitoring’
Stanford said in a statement the government was monitoring the situation in Gaza.

“The issue in Gaza is primarily a humanitarian and border issue, not a visa issue, as people are unable to leave.

“People who have relatives in Gaza can already apply for temporary or visitors’ visas for them,” Stanford said.

But Armstrong said: “If there is the political will, the government can do this.

“Other countries are doing this . . .  Canada and Australia are getting people out. It’s tricky, but it’s not impossible.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Frontline investigative articles on Aotearoa New Zealand’s 23-day Parliament protester siege, social media disinformation and Asia-Pacific media changes and adaptations are featured in the latest Pacific Journalism Review.

The assault on “truth telling” reportage is led by The Disinformation Project, which warns that “conspiratorial thought continues to impact on the lives and actions of our communities”, and alt-right video researcher Byron C Clark.

Several articles focus on the Philippines general election with the return of the Marcos dynasty following the elevation of the late dictator’s son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr and the crackdown on independent media, including Nobel Peace Prize co-laureate Maria Ressa’s Rappler.

• READ MORE: Pacific Journalism Review archives

Columbia Journalism School’s Centre for Investigative Journalism director Sheila Coronel writes of her experiences under the Marcos dictatorship: “Marcos is a hungry ghost. He torments our dreams, lays claim to our memories, and feeds our hopes.”

But with Marcos Jr’s landslide victory in May, she warns: “You will be in La-La Land, a country without memory, without justice, without accountability. Only the endless loop of one family, the soundtrack provided by Imelda.”

The themed section draws on research papers from a recent Asian Congress for Media and Communication conference (ACMC) hosted by Auckland University of Technology (AUT) introduced by convenor Khairiah A Rahman with keynotes by Asia Pacific Report editor David Robie and Rappler executive editor Glenda Gloria.

In the editorial titled “Fighting self-delusion and lies”, Philip Cass writes of the surreal crises in the Ukraine War and the United States and the challenges for journalists in the Asia-Pacific region:

“Similarly, there are national leaders in the Pacific who seem to truly want to believe that China really is their friend instead of being an aggressive imperialist power acting the same way the European powers did in the 19th century.”

With the Photoessay in this edition, visual storyteller and researcher Todd Henry explores how kava consumption has spread through the Pacific and into the diasporic community in Aotearoa New Zealand.

His “Visual peregrinations in the realm of kava” article and images also examine the way Pasifika women are carving their own space in kava ceremonies.

Unthemed topics include Afghanistan, the Taliban and the “liberation narrative” in New Zealand, industrial inertia among Queensland journalists, and Chinese media consumption and political engagement in Aotearoa.

Pacific Journalism Review, founded at the University of Papua New Guinea, is now in its 28th year and is New Zealand’s oldest journalism research publication and the highest ranked communication journal in the country.

The latest edition is published this weekend.

• Pacific Journalism Review fulltext articles at the Informit database

Asia Pacific Report newsdesk

In this this week’s episode of A View from Afar today, Selwyn Manning and Paul Buchanan are joined by Asia Pacific Report editor Dr David Robie to examine instability in the Pacific  – specifically to identify what is going on in New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa.

This is the second part of a two-part Pacific special.

In the second half, Buchanan and Manning analyse the latest developments on Afghanistan and consider whether the humiliating withdrawal of the US suggests an end to liberal internationalism.

• VIEW MORE: The first part of the two-part Pacific special of A View From Afar
• More on Afghanistan with A View From Afar

Specifically the first half of this episode looks at:

• New Caledonia where there will be a third and final referendum on Kanaky independence;
• Samoa where there has been a new government installed — the first in four decades — but only after the old guard attempted to resist democratic change, a move that has caused a constitutional crisis; and
• Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama has had a new addition to his political headaches — the question of how Fiji gets its NGO and aid workers out of Afghanistan.

In the second half of this episode Paul Buchanan and Selwyn Manning dig deep into the latest from Afghanistan.

The deadline for Western personnel to have withdrawn from Afghanistan is looming. The Taliban leadership states it will not extend the negotiated deadline of August 31, and US President Joe Biden insists that the US will not request nor assert an extension.

But Biden has instructed his military leaders to prepare for a contingency plan. 

• What does this humiliating withdrawal indicate to the world?
• Is this the realisation of a diminishing United States, a superpower in decline?
• Can the US reassert itself as the world’s policeman, or does Afghanistan confirm the US is in retreat and signal an end of liberal internationalism?

Watch this podcast on video-on-demand on YouTube and see earlier episodes at EveningReport.nz or subscribe to the Evening Report podcast here.

The MIL Network’s podcast A View from Afar was Nominated as a Top  Defence Security Podcast by Threat.Technology – a London-based cyber security news publication.

A collaboration between EveningReport.nz and AsiaPacificReport.nz.

Five Fijians who are based in Afghanistan say they are safe and well.

Speaking to FBC News, one of them who is living in the capital Kabul, said they kept tabs on each other and shared information on the Taliban takeover.

They say that they will only leave Afghanistan if the situation worsens.

• READ MORE: Fijians among those to be evacuated from Afghanistan
• Other Afghanistan crisis reports

The Fijian national spoke under the condition of anonymity and said he and three others were in Kabul while the others were in Mazar and Khandahar.

They said the situation was calm in the the three cities.

The man said he has been out and about in Kabul conducting assessment and supporting the UN evacuation flights in the last couple of days.

He had noticed that the usual traffic congestion had decreased significantly as most people were staying home.

Every 15 minutes
He said there was an evacuation flight almost every 15 minutes. However, movement within the country was challenging at times.

One other Fijian in Kabul was expected to relocate to Almaty in Kazakhstan.

• LISTEN: Afghanistan: Lawyer worried for evacuees stuck there

Meanwhile, RNZ News reports that the first group of New Zealand citizens, their families and other visa holders evacuated arrived yesterday in New Zealand.

New Zealand lawyer Claudia Elliott has worked across Afghanistan with the United Nations and is now trying to get visas to get at risk Afghani professionals to also be evacuated to New Zealand.

She says seeing the Taliban’s takeover has been traumatising – she is worried about how those who are given visas to New Zealand will actually be able to get out of Afghanistan.

Was at Kabul airport today for a few hours and saw flights taking off about every 15 minutes… https://t.co/gg9cc80bDm

— Charlotte Bellis (@CharlotteBellis) August 23, 2021

The former Minister of Defence has admitted he “completely forgot” about a report which stated civilian casualties were possible during Operation Burnham.

The Burnham Inquiry, led by Sir Terence Arnold and Sir Geoffrey Palmer, has found a child was killed during the operation in Afghanistan and at least seven men also died – three of whom have been identified as insurgents.

The two-year investigation found New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) officials did not plot to cover-up the casualties from the operation in August 2010, as claimed in the book Hit and Run by investigative journalists Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson.

READ MORE: An inquiry into the Hit and Run book claims essential

It did, however, find the Defence Force never corrected claims made to the public and ministers by its personnel that allegations of civilian casualties were “unfounded”, despite knowing it was possible.

The Burnham Inquiry stated NZDF officials misled former Defence Minister Dr Wayne Mapp for more than a year over the possibility of civilian casualties.

But Dr Mapp continued to tell the public claims of civilian casualties were not true after receiving a briefing which said they were in September 2011, it said.

Dr Mapp told RNZ he likely forgot about the briefing because of the death of New Zealand soldier Leon Smith, which happened about the same time.

‘I had actually forgotten’
“I would never do an official information reply untruthfully, knowingly untruthfully. The reality is I actually had forgotten about the briefing,” Dr Mapp said.

Dr Mapp had a sketchy memory of receiving the briefing from retired SAS commander Colonel Jim Blackwell, he said.

“I should’ve at that time spoken to the Chief of Defence Force and to the Prime Minister’s office and I didn’t do that, so I never allowed the opportunity for a proper consideration of that briefing and so that was a failing on my part,” Dr Mapp said.

Dr Mapp has asked himself how he forgot about such crucial information “a huge amount of times” since, he said.

He would never intentionally issue misleading statements, he added.

Dr Mapp told Checkpoint for years he forgot about the 2011 briefing he received from Colonel Blackwell, and it was only during the circumstances of the 2019 inquiry that it came back to him.

“I should have contacted the Chief of Defence Force General … and I should have contacted the Prime Minister’s Office,” when he remembered, he said.

“That was a major failing on my part.”

He checked his diary
He said when he checked his diary – which he had under his house – he realised he did get a briefing.

“Somehow it surfaced back into my memory that I could remember Colonel Blackwell sitting opposite me.

“None of us can ever remember when we forgot, by definition. I can only surmise it was the death of Corporal Leon Smith which occurred about two weeks after the [September 2011] briefing which somehow had the effect of removing it from my memory. That was a very traumatic thing.

Dr Mapp said it was unsatisfactory and he did fail the Defence Force.

“And I failed in fact my fellow colleagues and I guess ultimately I failed New Zealand, by not taking that briefing up immediately and then allowing a proper process to take place,” he told Checkpoint.

“I let New Zealanders down by not following the proper process and so in that sense I do apologise for that. I like to have thought of myself as someone who actually was across things, and in this instance I clearly failed.

“I’ve always been of the view that New Zealand as a nation owes compensation to the victims. I have always felt that we haven’t done enough as a nation to find out. Well now we have the report, we have more information. And I think is now incumbent upon the government now having got the report to do more for the villagers.”

Co-author Stephenson criticises ‘downplay’
One of the authors of Hit and Run is concerned inexcusable failures of the Defence Force are being downplayed.

Jon Stephenson said he felt vindicated by the findings of the Burnham Inquiry Report, but is worried its severity is not being fully conveyed.

“I’m concerned that they are being downplayed by the Defence Force, not only initially and throughout the inquiry, but even now it seems like the Attorney General is not really prepared to accept the extent to which the inquiry has condemned some of the actions of the Defence Force,” he said.

Stephenson had “serious doubts” about whether the Defence Force could change because of their record and their performance throughout the inquiry, he said.

Ardern promises quick implementation
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said the government would implement the recommended changes in the Burnham Inquiry report as quickly as possible and would proceed with them if re-elected.

“There are significant lessons to be learnt from the inquiry’s findings,” she said.

“There are findings here which we will be making sure we follow up on to give that extra layer of confidence in our Defence Force,” she said.

It was right to investigate the claims made in Hit and Run and the country would have a stronger system as a result, she added.

This article is republished by the Pacific Media Centre under a partnership agreement with RNZ.

The co-authors, Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson, also criticised the prime minister for taking the “next step in the seven-year cover-up” by rejecting an inquiry.

The book has alleged six civilians were killed and 15 injured in a “revenge” raid after the first death of New Zealand soldier in Afghanistan, Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell on August 4, 2010.

“In the past two weeks since Hit & Run was published, there have been calls for an independent inquiry from New Zealanders from all sides on the political spectrum,” said Hager.

“It is disappointing and concerning that Bill English has refused.

“When the book came out, Jon Stephenson and I emphasised that Bill English had no responsibility for the deeds done in 2010 and so was in a good position to offer aid to the Afghan villages and launch a proper inquiry. But he has joined the people trying to hide and dodge over what happened.

“I believe this decision is the result of military pressure on the government: the tail wagging the dog. That is not good for the country.

“Bill English is an experienced minister who knows the difference between being shown selective information by an interested party, as he has been by the Defence Force, and having an independent inquiry.

“This does not appear a rational decision based on evidence; it is helping the military bureaucracy to avoid having to front up. It is the next step in the seven-year cover-up.

“But, most of all, Bill English has just ensured that the issue will continue to boil and fester. It is not going to go away until it is properly addressed.”

After receiving Defence Force chief Lieutenant General Tim Keating’s advice that troops involved in the raids met the “benchmark” of acting according to the rules of engagement, Prime Minister English yesterday watched video footage taken from aircraft involved in the 2010 raids in Afghanistan’s Baghlan province, reports The New Zealand Herald.

The classified video he saw confirmed the “extensive steps, restraint and care” that forces took to minimise the chances of civilian casualties, English said.

English would not go into detail about what the footage showed and said it would not be publicly released.

He did not watch footage of the whole operation but was confident in what he saw.

• SAS soldier backs up Afghan raid claims
• Military chief’s Op Burnham accounts highlights key Afghan legal concerns
• PMC’s Southern Cross on Hit & Run

For the purpose of this analysis, we examine the statements and claims of the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Lieutenant-General Tim Keating, made before journalists during his press conference on Monday, 27 March 2017. We also understand, that the claims put by the general form the basis of a briefing by NZDF’s top ranking officer to the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Bill English.

It appears the official account , if true, underscores a probable breach of legal obligations – not necessarily placing culpability solely on the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) commandos on the ground, but rather on the officers who commanded their actions, ordered their movements, their tasks and priorities prior to, during, and after Operation Burnham.

READ MORE: No inquiry – ‘It is the next step in the seven-year cover-up’

*******

According to the New Zealand Defence Force’s official statement, Operation Burnham “aimed to detain Taliban insurgent leaders who were threatening the security and stability of Bamyan Province and to disrupt their operational network”. (ref. NZDF rebuttal)

We are to understand Operation Burnham’s objective was to identify, capture, or kill (should this be justified under NZDF rules of engagement), those insurgents who were named on a Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) that NZDF intelligence suggested were responsible for the death of NZDF soldier Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell.

When delivering NZDF’s official account of Operation Burnham before media, Lieutenant General Tim Keating said:

“After the attack on the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZPRT), which killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell, the NZPRT operating in Bamyan Province did everything it could to reduce the target profile of our people operating up the Shakera Valley and into the north-east of Bamyan Province.

“We adjusted our routine, reduced movements to an absolute minimum, maximised night driving, and minimised time on site in threat areas.

“The one thing the PRT [NZPRT] couldn’t do was to have an effect on the individuals that attacked Lieutenant O’Donnell’s patrol. For the first time, the insurgents had a major success — and they were well positioned to do so again.”

For the purpose of a counter-strike, intelligence was sought and Lieutenant-General Keating said: “We knew in a matter of days from local and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) intelligence who had attacked our patrol [where and when Lt. O’Donnell was killed].”

The intelligence specified the villages where the alleged insurgents were suspected of coming from and Leutenant-General Keating said: “This group had previously attacked Afghan Security Forces and elements of the German and Hungarian PRTs.”

The New Zealand government authorised permission for the Kabul-based NZSAS troops to be used in Operation Burnham.

“What followed was 14 days of reliable and corroborated intelligence collection that provided confirmation and justification for subsequent actions. Based on the intelligence, deliberate and detailed planning was conducted,” Lieutenant-General Keating said.

Revenge, Keating said, was never a motivation. Rather, according to him, the concern was for the security of New Zealand’s reconstruction and security efforts in Bamyan province.

As stated above, Operation Burnham’s primary objective was to identify, capture or kill Taliban insurgent leaders named in the intelligence data.

We know, from the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, Operation Burnham failed to achieve that goal.

Analysis of the NZDF official account
The official account of events that occurred in the early hours of 22 August 2010, describe how Taliban insurgents, realising coalition forces were preparing to raid the area (marked as “Operation Burnham Area of Operation” in a map (slide 3) declasified and released to media on 27 March 2017), formed a tactical maneuver using civilians (women, children and elderly) as a human shield.

Despite the official account placing this group within a building, within a small hamlet, within the area of operation, within Tirgiran Valley, there is no clear definitive official account yet given of what happened to either the civilians or the insurgents.

This appears to be an obvious void in the official record, but one that has failed so far to be scrutinised.

To follow the logic of Lieutenant-General Tim Keating’s account (detailed below), is to discover our defence personnel, who were in charge of the ground and air operation during Operation Burnham, failed to identify what had become of those civilians (women, children, and the elderly), and also importantly the suspected insurgents who Lt. General Keating said during his briefing used the villagers as a human shield.

We know from the Chief of Defence Force’s notes as provided on 27 March 2017, that as Operation Burnham began, NZDF was in command of United States manned aircraft (including helicopters and possibly a AC-130). The aircraft were swarming above the Tirgiran Valley.

From the NZDF account, an NZDF joint terminal air controller was in charge of the air attack against those NZDF had defined as insurgents.

Lieutenant-General Keating stated the alleged insurgents were armed and a NZDF commander authorised the US manned aircraft to commence firing. Weapons-fire then began to rain down on the valley from above.

Meanwhile, NZSAS ground force soldiers prepared to secure their positions and to defend themselves against any potential enemy counter-attack.

Lieutenant-General Keating stated the insurgents responded: “The insurgents, the guerrilla force, the tactic is mixed in with the civilian population, if you like, the term used is a human shield. So they use civilians as a shield.”

He added: “What occurred, is a helicopter was engaging a group of insurgents outside the village, on the outskirts of the village. During that engagement, it was noted by the ground forces there – the SAS ground forces – that some of the rounds [from the US manned aircraft] were falling short, and went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents.”

To be clear, from this account, Lieutenant-General Keating stated a group of insurgents were being tracked, targeted, and fired upon by the US manned aircraft and under the command of a New Zealand Defence Force terminal air controller.

Meanwhile, according to the NZDF record, one of the airborne helicopter’s weapon’s sights were not calibrated correctly, and, according to Lieutenant-General Keating, 30mm projectiles went into a building where it was believed there were civilians as well as armed insurgents – remember these 30mm projectiles are capable of penetrating the side of a tank.

For accuracy, Lieutenant-General Keating restated his account: “It is noted, the building, there were armed insurgents in there, but it is believed that there may have been civilians in the building.”

He then added: “There’s no confirmation that any casualties occurred, but there may have been.”

He restated again: “There were civilians in that building.”

Now, this is where the Chief of Defence Force’s account fails to further explain what occurred after that point.

To summarise, the official position of the New Zealand Defence Force is:

• There were civilians in a building within the village that was fired upon by an armor piercing aircraft weapon
• That it was believed insurgents were also in that building
• That civilian casualties or deaths “may have been” or occurred inside the building.

At this juncture, we must consider whether the New Zealand Defence Force ground commanders had a responsibility to determine whether there were Taliban insurgents in the building? And if so, whether they were the individuals listed on the JPEL list, those deemed responsible for the death of Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell? And what of the ground commanders’ legal requirements, the duty of care with respect to civilians, were NZDF commanders on the ground or back in Kabul compelled by law to confirm the status of the civilians, whether they were injured or killed?

When asked by a journalist at the 27 March 2017 press conference: “If there may have been civilian casualties, why not have an inquiry to find out?”

Lieutenant-General Keating replied: “Even if there was, as far as the New Zealand Defence Force has heard, the coalition investigation has, um, said that uh, if there were casualties, the fault of those casualties was a mechanical failure of a piece of equipment.”

This reply does not appear to consider the legal requirements under:

• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 7: the obligation to provide medical assistance to all wounded, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 8: the obligation to search for and collect the wounded and to ensure their adequate care
• Second Protocol to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 13: the obligation to protect the civilian population against dangers arising from military operations
• Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, section 102. This section provides that the commanding officer of a person alleged to have committed an offence under that Act must initiate proceedings in the form of a charge or refer the allegation to civil authorities, unless the commanding officer considers the allegation is not well-founded. While little legal guidance is provided, it cannot be accepted that preliminary inquiries to determine whether an allegation is well-founded can be considered adequate where they fail to obtain evidence from the injured parties, determine their identities or even verify that they exist
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 28
• The NZDF Manual of Armed Forces Law provides that there are three types of inquiry in the NZDF: a preliminary inquiry, a court of inquiry and a command investigation. (It appears however the ISAF investigation cited by the Chief of Defence Force was not any of the above forms of inquiry).

Specifically, if you analyse Lieutenant-General Keating’s account, the New Zealand Defence Force commanders failed to identify whether any insurgents were inside the building and whether there were dead or wounded civilians.

Why was this the case? It seems reasonable to suggest, this is an abandonment of logic. It does not make sense.

We know from official NZDF documents the soldiers arrived at the scene of Operation Burnham at 0030 hours on 22 August 2010 and left at 0345 hours, that’s the official record.

To clarify, the NZSAS commandos were in the area of operation for 3 hours 15 minutes. Lieutenant-General Keating stated, near the conclusion of the raid: “The ground force commander chose at that time that there was no longer a threat and they were leaving.”

How could that rationally be the case unless the suspected insurgents inside that building had been checked? Was it not suspected that there were insurgents in that building?

Surely the ground force commanders would be compelled to seek and identify the inhabitants of that building to see if they matched the names/descriptions on the JPEL list? After all, the manhunt for Taliban leadership was the purpose of the raid that night.

Also, logic would suggest, the people inside the building were in part civilians including women and probably children – by Lieutenant-General Keating’s account the group likely included wounded civilians and probably a dead child.

Also, it is reasonable to suggest, considering the events over those 3 hours 15 minutes, the survivors would have been crying, weeping, even howling, and the wounded would likely have been in agony.

It defies belief that the ground force commanders, and their counterparts back in Kabul, were not aware of this building, that the NZDF account states was housing suspected Taliban, and included a group of civilian victims that had been used as a human shield.

The entire area of operation specific to Operation Burnham is a skewed rectangle approximately 500 metres wide by 1 kilometre long, with an intensified operation plan focusing on two small hamlets, each approximately 50×200 metres in area [based on the scale measures of the NZDF map] – named Objective 1 and Objective 2 in the NZDF released material.

To state it simply, the official silence surrounding the above-mentioned building, and the fate of the people inside, speaks volumes. It leaves one to consider at worst whether a crime was committed by New Zealand Defence Force commanders that night – whether by failing in their duty to care for the injured they were in breach of Articles 8, 9 and 13 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

Additional note:

• The Statute of the International Criminal Court defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international character”. (Ref. IHL Definition of war crimes, page 1 (pdf) – ICC Statute, Article 8 (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 44, § 3))
• “The Statute defines as within the scope of the law, the “launching an attack without attempting to aim properly at a military target or in such a manner as to hit civilians without any thought or care as to the likely extent of death or injury amounts to an indiscriminate attack”.
• War crimes can consist of acts or omissions. Examples of the latter include failure to provide a fair trial and failure to provide food or necessary medical care to persons in the power of the adversary.’

At best, if NZDF’s official account is to be relied upon, we are to believe the NZSAS ground commanders failed to ensure the Taliban insurgents they sought were not holed up in a building that had sustained damage from coalition force aircraft. If this assumption is incorrect, at what point had the suspected insurgents left the building? And what had become of the civilians that had been allegedly used as a human shield? Again, the vacuum of information specific to this aspect of the official account needs to be explained, including an explanation as to why NZDF’s account remains vague after six years since Operation Burnham was conducted.

It appears reasonable to assert that this single issue, notwithstanding the irregularities of official NZDF stated “facts”, warrants further official and independent investigation.

As it is, at this juncture, we are left to consider a series of unanswered questions that to date the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force has failed to satisfy. Here are some of them.

Key unanswered questions:

• What were the specific definitions of an insurgent that were used by NZDF for the purposes of evaluation during Operation Burnham and for the purpose of post-operation official analysis? For example; was it deemed that anyone who was male and of a fighting age was defined to be an insurgent?
• Were NZDF soldiers fired upon by individuals (villagers or insurgents) located within the confines of the villages or surrounding area during Operation Burnham?
• Was the individual who was killed by a NZSAS soldier or NZDF personnel carrying a weapon at the time of this shooting? If so, had he fired or attempted to fire his weapon in an attempt to kill or wound NZDF personnel?
• How long in minutes were the coalition forces’ helicopters, and any other airborne craft, firing their weapons on the villages and surrounding region during Operation Burnham?
  How long in minutes were NZSAS soldiers involved in securing the operational area from real or potential insurgent attack?
• Did NZDF personnel at anytime seek to identify individuals (and their status, injured, killed, or otherwise) who were located inside or near the building that Lt. General Keating said had suffered damage from an alleged mis-aimed firing from an airborne coalition aircraft?
• Were those who were injured or killed within sight of NZDF personnel before, during, and/or after the alleged mis-aimed firing?
• How many individuals did the NZDF personnel suspect were inside the building?
• How many of these people did the NZDF personnel suspect were civilians?
• How many were suspected of being women?
• How many were suspected of being children?
• Lieutenant-General Keating suggested that one of the individuals that may have been killed during Operation Burnham was a six year-old child. What was the gender of this child?
• Was their any attempt to identify this six year-old victim?
• Was this child Fatima, the three year-old child identified in the Hit & Run [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] book? If not, then who was this child?
• What actions did NZDF personnel do to exercise their duty of care obligations to the injured and to civilians?
• What reports, cautions, evaluations were written and/or submitted regarding Operation Burnham to NZDF by the NZDF legal officer who was on the ground during Operation Burnham?

The twisting turning official account – is this smoke and mirrors?
As a consequence of the Hit & Run book [ISBN 978 0 947503 39 0] being published, New Zealand Defence Force’s top ranking soldier, Lieutenant-General Tim Keating admitted civilians “may have been” killed during the operation.

Up until 27 March 2017, for the past six years, New Zealand Defence Force has insisted that no civilians were killed during Operation Burnham on 22 August 2010.

But on Monday, under questioning from the media, at the March 27 press conference, Lietenant-General Keating stated that the NZDF’s new “official line” regarding civilian deaths was “there may have been”.

He then attempted to suggest that NZDF’s previously stated position – that claims of civilian deaths were “unfounded” – was basically the same thing.

“I’m not going to get cute here and say it’s a twist on words, it’s the same thing, ‘unfounded’, ‘there may have been’. The official line is that there may have been casualties,” Lieutenant-General Keating said.

A journalist then challenged him further suggesting: “They’re different things, one means they didn’t happen and one mean might’ve done.”

Lieutenant-General Keating then replied: “You’re right…the, the, the official line is that civilian casualties may have occurred, but not corroborated.”

When asked how many insurgents were killed, Lieutenant-General Keating replied: “A significant number of insurgents, identified insurgents, were killed during Operation Burnham.”

When asked again how many were killed, Lt. General Keating stated: “Nine.”

When asked if NZDF had the names of the insurgents that were killed, he replied: “No, we do not have names of insurgents.”

This trajectory, inching toward a truth, occurred under tight questioning by a journalist, over just a few minutes.

What further truths will become relevant to understanding what occurred that night in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages should a commission of inquiry be established?

The inconsistencies – a summary
In evaluation, it is reasonable to assert the official government inconsistencies observed along a six-year timeline offer the appearance of a military hierarchy that has being dragged, by degrees, (mainly by the work of Jon Stephenson, an investigative journalist specialising in war and conflict reportage) into an arena where the floodlight of public interest ought to shed light on secrets long since filed into a dark place.

However, considering the above, rather than responding openly to the challenge of meeting its responsibilities to the New Zealand Minister of Defence and public, the New Zealand Defence Force appears resistant to its obligations toward open and accurate disclosure of non-classified fact.

In conclusion, if this is true, this conduct exhibited by the officials of New Zealand Defence Force and its Chief Lieutenant-General Tim Keating is hardly a defining benchmark of “exemplary” standards.

Actually, the admissions of relevant information, that is forthcoming only when lanced from the New Zealand Defence Force under questioning, offers the impression of a smoke and mirrors operation – it may appear churlish to suggest, but perhaps the post-Operation Burnham aftermath ought to be referred to as Operation Desert Road (bleak, cold, inhospitable, proceed with caution).

The public deserves to know the whole truth, not spin or part-truths – both the public interest and the national interest depends on it.

By the New Zealand Defence Force’s own account, it appears reasonable to suggest that the commanders overseeing Operation Burnham had legal obligations to civilians; that they were potentially negligent when considered against their stated rules of engagement, rules of conduct, obligations to international human rights law and international humanitarian law – negligent of their obligations to laws covering war and armed conflict, notwithstanding their obligations as representatives of the people and government of New Zealand to observe the Bill of Rights Act.

It is also reasonable to suggest; there are significant established facts as mentioned above, as put by the New Zealand Defence Force, that require an official investigative response from the New Zealand government.

It is also reasonable to insist that the matter of an absence of consistent fact emitting from the New Zealand Defence Force upon which a reliable opinion can be draw, adds weight to the burden on the Government to establish an inquiry into this matter.

If the New Zealand Prime Minister Bill English elects not to act then it will likely become a matter of political leadership or lack thereof.

If Bill English does not care to act on his office’s public interest obligations, then, it is reasonable to suggest he consider the empirical facts underlying this matter and the impact the matter has on New Zealand’s national interest. Should he fail to do so, this matter potentially could be argued before the International Criminal Court.

*****

Background relevancies
Were NZDF officials and Hit & Run authors describing the same raid? Let’s compare.

“It seems to me,” Lieutenant-General Tim Keating stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.” – Lieutenant General Tim Keating, 27 March 2017.

On Monday, 27 March 2017 both the Prime Minister Bill English and the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force Lieutenant-General Tim Keating countered details revealed in the book Hit & Run and argued facts stated in the work could not be relied upon because the authors “incorrectly” alleged Operation Burnham took place in Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village deep in the mountainous Baghlan province of Afghanistan – two locations the Defence Force chief insisted his soldiers had never been to.

Lieutenant-General Keating asserted that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to the two villages (Khak Khuday Dad and Naik) and insisted Operation Burnham took place 2.2 kilometres to the south of where the authors Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson had marked the location of the villages (specifically on a map published in the book Hit & Run).

Lieutenant-General Keating said: “As you will note from the book, the authors have been precise in locating these villages with geo reference points — so I have no doubt they are very accurate in the villages they are taking their allegations from.

“The villages lie in the Tirgiran Valley some 2 kilometres north from Tirgiran Village. In straight distance this is like comparing the distance from Te Papa to Wellington Hospital. However, if you overlay the elevated terrain, you will see we are talking about two very separated, distinct settlements,” Lieutenant-General Keating said.

Beyond the obvious, it was a staggering claim, especially for those aware the New Zealand Defence Force had insisted one week prior, that its official position remained the same as stated in a media release dated 20 April 2011 that: “On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan, conducted an operation against an insurgent group.”

NZDF’s earlier position asserted New Zealand soldiers had not been in Baghlan province on or near 22 August 2010 the night of Operation Burnham. Now, the chief of New Zealand’s armed forces was admitting that they had.

At the press conference on Monday, 27 March 2017, the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force prepared to stake his claim that the book could not be relied on as a factual reference.

Before around 30 journalists, Lieutenant-General Tim Keating pointed to four relevant bullet-points underlying key claims of fact in the book:

• Helicopter landing sites
• Location of houses that were destroyed
• Locations of where civilians were allegedly killed
• Presumed location of an SAS sniper with evidence presented of SAS ammunition and water bottles which were found at the site.

A relationship was drawn between the sniper location and the alleged killing of the individual Islamuddin, the school teacher.

He acknowledged that the book contained a detailed list of those alleged to have been killed or wounded during a military operation in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages and a detailed list of the houses destroyed at the two locations.

Lieutenant-General Keating then drove his point home that: “The underlying premise of the book is that New Zealand’s SAS soldiers conducted an operation on Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village…”

“It seems to me,” he stressed, “that one of the fundamentals, a start point if you like, of any investigation into a crime is to tie the alleged perpetrators of a crime to the scene. Then we would examine the motive and means, and other scene evidence.”

Lieutenant-General Keating pivoted. “Let me now talk about the ISAF Operation Burnham in Tirgiran Village.”

The premise of the Chief of Defence Force’s position was; the book Hit & Run described events that may or may not have occurred in Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages, but that these alleged events had nothing to do with New Zealand Defence Force soldiers as they had never been to the two locations as marked in the book.

Likewise, the Prime Minister, Bill English, said the book got it wrong, that the New Zealand Defence Force had never been to either Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village.

The Prime Minister added: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

For some, it appeared the raid that night as described by the authors could have been committed by another force. For others, it seemed the authors had got a major fact wrong so therefore the remaining claims in the book were moot.

By mid-Wednesday morning, the government and the public found out there was more to it, that the Chief of New Zealand Defence Force was also wrong with regard to his geography.

Unpicking the official line began in earnest late on Tuesday night (28 March 2017) when the lawyers representing the alleged victims of Operation Burnham contacted their clients back in Afghanistan. The purpose of the contact was to identify the exact location of Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village; to confirm or otherwise disprove the existence of “Tirgiran Village” (the NZDF stated official location of Operation Burnham), and to identify and confirm what village or villages are located at the exact co-ordinates as provided by Lieutenant-General Tim Keating in his briefing to New Zealand media.

The lawyers’ clients, represented by a doctor from the region, stated categorically that “Tirgiran Village” (as stated by Lieutenant-General Keating) does not exist. That the region is known as Tirgiran Valley.

The lawyers evaluated from the new information, that to refer to the location of Operation Burnham as Tirgiran Village is like insisting an operation had occurred in Otago City (obviously Otago is a region and a city of that name does not exist, and as such would fail to offer an exact point of reference on a map).

Importantly, the lawyers confirmed, New Zealand Defence Force co-ordinates of where Operation Burnham took place were correct – but that the location was not as the NZDF had stated as “Tirgiran Village” (an incorrect reference to a village that does not exist) but rather marks the geo-locations of where Khak Khuday Dad Village and Naik Village are located.

Specifically, the villagers confirmed the red-rectangle as marked on the NZDF map provided by the Lt. General on Monday, March 27, and referred to as the area specific to Operation Burnham, frames the exact positions of where Khak Khuday Dad and Naik villages are located.

So simply, the book contained a map that placed Khak Khuday Dad and Naik 2.2 kilometres north of their specific real locations. And, the NZDF got it wrong by stating that those two villages were located where the book suggested, and that the village at the centre of Operation Burnham was a different village called Tirgiran Village (again, a place-name that does not exist).

So it turns out, according to those that live in the Tirgiran Valley, the Chief of Defence Force’s statement is incorrect or false; that when NZDF stated as a categorical fact that the New Zealand SAS commandos had never been to Khak Khuday Dad Village nor Naik Village, that that information was false.

At this point politically, it is inescapable that the Prime Minister’s stated position ought to have taken a hit.

Remember back to the Prime Minister’s statement to media on Monday, March 27, 2017 where he pitched his rationale: “We believe in the integrity of the Defence Force more than a book that picks the wrong villages.”

Surely, the same measure that was applied to the authors of Hit & Run now ought to be applied in equal measure to the New Zealand Defence Force chief and his officials. After all, they also got their geography wrong.

Since then, there has been stated unease about the whole issue by Internal Affairs Minister Peter Dunne (the minister who would have to sign off and authorise the costs of an inquiry should the Prime Minister order an inquiry be established). By Thursday, 30 March 201,7 Dunne, through media, called for an inquiry into the whole affair. (ref. Stuff.co.nz )

Also on Thursday, the Minister of Defence at the time of the raid, Dr Wayne Mapp, wrote of his unease about Operation Burnham in a piece published on the Pundit website. (ref. Pundit )

Dr Mapp argued that the government’s position, and that of the New Zealand Defence Force, cannot be the end of it.

“Part of protecting their [the SAS’] reputation is also finding out what happened, particularly if there is an allegation that civilian casualties may have been accidentally caused. In that way we both honour the soldiers, and also demonstrate to the Afghans that we hold ourselves to the highest ideals of respect of life, even in circumstances of military conflict,” wrote Dr Mapp.

Common statements of fact
The descriptions of Operation Burnham, in both the book, and, as stated by the New Zealand Defence Force, do mirror each account with precision on numerous vital points, including:

• The time of night Operation Burnham took place
• That New Zealand Defence Force was commanding and leading the operation (both on the ground and in the air)
• That the helicopters were manned by United States military personnel under New Zealand’s command
• That the purpose of the operation was to kill or capture those named as having been part of a Taliban insurgent raid that killed Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell
• That buildings were destroyed during the operation
• That people were killed at the villages.

However, anyone who has reasonably assessed the issue can see there is much more information to be revealed.

Conclusion
In concluding this analysis, it is an imperative that due to the highest levels of public and national interest concerning the alleged conduct, the seriousness of allegations, and the variables relating to the official account, that the matter be subjected to an independent commission of inquiry.

Selwyn Manning is editor of EveningReport.nz. This analysis was first published on Kiwipolitico.com and on Evening Report and is republished on the sister website Asia Pacific Report with the permission of the author.

• No basis for probe into Hager book allegations, says English
• No inquiry – ‘It is the next step in the seven-year cover-up’
  

The Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant-General Tim Keating presented the NZ Defence Force response to the book Hit & Run at a press conference on Monday, 27 March 2017. For 45 minutes he and his colleagues suggested that everything in the book was incorrect.

The Hit and Run authors have now had time to study the defence chief’s statements. Our conclusion is that the NZDF criticisms are wrong – with one exception – and that they have failed to address almost everything of substance in the book.

This is what a cover up looks like.

READ MORE: Villagers say both NZDF and authors wrong on village names – but confirm civilian deaths

1. The raid described in the book “is not an operation NZSAS conducted”: INCORRECT

The information presented in Keating’s press conference leaves no doubt that the book and the defence chief are talking about the same raid. Keating gave the name of the raid (Operation Burnham), the times and date (12.30-3.45am on 22 August 2010), the location in the Tirgiran Valley, and said the SAS arrived in two Chinook helicopters, used SAS snipers, found a quantity of ammunition in one building and had one SAS trooper injured by falling debris.

All of these are details of the SAS raid publicised first in chapter 3 of the book. There were not two different raids with the same operation name at the same time in the same valley. It is obviously the same raid.

An NZDF power point presentation shown in the press conference showed three main SAS objectives in the valley called A1, A2 and A3. The book had already identified the SAS’s main targets as being the house and guest house of an insurgent named Abdullah Kalta and the house of an insurgent named Naimatullah, neither of whom were present during the raid.

The NZDF objectives A1 and A2 are the buildings belonging to Abdullah Kalta seen in a photo on p. 60 of the book and NZDF objective A3 is the house of Nematullah shown on pp. 39 and 60 of the book.

2. The SAS raid was in a different village with a different name: INCORRECT

The defence force claimed that the SAS raid occurred in a village called Tirgiran, not the villages of Naik and Khak Khuday Dad named in the book. This is not true. The locals know the names of their own villages and they are called Naik and Khak Khuday Dad. The raid occurred there.

3. The SAS raid was about two kilometres from the position we gave in the book: CORRECT, BUT DOES NOT CHANGE THE STORY IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY

After the NZDF press conference, Nicky Hager said that the authors stood by the whole story and that at most the NZDF denials might mean that the events in the book occurred two kilometres from where we thought they were, ie. a slightly different location in the isolated mountain valley.

We have checked the NZDF maps shown at the press conference and it appears the location of the raid and the villages is indeed slightly different to what our local sources told us. But the villages at that location are definitely called Naik and Khak Khuday Dad, and all the rest of the story in the book is unchanged.

Likewise the photos in the book of the villages attacked in the raid are correct, as are the photos of the victims and destroyed houses.

The Defence Force leapt on this and tried to sow doubt about the rest of the book. Keating said the “central premise” of the book was incorrect; that there were “major inaccuracies – the main one being the location”.

But the location is a minor detail, difficult to establish in mountains with no roads or detailed maps (there are no known maps of the valley that include the locations and names of the villages along it).

Contrary to what Keating said, the central premise of the book is that the actions of the SAS and its allies in the villages of Naik and Khak Khuday Dad led to civilian deaths and injuries, destruction of houses, neglect of wounded people and then a cover up – and none of that has changed.

4. The NZDF has now replied to the allegations in the book: INCORRECT

The defence force has not replied to most allegations in the book. Most strikingly, Keating’s presentation did not address the deaths and injuries suffered by children, mothers and elderly people who were obviously not insurgents – which are the most important allegations in the book.

The allegations that the defence force has avoided or answered inadequately to date are:

• SAS-controlled attack helicopters fired at civilians in Khak Khuday Dad village with many casualties, including the three-year-old child Fatima;
• SAS snipers appear to have shot at least one civilian, a recently graduated school teacher home on holiday;
• SAS-controlled attack helicopters pursued two farmers who opposed the Taliban along the valley and killed them;
• Twelve houses were destroyed despite there being no military necessity to do so;
• No assistance was given to the wounded at the time, including in houses that Defence now says it knew might have contained civilians;
• Nor did the SAS go back to render assistance later, despite knowing that civilians were likely to have been injured;
• The SAS returned for a second raid on the village Naik and blew up a house or houses;
• A bound and blindfolded prisoner was beaten by an SAS trooper while his colleagues looked on and did nothing;
• The prisoner was then handed over to the Afghan secret police who were known to have a notorious reputation for torturing prisoners;
• That prisoner was then tortured by the Afghan secret police and when the defence force learned about this it kept it secret;
• The SAS arranged the extra-judicial killing of some other insurgent suspects; and
• The NZDF repeatedly denied and covered up what the SAS have done, and continue to do so to this day.

5. An ISAF investigation has already occurred, there is no need for another inquiry: A WEAK SELF-SERVING ARGUMENT

First it is important to explain about the investigation done in August 2010 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition headquarters, which was cited repeatedly during the NZDF press conference. In 2010 the subject of civilian deaths was very sensitive in Afghanistan and so ISAF was attempting to investigate all suspected cases of civilians being killed by ISAF forces. But these “assessments” were very far from being full or independent.

The ISAF investigation into the 22 August 2010 raid was completed in less than a week and did not involve anyone going to the area or talking to the affected villagers. It included a review of attack helicopter weapons system video and concluded that several “errant rounds”, caused by a gun sight malfunction, “may have resulted in civilian casualties”.

However reports from SAS members and local people interviewed for the book describe multiple heavy attacks that wounded and killed civilians in different locations. Thus the hastily-conducted ISAF review appears far from being adequate. It is silent on most of the allegations in the book.

There is no need for New Zealand to rely on the brief and inadequate ISAF review. Most of the information needed to confirm whether or not the allegations in the book are correct is located here in New Zealand, in the SAS files. The best option is an independent inquiry where this information can be gathered and assessed.

6. Keating said the insurgents may have used civilians as human shields; aircraft video showed insurgents were killed; the conduct of the New Zealand ground forces was “exemplary”; and so on: UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS AND SELECTIVE INFORMATION

Much of Keating’s presentation was unsubstantiated assertions. This does not help the public find the truth since the defence force has an obvious interest in avoiding bad news about itself. He also said that the book claimed the SAS “deliberately killed civilians”, which we did not say. If we are correct that bad things are being covered up, we cannot expect the people at the heart of the cover up to provide impartial information.

Once again, this means that the only acceptable option is a full and independent inquiry.

7. Lieutenant General Tim Keating told the press conference: “The ground force commander was an NZSAS Officer who controlled both the ground activities and provided clearance, after the appropriate criteria had been met, for any involvement of the aircraft. These elements were co-ordinated by an air controller in his location.” CORRECT AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION

This statement contradicts earlier statements by the government (in 2014) where ministers suggested that if there had been any civilian deaths they were the responsibility of the US pilots, not the New Zealand SAS. It confirms what we said in the book: that the SAS commanders in charge of the raid have responsibility for deaths and injuries caused by the US attack helicopters, which they controlled and had requested to be part of the raid.

8. Finally, Keating told the press that there were legal complications for having an inquiry: INCORRECT

This is not correct. We are not proposing an inquiry by the Defence Force about itself. The government has the power to launch a full and independent inquiry at any time. We believe the NZDF is trying to avoid a full and independent inquiry precisely because some officers are scared of what it will show. But the issue will continue to fester, as it has for years, until that happens.

This article was first published in The Daily Blog.

• ‘Put up or shut up,’ Defence Force chief told
• Hit & Run review – a painstaking and dangerous book challenge
• Did NZ commit war crimes?
• Authors call for full inquiry into SAS claim
• SAS soldier backs up Afghan raid claim

New Zealand’s largest and most influential newspaper today also published an editorial and a commentary by one of its leading columnists, Toby Manhire, calling for a full public inquiry.

According to the front-page report by investigative journalist David Fisher, the soldier told the Herald the two people found shot dead were killed by NZSAS sharpshooters who believed they were acting under “Rules of Engagement” governing their actions on the battlefield.

“They have taken out two,” the soldier told Fisher.

READ FULL STORY AT NZ HERALD ONLINE

The soldier said the other four people killed died in a barrage of fire from United States aircraft called in by a New Zealander operating as the joint terminal air controller – the person responsible for directing air support, the Herald reports.

According to the unnamed soldier, it emerged no combatants were identified on the battlefield, Fisher reports.

The controversy over the NZSAS and civilian casualties has been sparked by this week’s release of a book, Hit & Run, written by author Nicky Hager and war correspondent Jon Stephenson.

WATCH A RADIO NZ VIDEO OF THE HIT & RUN BOOK LAUNCH

‘Revenge’ raid claimed
The book alleged six civilians were killed and 15 injured in a “revenge” raid after the death of New Zealand soldier Lieutenant Tim O’Donnell on August 4, 2010.

The soldier told the Herald a number of those involved in the raid had received medals for their roles, “which sat uncomfortably when the civilian casualties emerged”.

Nicky Hager told the Herald last night the new details were “very timely” as the Defence Force and government continued to make denials.

“Another person has come forward and not only confirmed what we have said but has taken it further,” he said.

The Herald cited a NZDF spokeswoman saying its position of not commenting on the book’s allegations would not change.

Headlined “Now is our chance to do the right thing”, the Herald editorial said the story of the so-called War in Terror had been “riddled with controversy and failure”.

‘False reasoning’
“From the moment two passenger planes were flown into the Twin Towers in New York, the West has been challenged over its ability to meet an ill-defined enemy with conventional militaries in asymmetric warfare.

“From the false reasoning behind the war in Iraq to the horrors of Abu Ghraib prison, there have been events that have undermined the moral claim Western democracies have held to as their purpose for a conflict that has consumed a generation.

“Now, we have our own suggestions of a scandal in a new book, Hit & Run, from journalists Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson. We have been told that the estimated 25,000 civilians killed in Afghanistan now include six people whose deaths fall at our feet. Those six people include a 3-year-old [a girl, Fatima].”

The Herald said the country now faced a choice: “The second part of the story is what we do next. Our allies have not always acquitted themselves well in this regard.”

With the scandal now embroiling the commanders and the politicians who sent the soldiers to Afghanistan, it was time for an “introspective study”.

“Inquiries are a health check on our democracy and the War on Terror has infected some of the principles which underpin the democracies of allied nations.

“Historically, we have prided ourselves on doing better. Now is our chance.”

Author and columnist Toby Manhire wrote in the Herald that the book’s damning claims demanded an inquiry.

“For their sake, for the sake of the NZ Defence Force, whether to censure or vindicate, for the sake of the government, for the sake of respecting international law, for the sake of the dead, and in the public interest, that investigation needs to happen.”

• ‘They have taken out two’ — SAS soldier tells New Zealand Herald of raid
• Urgent, overwhelming case for inquiry
• Editorial: Now is our chance to do the right thing
• NZSAS killed civilians in raid, Nicky Hager’s new book claims
• Authors of new book call for full inquiry into SAS ‘betrayal’ claim + video

Author and investigative journalist Nicky Hager and war correspondent Jon Stephenson have teamed up, in a book released last night, to tell the story of a dark and guilty secret of New Zealand’s recent history.

The book is about what the New Zealand military – and especially the Special Air Service (SAS) – did in Afghanistan in response to the first New Zealander dying in combat in August 2010.

The book, called Hit&Run, was released at a book launch at Unity Books in Wellington.

It was written by Nicky Hager following a long collaboration with Jon Stephenson, who brought the majority of sources to the project. For more than two years, they gradually gathered and pieced together the evidence.

The book describes a series of operations which proved to be ill-conceived, tragic and disastrous. These included an SAS attack on two isolated villages in Afghanistan’s Baghlan province where they mistakenly believed they would find the insurgents who had attacked a New Zealand patrol 19 days earlier in neighbouring Bamiyan. SAS officers commanded and led the attack, supported by US and Afghan forces.

The insurgent group was not there. Instead, at least 21 civilians were killed and injured – many of them women and children – and the SAS and US forces burned and blew up about a dozen houses. The SAS also failed to help the wounded. The Defence Force and government then tried to keep the whole thing secret.

They have never admitted nor taken responsibility for what they did.

Second raid
In a second raid on one of the villages about 10 days later, the SAS destroyed more property. When they eventually caught one of the targeted insurgents in Kabul he was beaten before being handed to the Afghan secret police and tortured.

Fragments of the story have reached the public before but the vast majority has remained secret until now. It is much worse than anyone knew. As former Chief Human Rights Commissioner Margaret Bedggood says, there needs to be a full, principled and independent inquiry into the actions described in this book, which, if confirmed, would seriously breach international law.

Hit&Run is based on numerous and extensive interviews with people involved in these events, including New Zealand and Afghan military personnel as well as residents of the villages. All wanted this story told to recognise the dead and the injured.

“This story also needs to be told to ensure our military is held to account for its actions,” says Hager.

“Whether or not the public agreed with New Zealand sending troops to the US-led war in Afghanistan, there is no doubt that what the SAS did was wrong and betrayed the defence force’s core values of courage, commitment and integrity.”

Respected New Zealand Herald journalist Phil Taylor’s reportage last week has again raised concerns about poor transparency of the New Zealand government.

I also spoke on the issues raised in Phil Taylor’s report, on Radio New Zealand’s The Panel with Jim Mora.

Phil Taylor’s latest report (in what is shaping up to be a series) is titled ‘Witness said no to video link‘. It is about the New Zealand Defence Force and its attempt to avoid paying damages to a journalist, Jon Stephenson, who claimed it defamed him after his Metro magazine expose titled Eyes Wide Shut was published.

The Herald began digging into this issue after the National-led government was forced by the court to pay Jon Stephenson an undisclosed sum. The settlement came with conditions where both parties were not to discuss the proportioned values of that settlement.

It is important to point out, those conditions do not prevent the government from facing up to its public interest responsibilities, to enquire and speak out on what went on up in Afghanistan and why it attempted to shut this issue down through shoot-the-messenger tactics.

Phil Taylor’s reportage shows the stonewalling continues and details how:

When Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee was asked by Phil Taylor:

Would there be an inquiry into whether or not the commander committed perjury, and whether the Defence Force was gamed?

Gerry Brownlee answered “no”.

Frankly, such a response fails to serve the public interest, and leaves one wondering: what has the government got to hide.

This is serious stuff.

The public deserves to know:

This sordid affair underscores how, under recent governments, how difficult it is to advance or compel our elected representatives to initiate a thorough formal inquiry on any matter that may be contrary to their political interests.

Considering how this government’s politicians appear determined to keep the facts hidden, in my view, it is now reasonable to question their motives.

This opinion article by Selwyn Manning was published as Evening Report’s editorial on 4 March 2016 and is republished by Asia Pacific Report with permission.

Defence debacle: Afghan witness still in New Zealand